COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY BETWEEN COOPERATIVE,SAVINGS AND COMMERCIAL BANKS IN EUROPE USING THE FRONTIER APPROACH

We test competing hypotheses concerning the comparative behavior of shareholder‐owned commercial banks and stakeholder‐orientated cooperative and savings banks in European banking. One hypothesis is that the risk culture and business models of stakeholder and shareholder‐owned banks have become more alike and so cost efficiency has converged between bank ownership structures. The alternative hypothesis suggests that institutional differences do matter and lead, amongst other things, to variation in network effects and monitoring mechanisms producing differing behaviors and efficiency outcomes. By using a novel panel data set of 521 European banks during 1994–2010, we find: (i) mean inefficiency scores vary by ownership type and are lower for cooperative banks than for commercial and savings banks; (ii) there is a large variation in inefficiency scores among banks within each ownership type but the lower variance for cooperative banks indicates that they are the most homogeneous group; (iii) the inefficiency distribution of savings and commercial banks appear to arise from the same distribution, but this does not hold for cooperative banks. As such our findings are more consistent with the alternative hypothesis. Our first two findings buttress those studies that found significant differences between European banks with differing ownership structures, while our third finding on the significance of the cycle to the distribution of inefficiency is novel.     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.     

Bank Ownership and Efficiency in the Aftermath of Financial Crises: Evidence from Indonesia

This paper examines the relationship between types of ownership of banks and their efficiency in the aftermath of a financial crisis using Greene's “true” panel data stochastic frontier model, which takes into account unobserved heterogeneity among banks. The Indonesian banking sector is analyzed using financial data of 144 banks operating in Indonesia over the period of 2000Q4–2005Q2. In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the cost efficiency of all banks improves over time on average. However, there is some evidence that, as these banks improve their efficiency, state‐owned banks are the least efficient banks while joint‐venture and foreign‐owned banks are the most efficient.     

Foreign bank entry,bank efficiency and market power in Central and Eastern European Countries1

This article analyses the implications of the recently observed sharp expansion of foreign banks in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as measured by equity ownership. We show that the mode of foreign entry has a pivotal impact on the post‐entry performance of banks in CEECs. Foreign greenfield banks are characterized by superior cost efficiency, compared with domestic and foreign‐acquired banks. The efficiency of foreign‐acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, but improves thereafter. Banks acquired by foreigners have less market power relative to domestic and foreign greenfield banks. Overall, the CEEC banking sectors have benefited from the increased foreign bank participation, both in terms of higher efficiency and more competition.     

Cost economies,efficiency and productivity growth in the Chinese banking industry: evidence from a quarterly panel dataset

This article examines cost economies, productivity growth and cost efficiency of the Chinese banks using a unique panel dataset that identifies banks’ four outputs and four input prices over the period of 1995–2001. By assessing the appropriateness of model specification, and making use of alternative methodologies in evaluating the performance of banks, we find that the joint-stock commercial banks outperform state-owned commercial banks in productivity growth and cost efficiency. Under the variable cost assumption, Chinese banks display economies of scale, with state-owned commercial banks enjoying cost advantages over the joint-stock commercial banks. Consequently, our results highlight the ownership advantage of these two types of banks and generally support the ongoing banking reform and transformation that is currently taking place in China.     

Microeconomic determinants of acquisitions of Eastern European banks by Western European banks1

A considerable number of Western European banks acquired banks in Central and Eastern Europe from the mid‐1990s onwards. The question is whether or not this will improve the efficiency and profitability of the Central and Eastern European banking sectors. We test the relative strength of the efficiency versus the market power hypotheses by investigating the bank‐specific characteristics of the banks involved in the cross‐border acquisitions. We also examine the determinants of the post‐acquisition target banks’ performance. Our results indicate that large Western European banks have targeted relatively large and efficient Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) banks with an established presence in their local retail banking markets. We find no evidence that cross‐border bank acquisitions in the CEEC are driven by efficiency motivations. The evidence supports the market power hypothesis, raising concerns about the optimal balance between foreign ownership and competition.     

Public Sector Banks in India: Rationale and Prerequisites for reform

This paper contributes to the debate on public sector banks by suggesting several rationales for government ownership of banks in India. The paper then proceeds to argue that due to high economic costs, the current public sector banking system is unsustainable. Although a policy of wider private ownership was introduced in the 1990s, it is suggested that there are several prerequisites to be met before such a reform can be more fully implemented. It is argued that these prerequisites arise from the rationales for government ownership, and they include a credible bank regulatory regime, and government promotion of co‐operative banks and credit unions.     

