国家自主性、中央银行独立性与国际货币合作——德国国际货币政策选择的政治逻辑

政治经济学文献表明,通过将货币政策交给具有独立性的中央银行来管理,政府可以增强货币政策承诺的可信性。但是,具有独立性的中央银行在政治过程中也构成了一个否决行为体,从而有可能限制国家(政府)的自主性。根据"结构导致的均衡"的分析视角,如果国家偏好与中央银行偏好不一致,何者可以转化为权威性行为将取决于该国的政治制度。在国内政治制度的变革难以实现的情况下,国家可以通过参与国际制度与国际谈判来改变中央银行与政府之间的既有均衡,并使这种均衡朝着增强国家自主性的方向演变。作为世界上独立程度最高的中央银行之一,德国联邦银行担心欧洲货币合作会干扰其维护国内币值稳定的目标,更不愿通过放弃本国货币马克来推进货币一体化。但是,德国联邦政府通过其在国际制度与国际谈判中享有的信息优势与合法性,克服了德国联邦银行对欧洲货币合作的反对,推动建立了欧洲货币体系和欧洲货币联盟。     

The stability of German money demand: Tests of the cointegration relation

The Stability of German Money Demand: Tests of the Cointegration Relation. — In this study, two money demand functions are specified in single equation error correction as well as triangular error correction form involving real M1 (M3), real GNP, a short-and a long-term interest rate. Using various tests, it is shown that there may be a cointegration relation even after the German Monetary Union (GMU) was established in 1990. But the long-run coefficients of GNP and the interest rate probably have a structural break in 1973, when the Bundesbank changed its monetary regime, and in 1990, when the GMU was formed. The tests support weak exogeneity of real GNP and the interest rate.     

Money growth volatility and the demand for money in Germany: Friedman’s volatility hypothesis revisited

Money Growth Volatility and the Demand for Money in Germany: Friedman’s Volatility Hypothesis Revisited. — Recently, the Bundesbank claimed that monetary targeting has become considerably more difficult by the increased volatility of short-term money growth. The present paper investigates the impact of German money growth volatility on income velocity and money demand in view of Friedman’s money growth volatility hypothesis. Granger-causality tests provide some evidence for a velocity/volatility linkage. However, the estimation of volatility-augmented money demand functions reveals that — in contrast to Friedman’s hypothesis — increased money growth volatility lowered the demand for money.     

Interest rate policy of the deutsche bundesbank: An econometric analysis for 1975 to 1992

Summary Internal and external economic targets which a monetary authority tries to achieve make its interest rate policy partly endogenous. This article analyses the Bundesbank's interest rate policy since 1975, the year the Bundesbank published its first intermediate money growth target based on estimates of an inevitable inflation rate and expectations about economic development. Estimation of a discount rate reaction function suggests that German monetary policy responds primarily to the final objective of price level stability and to a smaller extent, to the intermediate money supply target. Moreover, cyclical movements and balance-of payments equilibria are found to significantly influence the Bundesbank's discount rate policy. Both the inflation rate and the current account enter the reaction function in a non-linear way. When inflation is above the targeted rate or when there is a current account deficit, discount rate responses are much stronger than in the case of below target inflation or a current account surplus. Internationally, the Bundesbank discount rate policy is limited by US short-term interest rate movements.     

The role of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the European System of Central Banks

This article lists the main functions and tasks of the Eurosystem NCBs in general and of the Bundesbank in particular. The bulk of these activities is related to monetary policy, payment systems and financial stability. Furthermore, this article addresses the question whether the degree of decentralisation prevailing in the Eurosystem is appropriate. General evaluation criteria such as monetary policy efficiency, the ability to act, transparency and cost efficiency do not give a clear-cut answer because they point in opposite directions and a definite weighting mechanism is not available. Looking therefore more closely at the historical development of the German Central Bank System and the U.S. Federal Reserve System, a tendency can be observed over time towards strengthening of the central office. Nevertheless, the main motive for these developments, namely improving the ability to act, does not seem to be of such importance in the European case: fears of possible inertia in the monetary-policy decision process seem to be unfounded because the respective decision-making bodies have always been able to take decisions quickly.     

