政府最终控制、控股股东行为与财务报告透明度——中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据

以中国沪深两市A股上市公司2004—2006年间的2940个公司年度为样本,以财政部发布的《企业会计准则———基本准则》和FASB发布的第2号公告中的会计信息质量特征为基础,对财务报告透明度进行度量,分析政府最终控制、控股股东行为对财务报告透明度的影响。研究发现:控股股东掏空行为显著降低了财务报告透明度;国家最终控制的上市公司的财务报告更不透明,并且政府干预动机越强,财务报告透明度越低;财务报告透明度与最终控股股东的所有权比例呈U型变化,与其他股东的制衡能力呈同向变化。     

终极控制人机会主义行为监管的博弈分析

运用完全信息静态博弈和演化博弈理论,通过对终极控制人与监管者成本收益函数的合理设计,从三个层次研究双方的博弈关系。完全信息静态博弈分析结果表明:对终极控制人机会主义行为监管,不能片面地重罚终极控制人的机会主义行为和给予终极控制人过多的控制权收益,而是必须综合考虑监督者的监管频率和监管者的监管水平。演化博弈研究结果表明:博弈双方进行演化博弈时在三种情况下存在演化稳定策略,终极控制人行动的净成本、市场环境、终极控制人控制权与现金流权的分离程度、股权比例,都显著影响到终极控制人的策略选择。     

Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders’ contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996–2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders’ contestability.     

法律环境、金字塔结构与家族企业的“掏空”行为

我国家族上市公司的最终控制人多数采用金字塔结构实现对上市公司的超额控制,现金流量权和控制权的分离程度较为严重。以2002-2004年家族上市公司为研究样本,本文实证考察了家族上市公司所处地区的法律环境及金字塔结构与"掏空"行为之间的关系。研究结果表明:控制性家族"掏空"上市公司的概率与其拥有的现金流量权显著负相关,与现金流量权和控制权的分离程度正相关;同时,较高的法治水平能够有效地遏制控制性家族的"掏空"行为。因此,建立一个有效的股东权利保护机制,同时完善家族上市公司的现金流量权和控制权结构,对于推进公司治理具有重要意义。     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

投资者法律保护与终极所有权结构关系研究

以2004—2006年A股上市公司为样本,考察投资者法律保护与金字塔结构下终极所有权结构的关系。结果显示:投资者法律保护程度越低,控股股东越有动机以较少的现金流投入来掌握企业的控制权,以便于通过财富放大效应进行掏空和寻租来谋取控制权私利;但是,当企业由国有企业控制而非民营企业控制时,控股股东控制权与现金流所有权分离度对投资者法律保护程度的敏感度降低,原因在于,在当前转轨经济阶段,中国国有企业产权公有的性质本身就是一种替代性的投资者保护机制。     

控股股东所有权结构、产权性质与高管薪酬决定的掏空效应

本文基于股东间代理问题视角,利用2007~2011年我国A股上市公司数据,实证考察了高管薪酬的过度支付是否会成为控股股东实现控制权私利的一种路径。研究发现：在地方国企中,高管薪酬水平与控股股东的现金流权显著负相关,与控股股东控制权与现金流权的两权分离度显著正相关,但这一结论在央企和民营企业中均不成立。这表明地方国企高管薪酬决定存在明显的掏空效应。本文的研究结论对于深化国企高管薪酬管理制度改革具有政策启示涵义。     

The Effect of Corporate Social Performance on Financial Performance: The Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration

The purpose of this study is to extend prior research on this topic by investigating whether the impact of ownership concentration moderates the link between corporate social performance (CSP) and financial performance (FP). This study uses a set of unique, hand-collected pollution control data to measure CSP, based on a sample of Taiwanese listed companies during the period from 1996 to 2006. The results of the empirical analysis provide firm support for the idea that the divergence between control rights and the cash flow rights of controlling owners negatively moderates the link between social and short- and long-run FP.     

