Public budget composition,fiscal (de)centralization,and welfare

Abstract We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a dynamic federal economy where governments decide on budget size and its allocation between public education and infrastructure spending. We find that full centralization of tax and expenditure policies is optimal when infrastructure productivity is similar across regions. When differences are not too large, partial centralization is optimal. With strong differences, full decentralization becomes optimal. National steady‐state output tends to be highest under full decentralization. We provide a justification for the mixed evidence regarding the Oates conjecture by showing that full dominates partial decentralization, despite being inferior to complete decentralization.     

Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?

Corruption is harmful for public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. We open a new avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal decentralization. For a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986–2010, we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate diversity in the effects of fiscal decentralization, in that it appears related to lower deficits in countries with higher levels of corruption but not in less corrupt countries. Our results suggest that bringing the government closer to the people through fiscal decentralization in relatively corrupt countries leads to more responsible fiscal management.     

财政分权的中国模式与OECD模式——分税制是财政集权吗

本文在完整的财政分权内涵上比较分析了1995—2009年中国与OECD国家的财政分权情况,结果发现,不管是收入还是支出,中国中央与地方政府的财政分权程度都远远高于发达国家,呈现出中国政治集权下的财政分权和OECD政治分权下的财政集权两种模式。中国的财政支出分权程度与经济增长和财政均等化存在显著的正向相关关系,而这在OECD国家是不显著的。在中国的财政分权结构中,结构偏向的经济性支出成为地方政府财政支出重点和经济增长的重要推动力量;扩张的预算外支出成为增加财政收入的重要途径。所谓“事权与财权匹配”问题的实质是公共职责不清晰和预算软约束的地方政府收支扩张的财政机会主义倾向。财政分权改革的后续深化方向是在明确规范化地方政府公共职责和硬化预算约束的基础上适度财政集权化。     

Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990–2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.     

Expenditure Competition

Given the temptation by government officials to use some of their budget for "perks," residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such "waste." The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore how the competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization affects "waste" in government. We find that such competition reduces waste, raises the utility of residents, and increases the desired supplies of public goods (potentially above the levels that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate). These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from "tax competition," and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization.     

中国的财政分权与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证

在Barro、Davoodi和Zou模型的基础上,本文构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用1980-2004年省级面板数据,采用随机效应回归方法,分阶段实证研究了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响.实证研究发现,财政分权总体上促进了我国的经济增长,而且我国财政分权的经济增长效应存在显著的跨区差异,东部地区的财政分权经济增长优势高于中西部地区.作者认为,财政分权体制下地方政府财政行为的差异与公共支出构成的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异的重要原因.     

财政支出分权如何影响政府支出预算偏离*

政府支出决算与预算的差异可称之为支出预算偏离，其大小直接关系到现代预算制度的建设和积极财政政策提质增效的效果。预算最大化理论指出地方政府追求自由裁量预算的最大化，这会导致预算支出大于决算支出，而财政支出分权则便利了地方政府追求自由裁量预算最大化的条件，因此，财政支出分权是导致支出预算偏离的一个重要因素。利用1994—2017年全省层面和市县加总层面的财政预决算数据，本文发现，财政支出分权程度越高，政府支出预算偏离的程度也越大。不同形式的稳健性检验较好地支持了上述结论。此外，经济发展水平和财政透明度能够降低财政支出分权对预算偏离影响的程度。合理调整不同层级政府之间的事权，建立事权与支出责任相匹配的财政体制，适度加强中央事权和支出责任，将有效降低政府支出预算偏离的程度。     

财政支出分权如何影响政府支出预算偏离*

政府支出决算与预算的差异可称之为支出预算偏离，其大小直接关系到现代预算制度的建设和积极财政政策提质增效的效果。预算最大化理论指出地方政府追求自由裁量预算的最大化，这会导致预算支出大于决算支出，而财政支出分权则便利了地方政府追求自由裁量预算最大化的条件，因此，财政支出分权是导致支出预算偏离的一个重要因素。利用1994—2017年全省层面和市县加总层面的财政预决算数据，本文发现，财政支出分权程度越高，政府支出预算偏离的程度也越大。不同形式的稳健性检验较好地支持了上述结论。此外，经济发展水平和财政透明度能够降低财政支出分权对预算偏离影响的程度。合理调整不同层级政府之间的事权，建立事权与支出责任相匹配的财政体制，适度加强中央事权和支出责任，将有效降低政府支出预算偏离的程度。     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH OF VIETNAMESE PROVINCES: THE ROLE OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