German dominance in the European Monetary System: Evidence from money supply growth rates

This paper presents further evidence on ostensible German dominance in the European Monetary System (EMS). A dynamic system of equations is built explaining money growth rates as a function of the EMS countries' money growth rates, the world money growth rate, exchange rate objectives, inflation rates, and real income growth rates. A test of German dominance based upon money growth rates is a test of the hypothesis that the EMS has increased the comovements of money demand between countries in the system. It is found that German independence holds, but other central banks can also be important players in the system in that they can conduct independent monetary policies. Monetary policies in the EMS are best characterized as interactive. Therefore, the strict German dominance hypothesis is rejected. It follows that the EMS has not increased significantly the link between money demand functions in the EMS countries in the hierarchical structure as claimed by the dominance argument.     

The Impact of EMU on Inflation Expectations

This paper analyses the impact of the monetary regime change from the Bundesbank to the ECB on inflation expectations. In the theoretical part, the Barro-Gordon model is used to derive the potential effect of a new central bank on inflation and inflation expectations. The econometric investigation is based on a flexible specification of expectation formation which allows both for rational and adaptive elements. The results indicate that the monetary regime change did not have a strong and lasting impact on the formation of inflation expectations and that the credibility of both central banks is not perceived to differ significantly anymore. JEL Classification Numbers: E 58, E 31     

Inflation and total factor productivity in Germany

Conclusions This paper has found a significant and substantial negative relationship between inflation and economic growth in Germany. Thus, inflation substantially reduced the rate of productivity growth and output growth in Germany. German policymakers, especially the Bundesbank, have emphasized the importance of low inflation rates, and inflation in Germany has been less than in most OECD countries. As a result, Germany has benefitted from relatively high rates of economic growth. But had the Bundesbank succeeded in achieving zero inflation, the underlying rate of productivity growth would have been almost a third higher and output growth about a sixth higher.     

International Interest-Rate Transmission and the “German Dominance Hypothesis” Within EMS

This article investigates whether the German Dominance Hypothesis is valid within the context of nominal short-term interest rates. The approach taken to address this hypothesis is based on the notion that German interest rates should convey valuable information to other countries' rates or that there exist significant multidirectional volatility spillovers from the Bundesbank to other nations' central banks. These transfers can be analyzed within a multivariate framework of an Exponential GARCH model capable of capturing the potential asymmetries of the volatility spillover mechanism. The results, basically, do not support the idea of a German predominance within the system, in a strict sense, since Germany's rates are also affected, for the most part, by actions from its partners.     

The future role of national central banks in the Eurosystem

This contribution describes some changes in European central banks after the start of the European monetary union. It explains how staffs at the national central banks cooperate with the staff at the European Central Bank. Furthermore, a few issues are discussed which relate to the organization of banking supervision in Europe. This paper represents the author's opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.     

Additional evidence on monetary base and interest rate linkages in the EMS

Conclusion This note has examined interest rate and monetary base linkages within the EMS. Cointegration tests suggest the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between German and other EMS interest rates and German and other EMS country monetary bases in a number of cases. Bivariate VAR analysis suggested that Granger causality with respect to EMS interest rate linkages stemmed either from German to European markets or was bi-directional and that the monetary base linkages were overwhelmingly bi-directional. When allowance is made for the influence of US monetary policy developments, the pattern of Granger causality within the EMS is predominantly bi-directional. These findings may be attributable to integrated financial markets and the discipline of a formal exchange rate mechanism. Thus, our results fail to support the hypothesis that German monetary policy plays a dominant and independent role within the EMS. Rather, they suggest that monetary policies in the EMS mainly respond to each other and, to a very limited extent, to developments in US monetary policy.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

Are small countries too powerful within the ECB?