控制权、现金流权与公司业绩——来自中国民营上市公司的经验研究

本文选取了2004年底在深市和沪市上市交易的238家民营公司作为样本,通过层层追溯控制链辨认了我国民营上市公司的最终控制股东,考察了最终控制股东拥有的控制权与现金流权及其偏离的程度,并进行了实证分析。结果发现在我国民营上市公司中,最终控制股东控制权的集中程度较高,并且其现金流权与控制权存在着偏离。最终控制股东的现金流权与公司业绩显著正相关,控制权与现金流权的偏离程度与公司业绩显著负相关     

Do financial constraints in an unstable emerging economy mitigate the opportunistic behavior of entrenched family owners?

Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties.     

控股股东控制、管理层激励与公司过度投资

本文基于我国上市公司大小股东间严重代理冲突、控股股东政府性质,以及股权分置改革的制度背景,从公司过度投资的视角对管理层激励效应进行理论分析,并以2004-2009年上市公司为样本,检验了控股股东两权分离程度及其性质对于管理层激励抑制过度投资效应的影响。研究发现,不论是货币薪酬激励还是管理层持股激励都起到了抑制过度投资的作用,但上市公司控股股东的两权分离程度会削弱管理层激励的这种治理效应;而且,公司的政府控制性质在弱化管理层激励抑制过度投资作用的同时,还会强化控股股东两权分离对管理层激励效应的负面影响。考虑股权分置改革影响的进一步研究表明,股改强化了管理层激励对于公司过度投资的抑制作用,同时又弱化了控股股东的两权分离对管理层激励治理效应的负面影响。研究结果不仅为现有文献关于管理层激励与企业绩效关联的结论分歧提供新的解释,对于理解我国上市公司管理层激励的有效性,以及切实改进管理层激励契约等,具有重要参考价值,同时也从新的视角为我国股改的有效性提供了证据。     

How Does Web Personalization Create Value for Online Retailers? Lower Cash Flow Volatility or Enhanced Cash Flows

This study examines the performance consequences of web personalization (WP), a type of personalization in which web content is personalized and recommendations are offered based on customer preferences. Despite the growing popularity of personalization, there is a dearth of research at the firm level on whether and how web personalization creates shareholder value. We develop and test a conceptual model that proposes that the impact of WP on shareholder value is mediated by (1) cash flow volatility and (2) premium price. The hypotheses are tested based on 603 firm-quarter observations spanning 80 firms over six years in the online financial services industry. The results suggest that while WP lowers the volatility of cash flows, it only enables firms to charge premium prices when online trust is high. Additional tests reveal that the reduction in cash flow volatility is because of lower churn as opposed to acquiring new customers or greater cross-buying. Finally, online trust positively moderates the relationships between WP and cash flow volatility and price premia. Practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

金字塔股权结构与盈余管理——基于民营上市公司的实证研究

文章以我国民营上市公司2004-2010年的数据为样本,研究了金字塔股权结构对盈余管理的影响。研究发现：金字塔股权结构的控制层级数与盈余管理之间呈正相关关系;现金流权与盈余管理呈负相关关系,最终控制人所拥有的现金流权比例越高,控制层级数对盈余管理的影响会被降低;最终控制人投票权与现金流权的分离程度加剧了控制层级对盈余管理的影响。     

Ownership concentration,separation of voting rights from cash flow rights,and earnings management: an empirical study in Canada

Drawing from models of Jones (1991) and Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), this study examines the relationship between Canadian corporate ownership structure and earnings management from 1995 to 1999. There is evidence of a nonmonotonic relationship. The concentration of voting and cash flow rights with the ultimate owner first increases earnings management, but as the level of ownership concentration increases, earnings management decreases. There is also a positive correlation between earnings management and voting and cash flow rights divergence. This is particularly evident when the gap between voting and cash flow rights is high. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效