This study offers an insight into the public governance role in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provincial economic growth in Vietnam. Fiscal decentralization measures are assorted. Applying a sequential (two‐stage) estimation for the panel data of 62 provinces of Vietnam over the 2006–2015 period, we find that first, fiscal decentralization is positively related to the economic growth of Vietnamese provinces. Second, the effects of public governance on economic growth vary across provinces depending on various levels of local public governance. Interestingly, the effect of fiscal decentralization is strengthened when this variable is added along with better quality of public governance. In a region of high public governance quality, fiscal decentralization exerts a positive effect on its economic growth. Our findings imply that the design of fiscal decentralization needs to be associated with local governments’ ability of public governance to improve the local economic growth.     

China's Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Economic Growth

The present paper applies Lucas's theory of endogenous growth and Stiglitz's theory of local public goods to build an econometric model consisting of five simultaneous equations to study China's fiscal decentralization effects on regional economic growth. The model is estimated by two‐stage least squares using a set of panel data on 31 Chinese provinces during 1996–2005. The estimated results show that China's fiscal decentralization increased the local governments' expenditure on physical infrastructure and education, which led to the rising local physical capital stock and human capital levels, respectively, and then resulted in the growth of regional economies.     

财政分权对全要素生产率的影响--基于“省直管县”改革的准自然实验

"省直管县"改革一改以往"省-市-县"的管理模式,有助于提高县级政府的财政分权水平。为缓解内生性,将"省直管县"改革视为一项准自然实验,构建双重差分模型检验了财政分权对全要素生产率的因果效应。研究发现:①财政分权对全要素生产率的正向促进作用高于负面阻碍作用,但不同形式的分权影响有异质性,具体来说财权的下放有利于全要素生产率的提高,经济社会事务管理权限的下放则不利于。②当地方政府自主权提高时,其"重生产、轻服务"的支出偏好,使得当地基础设施供给增加,而能够增强地方软实力、加快创新要素集聚的公共服务供给相应减少,造成了全要素生产率的损失,导致在经济高质量高效益增长中政府"有形之手"的作用发挥不够。③随着改革的推进,财政分权对全要素生产率的正向作用逐渐减弱,并不再显著。据此,从合理划分省以下政府的事权与支出责任,充实基层政府财力;提高公共服务类指标在政府官员政绩考核中的权重,加强各县(市)政府间的合作,实现各自为政的地方经济向统一市场整合等方面提出政策建议。     

Does decentralization contribute to efficiency? Evidence from OECD countries

This article provides evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and technical efficiency. We begin the first stage of this study with a data envelopment analysis to obtain technical efficiency estimates for a sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 1992–2009. In a second stage, we explore the effects of fiscal decentralization and other control variables on technical efficiency. The results including all the control variables reveal a statistically significant negative relationship between fiscal decentralization of public expenditure and technical efficiency.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

财政分权、地方财政赤字与土地财政——来自中部欠发达地区J省的经验证据

现行的财政支出式分权导致地方财政收支不平衡状况日益严重,而地方政府在收入自主能力受约束的条件下,只能依赖土地财政来缓解地方财政赤字压力。现行的政绩考评体系、预算制度不完善是造成土地财政的重要根源。本文以中部欠发达地区J省为例,验证了地方财政赤字对土地财政的正向影响效应,建议通过完善现行的财政分权体制,赋予地方政府更多的财权,完善预算管理制度、强化预算的归一性,同时构建以人为本、促进科学发展的政绩考评机制来根治土地财政问题。     

