The “LIFO Reserve” and the Value of the Firm: Theory and Empirical Evidence*

Abstract. A valuation approach is used to examine the effect of the LIFO inventory method on the relation between the market value of a firm's stock and the book value of equity. The paper develops three competing hypotheses that have different predictions regarding the relation between the LIFO reserve and the market value of equity. Results indicate a significant negative relation between the LIFO reserve and the value of equity, inconsistent with the pricing of LIFO reserves as unbooked assets, but consistent with a model that views the LIFO reserve as a measure of the effect of increases in factor input prices on firm value. Résumé. Les auteurs ont recours à une évaluation pour examiner l'incidence de la méthode DEPS de détermination du coût des stocks sur la relation entre le cours de l'action d'une société et sa valeur comptable. Ils élaborent trois hypothèses concurrentes qui débouchent sur des prédictions différentes en ce qui a trait à la relation entre la réserve résultant de l'utilisation de la méthode DEPS et la valeur marchande de l'entreprise. Les résultats indiquent une relation négative significative entre cette réserve et la valeur comptable de l'entreprise, relation qui ne concorde pas avec le prix de ladite réserve que l'on voudrait assimiler à un actif non comptabilisé, mais qui cadre avec un modèle selon lequel la réserve résultant de l'utilisation de la méthode DEPS est considérée comme une mesure de l'incidence des hausses du prix des intrants sur la valeur de l'entreprise.     

Analysts' Interpretation and Investors' Valuation of Tax Carryforwards*

We examine how financial analysts and equity investors incorporate information on deferred taxes from carryforwards into earnings forecasts and share prices. We focus on carryforwards because, in providing this information each period, management must use their private information about the firm's profitability prospects. Thus, accounting measurement of tax carryforwards is another way of providing a management earnings forecast. In analyzing the role of carryforwards in valuation, we distinguish between two conflicting effects. First, deferred taxes from carryforwards represent future tax savings; hence, they should be valued positively as assets. In contrast, the existence of tax carryforwards may signal a higher likelihood of future losses, which would have a negative effect on expected earnings and share prices. We find that analysts consider earnings of firms with carryforwards to be less persistent because of the increased likelihood of future losses. We also find that analysts tend to be less precise and more optimistic (biased) in forecasting earnings of firms with carryforwards. This higher optimism and lower precision are more pronounced just after firms adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SPAS) 109 and are almost entirely corrected over time. An analysis of investors' valuation indicates a strong positive relation between deferred taxes from carryforwards and share prices, suggesting that these carryforwards are valued as assets. Also, earnings and book values of equity are valued less in firms that have carryforwards than in firms without carryforwards. Finally, the valuation allowance required under SFAS 109 assists equity investors in valuing a firm's earnings and net assets. The combined findings on analysts' interpretation and investors' valuation suggest that analysts fail to fully capture the implication of carryforwards on future earnings within their forecasting horizon.     

JIT Adoption: The Effects of LIFO Reserves and Financial Reporting and Tax Incentives*

Using matched samples of JIT adopters and nonadopters, we examine the association of JIT adoption with firms' financial reporting and tax incentives, earnings‐management histories, and LIFO reserve levels. We find evidence that adoption decisions are influenced by the interaction of firms' LIFO reserves with their income smoothing, debt covenant, and tax incentives. We also find that adoption is less likely for firms historically engaging in high degrees of earnings management, particularly when such firms have no substantial LIFO reserves. Our study extends earlier research demonstrating a relation between inventory valuation method and year‐end inventory transactions, and documents a relation between earnings‐management incentives and a fundamental supply‐chain design choice.     

