Toll-free numbers: Demand,property rights,and public policy

The demand for Toll Free Numbers (TFNs) languished from 2000 to 2008; however recent growth in demand caused the FCC to open a new toll-free code (855) with the possibility of new code openings in the next three years. The analysis here indicates the demand for TFNs is highly inelastic (the coefficient for own price elasticity for TFNs is approximately −0.04). This has implications for concerns regarding future exhaust of toll-free codes and the price structure for recovery of SMS/800's costs. This article considers the effects of the limited property rights for TFN, and welfare implications of gray markets for vanity TFNs. The FCC's allocation mechanism for new 855 codes is considered and whether other allocation mechanisms, such as auctions, could be welfare superior.     

Estimating the foreclosure effect of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the entry of specialty beer producers

This paper estimates an entry model to study the effect of exclusive dealing between Anheuser Busch and its distributors on rival brewers' entry decisions and consumer surplus. The entry model accounts for post-entry demand conditions and strategic spillover effects. I recover a brewer's fixed costs using a two-step estimator and find spillover effects on brewers' entry decisions. I find that a brewer has higher fixed costs at locations where Anheuser Busch employ exclusive distributors, but the effect is only statistically significant in certain local areas. The estimates also show that a brewer is less likely to enter a location that is farther from its brewery, has lower expected demand, or is smaller in store size. I implement counterfactual experiments to study the effect of banning exclusive contracts between Anheuser Busch and its distributors. The results show that the welfare improvement associated with banning such contracts is very small.     

Differential Pricing in Intermediate Good Markets

This paper studies differential pricing by an upstream monopolist whose cost to supply the intermediate good differs across buyers in the downstream. It is shown that, different from demand‐based price discrimination, cost‐based differential pricing shifts production efficiently. If total output (and consumer welfare) is weakly increased under differential pricing as opposed to uniform pricing, as is true for weakly convex final market demand functions, social welfare is strictly improved. The analysis is extended to the case in which both the upstream monopolist's cost to serve the downstream firms and the downstream firms’ cost to produce the final good differ.     

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.     

A Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows: A Comment on Werden

Even when heterogeneity of demand for computers is taken into account, Microsoft's pricing of Windows is inconsistent with the government's claim that Windows is a monopoly, protected by high entry barriers. Werden's claim to the contrary rests on confusion between local and global maxima and on his use of assumptions about thePC market that are demonstrably false.     

Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me‐too's

Recent decades have seen a growth in treatments for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) including many branded and generic drugs. In the early 2000's, new drug entry dramatically altered market shares. We estimate a demand system for ADHD drugs and assess the welfare impact of new drugs. We find that entry induced large welfare gains by reducing prices of substitute drugs, and by providing alternative delivery mechanisms for existing molecules. Our results suggest that the success of follow‐on patented drugs may come from unanticipated innovations like delivery mechanisms, a factor ignored by proposals to retard new follow‐on drug approvals.     

A characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in Cournot oligopoly

This paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a Cournot model with linear costs. Under linear demand, a small reduction in a firm’s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1/(2n+2), or equivalently, its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market. A large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value. The paper also extends the results to non-linear demand, but the characterizations become less tractable.     

The impact on broadband access to the Internet of the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks

In Portugal, until recently, the telecommunications incumbent offered broadband access to the Internet, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. We estimate the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these two businesses. Using a panel of consumer level data and a random effects mixed logit model, we estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of broadband access to the Internet. Based on these estimates, we simulate the effect of structural separation on prices and social welfare. Our estimates indicate that structural separation would cause a substantial welfare increase. These results raise questions about the policy of some countries of allowing the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks.     

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RETAILER STORE BRAND PRESENCE ON MANUFACTURER BRANDS IN AN EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK*

This article assesses the impact of retailer store brand products on manufacturer brand prices, profitability and consumer welfare in Boston's white fluid milk market. Estimates from a random coefficients logit demand model are used to specify and test a set of pricing games. Under the selected model, milk manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders to retailers, and store brand milks are procured by retailers at cost. The model is used to investigate counterfactual markets without retailer store brand milks. Counterfactual Simulation results indicate that store brands increase channel profits, retailer profits and consumer welfare, while having mixed effects on equilibrium retail prices.     

Producing biodiesel from soybeans in Zambia: An economic analysis

Facing a huge fiscal burden due to imports of its entire petroleum demand in the face of ample supply of agricultural land to produce biofuels, Zambia has recently introduced a biofuel mandate. However, a number of questions, particularly those related to the economics of biofuels, have not been fully investigated yet. Using an empirical model, this study analyzes the economics of meeting the biodiesel mandate using soybean oil. The study finds that meeting the biodiesel mandate would reduce social welfare, mainly because of the welfare loss to fuel consumers and net reduction in foreign exchange earnings due to soybean oil imports. However, if Zambia increases its domestic soybean supply, as well as oil yield, soybean-based biodiesel is likely to be welfare-beneficial. The country’s welfare is found to be the highest under expanded soybean production and its domestic processing but with no biodiesel mandate.     

Regulatory decision errors,Legal Uncertainty and welfare: A general treatment

We provide a general treatment of the implications for welfare of various sources of legal uncertainty facing agents about the decisions made by a regulatory authority. We distinguish the legal uncertainty from the decision errors made by the authority. While an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always when sanctions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one's perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions.     

