Accounting Price of an Exhaustible Resource: Response and Extensions

Wei (Environ Resour Econ 60:579–581, 2015) presents a novel derivation of the accounting price for an exhaustible resource in a non-optimal economy subject to an allocation mechanism. We show that Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (Environ Resour Econ 42:53–64, 2009) are in fact employing different and mutually exclusive allocation mechanisms for the economy, and this explains the differences between the respective accounting prices. Because accounting prices must be defined subject to the allocation mechanism for the economy, the prices derived in the two papers are equally valid within their respective allocation domains. Further analysis shows that if there is declining marginal product of factors, a ‘Hartwick investment rule’ for the model economy (set investment just equal to depletion, valued at the accounting price) will lead to declining consumption for the Wei (2015) accounting price, and increasing consumption for the Hamilton and Ruta (2009) accounting price. This result is extended to consider the accounting standards recommended in the UN SEEA (System of environmental-economic accounting 2012: central framework. United Nations, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, 2012), as well as accounting for environmental externalities from resource use.     

Evolution and correlated equilibrium

Given a normal form game and a signal generating process, we construct an expanded game in the spirit of Aumann (Econometrica 55(1):1–18, 1987) in which agents condition their strategic choices on perceived signals. We collect results on evolutionary selection dynamics of Ritzberger and Weibull (Econometrica 63(6):1371–1399, 1995), Swinkels (J Econ Theory 57(2):306–332, 1992b) and Samuelson and Zhang (J Econ Theory 57:363–391, 1992) to apply them to normal form games with payoff irrelevant signals. We suggest a selection dynamic for the evolution of signals and characterize the set of signal distributions and induced payoffs for sets that are asymptotically stable with respect to this evolutionary selection on signals.     

Determining the number of factors after stationary univariate transformations

A very common practice when extracting factors from non-stationary multivariate time series is to differentiate each variable in the system. As a consequence, the ratio between variances and the dynamic dependence of the common and idiosyncratic differentiated components may change with respect to the original components. In this paper, we analyze the effects of these changes on the finite sample properties of several procedures to determine the number of factors. In particular, we consider the information criteria of Bai and Ng (Econometrica 70(1):191–221, 2002), the edge distribution of Onatski (Rev Econ Stat 92(4):1004–1016, 2010) and the ratios of eigenvalues proposed by Ahn and Horenstein (Econometrica 81(3):1203–1227, 2013). The performance of these procedures when implemented to differentiated variables depends on both the ratios between variances and dependencies of the differentiated factor and idiosyncratic noises. Furthermore, we also analyze the role of the number of factors in the original non-stationary system as well as of its temporal and cross-sectional dimensions. Finally, we implement the different procedures to determine the number of common factors in a system of inflation rates in 15 euro area countries.     

Measuring market power when firms price discriminate

We propose conduct parameter-based market power measures within a model of price discrimination, extending work by Hazledine (Econ Lett 93:413–420, 2006) and Kutlu (Econ Lett 117:540–543, 2012) to certain forms of second-degree price discrimination. We use our model to estimate the market power of US airlines in a price discrimination environment. We find that a slightly modified version of our original theoretical measure is positively related to market concentration. Moreover, on average, market power for high-end segment is greater than that of low-end segment.     

The Lindahl equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models

The main motivation of the paper is to determine the social value of innovations in a standard scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model, which explicitly introduces knowledge diffusion over a Salop (Bell J Econ 10(1):141–156 1979) circle. The social value of an innovation is defined as the optimal value of the knowledge inherent in this innovation. We thus have to price optimally knowledge. For that purpose, contrary to what is done in standard growth theory, we complete the markets using Lindahl prices for knowledge. The Lindahl equilibrium, which provides the system of prices that sustains the first-best social optimum in an economy with non rival goods, appears as a benchmark. First, its comparison with the standard Schumpeterian equilibrium à la Aghion and Howitt (Econometrica (60)2:323–351 1992) enables us to shed a new light on the issue of non-optimality of the latter. Second, the Lindahl equilibrium also allows us to revisit the issue of R&D incentives in presence of cumulative innovations. Finally, this benchmark may be a first step to understand how knowledge is exchanged in new technology sectors.     

Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction

We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by formalizations of forward induction that take Nash equilibrium as a reference point (such as Kohlberg and Mertens in Econometrica 54: 1003–1037, 1986; Govindan and Wilson in Econometrica 77: 1–28, 2009), while formalizations that only appeal to (higher-order) knowledge of rationality remain silent in this environment.     

Surplus measures and luenberger Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator

This paper extends to production theory some notions of compensated and equivalent variation analyzed in Luenberger (Econ Theory 7:445–462, 1996) in a consumer context. Along this line the Luenberger–Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator introduced in Briec and Kerstens (Econ Theory 23:925–939, 2004) is derived from these concepts for multi-output production technologies. The dual properties of this productivity indicator are analyzed and an aggregate indicator is introduced inspired from the resource function proposed in Luenberger (1996). A connection to a suitable Slutsky matrix is established.     

Rank based cointegration testing for dynamic panels with fixed <Emphasis Type="Italic">T</Emphasis>

In this paper, we show that the cointegration testing procedure of Binder et al. (Econom Theory 21:795–837, 2005) for Panel Vector Autoregressive model of order 1, PVAR(1) is not valid due to the singularity of the hessian matrix. As an alternative we propose a method of moments based procedure using the rank test of Kleibergen and Paap (J Econom 133:97–126, 2006) for a fixed number of time series observations. The test is shown to be applicable in situations with time-series heteroscedasticity and unbalanced data. The novelty of our approach is that in the construction of the test we exploit the “weakness” of the Anderson and Hsiao (J Econom 18:47–82, 1982) moment conditions. The finite-sample performance of the proposed test statistic is investigated using simulated data. The results indicate that for most scenarios the method has good statistical properties. The proposed test provides little statistical evidence of cointegration in the employment data of Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (J Bus Econ Stat 17:36–49, 1999).     

Markups and bargaining power in tradable and non-tradable sectors

This article jointly estimates product and labour market imperfections for narrowly defined sectors in the Portuguese economy for the period 2006–2009, following Roeger (J Polit Econ 103(2):316–330, 1995), Crépon et al. (Ann Econ Stat (79/80):583–610, 2005), Dobbelaere (Int J Ind Organ 22(10):1381–1398, 2004) and Abraham et al. (Rev World Econ 145(1):13–36, 2009). In addition, we propose a criterion for the identification of tradable and non-tradable sectors based on the export-to-sales ratio and compare markups and workers’ bargaining power along this dimension. Our findings suggest that markups are higher in the non-tradable than in the tradable sector but workers’ bargaining power is similar. In addition, there is a significant level of heterogeneity across markets, particularly in the non-tradable sector. Moreover, the article confirms that, if labour market imperfections are disregarded, markups are significantly understated.     

A Monte Carlo comparison of estimating the number of dynamic factors

Based on a Monte Carlo simulation, this study compares the finite sample performance of five of the most widely used methods for estimating the number of dynamic factors. The simulation results show that although the performance is affected by the data generating process, the methods proposed by Hallin and Li?ka (J Am Stat Assoc 102(478):603–617, 2007) and Bai and Ng (Bus Econ Stat 25(1):52–60, 2007) generally outperform the others. Specifically, Amengual and Watson’s (J Bus Econ Stat 25(1):91–96, 2007) method is sensitive to cross-sectional correlation, and Breitung and Pigorsch’s (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 75(1):23–36, 2013) estimator is sensitive to the overestimation of the number of static factors. The results of this study are further supported by an empirical application to a Chinese macroeconomic dataset.     

