Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks

In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

Operators are not Parameters, the Dimensions of Operators and Variables Must be Invariant, and Indices may not be Dimensioned: Rejoinder to Professors Folsom and Gonzalez

What is certain is that mathematics cannot possibly be a valid means (to advances in economic understanding) unless and until it is used properly. That means that dimensions must be used consistently and correctly. Barnett (Barnett, Quart J Austrian Econ, pp. 27–46, 2003) is about problems with the use of mathematics in economics involving the failure to use dimensions/units consistently and correctly. Professor Emeritus Folsom and Professor Gonzalez (Folsom and Gonzalez, Quart J Austrian Econ, pp. 45–65, 2005), hereinafter F&G, say, essentially, that what is correct therein is not new and that what is new is not correct. Additionally, they imply, by raising them, that I did not address issues that I should have, e.g., how to introduce dimensions into introductory economics and problems with the Cobb-Douglas (CD) function unrelated to dimensions. Herein, because of space limitations, I respond only to some of their criticisms. Responses to others are posted on the Ludwig von Mises Institute Working Papers site.

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

The Demand for Money for EMU: a Flexible Functional Form Approach

Monetary aggregates have a special role under the “two pillar strategy” of the ECB. Hence, a theoretically consistent measure of monetary aggregates for the European Monetary Union (EMU) is needed. This paper analyzes aggregation over monetary assets for the EMU. We aggregate over the monetary services for the eleven EMU (EMU-11) countries, which include Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We adopt the Divisia monetary aggregation approach, which is consistent with index number theory and microeconomic aggregation theory. The result is a multilateral Divisia monetary aggregate, in accordance with Barnett (J Econ 136(2):457–482, 2007). The multilateral Divisia monetary aggregate for the EMU-11 is found to be more informative and a better signal of economic trends than the corresponding simple sum aggregate. We then analyze substitutability among monetary assets for the EMU-11 within the framework of a representative consumer’s utility function, using Barnett’s (J Bus Econ Stat 1:7–23, 1983) locally flexible functional form, the minflex Laurent indirect utility function. The analysis of elasticities with respect to the asset’s user-cost prices shows that: (i) transaction balances and deposits with agreed maturity are income elastic and (ii) the monetary assets are not good substitutes for each other within the EMU-11. Simple sum monetary aggregation assumes that component assets are perfect substitutes. Hence simple sum aggregation distorts measurement of the monetary aggregate. The ECB provides Divisia monetary aggregates to the Governing Council at its meetings, but not to the public. Our European Divisia monetary aggregates will be expanded and refined, in collaboration with Wenjuan Chen at the Humboldt University of Berlin, to a complete EMU Divisia monetary aggregates database to be supplied to the public by the Center for Financial Stability in New York City.     

Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU

We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic stabilisation policies and policy games usually neglects this point and reaches overoptimistic conclusions about the desirable effects of accommodating fiscal policies. Central bank preferences also affect the desirability of fiscal coordination in a monetary union. In fact, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), we find that fiscal coordination improves outcomes in the case of a conservative central banker, whereas it leads to worse outcomes with a populist one.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve

In this paper we apply a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel to a monetary union (see Bofinger et al., J Econ Educ, 37:98–117 (2006), Walsh, J Econ Educ, 33:333–346 (2002)). We show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a high degree of integration in product markets is advantageous for the ECB as it prevents national interest rates from driving a wedge between macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In particular small countries are in need for fiscal policy as an independent stabilization agent with room to breath.

Reforms,Exchange Rates and Monetary Commitment: A Panel Analysis for OECD Countries

The paper investigates the link between monetary policy and structural reforms in open economies. We test three hypotheses: (a) the Calmfors hypothesis that the degree of reforms is higher in the case of autonomous policy and lower in the case of commitment, (b) the TINA hypothesis which implies a positive impact of a monetary policy rule on the extent of reforms, and (c) a third factors hypothesis. In our empirical analysis on panel data of 23 OECD countries from 1980–2000 we find little evidence for the Calmfors hypothesis, but evidence in favor of the TINA argument for labor market and regulatory reform.

Is Numérairology the Future of Monetary Economics?