On the nature of deferred income taxes*

Abstract. The topic of deferred income taxes has generated considerable controversy. This paper observes that much of this controversy centers on the contingent nature of income taxes. It reviews the similarity between the firm's income tax liabilities and a European call option written on the firm's pretax value. From this perspective, deferred taxes are shown to effectively alter the exercise price of the call option held by the government, thus affecting the value of the firm's debt and equity claims. Additional results are obtained from the model by valuing the tax liabilities and the firm's financial claims via an exact option pricing formula. Finally, the paper shows that the model is robust to some of its underlying assumptions. Résumé. Les impôts sur le revenu reportés ont été l'objet d'une immense contraverse. L'auteur fait remarquer que cette controverse est en grande partie centrée sur la nature conjoncturelle des impôts sur le revenu. Il examine la similarité entre la dette fiscale de l'entreprise et une option d'achat européenne libellée sur la valeur avant impôt de l'entre-prise. Dans cette perspective, l'auteur démontre que les impôts reportés modifient effectivement le prix d'exercice de l'option d'achat détenue par le gouvernement, infiuant ainsi sur la valeur des droits à l'actif de l'entreprise. Il obtient des résultats supplémentaires du modèle en évaluant la dette fiscale et les créances financières de l'entreprise par l'intermédiaire d'une formule de détermination du prix exact de l'option. Enfin, l'auteur démontre que certaines des hypothèses sous-jacentes au modèle résistent à l'analyse.     

无形资产摊销中的所得税筹划

从所得税入手,无形资产摊销出发,考虑纳税筹划的基本方法和企业所处法律,经济环境,进行税收筹划分析。无形资产在企业资产中占有的比重较大,从而无形资产摊销对应纳所得税额有重大的影响。实际中,可巧用摊销年限和选择适宜摊销方法,从而实现免除、减少或递延纳税义务,获取资金时间价值、实现涉税零风险等目标。     

The Effect of Limited Liability on the Informativeness of Earnings: Evidence from the Stock and Bond Markets*

Previous empirical research on the informativeness of earnings has focused on stockholders, and has not examined differences in earnings' informativeness for stockholders and bondholders. Because stockholders are residual claimants and bondholders are fixed claimants, the informativeness of earnings should differ for these two types of investors. When a firm's default risk is low, changes in its financial condition should be of limited relevance to bondholders, but should be relevant to stockholders. In contrast, as the likelihood of financial distress increases, stockholders' limited liability allows them to abandon the firm to the bondholders (Fischer and Verrecchia 1997). Accordingly, as a firm's default risk increases, changes in its financial condition should be increasingly important to bondholders and less important to shareholders. Because earnings provide information on firm value, the stock return-earnings association should decrease as the firm's financial strength declines, while the bond return-earnings association should increase. We use two measures of a firm's financial strength: the firm's bond rating and its reporting of a loss. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the association between stock returns and changes in annual earnings decreases as bond ratings decline, while the association between bond returns and changes in annual earnings increases. These results suggest that as the company's financial condition deteriorates, earnings become less relevant for stock valuation and more relevant for bond valuation. When we partition firms based on their loss status, we find a stronger association between stock returns and annual earnings changes for firms with positive earnings (profit firms) than for firms with losses, consistent with earlier studies. In contrast, we find that the association between bond returns and earnings changes is greater for loss firms than for profit firms. These results suggest that losses reduce the informativeness of earnings for stockholders but increase informativeness for bondholders, suggesting that investors view losses as indicating increased credit risk.     

Earnings Management Using the Valuation Allowance for Deferred Tax Assets under SFAS No. 109*

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109) allows firms to use their discretion to set arbitrarily high valuation allowances against deferred tax assets. Firms can then later use these "hidden reserves" to manage earnings. Our evidence indicates that most banks do not record a valuation allowance to manage earnings, but rather to follow the guidelines of SFAS No. 109. However, if the bank is sufficiently well capitalized to absorb the current‐period impact on capital, then the amount of the valuation allowance increases with a bank's capital. In later years, bank managers adjust the valuation allowance to smooth earnings. The magnitude of the discretionary adjustment increases with the deviation of unadjusted earnings from the forecast or historical earnings.     