The role of the German Historical School in the development of Mises’s thought

Hülsmann (2007) and Hayek ([1922] 1981) have argued that Mises’s first book The Development of the Relationship between Lords of Manor and Peasants in Galicia, 1772–1848 (1902) is written in the tradition of the German Historical School. Historicist contemporaries of Mises also considered his first academic work a continuation of the Knapp-Grünberg tradition (Kaser Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 28(1), 374–79, 1904; Wimbersky, 1906). We argue that von Mises (1902) does not represent the younger German Historical School. First, Mises provides a rationalization of the history rather than ethical and cultural explanation of historical events. Second, he does not support the Knapp-Grünberg argument about the historical development of serfdom under a Slavic rule. Finally, von Mises (1902) does not adhere to the ideology of the Historical School regarding the virtues of the Prussian bureaucracy.     

Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination

This paper compares behavior under four different implementations of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: the standard random termination method [proposed by Roth and Murnighan (J Math Psychol 17:189–198, 1978)] and three other methods that de-couple the expected number of rounds and the discount factor. Two of these methods involve a fixed number of repetitions with payoff discounting, followed by random termination [proposed by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (J Econ Behav Organ 48:37–50, 2002)] or followed by a coordination game [proposed in (Andersson and Wengström in J Econ Behav Organ 81:207–219, 2012; Cooper and Kuhn in Am Econ J Microecon 6:247–278, 2014a)]. We also propose a new method—block random termination—in which subjects receive feedback about termination in blocks of rounds. We find that behavior is consistent with the presence of dynamic incentives only with methods using random termination, with the standard method generating the highest level of cooperation. Subject behavior in the other two methods display two features: a higher level of stability in cooperation rates and less dependence on past experience. Estimates of the strategies used by subjects reveal that across implementations, even when the discount rate is the same, if interactions are expected to be longer defection increases and the use of the Grim strategy decreases.     

Urban Structure and Environmental Externalities

The objective of this paper is to analyze policy design for air pollution management in the spatial context of urban development. We base our analysis on the paper of Ogawa and Fujita (Reg Sci Urban Econ 12:161–196, 1982), which offers a proper theoretical framework of non-monocentric urban land use using static microeconomic theory where the city structure is endogenous. First, we show that when households internalize industrial pollution in their residential location choice, spatialization within the city is reinforced. This impacts directly the emissions of greenhouse gases from commuting. Then, we analyze policy instruments in order to achieve optimal land use pattern when the policy maker has to manage both industrial and commuting related polluting emissions, that interact through the land market.     

Entrepreneurship,search costs,and ecological rationality in an agent-based economy

Since Coase’s paper on the firm, transaction costs have occupied much attention as a field of economic inquiry. Yet, with few exceptions, neoclassical theory has failed to integrate transaction costs into its core. The dominant mode of theorizing depends upon Brouwer fixed points which cannot integrate transaction costs in more than a superficial manner. Agent-based modeling presents an opportunity for researchers to investigate the nature of transaction costs and integrate them into the core of economic theory. To the extent that transaction costs reduce economic efficiency, they provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to earn a profit by reducing these costs. We employ an extension of Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape to demonstrate this point one type of transaction costs: search costs. When agents do not face the cost of finding a trading partner, the system quickly reaches a steady state with tightly constrained prices regardless of agent production strategies. When search costs are present, entrepreneurs may use competing strategies for production and exchange that allow them to earn higher revenues than they would earn otherwise. These cost reducing innovations tend to promote concatenate coordination (Klein 2012). The agent’s production strategies represent technology in the form of mental models (Denzau and North 1994) that shape agent action with regard to the agent’s environment. The success of these are dependent on their ability to overcome search costs. The average profit, market rate of return, earned by each of these mental structures tends to equalize as a result of competition.     

Malaysia-EU trade at the industry level: Is there an asymmetric response to exchange rate volatility?

