Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay

This paper explores the interaction between wage inequality and the marriage and fertility decisions of young women. We develop an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce, and investment in children that allows for differential timing of fertility. We show how patterns of fertility timing in U.S. data can be explained by the incentives for fertility delay implied by marriage and labor markets. We find that these incentives help explain both the cross-sectional relationship between women's wages and fertility timing and the changes over the past 40 years in married women's fertility timing and labor supply. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, J13.     

夫妻侵权民事责任理论与实践问题探析

夫妻侵权行为,是指婚姻关系存续期间,夫妻一方以作为或不作为的方式侵害其配偶合法权利,并使对方的人身、财产乃至精神方面遭受到直接损害的一种侵权行为。由于侵权人与受害人之间为夫妻关系,夫妻侵权与一般侵权行相较而言具有一些特殊性。我国《婚姻法》针对夫妻侵权设立了离婚损害赔偿制,但存在适用范围界定不清、适用情形过窄,排除了混合过错及第三者的适用,排除了婚内侵权损害赔偿等缺陷。今后在《婚姻法》修改时应明确离婚损害赔偿也适用于协议离婚,并扩大使用范围,引入夫妻共同财产强制终止制度。     

Taxes and Marriage: A Two‐Sided Search Analysis*

This article analyzes the effects of differential tax treatment of married and single individuals in the United States on marriage formation and composition, divorce, and labor supply. We develop a marriage‐market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents that is sufficiently rich to capture key elements of the problem under consideration. We then calibrate the model and use it to evaluate the quantitative effects of several tax reforms aimed at making the tax law neutral with respect to marital status. We find that these reforms (i) systematically increase the labor supply of married females, with changes ranging from 0.3 to 10.1 percent; (ii) have substantial effects on the correlation of spouses’ incomes, which changes from 0.2 to values between 0.185 and 0.334; (iii) can lead to either an increase or decrease in the fraction of people married, with changes that range from ?0.6 to 2.4 percent.     

Soviet fertility,labor-force participation,and marital stability

A simultaneous-equations model of Soviet fertility and labor-force participation is estimated from a cross section of 72 oblast's of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) reported in the 1970 census. The construction of the model is based on the neoclassical theory of household behavior. Simulated changes capture effects of policy changes in the exogenous variables on Soviet fertility and the female labor supply. The exogenous variables investigated are child care facilities (CC), urbanization ratio (URB), male education (MALED), and female education (FEMED). It was found that an increase in FEMED affects labor force participation (LFP) directly and indirectly through impact on birth rate (BR). Increase in CC raise both LFP and BR; increases in FEMED causes womens withdrawal from the labor force and one would expect this to raise BR; however, FEMED raises the opportunity costs of fertility sufficiently to neutralize this effect. Increasing urbanization does not affect participation in a significant way, but it does retard fertility. This effect works through LFP's impact on BR and the indirect effect working through marital stability. A final set of simulations captured the impact of upward shocks of LFP, BR, and the ratio of divorces to marriages (DIV/MAR) on the endogenous variables. Such changes could occur through changes in abortion laws, tightening of divorce laws, or changes in labor legislation. Participation is reduced by the fertility shock, just as fertility is retarded by the LPF and marital stability shocks. Evidence of a backward-bending labor-supply curve was also found. The model is illustrated by tables and charts.     

FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE,BUT HOW ABOUT A RECESSION?

In light of the current economic crisis, we estimate hazard models of divorce to determine how state and national unemployment rates affect the likelihood of a divorce or separation. With data in the United States over the 1978–2008 period from the 1979 NLSY, we find some evidence indicating that a higher unemployment rate increases the risk of a marriage ending for couples in years 6–10 of marriage (suggesting counter‐cyclical divorce/separation probabilities) but has no significant effect for couples in years 1–5 of marriage and those married longer than 10 years. The estimates are generally stronger in magnitude when using national instead of state unemployment rates and when considering just divorces rather than the first observed divorce or separation. (JEL J12)     