Do Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts Encourage Managers to Improve the Firm's Cash Flows? Evidence from Tax Planning

Recent research finds that analysts' cash flow forecasts have meaningful financial reporting ramifications, but, to date, the identified effects are unlikely to yield meaningful cash flow benefits. This study examines whether analysts' cash flow forecasts encourage managers to enhance the firm's cash flow position through tax avoidance activities. We evaluate the change in cash tax avoidance after analysts begin issuing cash flow forecasts relative to a propensity score matched control sample of firms without cash flow forecasts. Consistent with analysts' cash flow forecasts encouraging tax avoidance that enhances the firm's cash flow health, we find a negative association between cash tax payments and analysts' cash flow coverage. Additional analysis suggests this association is driven primarily by strategies to permanently avoid rather than to temporarily defer tax payments and that increased cash tax avoidance activity represents a nontrivial component of the overall increase in reported operating cash flows after the initiation of analysts' cash flow coverage.     

The minimum wage and the financialization of firms: Evidence from China

This paper utilizes China's A-listed firm data to investigate whether increasing the minimum wage promotes the financialization of firms. We apply instrumental variable estimation and various robustness tests to address measurement errors and potential endogeneity. We find robust and consistent evidence that exposure to higher minimum wages increases a firm's investment in financial assets. Furthermore, we explore the effects of moderators, such as increased employment stickiness, intensification of financial constraints, and reduced innovation activities as potential explanations for the positive effect of increasing minimum wages. Moreover, firms located in non-coastal cities with relatively higher equity concentration and lower market competition are substantially more incentivized to increase investment in financial assets. Overall, this paper provides new insights into understanding the effects of increasing labor costs on firms' asset allocation in emerging market economies.     

Equity Valuation Effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006*

We investigate the equity valuation effects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006). The PPA 2006 has two main provisions: (1) firms must fully fund their pension plans within seven years (previously allowed 30 years to fund 90 percent of the pension liability) and (2) firms receive a tax deduction for contributions up to 150 percent of the pension liability (previously 100 percent). After controlling for the effects of SFAS 158, growth opportunities, the cost of external funds, and other information released during our sample period, we examine pension firms’ abnormal returns surrounding key dates in the legislative process leading to the adoption of the PPA 2006. First, we find a mean negative abnormal return of ?4.20 percent during the period in which the PPA 2006 was first voted on by Congress. The mean (median) firm in our sample experienced a $310 million ($60 million) decline in market capitalization. Second, we find that the valuation effect was more negative for firms with larger unfunded pension liabilities and larger capital expenditure requirements, while firms with higher marginal tax rates experienced a positive effect. Third, we find no evidence of differential valuation effects for firms in different “at risk” categories as defined by the PPA 2006. Finally, we find a significant number of pension freezes occurred during our sample period. Our results are stronger when excluding these firms from our sample.     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

Determinants of Funding Strategies and Actuarial Choices for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans*

This paper examines the effects of firms' financial and pension profiles on their funding strategies and actuarial choices. The paper uses reports filed by individual pension plans with the Department of Labor under the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for the analysis. Evidence reported in the paper shows that as firms become overfunded, they make conservative actuarial choices to avoid visibility costs, and that as firms become underfunded, they make liberal actuarial choices to avoid visibility costs. As the annual contributions increase relative to the permissible contribution ranges, firms make conservative actuarial choices to minimize penalties and maximize tax benefits. As the annual contributions decrease relative to the permissible contribution ranges, firms make liberal actuarial choices to minimize penalties and maximize tax benefits. The larger the profitability, cash flow from operations, and tax liability, and the smaller the debt of a firm, the higher the likelihood that the firm's managers will make conservative actuarial choices to maximize contributions. Conversely, the smaller the profitability, cash flow from operations, and tax liability, and the larger the debt of a firm, the higher the likelihood that the firm's managers will make liberal actuarial choices to minimize contributions. This evidence, which is consistent with the hypothesis of funding management, can aid the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in regulating the defined-benefit pension plans more effectively and help plan beneficiaries to manage their retirement portfolios more efficiently. The debiasing method developed in the paper can provide investors and creditors with the tools to identify the discretionary components of pension liabilities and thereby value firms more efficiently.     

