Markups,quality, and transport costs

This paper provides new evidence on trade prices based on firm-level data from France. It shows that firms charge higher free-on-board (net of transportation costs, hereafter noted as fob) unit values on exports to more distant countries. This finding holds within firms and products, and across destinations. The price premium paid by distant consumers is due to firms charging higher fob prices, and to higher transportation costs. A simple decomposition of the elasticity of import prices to distance shows that, after a fall in transport costs, almost 80% of the decline in import prices enjoyed by consumers is due to firms charging lower fob prices. This suggests a new channel through which changes in transport costs may affect welfare.     

Geographical separation of oligopolists can be very competitive

A given number of single, differentiated product oligopolists locate in one of two separate market-places, which consumers access at a cost. Firms set prices and the CES consumers choose purchases at one or both market-places. Firm agglomeration in one market-place produces positive profits because of product differentiation. But if consumer access costs are homogeneous and products are sufficiently good substitutes, geographical separation of firms produces prices analogous to homogeneous product Bertrand, and is “very competitive”, the reverse of textbook Hotelling. Hence a novel explanation emerges for the geographical agglomeration of firms producing very similar products.     

Organic food consumption in Europe: International segmentation based on value system differences

In this paper, we analyze the market for organic products in eight European countries, based on differences in their respective value systems. With a significant sample of 8014 consumers, we first identify international segments in the European organic products market using the Values Theory. Then we apply the Theory of Planned Behavior to examine how European consumers use attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control to form their purchase intention for organic products. Results show that subjective norms are the main underlying factor driving consumer behavior concerning these products. This effect is higher for the group of countries whose citizens score higher on Schwartz's value scale. In this segment of countries, people are more likely to be affected by what others think, which means that the best approach is to increase social awareness of the relevance of purchasing organic products. Organic products represent a potentially profitable opportunity for companies with an international horizon. Results are also useful for consumers and public administrations.     

A note on the Hotelling principle of minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd

This paper investigates price competition in the Hotelling location model with linear transportation costs when consumer preferences are affected by the number of consumers shopping at the same store. A consumption externality permits us to consider the imitation and the congestion effects which are opposite forces at work. The coexistence of the two effects confers new validity to the principle of minimum differentiation as it was in the original Hotelling model. I show that firms do not need to set apart in order to earn higher profits. The results show firms endogenously choosing to locate in the center of the interval sharing the market with positive prices.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

中国农食产品标准国际化能否提升出口产品质量?

执行国际标准能够促进产品质量提升,但也会给企业带来过高的遵从成本,从而可能不利于企业产品质量的提升。选取2000-2013年中国农食产品标准数据与企业-产品层面海关数据,实证分析中国农食产品标准"国际化"对企业出口产品质量的影响。结果显示:从整体来看,标准"国际化"对企业出口产品质量效应显著为负,而我国自行制定的国家标准对质量影响显著为正;按照对国际标准采纳程度分类,以及对出口产品和出口目的国发展程度分类,分样本检验发现,标准"国际化"对企业出口产品质量存在异质性影响。为此,照搬发达国家主导制订的国际标准不适用于中国出口企业,可能会由于过高的遵从成本阻碍企业产品质量升级。另一方面,以中国为代表的发展中国家需积极参与到国际标准的制定中,从而减少过高遵从成本对产品质量升级及出口带来的不利影响。     

企业在同质产品市场的差异化战略行为——一个对我国反垄断立法的产业组织理论解释

我国在加入WTO后,一些重要的服务领域面临着全面对外开放。由于转换成本的存在,使得该领域中本来在购买前功能相近的同质商品或服务,在购买后成为异质的商品。企业因而拥有相对于消费者的事后垄断的权力。为此,企业有动机在初期采取战略行为吸引消费者。这既缓和了后续阶段的企业间竞争,也在整体上将该行业的产品价格维持较高水平。它可能会降低社会效率和消费者福利。文章通过分析企业间在同质商品市场竞争的市场效果和福利后果,为在我国该领域反垄断立法提供了理论解释。     

On the evolution of the spatial economy with multi-unit · multi-plant firms: the impact of IT development

This paper examines how the decline of communication costs between management and production facilities within firms and the decrease in trade costs of manufactured goods affect the spatial organization of a two-region economy with multi-unit·multi-plant firms. The development of information technology decreases the costs of communication and trade costs. Thus, the fragmentation of firms is promoted. Our result indicates that, with decreasing communication costs, firms producing low trade-cost goods (such as electronics products) tend to concentrate their manufacturing plants in low wage countries. In contrast, firms producing high trade-cost products (such as automobiles) tend to have multiple plants serving to segmented markets, even in the absence of wage differentials.Received: November 2004, Accepted: March 2005, JEL Classification: F12, L13, R13Masahisa Fujita: Correspondence toWe are very grateful to J. Vernon Henderson, J. Pedro Pontes and Koumei Sasaki for helpful comments.     

Relocation and investment in R&D by firms

The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.     

Abstinence from child labor and profit seeking

Opponents of child labor suggest that demand-driven mechanisms can eliminate such practices. If consumers prefer adult-labor products, they suggest that labeling will drive out child-labor products. I show that under Bertrand competition, even with complete information, this is unlikely. When products are differentiated only by labor type, such a scheme requires at least three firms and child-labor costs at least as large as adult-labor costs. With additional lines of differentiation, child labor is eliminated only when the adult-labor costs are smaller. Thus, while labeling may reduce child labor, it is unlikely to eliminate it.     

