贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

贸易摩擦、宏观经济波动与经济开放程度的选择

本文构建一个包含关税冲击以及外汇风险溢价的两国开放经济DSGE模型,创新地揭示了关税冲击造成实际汇率波动的“直接效应”与“间接效应”,刻画了关税变动、贸易条件与实际汇率之间的动态关系与作用机制。我们深入分析了不同经济开放程度下贸易摩擦造成的宏观经济波动以及经济福利损失。模拟结果表明,在一定贸易开放程度下,外国加收关税一方面会导致本国贸易条件恶化,引发出口及产出下降;另一方面会导致本国汇率贬值,引发出口及产出增长。关税冲击发生后短期中汇率贬值效应占优,本国产出会出现小幅上升,随后贸易条件恶化效应逐步显现,产出持续下降。福利分析结果表明,本国适度提升贸易开放度,虽然经济福利损失会小幅上升,但福利损失增加幅度小于外国,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对优势;如果本国过度提高贸易开放度,则会导致本国福利损失大幅增加,并且大于外国福利损失增幅,会在贸易摩擦竞争中形成相对劣势。因此,应适度逐步有序地提升贸易开放度。此外,本国适度推进资本账户开放的政策能够改善贸易条件,促进本国经济增长。     

Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting

Adopting a single instead of multiple targets can be an effective way to overcome the classic time‐inconsistency problem. The choice of a single mandate depends on the trade openness and the credibility. Reduced‐form empirical results show as central banks become less credible, they are more likely to adopt a pegged exchange rate, and the tendency to peg depends on trade openness. In a model with “loose commitment,” as credibility falls, either an inflation target or a pegged exchange rate is more likely to be adopted. A relatively closed (highly open) economy would adopt an inflation target (exchange rate peg).     

Banking Competition,Collateral Constraints,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a model with two distinct financial frictions: monopolistically competitive banks that charge endogenous lending spreads, and collateral constraints. We show that welfare maximization is equivalent to stabilization of four goals: inflation, output gap, the “consumption gap” between borrowers and savers, and a “housing gap” that measures the distortion in the distribution of the collateralizable asset between both groups. Collateral constraints create a trade‐off between stabilization goals. Following both productivity and financial shocks, and relative to strict inflation targeting, the optimal policy implies sharper movements in the policy rate, aimed primarily at reducing fluctuations in asset prices and hence in borrowers' net worth. The policy trade‐offs become amplified as banking competition increases, due to the fall in lending spreads and the resulting increase in borrowers' leverage.     

Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model

Most central banks perceive a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade‐off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of nontrivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation–unemployment relation found in the data.     

Two targets,two instruments: Monetary and exchange rate policies in emerging market economies

This paper examines the case for using two instruments—the policy interest rate and sterilized foreign exchange market intervention—in emerging market countries seeking to stabilize inflation and output while attenuating disequilibrium currency movements. We estimate policy reaction functions for central banks, documenting that indeed both instruments tend to be deployed. We show that whether discretionary monetary policy or inflation targeting is preferable depends on the volatility of shocks relative to the central bank's time inconsistency problem. The use of FX intervention as a second instrument improves welfare under both regimes, but more so under inflation targeting. Overall, a regime of (two-way) sterilized intervention-cum-inflation targeting can result in better outcomes in the presence of imperfect capital mobility/asset substitutability—yielding similar gains to a discretionary policy while still delivering the inflation target.     

Inflation targeting & implications of oil shocks for inflation expectations in oil-importing and exporting economies: Evidence from three Nordic Kingdoms

In the context of the debate on inflation targeting, this paper analyses the impact of the oil shocks on inflation expectations in three Nordic Kingdoms. A NARDL framework is applied to data from Jan 1994 to June 2018 on the Kingdoms of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Our key findings suggest that there are considerable nonlinearities and asymmetries in the relationship between inflation expectations, oil shocks and economic determinants of inflation expectations. The expectations formulated in the past have a very significant negative impact on future inflation expectations (adaptive expectations) and there is heterogeneity in the adaptiveness pace. A country's net oil trade position seems to reflect on the impact of oil price shocks on the inflation expectations and there is asymmetry and downwards inflation expectations rigidity. There is strong evidence of exchange rate pass-through to inflation expectations. Prevailing regimes of price stability can support to anchor future inflation expectations. Reduction in fiscal deficit and increases in money supply has a positive impact while unemployment has a negative impact on inflation expectations. The cumulative multiplier analysis showed that the impact of oil shock was symmetric in Sweden and Denmark but asymmetric in Norway which is a large net oil exporter. Besides the adoption of explicit inflation targeting regime by Sweden and Norway, the inflation expectations in the underlying economies are prone to the oil price shocks and macroeconomic determinants. These shocks pose a whole set of challenges to monetary authorities in these economies and the findings in the subject treatise provide some guidance on how each shock may transmit.     

Learning and the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank

This paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. We assume that policy makers have to “learn” the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by “stickiness” in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity, exports and foreign price. We find that a switch from an “asymmetric” inflation targeting strategy to an “symmetric” makes little difference in welfare payoffs, but it comes at a cost of much higher interest-rate variability. We also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation-targeting strategy based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the HICP.     