国有银行与股份制银行资产组合配置的差异研究

商业银行国有产权与银行业绩表现的关系,近来成为一个热点话题。但是,很少有文章讨论银行国有产权与银行谨慎经营行为的关系。本文依据银行资产组合配置比率指标,研究了中国国有商业银行与股份制银行在谨慎行为方面的差异。实证结论表明:股份制银行比国有银行经营更为谨慎;国有银行由于管理与经营机制的改革正变得越来越谨慎。     

WTO challenges and efficiency of Chinese banks

After joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, China was given 5 years to completely open up its banking market for international competition. Chinese banks have been renowned for their mounting nonperforming loans and low efficiency. Despite gradual reforms, the banking system is still dominated by state ownership and encapsulated monopolistic control. How to raise efficiency is a key to the survival and success of domestic banks, especially the state-owned commercial banks. Two important factors may be responsible for raising efficiency: ownership reform and hard budget constraints. This article uses a panel data of 22 banks over the period 1995 to 2001, and employs a stochastic frontier production function to investigate the effects of ownership structure and hard budget constraint on efficiency. Empirical results suggest that nonstate banks were 8–18% more efficient than state banks, and that banks facing a harder budget tend to perform better than those heavily capitalized by the state or regional governments. The results shed important light on banking sector reform in China to face the tough challenges after WTO accession.     

BANK PERFORMANCE,FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MARKET CONCENTRATION: EVIDENCE FROM COOPERATIVE AND NON‐COOPERATIVE BANKS

Relying upon highly territorially disaggregated data taken at labour market areas, the paper explores the relationship between bank performances and financial stability of the banking system taking into account the role of market concentration. The z‐score is used as financial stability indicator, while the performance of financial intermediaries is measured using a parametric method recently developed (Kumbhakar et al. 2014). The empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between bank performance and financial stability and supports the ‘concentration–stability’ view for non‐cooperative banks only when concentration is measured on the whole sample of banks. Differences in the performance–stability nexus seem to depend more on the type of banks rather than different levels of market concentration. Higher market concentration of cooperative banks affects systemic stability by reducing the z‐scores of non‐cooperative banks, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of non‐profit‐maximizing entities can pull down stability of other financial institutions.     

股权结构、治理机制与城市银行绩效--来自山东、河南两省的调查证据

银行体系的重要地位和银行危机的频繁发生显示了加强银行公司治理的重要性 ,在我国银行体制改革的背景下 ,研究商业银行公司治理问题具有重要的现实意义。本文利用山东、河南两省 2 8家城市银行的调查样本对我国地方商业银行的股权结构、治理机制及其效果进行了实证分析。结果发现 ,虽然我国地方性银行国有和集中的股权结构特征明显 ,但大股东的国有性质并没有对银行绩效产生影响 ,同时集中型股权结构对银行绩效有明显的积极影响。银行高管人员薪酬有较明显的负激励效果。此外我们还发现 ,外部董事比例和银行规模基本没有对银行绩效产生影响 ,而且山东、河南两省城市银行在公司治理方面也不存在省际间的显著差异。     

Research on equity adjustment,agency costs and commercial bank performance: experimental evidence from China

This article studies the impact of options to adjust the performance of commercial banks from agency costs. In the shareholding structure of the adjustment process, considering changes in agency costs, only in agency costs no more than the commercial banks when new results, the company will have to adjust agent the cost of power stealth measure more just by reflecting the size of the incremental results. In addition, equity restructuring costs are the basis of agency governance and ownership structure has an important impact on agency costs. Through a few selected China 14 listed commercial banks’ 2007–2012 data, we show that the impact of performance of commercial banks on the proportion of the company’s largest shareholders is generally more significant; however, the impact of equity restriction on commercial banks was not as significant, as seen from the application of balanced panel data model analysis and the test results. However, the agency costs of commercial bank performance were significant also in a general state, indicating that equity adjustment activities of commercial banks’ cost perspective agency under the commercial bank performance significant changes are not large.     

Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration

The German system of corporate governance is often thought to be effective at addressing problems arising in large firms. In addition to the usual emphasis on the role of German banks, it is increasingly recognized that the German system also involves a high concentration of the ownership of large firms. We analyse the relative significance of these two features of the German system and conclude that high ownership concentration is more important. Although banks may influence corporate governance via their control of proxy votes, positions on supervisory boards, and provision of loan finance, in practice they do not play a role in the governance of large German firms which is distinct from that of other types of large shareholders. Any case for the superiority of German corporate governance of large firms must therefore be based on high ownership concentration rather than a special role of banks, and must consider the costs of ownership concentration as well as the benefits.     

