Tax Overpayments, Tax Evasion, and Book-Tax Differences

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analyzed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government take into account these effects when pursuing their own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.     

Subsidies for renewable energy in inflexible power markets

This paper analyses how short-term operational efficiency and the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of a power system depend on different subsidies for wind power and on the flexibility of the power system. This is analysed in the framework of a numerical power market model, calibrated to Danish data, where the start-up costs and other constraints in fossil-fuelled power plants are taken into account. The main conclusion is that flexibility is crucial for the costs of integrating wind power in an existing system. If thermal power plants are inflexible, subsidies for wind power should strive to increase the flexibility of the market by passing market signals to wind power. A subsidy that conceals market signals from wind power producers (a production subsidy) or disconnects wind power incentives from the market signals altogether (a fixed price) increases costs considerably. An inflexible power system should aim to introduce optimal subsidies (an investment subsidy) instead of production subsidies or a fixed price. The design of the subsidy scheme should take into account both the characteristics of the existing system and the characteristics of renewables.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

Dumping And Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness Of Cost‐Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information*

We argue that the rise of antidumping protection and the proliferation of voluntary export restraints (VERs) are fundamentally interrelated. We show that both can be explained by a cost‐based definition of dumping when the domestic government has incomplete information about the foreign firm's costs. Given that its costs are only imperfectly observed and knowing the government's incentives to protect, efficient foreign firms will voluntarily restrain their exports prior to the antidumping investigation. In turn, the VER distorts the government's perception of the foreign firm's efficiency and leads to undesirably high duties regardless of the foreign firm's efficiency.     

COMPETITION, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COST-REDUCING INNOVATION

Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two‐country two‐firm model which relates to the incentives for cost‐reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U‐shaped curve or an inverted U‐shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations.     

Explaining the effect of financial development on the quality of property rights

Empirical evidence suggests that financial development can catalyze property rights reforms. This paper offers a theory of financial markets to explain these facts defining the relationship. The explanation is based on a simple trade‐off between the costs and the benefits of securing property. Securing the right to property at a cost allows agents to post collateral against loans. However, the benefits of collateral vary according to the existing credit market conditions, which we take into account in the tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of securing property rights along the path of financial development to explain the conditions under which financial development can create incentives for better property rights institutions.     

WHAT DETERMINES MIGRATION FLOWS FROM LOW‐INCOME TO HIGH‐INCOME COUNTRIES? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF FIJI–U.S. MIGRATION 1972–2001

This article examines the long-run and short-run determinants of migration from Fiji to the United States between 1972 and 2001 using a human capital framework, which is extended to take account of political instability in Fiji. In the long-run the authors find that differences in income levels, disparities in police strength, disparities in the number of doctors, costs of moving, and political instability in Fiji are all statistically significant with the expected sign. In the short run the cost of moving, lagged migration, political instability, and differences in both police strength and medical care are the main determinants of Fiji–United States immigration. ( JEL C22, F22)     

Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes

We model an economy with clubs (or jurisdictions) where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs sizes are arbitrary—clubs may be restricted to consist of only one or two persons, or as large as the entire economy, or anything in-between. Notions of price-taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions take into account that there is a small communication cost of deviating from a given outcome. We demonstrate that, given communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies the core is nonempty and the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the core.     

Estimation of scale and scope economies in multiproduct banking: evidence from the Fourier flexible functional form with panel data

An empirical study is conducted on scale and scope economies for Taiwan's banking industry with panel data using a Fourier flexible cost function developed by Gallant and a translog cost function, both of which take economic efficiency into account. It is found that the Fourier form is more appropriate than the traditional translog form in fitting the data, and that various efficiency measures computed using the Fourier function are compatible with each other, while those computed using the translog function are not. The Fourier evidence shows that sample banks continue to enjoy economies of scale, and exhibit scope diseconomies, which indicates that greater product diversification can reduce banking costs through product-mix economies. Banks may benefit from further diversifying their line of financial services.     

