购买法下有关合并商誉处理的探讨

<正>合并商誉,也叫外购商誉,是指企业在合并过程中,预期被购并企业因其存在的优越条件使其在未来时期获利能力超过可辨认资产正常获利能力的资本化价值。在企业合并中,合并报表要反映合并商誉,而对于如何处理合并商誉,各国会计界在理论上有不同的理解,在实务上也存在着很大的区别。购买法和权益结合法的主要区别之一就是是否对合并商誉进行确认,只有在购买法下才涉及合并商誉问题。商誉根据     

对商誉会计理论的反思

近年来，国际上和我国企业的购并活动兴起，溢价收购极为普遍。随之而引发的商誉问题成为理论界关注的焦点。按现行会计理论，这些收购溢价都将被确认为外购商誉。这种确认方法是否代表商誉的性质？我们该如何准确、全面反映企业自创及并购所带来的商誉呢？在此，西方拟对现行商誉会计理论进行反思，并提出重构意见。     

企业商誉会计研究

由企业合并产生的商誉一直是会计界争论和关注的焦点,尤其是随着知识经济的到来,人们对于合并产生的商誉的关注更甚于从前。本文首先介绍了近年来影响较大的企业并购案例,分析了其中存在的商誉及由此引出来的问题。进而介绍了商誉的基本概念,包括商誉的本质,构成要素,商誉的减值等。商誉分为自创商誉和外购商誉,由于自创商誉成本的难以计量,一般不确认自创商誉,故本文主要讨论外购商誉。由于我国只确认外购正商誉,不确认负商誉,因此本文除非特别提出负商誉,其余所指商誉均为正商誉。本文对外购商誉的初始确认、后续计量等会计处理问题做了详细的介绍,并简单介绍了负商誉及其涉及的问题,使得本文体系趋于完善。最后是笔者对商誉确认和计量中存在问题的看法及个人建议。     

再谈商誉的性质及其确认

商誉这一概念是随着企业产权有偿转让行为的发生才在企业财务会计中出现的。近年来，随着企业改制、购并、资产重组和股份合作等经济业务的发展及知识经济的兴起，商誉有关问题受到理论界和实务界的关注。人们对商誉会计问题也存在许多争议．如商誉能否确认，自创商誉如何计量，正、负商誉本质问题，商誉能否摊销及如何摊销等?本文试对商誉性质作一新的认识，并进而对商誉确认问题提出自己的看法．     

商誉会计处理探讨

商誉是一种无形资产，是一种能带来超额收益的无形价值。由于商誉本身的无形性和带来超额收益的不确定性，其确认和计量已成为会计界研讨焦点。自创商誉应当评估确认并以资产入帐，外购商誉应确认为购并价差，并予以系统摊销，负商誉是客观存在的，应予以确认入帐。     

对商誉确认和计量问题的探讨

商誉是现代企业中无形资产的重要组成部分,商誉的确认和计量问题已成为会计实务界和理论界关注的焦点.应从商誉的性质和特性两个角度研究解决自创商誉和外购商誉的确认和计量问题.     

企业商誉的确认

商誉不是因并购而产生的,它一直都存在而且并非一成不变,也不是简单地摊销就完事。商誉既可以外购又可以自创。自创商誉价值的构成要素中,良好的地理位置、独特的生产技术和专营专卖权等,都可以根据需要作为企业的一般无形资产入账;由杰出的管理人员要素构成的部分,不应也不可能作为一般无形资产入账。购并企业在购并被购并企业时所支付的超过被购并企业净资产公允市价部分的价款,应作为递延资产处理,而不应确认为外购商誉。     

关于企业自创商誉的会计思考

自创商誉作为企业一项重要的无形资源,在企业经营活动中的作用与日俱增,对于企业价值评价的影响亦愈显重要,何时以何种方式向利益相关方披露自创商誉相关的信息成为财务会计无法回避的课题。在我国现代企业会计准则中,外购商誉已经作为一项无形资产进行反映,而自创商誉是否需要进行确认、计量、记录和报告一直是会计界研究的焦点和难点。本文试着从自创商誉的特性、确认的必要性、会计处理和披露三个方面谈谈关于自创商誉的会计处理问题。     

商誉摊销改为减值测试意义何在

外购商誉作为一种特殊的无形资产，越来越为企业所重视。对于外购商誉的确认和计量，在会计理论和实践中也是一个很值得关注的问题，同时也是一个很受争议的问题。如果对近几年来国际会计界有关商誉的准则变化展开分析，便会在理论和实务上给我们带来一些启迪。     

浅述外购商誉的后续计量

随着市场经济的高速发展,公司合并浪潮不断兴起,商誉日益成为公司重要的资产。目前我国会计准则已经要求企业采用减值测试法对外购商誉进行后续会计处理。尽管如此,学术界对于商誉还是存在诸多争议。在此背景下,本文简单介绍外购商誉后续计量的不同方法并重点分析减值测试法及改进建议。     

The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing

This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, while we find that PEG reputation is positively related to buyout leverage (i.e., LBO debt divided by pre-LBO earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization (EBITDA) of the target), and leverage is significantly positively related to buyout pricing, we do not find any direct relation between PEG reputation and buyout valuations. The evidence suggests that PEG reputation is related to LBO financing structure not only because reputable PEGs are more likely to take advantage of market timing in credit markets and but also because PEG reputation reduces agency costs of LBO debt.     