我国城市商业银行与地方政府关系

我国的城市商业银行与地方政府关系演变带有经济转型时期的特征。通过政府干预,城市商业银行获得了较快发展,地方政府也因为控制了一定的金融资源而促进了地方经济的发展。但是,现有的制度格局却带来了城市商业银行股权结构不合理、治理结构不完善等问题。由于各方利益的博弈,城市商业银行所推行的股权改革必然是一个渐进的过程,而在这一过程中,形成城市商业银行与地方政府良好的互动关系仍然是必要的。     

WHAT CAUSES THE EFFICIENCY AND THE TECHNOLOGY GAP UNDER DIFFERENT OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN THE CHINESE BANKING INDUSTRY?

This paper estimates and compares the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking industry among different ownership types for the period 2003–2014, using the stochastic metafrontier model. We find that foreign banks have the lowest cost frontier, while state‐owned commercial banks undertake the least sophisticated technology. Moreover, the results of the upward trend in the technology gap ratio (TGR) and in metafrontier cost efficiency support that a more open financial market is able to enhance banking efficiency. As for the role of environmental conditions, off‐balance sheet items, non‐performing loans, and financial market structure significantly impact the TGRs of different bank types. (JEL C51, G21, D24)     

Large lending and banks performance. Is there any relationship? Empirical evidence from US banks

Large lending in the banking industry has sparked concerns about banks’ efficiency performance, particularly, if it is related to their credit risk, as trade credit, provided by large, creditworthy firms. We provide evidence of a rather neglected issue regarding the impact of large lending on banks’ efficiency using cost and profit stochastic functions. A unique dataset was constructed concerning all US banks collected from the Statistics on Depository Institutions report compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Our sample contains US banks tracked yearly for the period 2010–2017, creating an unbalanced panel of year observations. An econometric framework based on nested non-neutral frontiers was developed to estimate the influence and the decomposition of large lending on the three banks’ performance aspects. Moreover, different types of frontiers aiming at the cost and profit sides have been investigated, and the associated elasticities have been calculated. We notice that large lending plays a crucial role in banks’ technical efficiency. Variations among different frontier models, type of bank and size, banks’ ownership structure, and macroeconomic conditions appear to be present. By considering all capital adequacy asset quality management earnings liquidity parameters, we notice that banks’ financial strength affects banks’ efficiency.     

HOW DOES FOREIGN BANK OWNERSHIP IN THE BANKING SECTOR AFFECT DOMESTIC BANK BEHAVIOUR? A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how foreign bank ownership in the banking sector affects domestic bank behaviour and whether this relationship depends on the economic and financial conditions of the host country. This paper contains 795 individual banks in 39 countries covering the period 1999–2006. Foreign ownership is calculated using bank level data as a proxy for the degree of foreign bank ownership in the banking sector. First, we find that foreign bank ownership is associated with a decrease in both the profitability and overhead expenses of the domestic bank after applying the system panel Generalized Method of Moments model. Second, a lower level of economic development of the host country enhances the positive effects of foreign bank ownership on the income, profit and cost of domestic banks. Third, financial development plays an important role in determining the effect of foreign bank ownership. Fourth, while the use of aggregate foreign ownership data may provide us with a big picture, it may not explain why individual banks in the same country perform differently, which this study will answer.     

我国商业银行收益结构转型对经营效率的影响

商业银行收益结构转型是我国商业银行实现可持续经营的重要一环。文章应用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法,构建超越对数产出距离函数,对我国12家代表性商业银行的技术效率和全要素生产效率指数进行分析,以此阐明收益结构转型与商业银行效率和生产效率指数之间的关系,并提出新形势下处理好支持经济发展、推动金融创新与提高银行竞争力和自身效率之间关系的政策建议。     

Banking reforms,performance and risk in China

We investigate the impact of the banking reform started from 2005 on ownership structures in China on commercial banks’ profitability, efficiency and risk over the period 2000–2012, providing comprehensive evidence on the impact of banking reform in China. We find that banks on average tend to have higher profitability, lower risk and lower efficiency after the reforms, and the results are robust with our difference-in-difference approach. Our results also show that the Big 5 state-owned banks (SOCB) underperform banks with other types of ownership when risk is measured by non-performing loans (NPLs) over the entire study period but tend to have fewer NPLs than other banks during the post-reform period. Our results provide some supporting evidence on the ongoing banking reforms in China, suggesting that attracting strategic foreign investors and listing SOCBs on stock exchanges appear to be effective ways to help SOCBs deal with the problem of NPLs and manage their risk.     

Bank ownership structure,lending corruption and the regulatory environment

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country’s regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further find that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries.