Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs

This paper investigates the influence that a firm’s distance from control has on its performance, using balance sheet information and a unique data set on small business ownership. This study fills a gap in the empirical governance literature by investigating whether there is expropriation of minority shareholders in small business groups. Contrary to observations for large business groups, results show a positive relationship between the separation of control from ownership and firm performance. Results also underline that tunneling promotes controlling shareholders’ profit stability rather than profit maximization in small business groups.     

Group control motive as a determinant of ownership structure in business conglomerates: Evidence from Korea’s chaebols

In this paper, we attempt to make two major contributions to the literature that studies the ownership structure of business conglomerates. First, we introduce the concept of group control motive and empirically show that this motive greatly shapes the controlling-minority ownership structure. Using a two stage least squares (2SLS) framework, we show that controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings in firms that have greater contribution to group control, and alternatively show that firms in which the controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings are made to have greater contribution to group control. Second, we find that the level of disparity between voting and cash flow rights is significantly higher than the levels previously reported in the literature on Korean firms when we include non-public firms and adopt a control concept that is more flexible and closer to reality.     

The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols

We study the evolution of Korean chaebols (business groups) using ownership data. Chaebols grow vertically (as pyramids) when the controlling family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to acquire firms with low pledgeable income and high acquisition premiums. Chaebols grow horizontally (through direct ownership) when the family acquires firms with high pledgeable income and low acquisition premiums. Central firms trade at a relative discount, due to shareholders’ anticipation of value-destroying acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the selection of firms into different positions in the chaebol and ascribes the underperformance of pyramidal firms to a selection effect rather than tunneling.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.     

Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel

We consider the effect on performance of very large controlling shareholders, who are mostly organized in voting blocks and business groups, in a sample of Belgian listed firms from 1991 to 2006. Since the shape of the relation between ownership and firm value is a controversial issue in corporate finance, we use semiparametric local-linear kernel-based panel models. These models allow us not to impose a priori functional restrictions on the relation between ownership and performance. Our semiparametric analysis shows that the effect on performance varies depending on the size of ownership stakes and that there are departures from linearity, especially in family firms. Our results suggest that this non-linearity in family firms is related to whether or not the CEO is a family member.     

Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy

This study examines the impact of concentrated founder ownership on related party transactions (RPTs) for Indian firms. We find that concentrated founder ownership is positively related to RPTs and is more likely to encourage RPTs that are beneficial for the minority shareholders. We also observe that RPTs are associated with higher firm value. This relationship is more pronounced for business group firms and firms with more highly concentrated founder ownership. We show that the reputation incentive plays a very important role in founders’ decisions, and they use RPTs as an efficient transaction mechanism.     

Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

We investigate the relation between founding‐family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one‐third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.     

The internal labor markets of business groups

This paper provides micro evidence of labor mobility inside business groups. We show that worker flows between firms in the same group are stronger than with unaffiliated firms. Moreover, the reallocation of top workers between group firms is more sensitive to international shocks. Top workers that move within the group in response to shocks reach higher positions and earn higher wages. We find suggestive evidence that productivity increases when firms receive same-group top workers. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that, in response to changing opportunities, joint ownership eases the redeployment of workers endowed with general management skills.     

The value of multinationality and business group for Japanese firms

We provide evidence for the combined value impacts of corporate multinationality and business group affiliation, incorporating the effect of endogeneity of diversification decisions. The results for Japanese industrial firms indicate that multinational firms have a statistically significant 2.3% value premium during FY1995–2011 relative to comparable domestic firms; however, the multinationality premium is moderated by the nature of business group as well as the characteristics of the host country. Specifically, the multinationality premium is negatively associated with both keiretsu membership and main bank ownership of group firms. Main bank ownership as well as vertical keiretsu affiliation positively impact the value of multinationality for firms operating in developing countries. These results hold even during the later part of the sample period, when the keiretsu and main bank systems have been under pressure. The implication is that corporate multinationality is a substitute for business group and for inadequate indigenous institutional infrastructure.     