The Role of Inflation Target Adjustment in Stabilization Policy

How and under what circumstances can adjusting the inflation target serve as a stabilization-policy tool and contribute to welfare improvement? We answer these questions quantitatively with a standard New Keynesian model that includes cost-push-type shocks. Our proposed inflation target rule calls for the target to be adjusted in a persistent manner and in the opposite direction to the realization of a cost-push shock, which is essentially a makeup strategy. The inflation target rule, combined with a Taylor-type rule, significantly reduces inflation fluctuations originating from cost-push shocks and mitigates the stabilization trade-off, resulting in a similar level of welfare to that associated with the Ramsey optimal policy.     

Price Stability with Imperfect Financial Integration

This paper studies whether the international monetary system can be affected by asymmetries in the cross-country positions in the international financial markets, i.e., the fact that some countries are large debtors while others are creditors. An important channel that is explored is the interaction between international risk sharing and the stabilization role of monetary policy in each country. The main finding is that the welfare costs of incomplete markets and the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability are increasing with the cross-country asymmetries in the initial net international positions and in particular they become nonnegligible when the persistence of the shocks increases (1% of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption, for the welfare costs of incomplete markets, and 0.2%, for the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability). When global imbalances become larger, optimal monetary policy requires an increase in the volatilities of the real returns on assets and in particular of the nominal interest rates, which should happen to be more correlated across countries.     

FX Intervention in the New Keynesian Model

We develop an open-economy New Keynesian Model with foreign exchange (FX) intervention in the presence of a financial accelerator and shocks to risk appetite in international capital markets. We obtain closed-form solutions for optimal monetary and FX intervention policies assuming the central bank cannot commit to future policies, and we compare the solution to that under policy commitment. We show how FX intervention can help reduce the volatility of the exchange rate, of inflation, and of the output gap, thus mitigating welfare losses associated with shocks in the international capital markets. We also show that, when the financial accelerator is strong, there is a risk of indeterminacy (self-fulfilling currency and inflation movements) although FX intervention can reduce this risk and thus reinforce the credibility of the inflation targeting regime. Model simulations match well the impact of a VIX shock obtained by local projections on a panel of inflation targeting emerging markets.     

Monetary policy, taxes, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to aggregate fluctuations. We find significant effects operating through the tax on realized nominal capital gains. A tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects. Our innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non-indexed taxes in a model where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule. Monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1980 because policymakers did not exert effective control over inflation. Monetary policy reform around 1980 led to better control, and with more stable inflation, the effect of the interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax has become negligible.     

On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy

We show that speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium‐scale DSGE models under discretionary policymaking. In contrast to small‐scale New Keynesian models, this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward‐looking. Importantly, the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level.     

The Advantage of Flexible Targeting Rules

This paper investigates the consequences of debt stabilization for inflation targeting. If the fiscal authority holds constant the real value of debt at maturity under strict inflation targeting, the equilibrium dynamics are indeterminate for a wide range of parameters and steady‐state fiscal stances. “Flexible” targeting rules that include a concern for stabilization of the output gap can restore determinacy of the equilibrium. Flexible inflation targeting appears to be more robust than flexible debt targeting to alternative parameterizations. The fiscal authority can prevent indeterminacy under strict targeting rules by committing to hold constant debt net of interest rate spending.     

Inflation responses to commodity price shocks – How and why do countries differ?

This paper relates the inflationary impact of commodity price shocks across countries to a broad range of structural characteristics and policy frameworks over the period 2001–2010, using several approaches. The analysis suggests that economies with higher food shares in CPI baskets, fuel intensities, and pre-existing inflation levels were more prone to experience sustained inflationary effects from commodity price shocks. Countries with more independent central banks and higher governance scores seem to have contained the impact of these shocks better. The effect of the presence of inflation targeting regimes, however, appears modest and not evident during the 2008 food price shock. The evidence suggests that trade openness, financial development, dollarization, and labor market flexibility do not significantly influence the way in which domestic inflation responds to international commodity price shocks.     

Why Is Canada's Price Level So Predictable?

This paper draws attention to the fact that the price level in Canada—which is an inflation targeter—has strayed little from the path it would have taken had inflation never wandered off the 2% target since its introduction and has tended to revert to that path after temporary deviations. Econometric analysis using Bayesian estimation suggests that a low probability can be assigned to explaining this behavior by mutually offsetting shocks. More plausible is the assumption that inflation expectations and interest rates are determined in a way that is consistent with an element of price‐level‐path targeting.     

Asset Prices,News Shocks,and the Trade Balance

We analyze the relationship between asset prices and the trade balance estimating a Bayesian VAR for a broad set of 38 industrialized and emerging market countries. To derive model‐based identifying restrictions, we model asset price shocks as news shocks about future productivity in a two‐country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Such shocks are found to exert sizable effects on the trade balance. Moreover, the effects are highly heterogeneous across countries. For instance, following a news shock that implies on impact a 10% increase in domestic equity prices relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. trade balance will worsen by up to 1.0 percentage points, but much less so for most other economies. We find that this heterogeneity appears to be linked to the financial market depth and equity home bias of countries. Moreover, the channels via wealth effects and via the real exchange rate are important for understanding the heterogeneity in the transmission.     

How much should inflation targeters care about the exchange rate?

A DSGE model is used to examine whether including the exchange rate in the central bank’s policy rule can improve economic performance. Smoothing the exchange rate helps both financially-robust economies and financially-vulnerable emerging economies in handling risk premium shocks and, given a small weight placed on the exchange rate, the effects on inflation and output volatility are minimal with demand and cost-push shocks. Financially-vulnerable economies are especially likely to benefit from exchange rate smoothing due to perverse movements of the exchange rate they experience when hit by demand shocks and being more prone to risk premium shocks.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.