环境的外在性和保护策略

一个简单的环境污染模型发展后,环境污染具有外部性,在这个内生增长模型中,考虑了通过税收提供的资本来保护环境的两条途径。在政府不参与环境控制时,经济增长率最高,但污染也最严重,社会福利要比政府采取补贴情形时底。当环境外部性较少时,环境保护采取政府补贴社会福利要比完全由政府控制时的福利要大,而当外部性较大时,则环境保护应当采取完全由政府控制为妙。     

Optimal policies in cities with congestion and agglomeration externalities: Congestion tolls,labor subsidies,and place-based strategies

This paper develops a spatial general equilibrium model that accommodates both congestion and agglomeration externalities, while firms’ and households’ land-use decisions are endogenous across continuous space. Focusing on the interaction between externalities and land use patterns, we examine the efficiencies of first-best policies and second-best pricing and place-based strategies using numerical simulations. A first-best policy must combine both Pigouvian congestion tolling (PCT) and Pigouvian labor subsidies (PLS) instruments, or design an optimal toll (or subsidy) internalizing agglomeration externalities (or congestion externalities). We also examine second-best pricing policies if only one instrument is adopted. Congestion pricing policies alone (e.g., a partial PCT or a flat-rate toll) can improve social welfare only in heavy-congestion cities, and their welfare gains may be insignificant (e.g., below 10% of the welfare improvement achieved by first-best policies). In contrast, second-best labor subsidy policies alone are a more effective alternative to first-best policies. As to place-based policies, the firm cluster zoning (FCZ) regulation is more efficient than the urban growth boundary (UGB) policy. UGBs only have small effects on the agglomeration economy but could worsen land market distortions via residential rent-escalation effects. These findings suggest that it is important to internalize business land use decisions and relax monocentricity assumptions, in order to appreciate the interplay of both urban externalities, since spatial adaptations to policy interventions can distort system efficiencies.     

Auto pollution and congestion in an urban model: An analysis of alternative strategies

Congestion and pollution externalities associated with automobile driving are examined for their effect on urban structure. A monocentric urban model which incorporates household preferences for both an unpolluted environment and for leisure time is presented, and used to evaluate alternative pricing and emissions policies on automobile use and their effects on city structure. Optimal tax gradients for driving are derived, and compared with second best cases of per mile taxes and no taxes. As externalities gradients become more nonlinear, the welfare gains from employing optimal taxes rather than a per mile tax are increased. The appropriate choices of an emission standard, highway capacity, and highway pricing policy must be made simultaneously and depend on household preferences.     

On the possibility and optimality of positive rent gradients

The assertion that externalities from low density can create positive residential rent gradients is examined in several cases: optimal externality internalization (zoning), excessive and insufficient restriction, and no internalization. In all cases positive rent gradients are unlikely (i.e., require land to be an inferior good), unstable, or impossible. In addition, easily interpretable welfare conditions are found as a result of consumer and social welfare maximization. The Alonso-Muth-Mills model is found to be quite robust.     

Optimality and the government's risk management programs

This paper examines the optimality of the government's risk management programs in the area of environmental policy. A model of risk management for the government is developed under the presumption that the objective of risk management is avoidance of damages from two general classes of pollutants. This model is then used to make direct comparisons between solutions to the government's social welfare maximization problem and Pareto-optimal outcomes. The underlying economic rationale for each of the different outcomes is also discussed.     

A differential game in a duopoly with instantaneous incentives

In this paper, we study a differential game in which two competing firms exploit a public renewable resource that is relevant from a landscape point of view. We consider a policy maker that provides an instantaneous incentive to the firms in order to prevent the resource exhaustion during the whole extraction period, which coincides with the harvesting license period. We compute an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential game, showing that it coincides with a linear feedback Nash equilibrium. Finally, we compute the value of the incentive that leads to the maximization of social welfare considering the incentive both as a pure transfer and as a cost.     

Second-best policies for congestion externalities

This is the third in a series of three articles on the topic of congestion externalities. We use an urban general-equilibrium model to test the efficiency of several second-best policies for congestion externalities. The most efficient second-best policy is a program of land-use controls; the program generates a welfare gain of $3.38 per household per week. A unit tax on commuting is a less efficient policy, with a welfare gain of $1.15.     