Family entrepreneurship around the world

In many countries of the world, families participate in most activities of emerging and mature companies. For example, established business owners may co-own and/or co-manage their businesses with family members. The purpose of this study is to model entrepreneurial formation, innovation and growth, and the exit and continuity of businesses where family members participate in ownership, management, and labor. Based on a sample of over 28,000 businesses across 49 countries, I conclude the following. First, young family businesses tend to be sole proprietorships, domestically-oriented, focused on niche activities, and small. Second, international family businesses may be less innovative in products and markets than international non-family businesses. However, both types of businesses show a similar propensity to adopt new technologies. Third, a sequential model for business decisions shows that family involvement may accelerate future business creation and early start-up stages. However, family participation in ownership and labor may decrease the chances of transitioning from a nascent to a young business. Fourth, internationalization, future business prospects, and family involvement may make business operations more likely to continue after exiting.     

The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe

We investigate the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in Continental Europe, using data from 675 publicly traded corporations in 11 countries. Although family‐controlled corporations exhibit larger separation between control and cash‐flow rights, our results do not support the hypothesis that family control hampers firm performance. Valuation and operating performance are significantly higher in founder‐controlled corporations and in corporations controlled by descendants who sit on the board as non‐executive directors. When a descendant takes the position of CEO, family‐controlled companies are not statistically distinguishable from non‐family firms in terms of valuation and performance.     

The impact of ownership transferability on family firm governance and performance: The case of family trusts

Ownership structure plays a critical role in the incentives and behaviors of business organizations. The literature has focused on the effects of firm ownership dispersion across managers and investors. We extend the literature by examining the roles of ownership structure within a controlling family. Specifically, we focus on the family trust structure, which is a popular vehicle for holding family ownership around the world. The trust structure typically locks controlling ownership within a family for a very long period. Although it ensures family control, the share transfer restriction may induce family shirking problems, make family conflicts difficult to resolve, and distort firm decisions. Based on a sample of publicly traded family firms in Hong Kong, we report that trust-controlled firms that are more susceptible to these problems tend to pay higher dividends, invest less in the long term, and experience worse performance. The costs of using a trust structure are more significant when the family stakes have been locked inside the trust for a longer period and when a larger amount of family ownership is held by the trust.     

Anticipating intergenerational management transfer of family firms: A typology of next generation’s future leadership projections

A key assumption in family business research and practice is that for family businesses to have a future, succession must be secured. Because family businesses are hybrid organizations with partially or totally overlapping family and business identities, a second consensual assumption is shared by most family business scholars and entrepreneurs: the business needs to stay in the family, so intra-family succession is the optimal ownership and management transfer solution. Yet both assumptions adopt the perspective of the business founder or the current family business leader. Next generations are rarely asked to express their thoughts and feelings about the future of the family firms that they are expected to protect, develop and pass on to their own children. Do next generation members share these two assumptions or do they envision their potential leadership role differently, expressing alternative views about the meaning and scope of family business succession? In this article, we present and discuss four alternative future leadership projections generated by a group of 14 next generation members participating in a training workshop held in the west of France in August 2013.     

Are family firms really superior performers?

Although international evidence suggests that families may be unhelpful to firm performance, recent analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform. This study probes these contrasting findings by investigating more fine-grained measures of family business in the U.S. Specifically, it makes a fundamental but neglected distinction between lone founder businesses in which no relatives of a founder are involved, and true family businesses that do include multiple family members as major owners or managers. The research also seeks to overcome issues of endogeneity and selection bias by examining both Fortune 1000 firms and a random sample of 100 much smaller public companies. The results show that findings are indeed highly sensitive both to the way in which family businesses are defined and to the nature of the sample. Fortune 1000 firms that include relatives as owners or managers never outperform in market valuation, even during the first generation. Only businesses with a lone founder outperform. Moreover neither lone founder nor family firms exhibited superior valuations within a randomly drawn sample of companies. Our results confirm the difficulty of attributing superior performance to a particular governance variable.     

