Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Securitization: The Transformation of Illiquid Financial Assets into Liquid Capital Market Securities Examples from the European Market

Since the benefits a firm can derive from securitization are universal, the discussion of a market bounded by national borders is somewhat artificial unless the focus is on constraints particular to the country which promote or inhibit the use of securitization. With the exception of the United Kingdom, regulatory constraints have been an important factor in slowing the development of a European market for asset and mortgage backed securities. In addition to the regulatory hurdles, securitization in Europe has been inhibited by segmented corporate bond markets and the relatively slow development of money market savings vehicles for households. Liquidity across credit spectrums has been enhanced since the introduction of the Euro, as has been the competition for savings. European companies are developing the ability to securitize even if the technique is not yet being widely exploited. What is the European market for mortgage and asset backed securities? Does it include the U.S. credit card banks, Citicorp, Chase, MBNA, and First USA that have refinanced U.S. credit card receivables in European currencies and in Euro? Does it include GMAC which has structured Swiss Franc and Euro ABS backed by its U.S. dealer floor plan loans? Does it include Japanese banks that have refinanced Yen denominated leases with Euro and Swiss Franc ABS? Does it include Barclays' issue of $1 billion of ABS backed by sterling credit card receivables? Of course the answer is yes. Markets are defined by both the supply and demand sides. Our analysis focuses on the supply side of the domestic European market.     

From Wall Street to Main Street: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Consumer Credit Supply

How did the collapse of the asset‐backed securities (ABS) market during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis affect the supply of credit to the broader economy? Using new data on the U.S. credit union industry, we find that ABS‐related losses are associated with a large contraction in the supply of credit to consumers, especially among those credit unions that began the crisis with weaker capitalization. We also find that this credit supply shock restricted the availability of mortgage and automobile credit. These results show how movements in the prices of financial assets can affect the real economy.     

The rise of China's securitization market

We study the development of asset securitization markets in China. We manually collect all asset securitization projects and securities data from 2005 to 2015. Inspection of this sample combined with related policy changes reveals distinct characteristics and some potential problems. At the macro level, asset securitization market in China is policy driven, regulation‐segmented, and highly illiquid. At the micro level, the underlying assets are mainly corporate loans or assets, rather than mortgage or consumption loans as in the US and European markets. State owned commercial banks and enterprises enjoy significantly lower interest rates when issuing securitization bonds. Finally, risk‐isolation and credit enhancing techniques significantly improve the rating of asset‐backed securities.     

Global Public‐Private Investment Partnerships: A Financing Innovation with Positive Social Impact

Global bond markets, along with banks and governments, are the main source of funding for investment in environmentally friendly infrastructure and the transition to clean energy. Although such bonds are a relatively recent innovation, the green bond market has grown rapidly from its start in 2008 to around $800 billion in outstanding issues. The problem, however, is that green bonds, which represent less than 1% of global bond markets, have been issued disproportionately by government‐sponsored entities, corporations, and municipalities in developed markets. In the emerging market countries where the infrastructure investments are most needed, they barely exist. The authors describe a new investment vehicle, called the AP EGO fund, whose mission and MO are to channel the vast global pools of institutional savings that are now invested in low or (even negative) yield fixed‐income assets—as much as $17 trillion in 2019—to higher‐return emerging markets green investments, in particular sustainable infrastructure, by creating a new asset class: emerging‐market green bonds issued by banks. The AP EGO fund is premised on and involves a reworking of the public‐private partnership (PPP) into a form they call the global public‐private investment partnership (or GPPIP). Unlike the PPP, which combines a public agency with a private operator, the GPPIP has four instead of just two partners. In addition to the standard public agency and the private concession operator, there is a development bank—in this case the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is the financial markets affiliate of the World Bank—and private investors that include emerging‐market banks as well as global institutional investors. Along with the mediating role played by a public agency like the IFC, the AP EGO Fund is fundamentally different from other PPPs in that it takes the form of a special purpose securitization vehicle whose shares are backed by a pool of green bonds issued by emerging market banks in multiple emerging market countries. And besides its application to a new asset class, the fund also breaks new ground by applying a securitization technique with a fund structure designed with an embedded “first‐loss” protection to a global pool of green bonds originated in emerging market economies. By means of this structuring, the green‐bond‐backed fund shares issued by the AP EGO are now providing developed market institutional investors with somewhat higher‐yielding fixed income securities that nevertheless carry an investment‐grade rating.     

The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).     