Using goal programming to determine interest group disutility for public policy choices

Within this paper a framework is developed for incorporating into the process of social choice both interest group preferences for social goals and the efficient allocation of limited resources. The social welfare function is adopted as the foundation for the framework and the goal programming algorithm is used to approximate the utility of the interest groups for their optimal policy choice. A function is defined which measures the disutility experienced by a social unit when a policy other than its optimal choice is selected. A surrogate measure of this disutility involving imposed preference weight changes for social goals is determined and its implications for use in developing the social welfare function are examined.     

Cultural Values and Social Planning: A Control Theory Approach to Satisfying a Social Welfare Criterion

A bstract . A method of social planning is presented which can be used to fulfill a social welfare criterion with normative values. The purpose is to show how a social welfare model which includes cultural norms can be optimized using classical control theory. Current literature stresses the importance of incorporating social indicators in welfare economics. Given a social welfare function which actively includes a hierarchy of cultural values , control theory can be used to set social policy to reach social goals. The approach is to define a set of desired cultural norms at some future time and then determine the social policy necessary to reach this state. Control theory is used to find the social plan consistent with attaining the set of desired values.     

How important is fiscal policy cooperation in a currency union?

By constructing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which assumes a currency union consisting of two countries with nontradables, we study the importance of fiscal policy cooperation. As shown in the previous studies, we find that the role of fiscal policy is important in maximizing social welfare. However, we have a contrary result for fiscal policy cooperation. While the previous studies highlight that fiscal policy cooperation has a nontrivial effect in maximizing social welfare, we show that fiscal policy cooperation has no benefits, regardless of the share of nontradables. Self-oriented fiscal policy can replicate social welfare under the cooperative setting.     

Coasian equilibrium

We consider a general equilibrium economy with public goods and externalities. Following Boyd and Conley (1997), we treat externality markets directly instead of indirectly through Arrovian commodities. Because such direct externality markets are not subject to the nonconvexities that Starrett [Starrett, D., 1972. Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities. Journal of Economic Theory 4, 180–199] shows are fundamental to Arrow’s externality markets, this new approach admits the use of largely standard methods to prove welfare and existence theorems in an economy with externalities. We extend the Boyd and Conley model to allow firms to benefit from public goods and be damaged by externalities, and to allow consumers to produce externalities. We state a first welfare theorem and prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Taken together, this can be viewed as a type of general equilibrium Coase theorem. Considered as a special case, these theorems also represent a significant generalization of existing results for pure public goods economies.     

Competitive bidding and voucher payments for implementing the new federalism with special emphasis on programs for the aging.

Principles from the economics of decentralization are applied to the planning and budgeting of social services for the elderly. The standard model of corporate decentralized planning and budgeting is extended to allow different levels of government to pursue qualitatively different goals. A safety-net voucher plan is also proposed to protect the most vunerable population from possible termination of services due to poorly formulated local plans. Such a decentralized planning and budgeting system would make Federal and State influence on local plans proportional to their contribution to total expenditures.     

Traffic externalities in cities: The economics of speed bumps,low emission zones and city bypasses

This paper considers various policy measures that governments can use to reduce traffic externalities in cities. Unlike much of the available literature that emphasized congestion, we focus on measures that reduce pollution, noise and some accident risks. These measures include noise barriers, speed bumps, traffic lights, tolls, emission standards, low emission zones, and bypass capacity to guide traffic around the city center. Using a simple model that distinguishes local and through traffic, we study the optimal use of these instruments by an urban government that cares for the welfare of its residents, and we compare the results with those preferred by a federal authority that also takes into account the welfare of road users from outside the city. Our results include the following. First, compared to the federal social optimum, we show that the city government will over-invest in externality-reducing infrastructure whenever this infrastructure increases the generalized cost of through traffic. We can therefore expect an excessive number of speed bumps and traffic lights, but the right investment in noise barriers. Second, when implementing low emission zones, the urban government will set both the fee for non-compliance and the emission standard at a more stringent level than the federal government. Moreover, at sufficiently high levels of through traffic the urban government will prefer imposing a toll instead of implementing a low emission zone. Third, whatever the tolling instruments in place, the city will always underinvest in bypass capacity. Finally, if it can toll all roads but is forced to invest all bypass toll revenue in the bypass, it will never invest in bypass capacity. Although the paper focuses on non-congestion externalities, most insights also hold in the presence of congestion.     

