The impact of compatibility on innovation in markets with network effects

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the relationship between compatibility and innovation in markets with network effects using a model of competition with endogenous R&D, commercialization and compatibility. Compatibility is a mutual decision between firms and demand is partially dependent on overall consumption across compatible networks. Incumbent acquisition of an innovation or profit from entry provides entrepreneurs with an incentive for developing technological improvements and entrepreneurs receive greater returns if larger incumbents offer compatibility with their installed base. But for sufficiently weak network effects a large incumbent increases demand for its own product by denying compatibility to rivals. As a result, a credible threat of incompatibility reduces the entrepreneur's reserve to sell an innovation, but can also increase offers from smaller incumbents to acquire the innovation if it also avoids an incompatibility response from a larger incumbent. In response, entrepreneurs adjust their research effort in order to target a favourable compatibility regime that maximizes profit from entry or offers to acquire the innovation from incumbents. This leads to a complex relationship between the strength of network effects, innovation incentives, the entrepreneur's ambition for improvement and potentially disrupting the compatibility regime.     

Rich or alive? Political (in)stability,political leader selection and economic growth

We develop a model that studies the incentives of the ruling elite regarding the selection of the political leader. We show that it is optimal for the ruling elite to choose leaders with more military experience in a politically unstable regime while more educated leaders are preferred in politically stable regimes. Using a dataset that includes 1569 national leaders from 177 countries over the period 1946–2011, we find empirical evidence that political stability contributes to the selection of more educated leaders, while the reverse holds for leaders with high military ranks. The empirical findings are robust to different subsamples, various proxies for educational and military attainment, and different measures for political stability. Our results suggest that leader selection is another reason why political instability is harmful for economic growth.     

Competition and corruption in an agency relationship

The paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model, where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account. It is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents, namely low powered incentives and greater competition. The paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on African data.     

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes – full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing – on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.     

腐败与经济增长的关系实证研究——基于多国面板数据的分析

本文利用多国面板数据实证研究了腐败与经济增长的关系,得出以下结论:一是对于发达国家,腐败不利于经济增长;二是对于发展中国家,一开始腐败对经济增长是有促进作用的,但腐败与经济增长之间是一种倒U型的关系,腐败对经济增长的促进作用只是暂时的;三是对于我国,改革开放的深入,市场体制的完善,政府管制的减少,腐败的负面影响已经超过了正面影响,目前处于倒U型的右半部分,即腐败不利于我国经济增长。最后,本文给出了治理我国腐败的对策建议。     

Seeds of Corruption – Do Market Institutions Matter?

Ten years into the transition process, corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon thatcan seriously jeopardize the best intentionedreform efforts. Because of the complex anddeep political economy dynamics surroundingthe process transition economies areundergoing it is essential for policy-makersto understand the causes of corruption. Thispaper develops an integrated analyticalframework of the role basic marketinstitutions play as determinants ofrent-seeking and illicit behavior intransition economies. Using data onlyrecently available on the incidence ofcorruption and institutional development inthese economies, we provide preliminaryevidence on both the systemic links betweendevelopment of market institutions andincentives for corruption and the relativeimportance of such institutions. The mainlesson from our analysis is that awell-established system of marketinstitutions – one characterized by clear andtransparent rules, fully functioning checksand balances, including strong enforcementmechanisms, and a robust competitiveenvironment – reduces rent-seekingopportunities and, in turn, the incentives forcorruption. The empirical results suggestthat high barriers to new business entrantsand soft budget constraints on incumbent firmsare particularly important institutionalfactors engendering opportunities andincentives for corruption. As in otherstudies, the empirical results also supportthe notion that economic development andmaturation of democratic processes both tempercorruption, as does, to a lesser extent,openness to trade.     

Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors

To what extent do voters hold local elected leaders accountable for public service delivery in fiscally and politically decentralized environments, as theory suggests should be the case? We examine political accountability and service delivery in subnational Indonesia, through the lens of mayoral incumbency advantage. We apply regression discontinuity methods to a unique data set on local elections to identify the causal impact of incumbency on election outcomes and relate those effects to changes in citizen access to local public services. We find that voters in Indonesia are, in general, very willing to return incumbents to office compared to their counterparts in other countries. We also determine that the incumbent advantage is conditional on advances in local service provision: as service access expands more quickly, voters are more likely to vote incumbents back into office. Finally, we find that electorally successful incumbents—second term mayors—spend substantially less on education and health and more on infrastructure, manage their budgets less prudently, and deliver public services neither more nor less effectively than their first term equivalents. We conjecture that term limits and the attendant lack of electoral incentives leads to the disappointing second-term mayor performance.     

Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico

International migration is costly and initially only the middle class of the wealth distribution may have both the means and incentives to migrate, which can increase inequality in the sending community. However, the migration networks formed lower the costs for future migrants, which can in turn lower inequality. This paper shows both theoretically and empirically that wealth has a nonlinear effect on migration, and then examines the empirical evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and inequality in rural sending communities in Mexico. After instrumenting, we find that the overall impact of migration is to reduce inequality across communities with relatively high levels of past migration. We also find some suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship among communities with a wider range of migration experiences.     

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

Incumbent organisations shaping emerging technological fields: cases of solar photovoltaic and electric vehicle charging

We explore how large incumbent organisations shape emerging technological fields while establishing a position and business opportunities for themselves during technological shifts. We draw from innovation studies that increasingly emphasise the ability of incumbent organisations to survive technological transformations and studies on emerging technological fields to identify ways in which incumbent organisations shape novel fields during their emergence. Through longitudinal case studies of two emerging fields, we examine how incumbents shape the emerging technological fields of solar energy and electric vehicles. We discuss the interlinked and cumulative business and discursive activities utilized by the incumbents as well as the mechanism through which they influence the legitimacy, expectations and field boundaries of the emerging technological fields. Our study draws attention to the fact that incumbents enter emerging fields at an earlier stage and in more diverse ways than has previously been noted.     

内部因素对家族企业传承影响的实证分析——基于在任者的视角

家族企业代际传承将直接影响企业的成长和竞争力。本文从在任者视角,实证研究了家族因素和在任者因素对家族企业代际传承的影响。研究结果表明,家族因素对传承意愿起着主导作用,说明中国传统文化深刻影响着家族企业代际传承,可以借鉴组建家族委员会的方式来协调家族成员与企业之间的关系,促进家族与企业的和谐发展;在任者的文化程度和年龄明显影响着家族企业传承计划的安排,本科以上学历的在任者会在传承时间、传承对象和继承人培养等方面更具前瞻性。在任者文化程度不高制约了家族企业发展,可以通过加强在任者素质教育来提高家族企业的传承质量。     

RJV FORMATION AND STRATEGIC ENTRY ACCOMMODATION*

This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à la Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992 ) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be asymmetric per Long and Soubeyran (2002 ). It is found that conforming with the conventional wisdom, the incumbents prefer to form RJV to deter entry when the entrant is very inefficient. However, if the entrant is moderately inefficient, it is a better choice for the incumbent to accommodate entry by forming a RJV with it. In contrast, if the entrant is very efficient, then the equilibrium RJV structure depends on the magnitude of spillover effect: it is better to deter entry in the case of high spillover effect.     

How do the combined effects of CEO decision horizon and compensation impact the relationship between earnings pressure and R&D retrenchment?

Although relevant literature has been accumulated, how earnings pressure from stock analysts affects a firm's innovation expenditures remains unclear. In order to make this relationship more clear, this study investigates the impact of earnings pressure on a firm's research and development (R&D) investment by considering the combined effects of CEOs’ decision horizon and incentives. Our hypotheses were tested by firms from the S&P 1500 during the period from 2000 to 2012. The findings reveal that earnings pressure has a detrimental effect on a firm's R&D investment, and also that it goes worse when CEOs have a shorter decision horizon. However, when it comes to compensation incentives, we found that either CEOs equipped with higher stock ownership or fewer stock options can reduce the adverse effect of a shorter decision horizon on the relationship between earnings pressure and R&D retrenchment.     

