Competition between branded and nonbranded firms and its impact on welfare

We examine a quantity competition among branded and nonbranded firms. The market comprises two consumer segments: one purchases only branded products (the high-end market), while the other segment's consumers purchase less expensive products (the low-end market). When branded firms take actions sequentially, we show that the branded leader has an incentive to restrict its quantity to avoid entering the low-end market. As the follower recognizes this incentive, it can restrict the leader by implementing a quantity constraint, which is affected by the number of nonbranded firms. We find that both the branded leader and follower could benefit from the nonbranded firms and that the leader prefers to have more nonbranded firms in the market than the follower does. Furthermore, we show that the free entry of nonbranded firms could negatively affect total surplus as well as consumer surplus even without any costs, because of the premium pricing of branded products.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games

Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a strict application of the Nash equilibrium concept to a symmetric simultaneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the break-even and the limit prices.     

Competition,asset build up and export incentives: The role of imperfect credit market

This paper studies the export incentive of credit rationed, competitive and homogenous firms through asset build up highlighting the generic trade-off between competition and asset value in an imperfect credit market where poor and rich firms have different levels of assets. It is a contribution to the issues related to finance and trade in developing countries as raised first in Jones and Marjit (2001, AER). Our theoretical and empirical results indicate that although firms in more competitive industries are likely to be exporters, history of greater local competition before the entry of firms into export market i.e. under autarky, hurts export incentive by limiting cash flows and asset build up. In our set up more intense local competition hence lower price is an advantage to access global markets, but associated low profits and hence lower assets acts a detriment.     

Efficient regulated entry in competitive markets with demand uncertainty

It is well-known that, in a competitive market, the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium is the efficient one. This paper shows that this textbook result breaks down if firms face demand uncertainty. In this case, entry is excessive relative to the optimum and, therefore, regulation improves market efficiency. This occurs because, in the absence of regulation, entry is motivated by the profits that firms expect to receive if market demand turns out to be high. However, when choosing the optimal regulated entry, the planner also considers that some surplus is lost if demand turns out to be low.     

Free entry,market diffusion,and social inefficiency with endogenously growing demand

This paper analyzes market diffusion in the presence of oligopolistic interaction among firms. Market demand is positively related to past market size because of consumer learning, networks, and bandwagon effects. Firms enter the market freely in each period with fixed costs and compete in quantities. We demonstrate that the nature of the inefficiency under free entry can change as the market grows, and more importantly, that S-shaped diffusion can be a signal that the number of firms under free entry is initially insufficient, but eventually excessive.     

Output price fluctuations,short-run profits and long-run industry size with input market equilibrium effects

Conclusions In this paper, input market equilibrium effects are incorporated into an analysis of output price fluctuations. In particular, it is shown that an increase (decrease) in output price may not necessarily lead to an increase (decrease) in the shortrun profit of a firm operating in a competitive product market. The firm's profit may not necessarily be convex in output price. Hence,ex-post flexibility in production does not guarantee the preference for price instability by risk-neutral firms. Finally, in longrun equilibrium, a mean-preserving spread in output price may increase or reduce the equilibrium number of firms.     

Towards a welfare model of trade and multinational firms with oligopolistic competition

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model in a world with two-symmetric countries. It explains welfare gains from international trade and horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economy with firm heterogeneity and variable markups stemming from oligopolistic competition. My model shows that the pro-competitive effects of trade and horizontal FDI happen because trade openness induces an increase in product market competition that reduces markups and toughens selection, increasing aggregate productivity. The most significant contribution of the paper is that multinational firms, via horizontal FDI, produce the most significant welfare gains through the toughest selection and lowest markups.     

Pricing on the Internet

It is often claimed that e-commerce has created a more competitiveenvironment by encouraging the entry of new online firms andby enabling buyers to search easily for the lowest prices. Thelimited evidence that exists paints a mixed picture. Many onlinemarkets are advertising- and technology-intensive, creatinga tendency towards growing concentration. Price search is imperfectand firms can dampen price competition by increasing productheterogeneity and switching costs. In many sectors, online firmsmay come to acquire some market power. We look at the formsof pricing that are likely to emerge in such markets, includingthe greater use of price discrimination and auction-like tradingarrangements.     

THE ECONOMICS OF IMPORT PARITY PRICING: A PEDAGOGICAL NOTE

This paper demonstrates that pricing to import parity is not necessarily prima facie evidence of the exercise of market power. It is shown that in the presence of imports both market structures, perfect competition and monopoly, can price to import parity. If markets can be segmented enabling the firm to discriminate between the export and domestic market it is shown that the imperfectly competitive firm can differentially price. Furthermore, as the number of domestic firms is increased, and if these firms are able to segment the market, the differential between domestic and foreign prices is reduced. The import parity price may or may not be charged in the domestic market. A measure of the exercise of market power is therefore the differential between export parity and the domestic price.     