A sufficient statistics approach for welfare analysis of oligopolistic third‐degree price discrimination

This paper proposes a sufficient statistics approach to studying the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in differentiated oligopoly. Specifically, our sufficient conditions for price discrimination to increase or decrease social welfare simply entail a cross-market comparison of multiplications of such sufficient statistics as pass-through, conduct, and profit margin that are functions of first-order and second-order elasticities of the firm’s demand. Notably, these results are derived under a general class of market demand, and can be readily extended to accommodate heterogeneous firms. These features suggest that our approach has potential for conducting welfare analysis without a full specification of an oligopoly model.     

Introduction to the RIO Special Issue on Antitrust and the Platform Economy

The emergence of large technology platforms has raised fundamental questions about antitrust enforcement. These questions, which are the subject of this RIO special issue, are now challenging scholars and policy makers. The topics covered here include the role of economics and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; lessons from historic antitrust cases; the role of big data in antitrust analysis; antitrust analysis of multi-sided markets; and the interplay between competition and privacy regulation.

     

An evaluation of China's evolving broadband policy: An ecosystem’s perspective

Although it is generally agreed that governments should have some roles in the development of broadband, questions about the specific role of governments remain unanswered, particularly from the perspective of developing countries. This paper evaluates China’s evolving broadband policy by developing a two-dimensional analytical framework, with the different stages of broadband development represented by columns and the four components of broadband ecosystem represented by rows. Generally speaking, China's telecommunications development has been driven by investments from government-allied entities and features a strong industrial policy. However, the Chinese government has chosen a somewhat soft-intervention approach in broadband development and relied on the market itself to grow by creating a competitive market structure. As the market has recently evolved to a certain degree of saturation, there is a seemingly shift of emphasis in China's broadband policy from infrastructure buildup and service provision to application creation and user demand stimulation. However, China’s broadband future is uncertain due to unsettled but important institutional and financial issues. Policy changes appear not to keep up with the broadband ecosystem evolution.     

A theoretical and empirical study on China's transition to digital TV

This paper explores the impact of policies made by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and TV on China's transition to digital TV. The method of stakeholder analysis is used to present a theoretical study on the digital transition, with a quantitative model analyzing the welfare change of three segments of consumers. A simultaneous-equation model is used to study the characteristics of the demand and supply of digital TV in China. It is argued that the policy of uniform transition that ignores coordination among stakeholders does harm to consumers’ benefits, and the healthy and sustainable development of China's cable digital TV industry. In an introductory phase of digital TV, educating consumers with convenient and pleasing experience is essential, and restructuring cable operators in a market-oriented way is also critical for developing countries like China.     

Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information

Television (TV) stations forego millions of dollars of advertising revenues by airing tune-ins (preview advertisements) for their upcoming programs. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium as well as welfare properties of tune-ins in a duopolistic TV market that lasts for two periods. Importantly, each TV station is fully informed about its own as well as its rival's program. Viewers receive information via tune-ins, if any, or alternatively by sampling a program for a few minutes (and switching across stations). I find that equilibrium tune-in decisions do not necessarily depend on TV stations' knowledge of their rival's program. In this case, the opportunity costs of tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. However, when tune-ins depend on both of the upcoming programs, it is possible that they enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the inefficient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.     

Multiproduct Price Regulation Under Asymmetric Information

We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. The regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose. When there is private information only about costs, the firm should always have a degree of discretion over its pricing policy. When uncertainty concerns demand, whether discretion is desirable depends on how demand elasticities vary with the scale of demands. If a positive demand shock is associated with a reduction in the market elasticity, discretion is good for overall welfare; otherwise it is not.     

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the U.K.

We develop a calibrated simulation model of the U.K. mobile telephony market and use it to analyze the effects of reducing mobile termination rates (MTR's) as recommended by the European Commission. We find that reducing MTR's is likely to increase both consumer surplus and networks' profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities (i.e., benefits to the recipient of a call), social welfare may increase by as much as £1 billion to £4.6 billion per year. We also use the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T‐Mobile and find that the merger led to a substantial reduction in consumer surplus.     

Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com

Research Summary : Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against them. Using data from Amazon.com to study Amazon's entry pattern into third‐party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow, suggesting that complementors' platform‐specific investments influence platform owners' entry decisions. While Amazon's entry discourages affected third‐party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the platform, it increases product demand and reduces shipping costs for consumers. We consider the implications of these findings for complementors in platform‐based markets. Managerial Summary : Platform owners can exert considerable influence over their complementors' welfare. Many complementors with successful products are pushed out of markets because platform owners enter their product spaces and compete directly with them. To mitigate such risks, complementors could build their businesses by aggregating nonblockbuster products or focusing on products requiring significant platform‐specific investments to grow. They should also develop capabilities in new product discovery so that they could continually bring innovative products to their platforms.     

The Tenacity of Antitrust Mythology: Dissenting from Mueller

This comment registers the author's reservations about Professor D.C. Mueller's proposals for revising federal merger policy and about the arguments that he advances in support of them. The comment especially questions the validity of the practice of using concentration data as the basis for inferring the presence or absence of monopoly power. It is argued that the analytical foundation for this practice is non-existent and that the purely statistical foundation is weak. The author finds persuasive Mueller's argument that, in recent decades, the merger activity of large firms has done little or nothing to increase the efficiency of the American economy. He believes that, right or wrong, what drives antitrust is fear of corporate size and power, not fear of textbook monopoly. Therefore, he believes consideration should be given to Mueller's proposal that the ambitious merger projects of large firms should not be allowed to go forward unless they promise some gain in efficiency.