The Relevance to Investors of Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosures

This study finds that investors price firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a negative component of equity value, and this valuation discount does not differ between firms that voluntarily disclose to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and nondisclosing firms. We derive the GHG emissions for nondisclosers from an estimation model that incorporates firm characteristics and industry. The finding that investors view CDP amounts and estimates of emissions as equally value‐relevant suggests that equity values reflect GHG information from channels other than the CDP. An event study of investors' response to emission‐related information in firms' 8‐K filings further supports this finding. Economically, our results suggest that, for the median S&P 500 firm, GHG emissions impose a market‐implied equity discount of $79 per ton, representing about one‐half of 1 percent of market capitalization.     

Impact of Competition and Taxes on Responsibility Center Organization and Transfer Prices*

We show that a firm can use its decentralized organizational structure and transfer price as commitment devices to obtain strategic advantage in the product market only when there are nonstrategic reasons to decentralize and to distort transfer prices away from marginal costs, such as the sales office's local knowledge about market conditions and the presence of tax rate differentials across the two tax jurisdictions. Surprisingly, an increase in the sales office's tax rates may help a firm increase overall profits. An increase in the sales office's tax rates causes the firm to increase its transfer price, which in turn dampens the sales office's competition and may more than offset the effect of increased tax rates on the firm's overall profits.     

Express Yourself: Why Managers' Disclosure Tone Varies Across Time and What Investors Learn from It

We argue that volatility in a manager's disclosure tone across time should be a function of two components: (i) the firm's innate operating risk and (ii) the extent to which the manager's disclosure transparently reflects that risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that both operating risk and disclosure transparency are important determinants of disclosure tone volatility. We then examine whether investors incorporate the incremental information provided by disclosure tone volatility into their assessments of firm risk. If disclosure tone volatility primarily provides investors with incremental information about a firm's operating risk, we should find a positive association between tone volatility and market-based assessments of risk. On the other hand, if disclosure tone volatility primarily provides investors with incremental information about a manager's disclosure transparency, we should find a negative association between tone volatility and market-based assessments of risk. Consistent with an operating risk explanation, we find a positive association between disclosure tone volatility and market-based assessments of firm risk after controlling for a comprehensive set of proxies for operating risk and transparency. We find little support for an information risk explanation, even when we examine multiple measures specifically designed to capture information risk. Taken together, our results suggest that although disclosure tone volatility is a function of both a firm's operating risk and a manager's disclosure transparency, investors appear to respond as if disclosure tone volatility only provides incremental information about a firm's operating risk.     

Strategic choice of inventory accounting methods*

Abstract. This paper presents a stylized game-theoretic model in which inventory accounting choices of firms convey proprietary information to their competitors, and hence those choices are strategically made. The model provides a rationale for the use of FIFO by some firms, foregoing significant amounts of tax benefits which could be captured by the use of LIFO. An explanation is also given for negative market reactions to LIFO adoptions documented by most of the empirical studies of LIFO/FIFO decisions. A further result obtained is that, given a certain condition, the use of FIFO (thus foregoing the LIFO tax benefit) would be more frequently observed in industries with high barriers to entry. Some extensions and limitations of the model are also discussed. Résumé. L'auteur propose un modèle stylisé inspiré de la théorie des jeux dans lequel les choix des entreprises au chapitre de la comptabilisation des stocks transmettent de l'information privilégiée à leurs concurrents, ces choix étant donc stratégiques. Le modèle contient une explication du raisonnement sous-jacent à l'utilisation de la méthode de l'épuisement successif (premier entré, premier sorti ou PEPS) par certaines entreprises qui renoncent ainsi aux avantages fiscaux importants qu'elles pourraient tirer de l'utilisation de l'épuisement à rebours (dernier entré, premier sorti ou DEPS). L'auteur propose également une explication des réactions négatives du marché vis-à-vis l'adoption de la méthode DEPS, appuyée par la majorité des études empiriques portant sur les décisions relatives aux méthodes DEPS et PEPS. Une autre des conclusions de l'étude veut qu'étant donné certaines conditions, l'utilisation de la méthode PEPS (par laquelle l'entreprise renonce aux avantages fiscaux de la méthode DEPS) serait plus fréquemment relevée dans les secteurs dans lesquels les barrières à l'entrée sont importantes. L'auteur traite également des prolongements et de certaines limites du modèle.     