Marriage and trust: some lessons from economics

This paper examines the role of marriage as an institution forproviding couples with the confidence to make long-term investmentsin their relationship. No-fault divorce has undermined the notionof marriage as a contract, thereby reducing the security offeredby marriage and promoting opportunism by men. This has weakenedthe bargaining power of wives, both within marriage and whendivorce occurs. Current legal reforms will improve the economicposition of all divorced wives, including those who are primarilyresponsible for the breakdown of their marriage. The latterfeature will encourage opportunism by women and make men lessprepared to invest in their marriage. The paper argues thatthe only way to achieve parity between men and women, and deteropportunism by either sex, is to return to fault-based divorce.Both divorce settlements and the custody of children shoulddepend on preceding marital conduct.     

More on Marriage,Fertility, and the Distribution of Income*

According to Pareto (1896) , the distribution of income depends on “the nature of the people comprising a society, on the organization of the latter, and, also, in part, on chance.” In the model developed here the “nature of the people” is captured by attitudes toward marriage, divorce, fertility, and children. Singles search for mates in a marriage market. Married agents bargain about work, and the quantity and quality of children. They can divorce. Social policies, such as child support requirements, reflect the “organization of the (society).” Finally, “chance” is modeled by randomness in income, marriage opportunities, and marital bliss.     

A theory of rational marriage and divorce

Despite high rates of cohabitation before marriage, and considerable efforts invested in the search for a life partner, a high number of marriages end in divorce. This paper develops a model of household formation and dissolution in which it may be rational for individuals to marry, fully anticipating that they will subsequently divorce. Economies of scale associated with living as a couple rather than in two separate households provide an incentive to marry; problems with free riding in the provision of household collective goods may lead to divorce. Marriages which involve partners who are similar, in tastes or in their productive capacities, and in which private goods are equally shared, are the most likely to be stable. In contrast, marriages which involve very disparate partners, or which share the fruits of market labor very unequally between the partners, are more likely to be shortlived and end in divorce.     

Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce

The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorceif and only if doing so increases their joint surplus, regardlessof the legal rules governing divorce. This does not mean, however,that divorce laws only affect the distribution of rents. Becausethe distribution of rents affects each spouse's incentives fornoncontractible investments, divorce laws can affect the jointwelfare of the couple. This article analyzes the effects ofthe consent divorce regime and the unilateral divorce regimeon incentives for selfish and cooperative marital investments.Using these results, the article demonstrates how endogenouschoice of marriage with noncontractible investments can explainsome recent empirical results concerning the effects of theshift from consent divorce to unilateral divorce. (JEL C78,D1, D23, J12, J18, K3, K36)     

Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution

This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.     

Fertility Decisions and Gender Differences in Labor Turnover, Employment, and Wages

A striking observation of the U.S. and other labor markets is the weak position of women in terms of job attachment, employment, and earnings relative to men. We develop a model of fertility and labor market decisions to study the impact of fertility on gender differences in labor turnover, employment, and wages. In our framework, individuals search for jobs and accumulate general (experience) and specific (tenure) human capital when they work. They can also increase their wage by moving to a job of higher quality. Labor market decisions (e.g., job acceptance and job mobility) may differ across genders: females that give birth may decide to interrupt their labor market attachment in order to enjoy the value of staying at home with their children. The model economy is successfully calibrated to match aggregate statistics in terms of fertility, employment, and wages. We find that fertility decisions generate important gender differences in turnover rates, with long lasting effects in employment and wages. These differences in labor turnover account for almost all the U.S. gender wage gap that is attributed to labor market experience by Blau and Kahn (2000, Journal of Labor Economics15(1), 1–42). The model also implies a very small role of tenure capital in accounting for wage differences between males and females (gender gap), and between females with and without children (family gap). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J13, J21, J31.     