文章以2007—2009年我国非金融上市公司扩张性并购事件为研究对象,对治理环境、终极股东控制与公司并购绩效的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,终极股东的两权分离度及政府控制性质与公司并购绩效负相关;治理环境的改善在提高公司并购绩效的同时,还能抑制两权分离对公司并购绩效带来的负面影响;终极控制股东的政府控制属性会弱化治理环境的这种治理效应。     

中国上市公司控股结构与债务融资关系的实证研究

论文以中国五个行业上市公司2005年的横截面数据为样本,通过分析第一大股东终极现金流量权与债务融资比例的经验关系,考察了负债的股权非稀释性和破产机制的治理作用.研究发现,非国有上市公司大股东的终极现金流量权比例与公司债务水平呈一种非线性的倒"U"型关系;而国有上市公司大股东的终极现金流量权比例与公司的债务融资水平则呈一种非线性的"U"型关系.此外,论文并没有发现股权制衡结构能够对大股东控制下的债务融资决策产生影响.     

终极产权、控制权结构和股利政策

以2004—2007年超过4500家上市公司为研究样本,基于终极产权的视角剖析了终极控制人及其控制权结构对股利政策的影响。实证结果表明,终极产权性质及其对应的控制权结构是目前影响我国上市公司股利政策制定的主要因素,尤其是终极控制人的投票权和现金流量权比例,对股利支付的可能性和水平均有显著正向影响。     

上市公司终极控制权特征对定增标的资产估值的影响

标的资产“高溢价”导致上市公司业绩下滑、资产承诺业绩未达标事件激增,其中尤以定增并购标的资产与上市公司终极控制人关联交易最为突出。本文以我国沪深A股2007-2018年对终极控制人及其关联方实施过定向增发资产注入的上市公司为样本,分析终极控制权特征对标的资产估值的影响。结果表明:终极控制人的控制权与定增标的资产评估增值率呈“U”型关系,现金流权与定增标的资产的资产评估增值率负相关,两权分离度、控制权复杂度、定增前后终极控制人控制权的分离程度与定增标的资产评估增值率正相关;终极控制人在董事会占据席位的比例越大,经理人由终极控制人任命或担任的,定增标的资产评估增值率更高;民营性质的相较于国有性质的终极控制人,定增标的资产评估增值率更高,反映了机会主义行为动机下终极控制人的控制权地位显著影响定增标的资产估值,虚增的注入资产价值加剧了定增并购中的业绩承诺风险。终极控制人借助定增并购资产估值转移上市公司财富行为更具隐蔽性,投资者和监管部门需关注定增并购资产估值环节,有效预防业绩承诺风险。     

OPTIMAL DIVIDEND PAYMENTS WHEN CASH RESERVES FOLLOW A JUMP‐DIFFUSION PROCESS

We consider a model in which a firm faces two types of liquidity risks: a Brownian risk and a Poisson risk. The firm chooses a dividend policy to maximize shareholder value. We characterize the optimal firm value and we show that the optimal dividend policy is a barrier strategy: the firm keeps cash inside when the cash reserves level is less than a critical threshold and pays cash in excess of this threshold. We also analyze the problem of insurance against the Poisson risk. We find that it is optimal for the firm to buy full insurance when its cash reserves are above a critical threshold and not to insure otherwise.     

The financial determinants of corporate cash holdings: Evidence from some emerging markets

This paper investigates corporate cash holdings in developing countries. In particular, we look into the effect of capital structure and dividend policy on cash holdings in Brazil, Russia, India, and China and compare our results with a control sample from the US and the UK. Our sample contains 1992 firms across these countries for the period 2002–2008. We employ Instrumental Variables analysis to control for the endogeneity of the financial policies (cash holdings, capital structure, and dividend policy). Our results show some evidence that capital structure and dividend policy affect cash holdings. There are similarities between developed and developing countries on the factors determining corporate cash holdings. The results of our cross-country model provide evidence that capital structure, dividend policy, and firm size are important factors in determining cash holdings. Finally, we show that firms operating in countries with low shareholder protection hold more cash.