Resource Allocation Effects of Price Reactions to Disclosures*

Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. We ask whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, we show that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing a potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, we show that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value strategy changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, we show that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like “sunk‐cost” behavior may in fact be optimal. Both demonstrations show that, in addition to performing their usual role of anticipating future cash flows generated by a manager's actions, capital market prices can also be used to direct a manager's actions. It follows that, in contrast to the usual depiction of the information flows between capital markets and firms as being one way — from firms to the capital markets — information also flows from capital markets to firms.     

Who Benefits from Inconsistent Multinational Tax Transfer‐Pricing Rules?*

This paper uses a strategic tax compliance model to examine taxpayer reporting and tax authority audit strategies in an international setting with two tax authorities. The setting features both information asymmetry between the taxpayer and the tax authorities and inconsistent tax transfer‐pricing rules. The latter creates the possibility of each country trying to tax the same income. We study the effect of the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency on the strategies and payoffs of the taxpayer and the tax authorities. We find that an increase in the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency induces more aggressive auditing by governments. It therefore deters taxpayers from shifting income to the country with the lower tax rate in situations in which the transfer‐pricing rules are consistent, and can either increase or decrease the income reported to the low‐tax‐rate country in cases in which the transfer‐pricing rules are inconsistent. We find that an increase in transfer‐price rule inconsistency could either increase or decrease the taxpayer's expected tax liability and could either increase or decrease the deadweight loss from auditing. Our results call into question the conventional wisdom that the prospect of double taxation due to transfer‐price rule inconsistency increases a firm's expected tax liability and governments' expected audit costs.     

Equity‐Based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality

We examine the relationship between a firm's disclosure quality and equity‐based compensation of independent members of the board of directors. The dimensions of disclosure quality we focus on are management's earnings guidance and information flowthrough financial analysts. Using both levels and changes specifications, we find the average ratio of equity‐based pay to total pay of independent board members to be positively related to a firm's disclosure quality. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of management's equity‐based compensation, other governance measures, and financial controls, and robust to instrumental variable tests of endogeneity. Furthermore, we find directors’ equity‐based compensation to be negatively associated with the firm's cost of equity capital. Our results are consistent with equity‐based compensation providing incentives to independent directors to push for better disclosure quality.     

The Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD&A Section of Annual Reports*

Abstract. In this study, we appeal to theories advanced by Darrough and Stoughton (1990) to enhance our understanding of why some firms may voluntarily include directional forecasts in their annual reports while others do not. The data are consistent with their predictions that a firm's disclosure policy reflects its concern for both financial market valuation and product market competition. We find that for “good news firms, the probability of forecasting is increasing in the financing requirements but decreasing in the threat of competitor entry. The converse holds for “bad news” firms. These results lend further empirical support to the observation that the familiar good news hypothesis tested in the management earnings forecast literature offers only a partial explanation for the decision to forecast. Interestingly, however, even after controlling for financial and product market considerations, an overall voluntary disclosure bias still exists in the data. The data also provide support for the OSC's concern about a voluntary disclosure bias. Only 17.5 percent of our sample forecasts represent revisions downward relative to the previous year's results. However, in contrast to the OSC's concern about a general lack of forward-looking disclosures in annual reports, 35.9 percent of our sample firms include directional forecasts in their MD&A or elsewhere in the annual report.