FAMILY PLANNING AND WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE ONE‐CHILD POLICY

This paper exploits China's one‐child policy (OCP) to study the relationship between fertility and educational attainment of the mothers of China's “sibling‐less generation.” I take two difference‐in‐differences approaches to estimate the OCP's effect on women's education: one compares gender difference among the ethnic majority group and the other compares ethnicity differences between ethnic majority women and ethnic minority women. I also explore the heterogeneity of the policy's effects by parent's status at the Communist Party. I find that the OCP has a positive and significant effect on women's education and explains about half of the increase in educational attainment for women born between 1960 and 1980. Their increased educational attainment associates with delayed entry into first marriage, delayed entry to parenthood and increased labor supply. (JEL I20, J13, J16, J18)     

Heterogeneous human capital, uncertainty, and the structure of plans: A market process approach to marriage and divorce

The family has not been exempt from the multiple and rapidly occurring changes in the world today, particularly in market economies. The number of marriages has declined, age at first marriage has risen, the number of divorces has risen sharply, the fertility rate has declined, and the division of labor within families has changed, not always in ways that might be expected. This paper subjects these developments to a market process analysis, drawing on the voluminous work occurring in family economics. The Austrian theory of capital, with its emphasis on capital heterogeneity, is relevant. We place particular emphasis on the importance of the structure of human capital within marriage and how investments in such human capital have been affected by the uncertainty that these changes have produced. We also examine investments in marriage-specific human capital and in general human capital (particularly as they relate to childcare). This is then related to the incidence of divorce and the causes and spoils from divorce. The advent of no-fault divorce seems to have been seminal in this regard. We end with a brief glance at the future.

Life cycle employment and fertility across institutional environments

In this paper, we formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor force participation and fertility choices and estimate approximate decision rules using data on married women in Italy, Spain and France. The estimated decision rules indicate that first-order state dependence is the most important factor determining female labor supply behavior in all three countries. We also find that cross-country differences in state dependence effects are consistent with the order of country-level measures of labor market flexibility and child care availability. Counterfactual simulations of the model indicate that female employment rates in Italy and Spain could reach EU target levels were French social policies to be adopted in those countries.     

UNDERSTANDING MEASURES OF NONMARITAL FERTILITY: THE ROLES OF MARRIAGE AND ACCESS TO HUMAN CAPITAL

This paper proposes an explanation for several decades of rising U.S. nonmarital birth rates and shares, and for cross‐sectional differences in black‐white fertility. Significantly, the explanation does not rely on changes over time or differences across races in individual fertility behavior. It is consistent with the rising nonmarital fertility measures observed in the United States since the mid‐1970s, higher measured fertility for unmarried blacks than whites, and differences across races in the timing of childbearing, despite nearly constant total fertility rates and increasingly similar target family sizes for blacks and whites. The explanation relies on a selection effect associated with changes in the marriage rate and on racial differences in access to human capital investment opportunities. We find strong support for the explanation using U.S. data over the period 1957–2002. Our findings suggest caution in interpreting the results of empirical studies of childbearing that examine marital and nonmarital fertility rates separately, as these studies typically ignore the selection effect of marriage. (JEL J12, J13, I38)     

产需双重不确定情形下绿色农产品供应链的协调研究

为解决产需不确定性给绿色农产品供应链运营带来的复杂影响,寻求绿色农产品生产商和销售商面对产需双重不确定情形下各自的最优决策,研究从农产品产出和市场需求双重不确定性视角出发,结合目前消费者对绿色农产品的需求偏好,构建由生产商和销售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,探究收益共享契约能否有效协调产需都不确定的绿色农产品供应链。研究结果表明:分散决策时的批发价契约无法协调此供应链。引入收益共享契约后,在合适的共享系数范围内,生产商的农资投入量会增加,农产品的绿色度会比分散决策时高,同时销售商的销售价格降低;当农产品订购量变大后,引入契约后的生产商和销售商各自的利润相较于分散决策时更高。     