The paper discusses some fundamental problems in monetary economics associated with the determination and role of the numéraire. The issues are introduced by formalising a proposal, attributed to Eisler, to remove the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates by unbundling the numéraire and medium of exchange/means of payment functions of money. The monetary authorities manage the exchange rate between the numéraire (‘sterling’) and the means of payment (‘drachma’). The short nominal interest rate on sterling bonds can then be used to target stability for the sterling price level. The paper puts question marks behind two key bits of conventional wisdom in contemporary monetary economics. The first is the assumption that the monetary authorities define and determine the numéraire used in private transactions. The second is the proposition that price stability in terms of that numéraire is the appropriate objective of monetary policy. The paper also discusses the merits of the next step following the decoupling of the numéraire from the currency: doing away with currency altogether—the cashless economy. Because the unit of account plays such a central role in New-Keynesian models with nominal rigidities, monetary economics needs to devote more attention to numérairology—the study of the individual and collective choice processes that govern the adoption of a unit of account and its role in economic behaviour.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory in Light of Rational Expectations: The Role of Heterogeneity, the Monetary Footprint, and Adverse Selection in Monetary Expansion

We contribute to the debate over the contemporary relevance of the Austrian Business Cycle theory (ABC) by making three theoretical developments. First, we claim that the heterogeneous nature of entrepreneurship is the best means to respond to a Rational Expectations (RE) critique. If entrepreneurs are different then the “cluster of errors” are not made by everyone, just those on the margin. And if the marginal entrepreneurs are systematically different from the population as a whole, we avoid the implication of widespread irrationality, even though credit expansion will affect real variables. Second, we argue that the size of the monetary footprint is a more telling signal than the market rate of interest, and will not necessarily be revealed by measured inflation. Therefore attention to the official interest rate or Consumer Price Index is misleading, and an inappropriate way to assess applicability. And third, the main harm from loose monetary policy is not that it encourages entrepreneurs to behave more recklessly with capital, but that it encourages precisely the people who can’t afford capital at the market rate to borrow, and makes them the marginal trader. This suggests that adverse selection is a more important issue than moral hazard. We acknowledge that empirical work is required to verify these claims, and suggest how this might be undertaken.

Implications of Monetary Union for Catching-up Member States

We examine the implications of monetary union for macroeconomic stabilization in catching-up participating countries. We allow member states’ supply conditions to differ, especially with regard to sectoral characteristics. Sectoral productivity shocks of the type associated with the Balassa–Samuelson effect tend to hamper the stabilization properties of a currency union. In the face of aggregate supply disturbances, the stabilization costs of renouncing monetary autonomy diminish with a steeper supply curve (as induced by higher trade openness) and—barring idiosyncratic shocks—with a larger reference country size, more homogeneous supply slopes and a higher preference for price stability.

Has there been any structural convergence in the transmission of European monetary policies?

This paper makes three contributions. First we present a technique by which the monetary transmission mechanism of Germany, France, the UK and the Eurozone can be decomposed into its component cycles, compared across economies and across time. As a result, we found that the individual data generating processes have varied over time. Second we show that Germany has now converged on the rest of Europe and not vice versa, although Germany had dominated monetary policy making in Europe for many years. Third, we show that the UK as an outsider has behaved like a peripheral EMU country, even when EMU was not in place. In other words, the transmission mechanisms of Germany and the UK were fundamentally different. Hence, when that German monetary policy dominated Europe in a way that was not in line with the rest of Europe, never mind the UK, it is no surprise that the UK eventually left the ERM (1992). The current financial crisis may enforce the trend of convergence of the transmission mechanism. But there have been signs of a divergence between core and periphery, to some extent involving the UK, so this general convergence, as opposed to tighter convergence in the core, may not last.

Monetary Inflation’s Effect on Wealth Inequality: An Austrian Analysis

Austrian monetary inflation theory claims that changes in the money supply are disproportionately distributed throughout an economy, and as a result wealth is coercively redistributed. This study proposes and tests a model illustrating this connection by examining monetary inflation’s effect on wealth inequality. After testing the model’s validity, this study compares monetary inflation’s effect on several measures of wealth inequality, concluding that not only is monetary inflation a significant variable, but its effect on wealth inequality is more pronounced at the extremities of the distribution.