Auditor selection within a business group: evidence from Taiwan

Although auditor selection is well documented in the literature, it is unclear whether group characteristics affect firms’ auditor selection decisions. Generally, a business group is the result of diversification by the core firm. Major decisions of the business group, such as auditor selection, are made by the core firm and influenced by the business group’s characteristics. Using operational and ownership linkages perspectives, this study investigates the determinants of a business group’s member firm engaging the same auditor as its core firm. We employ the input–output relationship of products along a supply chain to construct product vertical relatedness measures between member firms and the core firm, and establish logistic regression models to test our hypotheses. Using a sample of publicly listed business groups in Taiwan from 2000 to 2010, our results suggest that a member firm is more likely to engage the same auditor as its core firm when (1) the core firm engages a Big N auditor, (2) the core firm’s auditor is an industry specialist for both the core firm and its member firm, (3) the degree of vertical relatedness increases, or (4) the controlling shareholders’ deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights increases (hereafter deviation). On the other hand, the likelihood of a member firm engaging the same auditor as its core firm when induced by higher deviation could be offset by the influence of stronger business vertical linkages.     

Ownership structure, family control, and acquisition decisions

We investigate how ownership and family control influence the decision to take part in M&As as an acquirer or as an acquired company in a sample of 777 large Continental European companies in the period 1998-2008. We find that ownership is negatively correlated with the probability of launching a takeover bid, and family firms are less likely to make acquisitions, especially when the stake held by the family is not large enough to assure the persistence of family control. On the passive side of M&A deals, the effect of the largest shareholders' ownership on the decision to accept an acquisition proposal depends non-linearly on the voting rights they hold, and family control reduces the probability of being acquired by an unrelated party. We do not find evidence that family-controlled firms destroy wealth when they acquire other companies. Finally, we document that ownership and family control, while being negatively correlated with M&A activity, are not negatively correlated with growth in firm size.     

A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups

We provide a new rationale for pyramidal ownership in family business groups. A pyramid allows a family to access all retained earnings of a firm it already controls to set up a new firm, and to share the new firm's nondiverted payoff with shareholders of the original firm. Our model is consistent with recent evidence of a small separation between ownership and control in some pyramids, and can differentiate between pyramids and dual‐class shares, even when either method can achieve the same deviation from one share–one vote. Other predictions of the model are consistent with both systematic and anecdotal evidence.     

Understanding the relationship between founder–CEOs and firm performance

We use instrumental variables methods to disentangle the effect of founder–CEOs on performance from the effect of performance on founder–CEO status. Our instruments for founder–CEO status are the proportion of the firm's founders that are dead and the number of people who founded the company. We find strong evidence that founder–CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions and that good performance makes it less likely that the founder retains the CEO title. After factoring out the effect of performance on founder–CEO status, we identify a positive causal effect of founder–CEOs on firm performance that is quantitatively larger than the effect estimated through standard OLS regressions. We also find that founder–CEOs are more likely to relinquish the CEO post after periods of either unusually low or unusually high operating performances. All in all, the results in this paper are consistent with a largely positive view of founder control in large US corporations.     

The determinants of the voting premium in Italy: The evidence from 1974 to 2003

We examine the voting premium in Italy in the period 1974 to 2003, when it ranged from 1% to 100%. At firm level, the measure of the price differential between voting and non-voting stocks cannot be fully explained without taking into account the effect of the largest shareholder’s identity. Family-controlled firms have higher voting premiums, especially when the family owns a large stake in the company’s voting equity and the founder is the firm’s CEO and/or Chairman. We explain this result by showing that families attach greater importance to control and are more prone than other types of controlling shareholders to expropriate the non-voting class of shareholders.     

The impact of business group affiliation on stock price informativeness: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper examines the relationship between business group affiliation and stock price informativeness in an emerging market setting. We use stock price synchronicity as a measure, and study the impact of group affiliation ‐specifically the extent of affiliation, ownership structure and existence of group bank‐ on firm specific information content. Results reveal that the amount of firm‐specific information capitalized into stock prices tends to be lower (higher) when the firm is group‐affiliated (unaffiliated), indirectly (directly) owned, and affiliated group has (does not have) a group bank. Additionally, the extent of group affiliation maintains a non‐linear relationship with synchronicity, suggesting that the perception of higher versus lower levels of group ownership differs.