Endogenous fertility and growth in a model with old age support

Summary. This paper examines the interrelationship between capital accumulation, fertility, and growth by introducing an endogenous fertility decision into Diamond's (1965) neoclassical growth model. Under the assumptions that children provide old age support and that individuals incur a variable time cost of raising children, it investigates the potential for cyclical fluctuations in the capital-labor ratio and fertility, as well as for development trap phenomena to be observed. It is shown that when capital and labor are highly substitutable in production, there is a unique steady state equilibrium, and either damped or undamped oscillations in fertility and the capital-labor ratio may occur. However, when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than one, two steady state equilibria may exist; one with a high capital-labor ratio and a high rate of population growth, and the other with a lower capital-labor ratio as well as a lower population growth rate. The former is a saddle, while the latter may be either a source or a sink. In the latter case development traps are possible. Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: December 18, 1997     

The cause of Danish unemployment: Demand or supply shocks?

We study the Danish unemployment experience 1905–92 using a common trends model with cointegration constraints. To justify the identifying assumptions about the cointegration vectors and the common trends we present a simple macroeconomic model of the labor market. The model determines the long run behavior of labor productivity, employment, unemployment, real product and real consumer wages. The empirical results give support for three cointegration relations and two common trends. Based on the economic model the trends are interpreted as representing labor productivity (technology) and labor supply. With unemployment being nonstationary, the common trends analysis indicates that labor supply shocks is the primary source for explaining the behavior of unemployment. First Version Received: August 1999/Final Version Received: June 2000     

Soviet theories of economic demography: a survey

At this time Soviet demographic scientists maintain the position that population problems may in fact exist temporarily under socialism but that the planning principle will allow society to resolve population problems, through the use of the administrative, moral, and economic levers (subsidies, government policies, propaganda, education) emphasized by Urlanis (1974) and others. For planners to deal effectively with population management, the determinants of fertility and labor force participation must be established. The foundations of Soviet theories of human capital and fertility were laid by several writers. For the sake of simplicity, these are referred to as the Urlanis-Strumilin model, named after 2 pioneer researchers in Soviet demography and manpower economics. The formulations are based upon the writings of Strumlin (1964) and Urlanis (1974), supplemented by writings of numerous other Soviet researchers. Although their models avoid neoclassical terms such as marginal utility and income and price elasticities, they clearly employ these concepts. The Urlanis-Strumilin model, reduced to its basic elements, is a direct household utility maximizing model. The husband and wife, the household decision makers, must select optimal levels of child "quantity," child "quality," leisure, their own human capital (further education and training), and other goods. The Soviet theory recognizes that an increase in household income will increase relatively the demands for income elastic goods. The model postulates that the demand for child quality is inversely related to the price of children. The price of children is the opportunity cost of children, the major element of which is the income foregone by the mother in the course of childbearing and childrearing. The child quantity demand schedule has elastic and inelastic portions. The marginal utility of the 1st child is great. The marginal utilities of higher order children decline substantially. Families with at least 1 child can make substitutions between having more children and raising the quality of children already born. The question is what does the model predict will happen to fertility with economic development. The positive income effect will be limited as increased income is channelled into child quality and other superior goods rather than child quantity. The Urlanis-Strumilin model of labor supply assumes that the household allocates its time among market employment, household production. The model shows that the effect of children on female labor supply is not ambiguous. The presence of young children raises the value of home services and lowers long run market wages, thereby reducing female market labor supply. According to the model, the socialist state can manipulate labor supplies through several channels. It can reduce the value of home services by providing market substitutes. Soviet writers recognize the linkages between labor supply and fertility without formalizing the simultaneous relationship. The comparative statics of the Soviet model are essentially the same as those of the neoclassical model: an increase in "costs" of children will have, at best, a small positive impact on fertility.     

The career and family choices of women: A dynamic analysis of labor force participation,schooling, marriage,and fertility decisions

This paper formulates and estimates a discrete time, discrete choice dynamic labor supply model in which marriage, fertility, and education are choice variables. The dynamics of these choices are captured by various forms of state and duration dependence. Uncertainty comes from the imperfect control women have over births and from a choice-specific random shock to utility each period. Women choose different career and family life-cycle paths because of these uncertainties and also because they have different tastes. The structural parameters of the model are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation techniques with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.