Business reforms and total factor productivity in Vietnamese manufacturing

Vietnam implemented reforms in the 2000s to ease start-up of new businesses with dramatic effect on firm entry and market competition. This study examines firm level data for the period 2000–2010 to analyze total factor productivity (TFP) in connection with the reforms, adopting a semi-parametric technique developed by Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) to measure TFP. Intensified competition is hypothesized to have driven convergence of TFP within industrial sectors as technologies best suited to Vietnamese market conditions became more widely implemented. The evidence strongly supports this hypothesis with convergence found for 16 of the 17 sectors analyzed. Further, comparison of TFP growth rates between the first and second half of the decade shows mixed results by sector and region. More often than not, TFP growth is seen to have slowed over time. This suggests that competition acted not only to push low TFP firms to exit the market or raise productivity, it also discouraged use of technologies that may have been overly advanced and not cost efficient for Vietnam.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

Consumer discrimination,duopoly, and black firm entry: The welfare effect of subsidies

Consumer discrimination, to the extent that it lowers expected profit for black owned firms, discourages the entry of new black firms. From a social welfare perspective, consumer discrimination may be welfare reducing, since market output is lower than otherwise. If so, a policy intervention that subsidizes new black firms may improve social welfare. This article presents a simple model of duopoly where consumer discrimination exists with uncertainty, and the only cost of production is a “loss of sales” cost. Given the Nash equilibrium, in which a black and white firm must select a price to charge, conditions are derived for which a profit subsidy to a new black firm increases, decreases, or has no effect on social welfare.     

Toward an institutional ecology of establishment of foreign firms in the Chinese construction industry

In the current study, an integration of insights from institutional theory and organization ecology is used to explain the relationship between industry-level ownership structure and the establishment of foreign invested firms in the Chinese construction industry. It is argued that in a stated-owned enterprises dominated environment, where the market forces are weak, legitimation is the major driving force harming the proliferation of foreign firms, whereas in a private-enterprise dominated environment, where the market forces are strong, competition is the major driving force inhibiting the viability of foreign firms. Thus, concentration of either state ownership, implying lower legitimation of the foreign firm form, or concentration of private ownership, triggering tough competition from domestic private firms, is hypothesized to have a negative impact on the number of foreign firms. Using a regional data set from 1994 to 2007, estimation of a cross-section–time series model largely confirms our theoretical claims.     

Product innovation and contestability

Summary This article deals with the introduction of product innovation in a contestable market model. Investment contestability describes a benchmark case of competition by introducing sunk entry-deterring investment in a free entry framework. Aside from careful price setting, suppliers adopt investment in product quality in order to deter entry. Zero-profit pricing and increased quality point to a partial second-best outcome of market behaviour.The author is very grateful for the support of Professor W.J. Baumol, The C.V. Starr Center for Research in Applied Economics at New York University, The Dutch Organisation of Scientific Research and an anonymous referee. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.     

Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market

This paper tests the structure performance hypothesis by examining a highway construction industry in Florida. In the first-price sealed bid auction literature, there is little evidence on how many bidders are required for these markets to be competitive. Two different indicators are used to capture the transition from collusion to competition—a discontinuous effect of the number of bidders on winning bid price, and an associative effect of repeat bidding of a contractor with the same set of firms. The results suggest that winning bids decrease as the number of bidders rises until there are about six to eight firms. Since subsequent entry has no effect on the winning bid price, it is concluded that the highway construction market becomes competitive with about eight bidders.     

Open Source Software: Competition with A Public Good

This paper looks at price and quality competition in software markets under two different forms of competition—one where two proprietary firms first choose quality and then engage in price competition, and second where a proprietary firm faces competition from an open source software (OSS) firm that allows its users to determine quality level and provides the software at zero price. We find that OSS competition never improves quality for consumers who value quality highly. However, it may provide greater quality to users with a low valuation for quality. In addition, we find that although OSS has a zero market price, the public good nature of OSS competition can lessen price competition, making the proprietary firm better-off with increased profit but leaving consumers worse-off with lower surplus.     

Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper is about price and wage competition in a dynamicgeneral equilibrium model. We consider an equity financed economywhere firms need money to finance their input costs. Part ofthe output is sold for money to be used in the next period asworking capital and the remaining part is distributed to ownersas real dividends. We first characterize the steady state competitiveequilibrium path. Second, we study whether this competitiveequilibrium can be supported as a pure strategy Nash equilibriumin price and wage setting games. We prove a positive resultfor price competition and a negative one for wage competition.     

How revolving-door recruitment makes firms stand out in land market: Evidence from China

The fact that firms seek political connections through revolving-door recruitment is widely acknowledged around the world. Using an original database including the information of listed firms' board members and parcel-level land transaction records, this paper documents how revolving-door recruitment makes firms stand out in China's land market. We show that firms with revolving-door recruitment receive special deals in land transactions, which are simultaneously reflected in the quantity and price of land. Specifically, connected firms buy more parcels and larger areas of land in the primary land market. Due to the particularity of industrial land, price discounts are only identified for commercial and residential land, while not for industrial land. Measuring economic activity by night light intensity, we find no evidence that land transaction under the influence of political connections has a negative impact on economic activity on land. Our research advances the understanding that the state-business relationship is an essential factor in resource allocation in an emerging market with government intervention.