农地城市流转中土地增值收益分配不公平的度量——方法与案例

研究目的:探讨农地城市流转中各权利主体间土地增值收益分配不公平的度量方法。研究方法:运用阿特金森指数和社会福利指数对武汉市2007-2010年土地征收中收益分配的数据进行实证分析。研究结果:2007-2008年武汉市征地收益分配的不平等程度有好转,2008-2009年有恶化,2009-2010年不平等程度又有所减缓,但最后一列的福利指数说明,如果综合效率与公平两方面来考虑,这四年的社会福利却在逐年减少。研究结论:在我国现实的土地征收中,确实存在着机会不公、分配不公的问题,这将造成社会福利的损失。必须找出减少这些原因的方法或途径,才能消除政府失灵和市场失灵,实现资源配置效率和收益分配公平的统一及社会福利的最大化。     

Social dumping and relocation: is there a case for imposing a social clause?

Public opinion in Europe seems worried about the relocation of production plants toward low wage countries often accused of practicing ‘social dumping’. To reduce the incentives for relocation trade unions proposed the adoption of ‘social clauses’ protecting domestic markets from commodities produced in countries where minimal labor condition are not met. We analyze the effects of the adoption of a social clause in a vertically differentiated Bertrand duopoly. We assess how such a policy affects firms’ relocation decisions in order to be able to assess its welfare implications. We also characterize the optimal social clause policy, both under domestic welfare maximization, and from an efficiency point of view. While we show that a social clause policy cannot be dismissed on domestic (or world) welfare grounds, its case is weaker the higher is the domestic wage and the lower is the foreign wage.     

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.     

Cooperative R&D with Endogenous Technology Differentiation

We study a nontournament R&D duopoly. Before the standard R&D investment and quantity-setting stages, we consider a stage in which firms choose their R&D technologies. Spillovers negatively depend on R&D technology differentiation. We show that, in equilibrium, firms will choose identical or very similar R&D processes. Such equilibria may entail less differentiation than would be dictated by social welfare maximization.     

Environmental quality standards: A general equilibrium analysis

The increasing importance of pollution controls as a part of government regulatory activities has motivated considerable concern about the economic impact of these activities. This question is of considerable importance, because environmental quality goals are sometimes in conflict with other objectives such as full employment and economic growth. Policy-makers are thus faced with the task of identifying and measuring the trade-offs between these various objectives. But the measurement of these objectives requires information on their economic impacts. This paper develops a general equilibrium model with pollution specifications which can be used to identify the economic impacts of pollution-control policies. The particular pollution-control policy addressed is an environmental standards approach. The model is based on a technique that combines an explicit representation of consumer demand behaviour vis-à-vis linear aggregate demand functions with activity analysis.     

Impatience, pollution, and indeterminacy

This paper examines an equilibrium growth model in which production activities generate environmental pollution that has a negative welfare effect and in which individual households' subjective discount rate is a function of individual consumption, which is internal to each household, and of total pollution, which is an external factor to the individual agents. It is shown that there may exist multiple steady states and that the dynamic equilibrium may display indeterminacy, depending on the properties of the discount-rate function, the pollution-capital relationship in production technology, and the pollution-consumption relationship in instantaneous utility. The long-run effects of tighter environmental policy are subsequently examined, and the results are also found to be dependent on the above factors.     

UNEMPLOYMENT, TRANS-BOUNDARY POLLUTION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN A DUALISTIC ECONOMY

This study is intended to examine the effects of environmental policies on employment, the use of polluting goods, and the unemployment rate under a model introducing trans-boundary pollution affecting the productivity of the other productive sectors. That model was designed by Copeland and Taylor (1999) , and transformed into a dualistic economy model constructed by Harris and Todaro (1970) . Results of our analyses show that enforcement of environmental policy through control of emissions taxes does not necessarily worsen urban unemployment. Therefore, we show that it is not usually proper to maintain that some environmental pollution cannot be avoided to establish economic development. Moreover, we analyze the effect of some environmental policies on social welfare and discuss the effectiveness of those policies.