环境壁垒在处理跨界污染问题中的运用

由于缺乏能够有力约束各国政府的组织存在,而各国仅从自身利益最大化来考虑污染排放,故如何让各国自愿并积极地参与环境保护协议以解决跨界污染一直是环境经济主要研究的问题之一。另外,环境壁垒一直被认为是新贸易保护主义所采取的一种贸易保护政策的新形式,其阻碍了贸易自由化的发展。然而,本文从另一角度重新审视环境壁垒,通过把它引入跨界污染博弈中形成关联博弈,最终得出环境壁垒有助于解决国家间的跨界污染问题的结论。     

Maritime trade and migratory species management to protect biodiversity

Invasive species threaten biodiversity worldwide. Ships inadvertently carry marine invasive species to vulnerable ports. An empirical game theoretic analysis is presented to explore this transboundary biological pollution topic. This analysis utilizes data on marine invasive species and maritime trade as a vector of impact on native species at different public port locations along the Pacific coast of the North American countries. Preventative and reactive abatement strategies are compared. The countries are not identical and a comparison of noncooperative game strategies and payoffs to the cooperative game is presented. With the asymmetry between countries, optimal sharing rules are quantified. Results show that cooperative and preventative abatement is optimal compared to all other strategies dealing with stock and flow pollution.      

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

Trade agreements,domestic environmental regulation,and transboundary pollution

This paper investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries that takes the distortion arising from their non-coordinated environmental policies into consideration. In a reciprocal-markets model with bidirectional transboundary pollution, we find that if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, the second-best trade agreement requires that both countries subsidize the imported goods whose consumption gives rise to pollution. We also find that a bilateral tariff reduction is beneficial to the global environment.     

Strategic Environmental Policies and the Gains from Trade Liberalization

The literature on strategic environmental policy has not fully addressed welfare effects of trade liberalization from autarky. In a reciprocal market model of duopoly with transboundary pollution, we study how reductions in transport costs and import tariffs affect the Nash‐equilibrium welfare of an environmental policy game as compared to any initial state including autarky. We show three patterns of gainfulness of trade depending on the interaction between marginal damage from pollution and the degree of transboundary pollution.     

AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION AND THE GAINS FROM TRADE: RECONSIDERATION

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of transboundary pollution on trade and welfare in a two-country, two-good, one-factor model in which pollution is treated as a negative cross-industry externality. It is shown that trade may improve countries' natural environment and consequently raises the countries' welfare if a comparative advantage in a pollution-producing good is held by a country that greatly surpasses the other in pollution abatement technology. This result has not been obtained from existing models of this type.     

Environmental policy and lobbying in small open economies

This paper analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are here characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. The optimal pollution taxes are characterized and comparative statics are carried out to increase the understanding of mechanisms underlying pollution taxes in the specified setup. It is found, among other things, that the presence of local lobbying may decrease, as well as increase pollution taxes - depending on, e.g. an assumption of symmetry.     

Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements

This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements: the non-cooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the non-cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules.     

Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

Transboundary Pollution and International Migration

We analyze the welfare effects of international migration in the presence of transboundary pollution. We use a simplified Copeland and Taylor (1999) model, where the (developed) home country's pollution abatement technology is superior to that of the (less developed) foreign country. If there is no trade, workers will migrate from the foreign country to the home country. The foreign country gains from migration, but whether the home country gains or not depends on the abatement‐technology gap and the magnitude of the coefficient of transboundary pollution. World welfare will increase under migration. If there is free trade in goods, international migration occurs when the home country specializes in the production of the environmentally sensitive good. In this case, migration will result in increased production of the manufactured good and increase the level of world pollution.     

FDI and environmental regulation: pollution haven or a race to the top?

Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows accompanied with globalization have raised the concern of a “race to the bottom” phenomenon in environmental protection. This is because footloose investors of “dirty” industries tend to relocate to “pollution havens” of the developing world. However when pollutant is transboundary (as in the case of greenhouse gases), the source country’s incentive to relocate and the recipient country’s willingness to host such industries are not straightforward. This article studies the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation using a North–South market share game model in a two-country setting, when pollution is transboundary. Contrary to the pollution haven hypothesis, our model shows that if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, resulting in a “race-to-the-top” phenomenon; but if market sizes are large enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South (from its laxest form), a finding that is consistent with the “regulatory chill” argument. Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the fixed cost of FDI, as the traditional proximity–concentration tradeoff theory predicts.     

