考虑终止权的两阶段研发投资激励和合同设计

针对产品研发过程中的投资激励问题,分别建立了存在终止权和不存在终止权两种情况下的两阶段研发投资决策模型,并利用逆向归纳法讨论了委托方的偿付合同设计。研究结果表明:当第一阶段的研发结果为高质量时,代理人在第二阶段的投资积极性更高,代理人在第一阶段的投资水平和委托方支付的最优偿付都随着低质量时研发成功的比例系数而单调递减;研发活动的终止威胁导致代理人的投资积极性降低;在一定范围内,或有终止权偿付合同能够缓解信息不对称时的投资不足问题、提高双方的研发合作效率。     

建设工程合同谈判经济效益公平分配理论研究

引育在过去的合同谈判中，谈判双方对工程项目的经济效益分配问题是一模糊的概念。从业主方面来讲，他只知道自己的投资能够获利或获利多少，至于承包商在此项目上取得多大的利润，利润比自己的高或低，达到什么样的程度，他却一概不知。从承包商的角度而言，同样也存在这个问题，不是业主吃亏，便是承包商吃亏，很难保证谈判双方利润的均衡，公平分配，违背了社会主义市场经济关于公平竞争、效率优先、利益均等的市场法则。本文站在业主和承包商共同的利益立场上，运用工程经济分析原理和方法，提出了工程项目合同谈判中的经济效益公平分配…     

BOT项目套牢问题的博弈分析北大核心CSSCI

由于合同的不完全性和资产的专用性,BOT项目参与方受利益驱动可能采用机会主义行为套牢对方。本文研究了BOT项目中的套牢问题,给出了项目公司和政府套牢问题的博弈收益矩阵;并引入产品购买方,构建了产品购买方和项目公司在政府监督和不监督两种情况下的基于合同价格谈判的套牢问题的博弈收益矩阵。求解得到各方采取套牢行为的临界条件,给出了不同情况下参与方的最优策略。研究表明,政府通过适时的监督、适当的罚款额度和合适的利益激励机制避免被项目公司套牢;项目公司应增大其事前的产权比例和再谈判成本,防止产品购买方通过价格再谈判将其套牢。     

基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决

敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。     

房地产投资决策的期权博弈分析

近年来随着房地产行业竞争的日益加剧,基于房地产企业核心竞争力的战略投资越来越引起房地产企业的重视。在一些资产雄厚的企业中,一家房地产公司可以同时对几个项目进行投资,这就需要企业充分考虑内部资金的合理分配,项目的投资顺序等系列投资决策问题,以使企业获得的综合效益最大。引用期权博弈理论对房地产企业内部的项目投资决策进行研究,在深入剖析房地产开发项目所具有的期权特性的基础上,建立房地产企业内部双项目投资期权博弈模型。此外,我们还将利用变分法对模型的最优解进行讨论,从而为房地产企业内部多项目投资提供最优化策略建议。     

关于合同谈判与执行关系思考

在商务活动开展的过程中,为了能够通过法律的手段以保证自身的经济利益需求,监督双方在业务开展中履行相对应的义务,我们一般需要在合作的确定的时候签订一份双方都比较满意的合同.我们在签订合同之前往往需要开展多次的商务会议进行合同谈判,但是目前往往很多的合同谈判过程中的确立的相关条约,在执行方面存在着一定的偏差.所以本文针对这一现象展开相关思考论述.     

不完全合同、创新与联合投资

本文结合美国硅谷的实际情况,基于不完全合同理论从联合投资和创新激励二者之间的关系展开研究.通过建立两期模型研究认为,合同不完全正是导致创业资本家发生窃取行为的客观原因.这种情况下,企业家和创业资本家双方的努力投入是不足的;而通过联合投资可以使得投资双方的努力投入达到最优,并给出了最优的联合投资规模.     