The social efficiency of instruments of promotion of renewable energies: A transaction-cost perspective

This paper compares the social efficiency of the regulatory instruments used to promote renewable energy sources in electricity generation, taking into consideration their role in promoting the preservation of collective goods. They are based on a purchase obligation and act either by price (feed-in tariffs) or by quantity (bidding for new RES-E capacities; RES-E quotas). From the Public Economics perspective, the two instruments are distinct in terms of cost-efficacy and market incentives in a world of imperfect information. Exchangeable quotas of green certificates are preferred because this instrument allows better control over consumer costs and whilst retaining market incentives. Transaction cost economics (TCE) contributes to the assessment of these instruments, by introducing RES-E investment safeguard as a major determinant of social efficiency, and the instruments' conformity to its institutional environment as a determinant of its viability. In light of this additional consideration, the arrangements between RES-E producers and obligated buyers inherent in each instrument are in fact quite similar—either long-term contracting or vertical integration. We compare and assess RES-E price- and quantity-instruments on several dimensions from both the public economics and TCE perspectives: control of the cost for consumers, safeguards of RES-E investments, adaptability of the instrument in order to preserve its stability in the long run, market incentive intensity, and conformity with the new market regime of electricity industry. It shows neither instruments offer an optimal solution in each of these dimensions. The government will thus select an instrument in accordance with the relative importance of its objectives.     

Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice

If rent-seeking costs are considered in addition to, and separate from, external costs and decision costs in Buchanan and Tullock's economic theory of constitutions, total interdependence costs may have multiple local minima close to the decision-making extremes. As a result, the global minimum, which gives the optimal decision rule, may be much closer to “unanimity rule” or “individual rule” than to “simple majority rule”. Further, the comparison of the minimum total interdependence costs for the public sector with those for the private sector would only justify a smaller scope and size for the public sector than would be the case if rent-seeking costs were ignored. Finally, systematic variation in rent-seeking cost could account for dramatic regime shifts between dictatorship and democracy.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

In or out: efficient inclusion of installations in an emissions trading scheme?

Regulators around the world are currently considering national emissions trading schemes (ETS) as cost-effective instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the process, they are confronted with numerous design issues. The coverage of installations in an ETS is one such issue. While “blanket coverage” that includes all industrial emitters of greenhouse gases in an economy has some intuitive appeal, and seems equitable, it does not take into full account all the costs related to the extent of coverage. This paper shows that an alternative approach of “partial coverage” based on benefit–cost analysis can achieve the same emission reduction outcome at lower social cost. The approach is based on maximizing the benefits from inclusion of installations in an ETS at the same time as taking all relevant transaction costs into account. A broad definition of transaction costs is used, which covers the regulatory costs to the government as well as regulatory costs imposed on covered installations. We find that particularly for relatively modest emissions reduction targets the cost savings of a “partial coverage” compared to “blanket coverage” are significant.     

Estimating Labor Demand with Fixed Costs*

We consider a dynamic model in which firms decide whether or not to vary labor in the presence of fixed costs. By exploiting the first‐order condition for optimality, we derive a semireduced form in which firms' intertemporal employment is defined by a standard marginal productivity condition augmented by a forward‐looking term. We obtain a marginal productivity equilibrium relation that takes into account the future alternatives of adjustment or nonadjustment that firms face. We use the structural parameter from this condition to estimate the fixed cost within a discrete decision process. Fixed costs are about 15 months' labor cost.     

Money for nothing: The dire straits of medical practice in Delhi,India

The quality of medical care received by patients varies for two reasons: differences in doctors' competence or differences in doctors' practice. Using medical vignettes, we evaluated competence for a sample of doctors in Delhi. One month later, we observed the same doctors in their practice. We find three patterns in the data. First, doctors do less than what they know they should do. Second, the more competent the doctor, the greater the effort exerted. Third, competence and practice diverge in different ways in the public and private sectors. Urban India pays a lot of “Money for Nothing”: in the private sector there is a lot of expenditure on unnecessary drugs. In the public sector, education subsidies and salary payments translate into little (and in small clinics, very little) effort and care. Provider training has a small impact on the actual quality of advice; under the circumstances, awareness campaigns to create a more informed clientele may be the best option.     

PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS

I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective‐value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods.     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

The strategic value of partial vertical integration

We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods. The partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer–retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration. This ‘information vertical effect’ translates into a ‘competition horizontal effect’: the partially integrated hierarchy's commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price, which strategically relaxes competition. Our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions.     

Internal debt and welfare

This paper analyzes how multinational firms' internal debt financing affects high-tax countries. It uses a dynamic small open economy model and takes into account that internal debt impacts both the multinational firms' investment decisions and the government's tax policy. The government has incentives to redistribute income from firm owners to workers. If the government's redistributive motive is not too strong, internal debt reduces welfare in the short term by decreasing tax revenues. However, debt financing stimulates capital accumulation and exerts a positive long-term welfare impact.