This paper analyzes the possible consequences of diverging economic developments within the euro area, given the current decision-making process of the European Central Bank (ECB). For the German Bundesbank, the role model of the ECB, there is evidence that differences in the economic situation in the various states affected voting behavior in the Governing Council. For the euro area countries, the paper finds that, despite convergence, important differences in terms of economic performance and preferences remain. As all national central banks have one vote within the Governing Council of the ECB, there is a risk that national considerations may prevail over EMU-wide considerations.     

Lessons from the early history of the federal reserve

We meet in Germany a little more than one year after the start of a new monetary institution, modeled in part as a federal system like the Federal Reserve with policy operations like those of the Bundesbank. For the past five years, one of my main occupations has been the early history of the Federal Reserve. I have looked in detail at its voluminous records of its formative years. My talk today is a brief summary of some things I have learned. Presidential Address presented at the Forty-Ninth International Atlantic Economic Conference, Munich, Germany, March 14–21, 2000.     

Wage-Setting and Inflation Targets in EMU

Although the operation of national coordinated wage-bargainingsystems in EMU has produced low inflation rates, EMU-wide inflationhas been above the ECB target rate for the last 3 years. Bycontrast, under the ERM, inflation rates declined steadily after1992 to below 2 per cent in both the last 2 years of the regime.It is argued that this was the consequence of two low-inflationincentives under ERM: (i) the Maastricht inflation conditionfor EMU entry; and (ii) the combination of the Bundesbank threatto raise interest rates if German wage and price inflation roseabove acceptable limits, linked to the need for other ERM membersto follow low German inflation to stay within the exchange-ratebands. These incentives no longer operate under EMU, where individualeconomies do not have an incentive to contribute to low EMU-wideinflation. We suggest that inflation coordination between thelarge EMU member states might contribute to a solution whilepermitting the continuation of real exchange-rate adjustmentsof smaller economies.     

The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government

In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank for the 1989-1998 period. We rely on a novel proxy for the impact of public communication by Bundesbank officials on the probability of conflict, in addition to interest rate, exchange rate, money supply behavior, as well as electoral influences. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that speeches by the Bundesbank president dealing with inflation and economic policy are a positive source of conflict in a probabilistic sense. Conflict was not a constant but flared up at times of economic stress and could be exacerbated by the “talking” of Bundesbank officials.     

Spatial Comparisons of Poverty and Inequality in Living Standards in Malawi

The paper looks at poverty and inequality across areas in Malawi. The focus is on both monetary (consumption) and non‐monetary (health and education) dimensions of well‐being. Stochastic poverty dominance tests show that rural areas are poorer in the three dimensions regardless of poverty line chosen. Stochastic inequality dominance tests find that the north and south dominate the centre in health inequality, and there is no dominance between the north and south. With respect to education inequality, dominance is declared for the south‐centre pair only. A subgroup decomposition analysis finds that the south contributes the most to consumption and education poverty, while the centre is the largest contributor to health poverty. We establish that within‐area inequalities (vertical inequalities) rather than between‐area inequalities (horizontal inequalities) are the major driver of consumption, health and education inequality in Malawi.     

Progress report on the new history of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand

Work began in 2001 on a new official history of the RBNZ, focusing on the period since publication of Gary Hawke's study of the Bank in 1973. This paper discusses the arrangements under which the current project is managed, explains the significance of the RBNZ for central banking, and indicates the challenges facing the historians. A brief outline is given of the planned contents of each chapter. It is hoped that the book arising from this project will be of value to those interested in central banking and monetary policy as well as in the recent history of New Zealand. Over the years, a number of leading central banks, including the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Deutsche Bundesbank, have commissioned institutional histories. The present research project on the history of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ or the 'Bank') falls within this tradition.     

The German financial system and European monetary union

In connection with the European monetary union there has been much speculation about changes European monetary union will engender in member states’ financial systems. Assessments have varied greatly, and are still varying. On the other hand, for a number of reasons, it is important to be able to forecast the impact of European monetary union on the financial system. The paper outlines some major developments in the German financial system during the past few years. It is, however, often very difficult to identify a clear and causal connection between the launch of monetary union and these changes. The paper concludes with some monetary policy implications and issues.