An Empirical Examination of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis for India: Towards a Green Leontief Paradox?

Using input–output analysis, we examine whether India can be regarded as a pollution haven. We calculate the extra CO₂, SO₂ and NO _x emissions induced by 1 billion rupees of additional exports. This is compared with the reduction of Indian pollution caused by an import increase of equal size. In contrast to what the pollution haven hypothesis states for developing countries, we find that India considerably gains from extra trade. Comparing 1996/1997 with 1991/1992, the gains have only increased, indicating that India has moved␣further away from being a pollution haven. The outcome is robust to changes in the underlying assumptions.      

Economic integration and the environment: Effects on members and non-members

The paper analyses the effects of economic integration and national environmental policies in a three-country world. There are two factors of production, an environmental good and capital, which is internationally mobile. Two of the countries create an internal market. This is modelled by a reduction in mobility costs. This process of economic integration leads to a relocation of the factors of production. The welfare effects of factor relocation are analysed for different types of environmental policies. Special emphasis is placed on the issue of international externalities such as transboundary pollution spill-overs.     

Trade,Transboundary Pollution,and Foreign Lobbying

In this paper, we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution. We show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream (polluted) country. But if the upstream (polluting) country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs, distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country’s social welfare, and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country. Thus, the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments’ susceptibility to foreign political influence.     

Transboundary Externalities in the Environmental Transition Hypothesis

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is a hypothesis which implies that it is possible to grow out of environmental degradation. Most theoretical models of the EKC relation have not accounted for transboundary and intergenerational externalities nor have empirical studies provided evidence that validates an inverted U shaped relation between environmental degradation and economic growth for pollution problems where the effects are far-displaced or are long-delayed.This paper integrates the theory of transboundary externalities into the most common theoretical framework applied to the EKC hypothesis. It shows that where a significant proportion of the environmental impacts of economic activity occurs outside the territories in which those activities take place, the de-linking of growth and environmental degradation is less likely to happen. This proposition is demonstrated by assuming that decisionmakers have a Nash-type non cooperative strategic behavior.     

Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games

This paper studies a machine (finite automaton) playing a two-player repeated game of a simple extensive-form game with perfect information. We introduce a new complexity measure called multiple complexity which incorporates a strategyʼs responsiveness to information in the stage game as well as the number of states of the machine. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the machine game. In the sequential-move prisonerʼs dilemma, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium.     

Is Corporate Environmentalism Good for Domestic Welfare?

Many private firms voluntarily care about the environment and declare that their products and production processes are environmentally friendly. This paper shows that corporate environmentalism may reduce the effectiveness of government policies. A simple third‐market trade model with strategic environmental and trade policy is employed, in which an environmentally conscious domestic firm competes with a profit‐maximizing foreign firm. It is shown that even if emission taxes and export subsidies are both available, corporate environmentalism may reduce domestic welfare when pollution is transboundary. In the realistic situation where export subsidies are prohibited, welfare may fall even if pollution is local.     

VALUING HEALTH EFFECTS: THE CASE OF OZONE AND FINE PARTICLES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

This study presents a conservative estimate of the health benefits that would result from attainment of the federal ozone and fine particle (PM_2.5) standards in the South Coast Air Basin of southern California. A three‐stage approach is used that links pollution exposures to adverse health outcomes to economic values. The annual value of the aggregate health benefits approaches $500 million (with a range of $295–$646 million) for ozone and exceeds $21 billion (with a range of $12.85–$34.22 billion) for fine particles. Such results are useful to regulatory agencies and other policy makers when evaluating the merits of various air pollution reduction strategies. (JEL Q51, Q53)     

On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations

Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement.     

Strategic pollution control under free trade

This paper designs a reciprocal dumping model to address the control of industrial pollution between two trading partners. Firms generate transboundary pollution from production and environmental taxes represent the pollution control instrument. We ask whether environmental taxes implemented in a non-cooperative setting are more stringent than the globally efficient level. Relative to the globally efficient case, we find in the linear Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) context that the tax rate for both countries is smaller and individual emissions are larger. However, these results may not hold in the non-linear MPNE case depending on market structure and environmental conditions. Unlike the symmetric equilibrium case, the tax rates are always discontinuous under asymmetric MPNEs. The asymmetric equilibrium scenario can give rise to higher individual payoffs relative to the symmetric equilibrium case.