Aftab et al. (Empirica 43:461–485, 2016) in this journal assessed the impact of exchange rate volatility on Malaysia-EU trade at commodity level using the linear ARDL approach of Pesaran et al. (J Appl Econom 16:289–326, 2001) and did not find significant effects in most of the 81 Malaysian exporting and 66 importing industries. In this paper, we argue for asymmetric effects of exchange rate volatility on the same industries’ trades which implies using Shin et al.’s (Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt, Springer, New York, 2014) nonlinear ARDL approach. While we find short-run asymmetric effects of volatility in almost all industries, we find evidence of adjustment asymmetry in 17 exporting and nine importing industries. We also find significant impact or short-run cumulative asymmetry in 12 exporting and six importing industries. The most important finding is significant long-run asymmetric effects in 36 Malaysian exporting industries and 25 Malaysian importing industries. Clearly, trade flows react to an increased exchange rate volatility differently than to a decreased volatility.     

A note on testing instrument validity for the identification of LATE

In this paper, we show that the testable implications derived in Huber and Mellace (Rev Econ Stat 97:398, 2015) are the best possible to detect invalid instruments in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects and endogeneity. We also provide formal proof of the fact that those testable implications are only necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for instrument validity.     

External and internal consistency of choices made in convex time budgets

We evaluate data on choices made from convex time budgets (CTB) in Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) and Augenblick et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), two influential studies that proposed and applied this experimental technique. We use the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) to test for external consistency relative to pairwise choice, and demand, wealth and impatience monotonicity to test for internal consistency. We find that choices made by subjects in the original Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) paper violate WARP frequently; violations of all three internal measures of monotonicity are concentrated in subjects who take advantage of the novel feature of CTB by making interior choices. Wealth monotonicity violations are more prevalent and pronounced than either demand or impatience monotonicity violations. We substantiate the importance of our desiderata of choice consistency in examining effort allocation choices made in Augenblick et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), where we find considerably more demand monotonicity violations, as well as many classical monotonicity violations which are associated with time inconsistent behavior. We believe that the frequency and magnitude of WARP and monotonicity violations found in the two studies pose important confounds for interpreting and structurally estimating choice patterns elicited through CTB. We encourage researchers employing CTB in present and future experiments to include consistency tests in their design and pre-estimation analysis.     

Pollution abatement and employment

Morgenstern et al. (J Environ Econ Manag 43:412–436, 2002. doi: 10.1006/jeem.2001.1191) are well-known for its investigation of the employment effects of environmental regulations. However, the cost function specified in that paper is handicapped by its reliance on survey data of the costs of inputs assigned to pollution abatement. In this paper, we specify an input distance function that models the joint production of good and bad outputs. This allows us to measure the relative importance of factors associated with changes in employment without pollution abatement cost data. We operationalize our model using a sample of 80 coal-fired electric power plants from 1995 to 2005.     

Coordination and transfer

We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248, 1990, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910, 1991). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less sensitive to the order statistic than when a fixed order statistic is used throughout. This is consistent with the prediction of a simple learning model with transfer. If subjects play a series of similar stag hunt games, play converges to the payoff dominant equilibrium when a convention emerges, replicating the main result of Rankin et al. (Games Econ Behav 32:315–337, 2000). When these subjects subsequently play a random sequence of order statistic games, play is shifted towards the payoff dominant equilibrium relative to subjects without previous experience. The data is consistent with subjects absorbing a general principle, play of the payoff dominant equilibrium, and applying it in a new related setting.     

Using simulation experiments to test historical explanations: the development of the German dye industry 1857-1913

In a simulation experiment, building on the abductive simulation approach of Brenner and Werker (2007), we test historical explanations for why German firms came to surpass British and France firms and to dominate the global synthetic dye industry for three decades before World War 1 while the U.S. never achieved large market share despite large home demand. Murmann and Homburg (J Evol Econ 11(2):177–205, 2001) and Murmann (2003) argued that German firms came to dominate the global industry because of (1) the high initial number of chemists in Germany at the start of the industry in 1857, (2) the high responsiveness of the German university system and (3) the late (1877) introduction of a patent regime in Germany as well as the more narrow construction of this regime compared to Britain, France and the U.S. We test the validity of these three potential explanations with the help of simulation experiments. The experiments show that the 2nd explanation—the high responsiveness of the German university system— is the most compelling one because unlike the other two it is true for virtually all plausible historical settings.