分权的“悖论”：“省管县”改革对居民医疗服务满意度的影响

财政分权是否有助于提高与本地居民偏好更加匹配的公共服务水平未有定论。借助“省管县”改革这一准自然实验,文章旨在从微观需求角度考察地方分权对公共服务改善的效果。采用2005年的县级宏观数据和 CG S S2005居民调查数据,本文对“省管县”改革与公共医疗服务满意度的关系进行了实证分析。 Logit模型结果表明,“省管县”财政体制的实施未能使当地政府提供让居民更加合意的医疗服务,反而恶化了居民对公共医疗服务的满意度。在排除了“改革错觉”、“预期效应”以及“滞后效应”的干扰后,这一结论依旧稳健。文章认为,财权扩大加剧了地方政府间竞争,使得县级政府有更大的激励将财政资金投入到基建领域而非民生领域,这将导致医疗服务供给相对不足,进而引起满意度的下降。中介分析证实了这一推理。文章研究有助于从微观视角评析分权改革的公共福利效应。     

空间外部性视角下的地方政府支出策略互动模式

运用空间面板计量方法研究了分税制改革以来中国地方政府支出的策略互动模式。结果表明,基本建设、文教科卫和预算外支出具有显著的空间自相关性,表现出策略互补,行政管理支出则由于地方财力情况的差异形成策略替代,效益外溢性、财政竞争机制和标尺效应在其中交替发挥了主导作用。财政收支分权对支出策略互动模式的影响效果并不一致,扩张支出分权将加剧以基建支出为主的地方政府竞争。财政分权的改革方向是使地方政府在一定程度上拥有收入自主权,中央适当上收具有强烈区域外溢性的公共品供给责任,降低地方非正式收支自主权,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

转型中的分权与公共品供给:基于中国经验的实证研究

文章首先从理论上阐述了中国转型中分权与公共品供给的内在联系;进而利用中国省级面板数据,构建动态结构模型,在控制住财政分权与公共品内生关系基础上,运用系统广义矩估计方法(SYS GMM)检验证实了理论分析的推论:分权对"硬"公共品供给有明显加速作用,时"软"公共品供给有明显抑制作用;经济较差的地区,分权速度会加快,其中人口密度较高的地区分权速度要比人口密度低的地区快;人口密度较高、经济较好的地区分权速度会减弱;分权程度变化与政府行政效率间存在显著正相关关系."发展型政府"更偏好"硬"公共品供给,因而更偏好高分权.     

基于收入视角的中央与地方财政关系

基于财政收入视角,本文回顾了我国财政改革历程,认识到宪政背景、意识形态和地方可支配财力对财政分权的重要意义。分税制改革是政府间财力的重新分配。分税制改革至今,中央和地方的税收分享不断调整。中央通过扩大共享税范围,增加了分享比例,集中税收,上收财力。分税制规定了政府间的预算内财政收入,并没有规定支出,实质上增加了地方政府财政支配权。地方政府预算内财政收入减少,却不断扩大财政支出的规模。地方政府通过增加非税收入规模,提高中央转移支付额度,实现收支平衡。地方政府提高财政可支配收入的积极性和经济建设的积极性相互交织,成为地方非税收入膨胀的根源。     

Fiscal Decentralization and Political Budget Cycles

We analyze a problem à la Rogoff where incumbents can distort fiscal policy to signal their competency, but where fiscal policy can be centralized or decentralized. Our main focus is on how the equilibrium probability that fiscal policy is distorted in any region (the political budget cycle, PBC) differs across fiscal regimes. With centralization, there are generally two effects that change the probability of a PBC. One is the possibility of selective distortion: the incumbent can be reelected with the support of just a majority of regions. The other is a cost diversification effect, which is present unless costs are perfectly correlated across regions. Both these effects work in the same direction, with the general result that the PBC probability is lower under centralization when decentralization also involves PBC. Welfare analysis shows that voters tend to be better off when the PBC probability is lower, so voters prefer centralization when decentralization involves PBC. Our results are robust to a number of changes in the specification of the model.     

转轨经济、软预算约束与财政分权

我国正处在经济转轨时期,软预算约束问题仍然存在。财政分权能够通过增强制度约束来缓解动态过程中因事前事后承诺不一致而导致的软预算约束问题,同时,也可以通过促进地方上及地方间的竞争来在一定程度上缓解软预算约束问题。