共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
手机行业的高发展、高竞争与高科技的特征决定了其对高级管理人员及核心技术人员的需求非常迫切,要想保持其市场优势,必须能够吸引并聚拢一批高端的管理人员与核心技术人员。在这样的市场需求与竞争压力下,公司为实现公司的长远发展,选择了股权激励这一长期激励机制。本文从提出股权激励计划的上市公司中选取有代表性的手机行业H公司为例,具体分析其股权激励的实施情况。 相似文献
2.
3.
我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究 总被引：81，自引：0，他引：81
目前股权激励在国内越来越受到重视,作为一种长期激励制度安排,股权激励的作用最终要落实到公司业绩增长上。本文通过对剔除行业影响后的上市公司高管人员股权激励效应进行实证研究,指出目前我国上市公司高管人员股权激励的长期效应不明显;从行业角度看,交通运输行业的上市公司股权激励效果最好。 相似文献
4.
不确定性、股权激励与非效率投资 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
文章在考察环境不确定性对上市公司投资行为影响的基础上,分析了股权激励计划对这一相关关系的影响机制和作用效果,结果发现:企业所面临的环境不确定性会降低企业投资效率,导致过度投资或投资不足。而股权激励措施对不确定环境引起的管理者非效率投资行为有抑制作用。本文研究结果表明,股权激励制度有助于减少环境不确定性导致的代理矛盾,抑制过度投资,也有助于降低企业管理者风险的厌恶程度,缓解投资不足。 相似文献
5.
股权激励作为解决委托代理问题的一种长期激励手段,受到了我国很大一部分上市公司的青睐。其实施效果究竟如何,我国的学者们也通过各种方式进行了研究,然而得到的结果并不一致。本文对这些研究进行了梳理,同时也对现阶段研究中存在的局限进行了分析。 相似文献
6.
近年来,越来越多的民族自治区上市公司开始实施股权激励,由于授出权益的数量较少,业绩考核标准较为简单,导致股权激励的实施效果不太明显,加之股市行情低迷,致使部分公司的股权激励半途而废。要使股权激励顺利的实施并发挥激励效应,离不开资本市场与公司基本面等诸多因素的配合,也离不开业绩考核标准的合理设定。企业在实施股权激励计划之前应做好可行性分析,以确保股东利益不受侵害。 相似文献
7.
公司治理一直是学术界研究的焦点问题,而公司治理中有关股权激励的讨论一直不绝于耳。股权激励作为缓解企业代理关系双方利益分歧的方式之一受到国内外企业的广泛运用,而国内外的相关研究也是层出不穷．本文仅以国内相关研究为基础,对股权激励动机、股权激励方案、股权激励效果、股权激励发展趋势等方面进行文献综述。 相似文献
8.
股权激励是一种长期激励制度,有助于现代企业的发展,一经提出便备受关注。文章首先对我国上市公司股权激励实施的背景进行介绍,然后分析我国上市公司股权激励实施进展,对有关股权激励的法律规章作了梳理,对学术界研究这一课题情况做了统计分析,并提出相应的建议。 相似文献
9.
米海霞 《金融经济(湖南)》2008,(6):10-11
本文以2006年43家披露股权激励方案的上市公司和相应的配对公司为样本,运用比较分析法检验了股权激励方案披露后公司的业绩变化,研究发现:(1)上市公司披露股权激励计划后的业绩好于其披露前的业绩,且总体上来说好于未披露股权激励计划公司的业绩;(2)股票期权的激励效应要比限制性股票显著;(3)批发零售贸易行业的股权激励效果最好。 相似文献
10.
中国上市公司股权激励的效应分析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
米海霞 《金融经济(湖南)》2008,(12)
本文以2006年43家披露股权激励方案的上市公司和相应的配对公司为样本,运用比较分析法检验了股权激励方案披露后公司的业绩变化,研究发现:(1)上市公司披露股权激励计划后的业绩好于其披露前的业绩,且总体上来说好于未披露股权激励计划公司的业绩;(2)股票期权的激励效应要比限制性股票显著;(3)批发零售贸易行业的股权激励效果最好。 相似文献
11.
SeungWon Lee 《Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance》2023,34(1):179-190
This study investigates whether SFAS 123R was effective at curtailing firms’ earnings management associated with stock option compensation. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis, I find that firms with high implied option compensation before SFAS 123R significantly reduced earnings management after SFAS 123R. The sub-period analysis indicates that option compensation after SFAS 123R is negatively related to earnings management, while option compensation before SFAS 123R is positively related to earnings management. Overall, the findings indicate that SFAS 123R effectively diminished earnings management associated with stock option compensation. 相似文献
12.
In this paper, we develop a two‐stage continuous time model of employee stock option (ESO) valuation under different tax regimes. We show that tax rules can have significant effects on ESO exercise behavior. In addition, we find that incentive stock options (ISO) are the optimal form of compensation for all levels of employees in the UK. In the US, restricted stock plans are preferred, and tax breaks offered by incentive schemes are only beneficial to employees with high liquid wealth (or small option holdings relative to wealth) or low risk aversion. We also analyze 83b elections for restricted stock plans in the US and find that making an election is a sub‐optimal decision for both the employee and the firm. 相似文献
13.
Abstract:Taking account of the business life cycle, this paper investigates the impact of the proceeds associated with stock option exercises on investment expenditures and stock repurchases. The results reveal that the proceeds associated with option exercises could add internal funds to firms and contribute to investment in research and development and capital expenditures, especially in the growth stage of a firm’s life cycle. This paper also shows the positive relationship between option proceeds and stock repurchases in the stagnant stage of that cycle. The empirical results further suggest that stock repurchases may substitute for dividends. In summary, the paper empirically demonstrates that stock options not only encourage employees to work harder, but also create more funds for the firm. 相似文献
14.
Linxiao Liu Harrison Liu Jennifer Yin 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2014,41(5-6):652-684
This study investigates some of the most important avenues that mangers use to manipulate the value of stock option grants. It also compares the use of these avenues in firms that issue scheduled options and in firms that issue irregular options. We document that before the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX), cumulative abnormal returns were significantly negative in the 30‐day window before an option grant, but cumulative abnormal returns turned significantly positive after the option grant. This pattern is more pronounced for irregular options, and the evidence supports the hypothesis that opportunistic manipulation of strike prices by CEOs maximized the value of the option grants. We find the disclosure requirement of option grants included in SOX successfully curtails opportunistic behavior in firms that issue scheduled options, but has a lesser effect stopping opportunistic behavior in firms that issue irregular options. Firms granting irregular options take larger negative discretionary accruals in advance of the grant than firms that grant scheduled options, and the degree of downward earnings management increases with the size of the subsequent grant. We further show that firms are more likely to issue irregular options when they offer larger option grants, have a less independent board, receive less analyst coverage, have a new CEO, exhibit poor prior performance, have higher stock return volatility and are smaller in size. 相似文献
15.
We study motives for executive stock option backdating, the practice of changing the grant dates of current options to dates in the past using hindsight. We find that smaller, younger and less profitable firms tend to be more heavily involved in backdating. These results are consistent with the retention hypothesis. In line with the incentive hypothesis, we find that backdating occurs more for options that are out‐of‐the‐money. We derive some evidence for the agency hypothesis, in the sense that backdating companies have a larger percentage of inside directors. However, contrary to this hypothesis, we conclude that backdating firms have better protection for minority shareholders compared to firms that do not backdate. 相似文献
16.
梁俊娇 《中央财经大学学报》2003,(4):19-23
股票期权制度是一种新型的薪酬激励制度。股票期权制度作为富有成效的激励制度之一，在发达国家得到了广泛的应用，已成为市场经济国家和地区的企业对员工进行长期激励的非常普遍的方式。近两年来，股票期权成为我国企业改革和发展的一个热门话题，并在部分企业开始实施。如何针对股票期权所得的特点，并借鉴国外经验，制定相应的税收政策，是我们迫切需要解决的问题。本对我国股票期权所得税目、纳税义务发生时间、计税依据、税收优惠及税收征管等作了较为详细的探讨。 相似文献
17.
This article studies a well-known, and flawed, use of the Black–Scholes model in reporting. It achieves two principal goals. First, it reports our critical analysis into the topic resulting from the combination of our fields’ expertise in it. Second, we report our study into an as-yet undocumented example of that flaw. The flawed use of Black–Scholes leads to mark-to-model measurements errors in reporting, most notably in Earnings. Our analysis covers the major sources of the resulting mis-measurement: the mismatch between the parametrization of Black–Scholes models versus the legal formulation of ESO contract terms; and the alteration of the models’ inputs mandated by regulators. These regulators asserted that the unavoidably incorrect values would be “sufficient” for reporting. Our study examines the infrequently studied “risk-free rate” input to demonstrate that resulting mis-measurements are readily quantifiable. We expect to continue this research into our fields’ disagreements on the use of the Black–Scholes class of option pricing models for reporting. 相似文献
18.
Eileen F. St. Pierre 《The Financial Review》1998,33(1):105-118
This paper combines several interesting econometric techniques to examine changes in the conditional return distribution of security returns following option introduction. An EGARCH model is used to characterize the return generating process. An intervention analysis is performed to determine whether the parameters of the EGARCH model shift following initial options listing. This paper finds that the conditional distribution of security returns is unaffected by option introduction. Estimation of a transfer function-noise model also shows that option introduction has no effect on conditional volatility. 相似文献
19.
Kyung Tae Lee Sang Cheol Lee Suhyeun Choi 《Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies》2011,40(6):856-888
In this study we examine whether executives manage accounting earnings to maximize their own gains around stock option exercises. In particular, this study analyzes the effects of two factors, the value of exercised executive stock options and the change in the value of exercised executive stock options for a 1% change in the underlying stock price on the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. Furthermore, the present paper investigates whether the relations between both the value and the price incentive of exercised stock options and earnings management are more affected by the level of information asymmetry and the length of the stock disposition period after exercising stock options. The sample for this study consists of 93 observations from 51 companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange and Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations. Managers exercised their stock options from the fourth quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2005. The empirical findings are as follows. First, higher values and price incentives for executive stock options were associated with higher earnings management. These results imply that executives manage firms’ reported earnings to maximize their own gains around stock option exercises. Second, information asymmetry reinforces the association between both the values and price incentives of exercised executive stock options and earnings management. Finally, the values and price incentives of exercised executive stock options provide greater incentives for executives to manage earnings when executives sell the acquired stocks after exercising the stock options. 相似文献
20.
This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies shorten the expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula. Theoretical support for these adjustments is often thin, and companies universally ignore reasons that the Black-Scholes formula might underestimate the value of executive stock options. The findings not only cast light upon how corporations value executive stock options, but also provide a means of forecasting compliance with controversial new FASB requirements for firms to disclose the compensation expense represented by executive stock options. 相似文献