The effect of technology choice on specialization and welfare in a two‐country model

This study presents a simple two‐country model in which firms in the manufacturing sector can choose a technology level (high or low). We show how trade costs and productivity levels affect technology choices by the firms in each country, where the fixed cost of adopting high technology differs between the two countries. This depends on the productivity level of the high technology. In particular, if the productivity of high technology is medium and trade costs are not too low, then a technology gap between countries arises. In this case, improving the productivity of the high technology country reduces the welfare level of consumers in the country in which low technology is adopted. To compensate for the welfare loss of the country from the technological improvement, trade costs should be reduced.     

The competitive advantage of honesty

We study competitive markets where firms may lie to their workers to reduce costs. Consumers may benefit from firms’ dishonesty through lower market prices. Does firms’ (dis-)honesty affect consumers’ purchasing decisions? Our experiment shows that when honesty is fully transparent, it can provide a competitive advantage: Honest firms sell more and – despite higher costs – achieve higher profits. This finding is in line with our equilibrium predictions when allowing for dishonesty-averse consumers. By identifying circumstances in which consumers – although not the addressee of dishonesty – “punish” firms for their within-firm dishonesty, we contribute both to behavioral ethics and behavioral industrial organization.     

Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed

We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality-dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods. Compared to the unregulated outcome, both profits and social welfare would increase if firms could commit to producing a higher quality. An MQS restricts the firms׳ quality choice and leads to less differentiated goods. This fuels competition and may therefore deter entry. A certification policy, which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold, does not restrict the firms׳ quality choice. In contrast to an MQS, certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher profits. We find that firms are willing to comply with an ambitious certification standard if the share of informed consumers is small. In that case, certification is more effective from a welfare perspective than a minimum quality standard because it is less detrimental to entry.     

TALKING,SEARCHING, AND PRICING*

I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms’ pricing behavior. Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price; consumers acquire price information at some cost to themselves. Also, each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers—interpersonal communication. An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication decreases the information that consumers acquire, and, when search costs are low, firms price less aggressively. In an extension, consumers may choose to invest in interpersonal communication at some cost. A decrease in the costs of interpersonal communication decreases firms’ competition.     

When Competition is Not Enough: Consumer Protection

Rather than market structure, it is the nature of the goods and services and the cost of obtaining and processing information that may place consumers in a poor bargaining position. The article outlines the key provisions for consumer protection in Australia, Part V of the Trade Practices Act. It discusses search costs, and the factors that limit search, and explains how the conduct of suppliers (or others) may reduce search costs. Asymmetry of information is identified as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for misleading consumers. When products are sub standard or are used incorrectly, they may harm consumers or cause property damage and in some circumstances this may be best addressed via product liability laws. The article concludes by considering how firms or industries can be more pro-active in relation to consumer protection.     

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

We use a laboratory experiment to study advertising and pricing behavior in a market where consumers differ in price sensitivity. Equilibrium in this market entails variation in the number of firms advertising and price dispersion in advertised prices. We vary the cost to advertise as well as varying the number of competing firms. Theory predicts that advertising costs act as a facilitating device: higher costs increase firm profits at the expense of consumers. We find that higher advertising costs decrease demand for advertising and raise advertised prices, as predicted. Further, this comes at the expense of consumers. However, advertising strategies are more aggressive than theory predicts with the result that firm profits do not increase.     

Price dispersion in the private health insurance industry: The case of Catalonia

This paper presents a vertical and horizontal product differentiation model that explains price dispersion among different kinds of health care insurance firms. Our model shows large insurance firms engaging in price competition with small mutual organizations that serve only a local area and charge lower premiums. We found that, although the market allows the entry of an excessive number of firms, the presence of local insurance companies increases social welfare by increasing the range of products available to consumers. Our conclusions are applicable to OECD countries in general although we rely on Catalonia's data.     

International duopoly with overseas production and strategic trade policies

This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).     

Efficiency properties of binary ecolabeling

We investigate efficiency properties of binary ecolabels in a homogeneous good market with heterogeneous consumers. Faced with the minimum technology standard, firms make endogenous entry, certification, and price/quantity decisions. We consider both perfect and imperfect competition with or without sunk fixed costs. Our findings are as follows. Ecolabeling alone does not achieve the first-best outcome and, to achieve the second best, may need to set the standard less strict than the efficient level. Without sunk fixed costs, ecolabeling can achieve the first-best outcome provided that both the technology standard and the complementary pollution tax are set at efficient levels. With sunk fixed costs, however, differential excise taxes that would restore allocative efficiency induce more entry than optimal, and thus, can be even welfare decreasing relative to no tax outcome. Tightening the technology standard may ameliorate such an adverse effect of the corrective tax system by reducing excessive entry and pollution per output by the certified firms.     

The impact of the market transparency unit for fuels on gasoline prices in Germany

Increasing horizontal as well as vertical transparency in oligopolistic markets can be advantageous for consumers, due to reduced search costs. However, market transparency can also affect incentives to deviate from collusive agreements and the punishment by rival firms in the market. Using a panel of 27 European countries, we analyse the impact of increased market transparency via the introduction of a market transparency unit for fuels in Germany. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence that both gasoline and diesel prices have increased. While consumers may be better off using a retail price app for fuels, gas stations are also able to compare prices at almost no cost.