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Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union

With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank.

Preference erosion and market access liberalization: the African dilemma in multilateral negotiations on agriculture

African countries, especially sub-Saharan ones, have conflicting interests in multilateral negotiations on agriculture. On the one hand, their economies may be boosted by the price effect induced by agricultural liberalization. On the other hand, multilateral tariff cuts will result in the erosion of preferential margins. Based on an original methodology, using CGE modeling, detailed tariff calculations and predictive analysis, this paper investigates the potential impact of current multilateral negotiations on the value of preferences for African agriculture. It estimates the preferential value to USD 0.7 billion of welfare and USD 1 billion of exports to the Triad markets. Furthermore, it highlights the “cruel dilemma” African countries face in current negotiations, as they gain from ambitious trade liberalization, despite the large preferential erosion, while they suffer from noticeable trade and welfare losses under conservative scenarios.

Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilizations: What are the Gains from Cooperation?

In this paper we extend the open-economy stochastic framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (Q J Econ. 117:503–36, 2002) to include distortionary taxation, when prices are flexible but wages are sticky. We use the model to analyze the optimal design of tax rules that respond to productivity shocks, under non-cooperation and cooperation between the fiscal authorities, and evaluate the gains from coordination. We show that, although monetary policy would be preferred to fiscal policy as a stabilization tool both under competition (Nash) and under cooperation, there is a role for procyclical fiscal stabilization in a monetary union where the monetary authority cannot respond to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that in the Nash game there will be an incentive for the fiscal authorities to try to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor, and we estimate the potential gains from fiscal policy coordination. The size of the gains depends crucially on the value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For lower values of the Frisch elasticity (more in line with microeconometric estimates) the gains are relatively small, but for more elastic labor supplies (more in agreement with the business cycle literature) the gains can be very large.

Saving–investment Correlations in Response to Monetary Policy Shocks: New Insights into the Feldstein–Horioka Puzzle?

In this paper, it is argued that the observed high positive correlation between national savings and investment which is found in the data can in part be explained by shocks to monetary policy. This hypothesis, which is established by reviewing some empirical findings, is tested in a two-country DSGE-model framework in the tradition of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics. The simulation results obtained support the idea that shocks to monetary policy might contribute to the explanation of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.

Monetary Policy Analysis in a Small Open Credit-Based Economy

This paper describes a simple framework for monetary policy analysis in a small open economy where bank credit is the only source of external finance. At the heart of the model is the link between banks’ lending rates (which incorporate a premium over and above the marginal cost of borrowing) and firms’ net worth. In contrast to models in the Stiglitz-Weiss or Kiyotaki-Moore tradition, the supply of bank loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing rate. The central bank sets the refinance rate and provides unlimited access to liquidity at that rate. The model is used to study the effects of changes in official interest rates, under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. Various extensions are also discussed, including income effects, the cost channel, the role of land as collateral, and dollarization.

Market structure and the link between migration and trade

Many recent studies have looked at the impact of international migration on trade and found a significant effect. They posit that migration fosters trade by lowering costs or by means of a preference bias. However, to my knowledge, market structure has not as yet been considered. Using data from Switzerland, this paper empirically assesses the extent to which migration affects trade, taking goods differentiation into account. A monopolistic model with a multisector economy (Chaney in Am Econ Rev 98(41):1707–1721, 2008) is then empirically estimated. The findings show that market structure explains the different channels through which migration affects trade.

Monetary Policy in Illiquid Markets: Options for a Small Open Economy

Two impediments to effective monetary policy operation include illiquidity in bond markets and the zero bound of interest rates. Under these conditions alternative means of enacting monetary policy may be required. This paper empirically explores policy options implemented through equity and currency markets that will generate similar inflation responses at different time horizons. In terms of GDP loss the least costly means of achieving a particular long run inflation outcome is via the current monetary policy arrangements. Currency market alternatives are volatile but less expensive than the equity market in terms of output loss for short term inflation horizons.