Syndication of European Buyouts and its Effects on Target‐Firm Performance

Using a unique dataset of 859 leveraged buyouts in Europe during the period 1999–2009, the authors' recent study reports that buyout financiers syndicate their transactions to other buyers to achieve benefits that include diversification of different types of target risk, the combination of complementary investor information and skillsets, and an increase in future deal flow. The authors also report that lead financiers structure their syndicates in ways designed to minimize syndication costs, in particular potential information and incentive problems with co‐investors in the syndicate, while also aiming to maximize the syndication benefits mentioned above. For example, through effective management of conflicts of interest with co‐investors within their syndicates, lead financiers are likely to acquire a reputation for looking out for the interests of their co‐investors that ends up increasing their own deal flow. As additional evidence in support of this claim, the authors also report finding that the post‐buyout profitability and growth of the target companies are higher when buyouts are syndicated (even after adjusting for the “endogeneity” of such decisions) and when the syndicates are structured to limit inter‐investor conflicts of interest within the syndicate. And as the authors point out, this finding, when viewed with the other main findings cited above, provides a more positive view of European buyout syndicates than the one projected by studies of Anglo‐American syndicates to date, whose findings have emphasized the potential for collusion among the buyout financiers.     

商业银行股改转型期声誉风险管理分析

对于商业银行尤其是处于股改转型期的商业银行,应当深刻理解有效规避声誉风险是商业银行健康、有序、可持续发展的重要保障,因而要有意识地建立和强化声誉管理意识,采取切实可行的措施防控声誉风险.本文着重分析了商业银行声誉风险管理的内涵及商业银行声誉风险的形成,针对商业银行声誉风险管理中存在的问题及商业银行股改转型期声誉风险管理的特点,提出了商业银行股改转型期加强声誉风险管理的措施与建议.     

我国上市公司杠杆收购绩效研究

企业资源优化配置,实施并购重组是我国目前资本市场上的一大热点.杠杆收购由于其创新性的并购方式,强大的融资能力,成为近年来在我国并购市场上备受瞩目的商业手段.本文通过对我国上市公司发生的杠杆收购案例进行分析,进一步选用因子分析法对公司杠杆收购绩效进行量化分析,得出结论为：杠杆收购对短期的企业绩效有正向激励作用,但是对长期绩效积极影响不明显,企业总体绩效在杠杆收购第3年后下滑,同时归纳出我国目前杠杆收购融资模式主要集中于商业银行贷款、信托机构融资的方式,融资模式较为局限,现存资本市场条件及政策对杠杆收购绩效有所限制.     

Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration

Abstract:  Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two or more private equity firms invest together in an investee firm and share a joint pay-off, and are an enduring feature of the leveraged buyout (LBO) and private equity industry. This study examines the relationship between syndication and agency costs at the investor-investee level, and the extent to which the reputation and the network position of the lead investor mediate this relationship. We examine this relationship using a sample of 1,122 buyout investments by 80 private equity companies in the UK between 1993 and 2006. Our findings show that where agency costs are highest, and hence ex-post monitoring by the lead investor is more important, syndication is less likely to occur. The negative relationship between agency costs and syndication, however, is alleviated by the reputation and network position of the lead investor firm.     

信息不对称、银行声誉差异与金融规制

国有商业银行长期以国家声誉代替银行声誉,以此来维持自己的日常运营,这会增加政府负担,容易导致全面金融危机的爆发。本文在声誉理论框架下,运用信息经济学研究银行声誉与规制制度之间的关系,并且针对我国当前银行声誉制度存在的问题提出相应的政策建议。     

信贷市场中的企业声誉与机制研究

现行信用评价体系都是从银行角度出发的,没有任何一种指标体系或衡量方法是站在企业角度、从企业的能力和特征因素等方面反映其信誉情况的。本文引入了企业声誉这一概念,在信贷市场的框架下,运用统计分析方法,筛选影响企业声誉的关键指标,构建企业声誉度量模型,研究企业声誉对于银行信贷决策和信用评价体系的作用,并探讨企业声誉机制建设的可行性。     

商业银行声誉风险管理组织体系的构建思考

商业银行声誉风险管理目标确定之后,需要由风险管理组织体系予以实施,即完善的声誉风险管理组织体系是有效实施声誉风险管理的基本保障。由于声誉风险管理既具有其它种类风险管理的共同特征,又有其个性化管理要求。构建商业银行声誉风险管理组织体系,除了要认真落实国家银行业监督管理委员会关于声誉风险管理组织体系的基本要求外,更要根据声誉风险管理的内在规律性要求构建体现商业银行声誉风险管理特定要求的组织体系。     

Secondary Buyouts: Operating Performance and Investment Determinants

Secondary buyouts (SBOs) now represent over 60% of the overall buyout activity. In this paper, I investigate the possible determinants of such spectacular growth. I find that first round buyers generate a large and significant abnormal improvement in operating performance. In contrast, SBO operating growth is not different from that of its peer group. Returns to secondary private equity (PE) investors are positive, but significantly lower than those of first round buyers. I examine several alternative drivers of SBOs and find that favorable credit market conditions and PE reputation drive secondary investment volume.     

Drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity-backed buyouts

We extend the research on the drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity (PE)-backed buyouts by examining deal-, industry-, and macroeconomic-level drivers and their interaction. To conduct our study, we use a comprehensive and hand-collected dataset covering exited buyouts in the UK between 1995–2004, and we control for sample selection and investment risk. Our study shows that governance variables generally have a limited role in driving value creation but that use of a ratchet is positively related to both equity and enterprise value returns; we also find that leverage has a positive impact on median and top-quartile equity returns. Moreover, returns are driven by the size of the buyout and the acquisitions made during the holding period. With respect to macroeconomic and industry level factors, industry growth particularly drives buyout returns. However, the effect of industry growth is not uniform; its influence is particularly strong in insider-driven and divisional buyouts, in addition to top-quartile transactions.