Agency Theory and Japanese Corporate Governance

Agency theory has been used to predict managerial strategic behavior in the past. However, critics have commented that this theory, in its applications, has been too Anglo-American specific. Research in non-Anglo-American settings has been scarce. Recent changes in the Japan Commercial Code and moves by Japanese corporations to access global equity markets allow us to test the veracity of this criticism by examining how Japanese firms respond strategically to the increased requirement for disclosure and transparency; whether they behave in ways congruent with agency theory predictions. Agency theory states that managers who are held accountable for their use of corporate resources will deploy them in ways to enhance stockholder value rather than increase their shares of the economic residual. Thus, we would expect to observe a difference in Japanese managerial behavior accompanying an increased exposure to global capital markets. Using data from Japanese firms, we found some support for the usefulness of agency theory to non-Anglo-American settings when the rules of capital market discipline are allowed to operate.     

Environment, governance, controls, and radical innovation during institutional transitions

Researchers pay only limited attention to the problem of drive force of radical innovation in institutional transitions, especially in China. Drawing on both institutional theory, managerial control theory, and innovation theory, this study examines the roles of external and internal drivers to firms?? radical innovation. Specifically, we examine the effects of external institutional environment and internal corporate governance on radical innovation by introducing management control systems. Based on data from a sample of 585 firms in China, this study finds that the effect of institutional environment uncertainty on radical innovation is significant but formal corporate governance is not. These results suggest that firms facing an uncertain institutional environment emphasize both financial control and strategic control, and firms that have adopted formal corporate governance prefer strategic control to financial control. The implications of these findings for research during institutional transitions are discussed.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Governance: The Role of Executive Compensation

This article examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate sustainability by focusing on an essential component of companies' governance structure: executive compensation programs. We propose an original empirical strategy based on a large set of the biggest capitalizations in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 2004–2018, with explicit measures of how companies integrate into executive managers' remuneration precise criteria of corporate social responsibility, an incentive scheme called corporate social responsibility (CSR) contracting. Our results show that proposing executive compensation programs including CSR criteria has a negative impact on financial performance, and a large positive impact on extra-financial performance based on the following dimensions: relationship with customers and suppliers, and community involvement. Second, we explore the moderating role of the corporate governance model by distinguishing the impact between firms with a shareholder or stakeholder corporate governance model and reveal significant differences in the impact of CSR contracting. For firms with a stakeholder corporate governance model, CSR contracting is no longer associated with a fall of financial performance and has a large positive impact on human resources, environmental, and human rights performance. On the other hand, CSR contracting has a negative impact on financial performance but no impact on extra-financial performance for firms with a shareholder corporate governance model.     

Corporate Governance and Performance: The REIT Effect

Real estate investment trusts (REITs) offer a natural experiment in corporate governance due to the fact that they leave little free cash flow for management, which reduces agency problems. We exploit a unique and leading corporate governance database to test whether corporate governance matters for the performance of U.S. REITs. We document for a sample including governance ratings of more than 220 REITs that firm value is significantly related to firm-level governance for REITs with low payout ratios only. Repeating the analysis with the complete database that includes more than 5,000 companies and a control sample of firms with high corporate real estate ratios, we find a strong and significantly positive relation between our governance index and several performance variables, indicating that the partial lack of a relation between governance and performance in the real estate sector might be explained by a REIT effect.     

Corporate Governance Structure and Employment Adjustment in Japan: An Empirical Analysis Using Corporate Finance Data

I investigate the influence of corporate governance structures on employment adjustment in Japanese firms, using financial data for firms listed on the Japanese stock market. The results indicate that corporate governance structures affect the rate of employment adjustment. The presence of large stockholders and the degree of stock cross–holding lengthens the period the firm remains in debt and slows down the speed of employment adjustment.     

Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions

Do outside directors on corporate boards make a difference in firm performance during institutional transitions? What leads to the practice of appointing outside directors in the absence of legal mandate? This article addresses these two important questions by drawing not only on agency theory, but also resource dependence and institutional theories. Taking advantage of China's institutional transitions, our findings, based on an archival database covering 405 publicly listed firms and 1211 company–years, suggest that outsider directors do make a difference in firm performance, if such performance is measured by sales growth, and that they have little impact on financial performance such as return on equity (ROE). The results also document a bandwagon effect behind the diffusion of the practice of appointing outsiders to corporate boards. The article not only highlights the need to incorporate multiple theories beyond agency theory in corporate governance research, but also generates policy implications in light of the recent trend toward having more outside directors on corporate boards in emerging economies. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda

We present a critique of corporate governance research grounded in agency theory and propose that cross-national comparison of corporate governance should consider how the nature and extent of agency relationships differ across different institutional contexts. Building on prior governance studies grounded in sociology and organizational theory we argue that performance outcomes of boards of directors, ownership concentration, and executive incentives may differ depending on the legal system and institutional characteristics in a specific country. Institutions may also affect the extent of complimentarity/substitution among different firm-level governance practices producing patterned variations in firm-level governance mechanisms. Our discussion suggests that researchers need to develop more holistic, institutionally embedded governance framework to analyze organizational outcomes of various governance practices.     

治理伦理与公司治理:二维治理结构的建立

流行的公司治理理论是以制度性机制为单一维度的分析框架。本文通过对公司治理行为所暗含的“私人安排”的分析,将伦理参数导入公司治理的机制体系,建立了一个扩展成的“二维治理结构”。通过对几种典型的治理结构的比较分析,指出“治理伦理”标准化和职能化,以及提高伦理治理强度是改善公司治理绩效的关键环节之一。     

"债转股"企业治理评价体系研究

资产管理公司应在债转股企业中确立共同治理原则，发挥积极机构投资者的主导功能。针对资产管理公司股权管理实践，本文提出债转股企业治理评价体系包括关键股东影响、财务信息披露、董事会责任感、经理层考核激励、企业关系管理等五个方面。资产管理公司应建立统一、公开的治理评价体系，以之作为诊断并改善债转股企业治理的工具。     

资本市场对公司治理的作用机理及若干实证检验

本文从资本市场与公司治理的关系入手研究资本市场对公司治理的作用。资本市场的融资机制，使投资者有权选择投资的对象，从而改善和提高公司的治理结构；资本市场的价格机制，可使出资者了解公司经营信息，降低了股东对管理层的监控信息成本，降低了公司治理的成本；资本市场的并购机制，可以强制性纠正公司治理的低效率。本文还用中国上市公司的实际情况验证了资本市场对公司治理的作用机理及其有效性。     

公司治理质量、债务期限与投资效率——来自中国上市公司的证据

信息不对称和代理问题是引起公司非效率性投资的主要扭曲因素。基于我国经济转型的治理环境，文章以我国A股上市公司的2012～2014年数据为样本，探讨了公司治理质量、债务期限对公司投资效率的监督机制。研究发现，公司治理质量、短期债务有效改善相关方信息不对称和代理问题，从而提高投资效率，进一步地，公司治理和债务期限对公司投资效率的监督在一定程度上是一种替代机制，在公司治理质量高的公司里，短期债务对投资效率的作用减弱。     

Corporate Governance and returns on information technology investment: evidence from an emerging market

Prior studies have reported mixed findings on the impact of corporate information technology (IT) investment on firm performance. This study investigates the effect of corporate governance, an important management control mechanism, on the relation between IT investment and firm performance in the Taiwanese electronics industry. Specifically, we explore board independence and foreign ownership, which have increasingly become salient factors concerning corporate governance in emerging markets. We address their roles across firms of different sizes and in industries where degrees of competitiveness run a wide gamut. Our results show a positive moderating effect of board independence on the IT investment‐firm performance relation, especially when competition intensifies. Furthermore, we find that the greater the foreign ownership in small firms, the more positive the IT investment‐firm performance relation, suggesting that foreign investors may bring IT expertise to help small firms reap the benefits of using IT. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