企业性质的合作博弈分析

企业本质上是一个人力资本与物质资本基于“合作剩余”的合作博弈。合作剩余是企业产生和存在的根本原因 :合作剩余的分配 ,取决于要素所有者的谈判力以及选择的博弈策略。要素所有者的谈判力取决于资产专有性、产权特性、市场竞争状况和技术条件等因素。在合作剩余分配中 ,非合作博弈将导致企业难以久存 ;现实企业 (特别是绩优企业 )的合作剩余分配应是一种合作博弈的局面。     

资本预算中采用实物期权方法的若干问题探讨

投资决策可以根据市场变化进行调整即表现出投资具有柔性的特点,实物期权的投资决策方法可以较好地体现投资柔性所具有的价值。本文研究了实物期权投资决策方法(Real-OptionsApproach,ROA)的具体运用,并提出在我国使用、推广所面临的问题和若干对策性建议。     

商品房价格不确定条件下旁地产企业投资决策的期权模型研究

随着我国市场改革开放的进一步深入，市场竞争日益激烈，房地产投资受市场不确定性因素影响更加敏感。本文首先将房地产项目的固有价值进行分解，将不确定性建立在房地产投资产品——商品房的价格之上，利用美式永续期权定价方法建立相应的房地产企业投资决策模型。本文还对这一模型进行了数值分析，分析表明，房地产企业投资期权价值以及最优执行期权时的临界价格与其相应的商品房价格的波动率成正向相关关系.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

THIRD PARTIES, INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND MONITORING INCENTIVES

Within an incomplete contract setting, the paper analyses the role of third parties in ameliorating incentive problems arising in the context of financial contracts with costly verification and lender's bargaining power. Contrary to the findings of the bilateral lender–borrower relationship, characterised by no information revelation and possibly a breakdown of the market, it is shown that, in the presence of third parties, an optimal contract exists featuring partial information revelation and random monitoring. The importance of third parties is therefore not limited to improving efficiency, as it is when the contract offer comes from the informed party, but to ensure project realisation, and thus to ensure that the surplus that can arise from the project does not get lost.     

共同代理框架下转售价格控制的反垄断竞争效应研究

转售价格控制一直是备受争议的纵向约束手段，也是反垄断部门重点关注的对象。本文以茅台和五粮液被处罚为出发点，研究在共同代理框架下上游制造商对产品进行广告宣传和推广等活动中采用转售价格控制是否具有反竞争效应的问题。结果表明：如果拥有全部的讨价还价能力，制造商在共同代理框架下没有动机使用转售价格控制；此外，两部定价可以使制造商达到默契合谋的结果，而与是否采用转售价格控制无关。尽管如此，转售价格控制的使用应该被反垄断部门予以禁止。     

外资讨价还价能力与地区引资结构

本文在不完全契约理论基础上构建了一个开放经济垄断竞争模型,考察了外资讨价还价能力的地区差异对引资结构的影响。理论分析表明:外资讨价还价能力的提高,对于外资拥有所有权优势的行业的外资流入具有显著促进作用。在此基础上,我们利用中国2001-2007年30个省市细分行业的数据,采用动态面板方法对该结论进行了实证检验。结果显示,外资讨价还价能力的提高对人力资本、物质资本、管理和研发密集型等外资拥有所有权优势行业的外资流入有显著的促进作用。并且在控制了地理集聚、市场潜力和基础设施水平等因素后,本文的实证结果依然稳健。     

Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization

A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold but only the Nash bargaining solution set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option values.     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

Wage Bargaining,Privatisation, Ability to Pay and Outside Options: Evidence from Hungary

This article examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for 1996–99. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between incumbent employees and managers, which the data do not reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relates to state sector workers versus privatised firms with majority foreign ownership.     

所有权安排与技术创新绩效

技术创新合约是一个不完全合约,创新所有权配置影响各方的专用性投资激励.本文采用不完全合约理论分析显示:技术创新的所有权应该配置给对投资激励和产出贡献重要的一方;建立多元化技术创新融资体系和在创新资源分配中引入竞标体制,会增加创新的社会总盈余;技术创新资源的平均分配和资源配置中的寻租行为会降低技术创新的社会总盈余,中国工业技术创新绩效的持续改善要求建立效率导向的创新所有权安排.     

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

Abstract. We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal–agent (P–A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P–A model and in the alternating offer game.