Learning about challengers

We examine a political agency problem in repeated elections where an incumbent runs against a challenger from the opposing party, whose policy preferences are unknown by voters. We first ask: do voters benefit from attracting a pool of challengers with more moderate ideologies? When voters and politicians are patient, moderating the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians (those close to the median voter) reduces voter welfare by reducing an extreme incumbent's incentives to compromise. We then ask: do voters benefit from informative signals about a challenger's true ideology? We prove that giving voters informative, but sufficiently noisy, signals always harm voters, because they make it harder for incumbents to secure re-election.     

Corporate taxation, incumbency advantage and entry

It is the purpose of this paper to show that corporation tax may affect industrial structure. Analyzing the effects of corporation tax, we demonstrate that it tends to favour incumbents over entrants. We further show that the effect of this advantage on an incumbent's output depends on his profit or loss history. An incumbent with a past profit is likely to produce a greater output, thereby partially or fully crowding out an entrant's output. In contrast, an incumbent with a past loss is more likely to produce a smaller output, making entry easier.     

Who gains from non-collusive corruption?

Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs. If borrowing is limited, bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business. But this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway; the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets.     

高层管理团队断裂带影响管理者能力实证研究

选取2014-2016年中国创业板上市公司为研究样本,实证考察了创业板上市公司高层管理团队断裂带对管理者能力的直接影响,以及产业环境对两者关系的调节作用。层级多元回归分析结果表明：线性关系下,高层管理团队社会分类断裂带与信息基础断裂带对管理者能力产生显著负向影响,但在稳定产业环境下高层管理团队社会分类断裂带对管理者能力产生显著正向影响;非线性关系下,动态产业环境中高层管理团队社会分类断裂带与管理者能力呈显著倒U型关系,而信息基础断裂带与管理者能力呈显著U型关系;稳定产业环境下,高层管理团队社会分类断裂带与管理者能力呈显著U型关系,而信息基础断裂带与管理者能力呈显著倒U型关系。在理论层面,结论拓展了管理者能力影响因素研究,丰富了关于高层管理团队断裂带经济后果的复杂关系讨论。同时,考察了不同情境下高层管理团队断裂带对管理者能力的影响。在实践层面,可为企业高管团队构建、管理者能力发挥,以及新业务产业经营领域选择提供经验证据与管理启示。     

Corruption,intrinsic motivation,and the love of praise

Do higher wages prevent corruption (bribe taking)? We investigate a setting where individuals who apply for public sector jobs are motivated not just by monetary incentives but also by intrinsic motivation and concern for the collective reputation of their profession. We show that an increase in monetary compensation may cause reputation‐concerned individuals to be more prone to participate in corruption due to an “overjustification” effect. The overall effect of monetary incentives on fighting corruption crucially depends on the composition of the pool of public sector workers for two reasons: first, different types of workers react differently to the same policy; second, the composition of the pool of workers affects individual behavior through its effect on collective reputation. These results imply in particular that policies to fight corruption should focus more on increasing the collective reputation of the public sector rather than using monetary incentives, which have perverse effects on some agents.     

Trends in the extraction of non-renewable resources: The case of fossil energy

This paper considers a strategy for the extraction and production of non-renewable resources that are finite in quantity. Specifically, we illustrate empirical data on reserves, production, consumption, and price evolution for fossil fuel. Our model is an intertemporal model of a short decision time horizon with a monopolistic resource producer extracting non-renewable resources. The model is solved numerically using a finite horizon solution method called Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (NMPC), which approximates well models with a longer decision time horizon. Consistent with the results of recent empirical studies, our numerical solution method shows a U-shaped path for the price and an inverted U-shaped path for the extraction rate, in the case of modest initial stock of proved reserves.