Looking Beyond Credit Ratings: Factors Investors Consider In Pricing European Asset‐Backed Securities

In this paper, we empirically investigate what credit factors investors rely upon when pricing the spread at issue for European asset‐backed securities. More specifically, we investigate how credit factors affect new issuance spreads after taking into account credit rating. We do so by investigating primary market spreads for tranches of non‐mortgage‐related asset‐backed securities issued from 1999 to the year prior to the subprime mortgage crisis, 2007. We find that although credit ratings play a major role in determining spreads, investors appear to not rely exclusively on these ratings. Our findings strongly suggest that investors do not ignore other credit factors beyond the assigned credit rating.     

Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE‐backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested (“dry powder”), could increase the resilience of PE‐backed companies. In their study of PE‐backed buyouts in the U.K.—which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S.—the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE‐backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non‐PE firms. Moreover, such PE‐backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE‐backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.     

The Impact of the 2007 Liquidity Shock on Bank Jumbo Mortgage Lending

This paper explores the consequences of the collapse of the private‐label residential mortgage‐backed securities market in 2007 on banks’ originations of jumbo mortgages. We show that jumbo lending declined by more at banks that were more dependent on this market and were less well capitalized. In contrast, banks that had little dependence on this market and were well capitalized increased jumbo originations. These findings highlight how dependence on the secondary market may cause amplification of financial shocks, and the potential value of capital requirements that are higher during periods of economic growth in mitigating the amplification effects.     

Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress,Incentive Distortions,and Gains Trading

Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.     

Tainted portfolios: How impairment accounting rules restrict security sales

Contrary to claims that fair value accounting exacerbated banks’ securities sales during the recent financial crisis, we present evidence that suggests – if anything – that the current impairment accounting rules served as a deterrent to selling. Specifically, because banks must provide evidence of their ‘intent and ability’ to hold securities with unrealized losses, there are strong incentives to reduce, rather than increase, security sales when market values decline to avoid ‘tainting’ their remaining securities portfolio. Validating this concern, we find that banks incur greater other‐than‐temporary impairment (OTTI) charges when they sell more securities. We then find that banks sell fewer securities when their security portfolios have larger unrealized losses (and thus larger potential impairment charges), and these results are concentrated in banks with homogenous securities portfolios, expert auditors, more experienced managers, and greater regulatory capital slack. Overall, our results suggest that – contrary to critics’ claims – the accounting rules appear to have reduced banks’ propensity to sell their securities during the financial crisis.     

Systemic Bank Risk in Brazil: A Comprehensive Simulation of Correlated Market, Credit, Sovereign and Inter-Bank Risks

In this study we present a comprehensive forward‐looking portfolio simulation methodology for assessing the correlated impacts of market risk, private sector and Sovereign credit risk, and inter‐bank default risk. In order to produce better integrated risk assessment for banks and systemic risk assessments for financial systems, we argue that reasonably detailed modeling of bank asset and liability structures, loan portfolio credit quality, and loan concentrations by sector, region and type, as well as a number of financial and economic environment risk drivers, is required. Sovereign and inter‐bank default risks are increasingly important in the current economic environment and their inclusion is an important model extension. This extended model is demonstrated through an application to both individual Brazilian banks (i.e., 28 of the largest banks) and groups of banks (i.e., the Brazilian banking system) as of December 2004. When omitting Sovereign risk, our analysis indicates that none of the banks face significant default risk over a 1‐year horizon. This low default risk stems primarily from the large amount of government securities held by Brazilian banks, but also reflects the banks' adequate capitalizations and extraordinarily high interest rate spreads. We note that none of the banks which we modeled failed during the very stressful 2007‐2008 period, consistent with our results. Our results also show that a commonly used approach of aggregating all banks into one single bank, for purposes of undertaking a systemic banking system risk assessment, results in a misestimate of both the probability and the cost of systemic banking system failures. Once Sovereign risk is considered and losses in the market value of government securities reach 10% (or higher), we find that several banks could fail during the same time period. These results demonstrate the well known risk of concentrated lending to a borrower, or type of borrower, which has a non‐zero probability of default (e.g., the Government of Brazil). Our analysis also indicates that, in the event of a Sovereign default, the Government of Brazil would face constrained debt management alternatives. To the best of our knowledge no one else has put forward a systematic methodology for assessing bank asset, liability, loan portfolio structure and correlated market and credit (private sector, Sovereign, and inter‐bank) default risk for banks and banking systems. We conclude that such forward‐looking risk assessment methodologies for assessing multiple correlated risks, combined with the targeted collection of specific types of data on bank portfolios, have the potential to better quantify overall bank and banking system risk levels, which can assist bank management, bank regulators, Sovereigns, rating agencies, and investors to make better informed and proactive risk management and investment decisions.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

Is small beautiful? The resilience of small banks during the European debt crisis

We examine the lending behaviour of small and large banks in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. Relative to large banks, small banks are less pro-cyclical in that they exhibit more stable lending growth across credit expansion and contraction periods. In peripheral countries, the portfolio rebalancing of small banks towards higher public debt (substitution effect) does not appear to cause a reduction of their lending to the private sector. Instead, the level of public debt seems to provide a liquidity buffer that influences bank-specific loan growth positively (complementarity effect), particularly during market-wide lending contractions. Our findings show that for small peripheral banks the substitution effect found in the literature can coexist with a complementarity effect when public debt grows faster than private loans. Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the regulatory treatment of public debt in banks and supports incentives embedded in new banking regulation that penalise bank size.     

Dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities

We assess dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities by comparing dealer participation in the Federal Reserve's securities loan auctions with prices in the private market. Dealer behavior is generally consistent with the law of one price and apparent violations can largely be explained by institutional differences between the private market and the Fed's program. However, for auctions that are effectively noncompetitive, dealers regularly pass up true arbitrage opportunities and frequently overpay to borrow securities. Dealers apparently do not realize that certain auctions are noncompetitive, even though the information needed to discern this fact is publicly available in advance.     

Information Asymmetry and Voluntary SFAS 157 Fair Value Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies During the 2007 Financial Crisis

We hand‐collect SFAS 157 voluntary fair value disclosures of 18 bank holding companies. The SEC's Division of Corporate Finance likely targeted these entities in 2008 through their “Dear CFO” letters in which they requested specific, additional disclosure items. We collect disclosures that match the SEC recommendations and create eight common factor disclosure variables to examine the effect of such disclosures on information asymmetry. We find that disclosure variables about the use of broker quotes or prices from pricing services and the use of market indices and illiquidity adjustments are related to lower information asymmetry. However, disclosure variables about valuation techniques and asset‐backed securities are related to greater information asymmetry. We also document that disclosure complexity, and disclosure tone (uncertainty and litigious) is related to greater information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with criticism that corporate disclosures are voluminous; management may obfuscate unfavorable information which in turn increases market participants’ assessment of uncertainty associated with the fair value measures. We caveat that the setting of the financial crisis and a small sample size may limit the ability to generalize these inferences to other time periods or other financial firms.     

Who drives whom ‐ sukuk or bond? A new evidence from granger causality and wavelet approach

Sukuk is a highly appealing alternative instrument of conventional bond in the financial market over the last two decades. To a certain extent, the market players assume sukuk as the same as bond. However, sukuk has its own fundamental asset backed principles, whereas bond is backed by debt. The objective of the study is to examine the Granger‐causality and lead–lag relationship between sukuk and bond by using the data of the Malaysian Government securities return for both conventional and Islamic instruments. The data for every working day of 7 years covering the period from January 31, 2007 to December 31, 2013 were collected from Bloomberg database. The yield returns of both securities have been plotted for each six months of a year. This study applied both Granger‐causality and dynamic co‐movement techniques such as, continuous wavelet transforms (CWT) coherence for analyzing the temporal evolution of the frequency content of both securities by decomposing each period into different time scales. The empirical findings of the paper reveal that with a bit of exception, there is a causal relationship between sukuk securities and conventional bonds for a given period of time. For robustness, this study applied the wavelet coherence approach and found that bond is led by sukuk in the long term investment horizon rather than in the short term. Our findings relating to the lead‐lag relationship between sukuk and bonds have important implications in terms of policy regulations and investment management. Future research and market practices could reinvestigate the differences between these two securities across different markets and types.     

Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis

We test whether income from nontraditional banking activities contributed to the failures of hundreds of U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis. Estimates from a multi-period logit model indicate that the probability of distressed bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, investment banking and asset securitization. Banks that engaged in risky nontraditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis.     

Modeling of CPDOs – Identifying optimal and implied leverage

When the subprime crisis started to emerge, collateralized products based on credit default swap (CDS) exposures combined with security features seemed to be a more rational alternative to classic asset backed securities. Constant Proportion Collateralized Debt Obligations (CPDOs) are a mixture of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and CPPIs with inverse mechanism. This new asset aims at meeting the investors’ demand for credit derivatives with security enhancements, but to our knowledge quantitative approaches for pricing other than simulation algorithms do not exist yet. CPDOs became famous notably by Standard & Poor’s rating model error which illustrated that closed-form analytical pricing is necessary in order to evaluate and understand complex derivatives. This article aims to shed a light on CPDOs’ specific structural enhancements and mechanisms. We quantify inherent risks and provide a dynamic closed-form pricing formula.     

Security Design with Investor Private Information

I study the security design problem of a firm when investors rather than managers have private information about the firm. I find that it is often optimal to issue information‐sensitive securities such as equity. The “folklore proposition of debt” from traditional signaling models only goes through if the firm can vary the face value of debt with investor demand. When the firm has several assets, debt backed by a pool of assets is optimal when the degree of competition among investors is low, while equity backed by individual assets is optimal when competition is high.