公司治理合约的制度基础、演进机理与治理效率

最优公司治理合约是人们在给定局限条件下理性选择的结果。社会制度基础就是公司治理合约选择的给定局限条件。社会制度基础主要影响产权界定类型和界定效率，进而决定包括内生交易费用和外生交易费用在内的总交易费用以及交易效率，导致人们所选择的公司治理合约形式不同。特殊关系治理合约和普遍关系治理合约是两种典型的治理合约形式，其内生和外生交易费用的值不同。内生和外生交易费用是相互替代的，科学选择治理合约形式可以有效降低总交易费用。社会制度基础发生变化，最优的治理合约形式也将随之发生相应变化。而制度演化具有明显的路径依赖特征，简单模仿他国的经验是不可取的。     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS

This paper advances understanding of corporate governance relationships with a longitudinal study of multiple antitakeover options. Prior analyses have been primarily cross-sectional, focused exclusively on a single provision ignoring provisions which require subsequent stockholder approval. The current study uses agency theory, and broadens this perspective by examining the differential impact of institutional investors stockholding, managerial stock ownership, and corporate board characteristics on the rate of adoption of six provisions, including provisions which do and do not require stockholder approval. Results of hazard analyses of the rate of amendment adoption of 185 firms between 1984 and 1988 indicate that the impact of governance variables on antitakeover provisions differ depending on whether these actions require stockholder approval or not. The pattern of differences indicates that institutional investors use their voting power when they are given an opportunity to vote and that substitution between direct shareholder control and managerial stock ownership exists.     

代理问题、公司治理与企业价值--以民营上市公司为例

本文运用代理理论对2002年在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的122家民营上市公司治理与企业价值进行理论分析与实证检验,发现民营上市公司治理包括在股权集中度、债务融资比重、金字塔式控股、控制权与现金流权偏离、流通股与非流通股价偏离等五个方向上存在着代理冲突,并指出引发民营上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行流通股与非流通股的股权割裂。     

Corporate Governance and Firm Capabilities: A Comparison of Managerial, Alliance, and Personal Capitalisms

Incentive structures embodied in different systems of corporate governance produce firms with inclinations towards the development of particular capabilities and strategic assets and disinclinations towards the development of others. To the extent that there is an excessive dependence upon any particular type of governance, an economy as a whole will be endowed with both its benefits and costs. As such, governance reform in East Asian economies may be better aimed at cultivating alternative governance institutions alongside existing relational institutions, rather than in converting these governance systems into facsimiles of the so-called Anglo-American model.     

基于自我主体价值的行为公司治理理论

本文首先提出并用实验检验了经济主体自我主体价值理论。实验结果显示,经济主体对自己有本能的认同和欣赏,具有自我主体价值感,从而表现出违反完全理性假定的行为特征。进而,本文创立了基于自我主体价值的行为公司治理理论,并运用该理论对公司治理中的代理问题(主体意识)、外部董事制度(主体无涉)、高管持股(主体融合)、家族企业治理(主体同一)、控制权之争(主体互斥)和政府控制(主体错位)等重要问题进行了一以贯之的分析。     

基于网络关系的公司治理

公司治理已由“股东至上”的产权治理演进为“利益相关者”的超产权治理,由单一企业的内部法人治理结构治理向网络关系的公司治理演进.企业价值评价也由财务指标逐渐转向非财务指标.在以网络关系为基础的公司治理中,企业当着力构建公司的价值网络关系、社会网络关系和顾客网络关系,并以利益相关者的公司治理理论为基点,根据不同的网络关系,实施分类治理,协调、维护好各种网络关系,使各类利益相关者协调发展.公司利用各种网络关系攫取企业发展所需的各类资源,致力于企业“Key Stone”角色的建设,保持企业的“常青基业”,以实现企业和社会效益的最大化.     

企业理论的社会资本逻辑

本文在回顾以知识为基础的企业理论的基础上，提出了社会资本不仅是企业战略资源，也是企业的一种有效的治理机制。企业交易复杂性程度越高，社会资本治理存在的价值就越大。按照社会资本治理的逻辑，企业比市场更能有效地创造社会资本，更能充分有效地利用社会资本的价值；与之相适应，本文分析了企业制度安排从资本为基础转向以社会资本为基础的可能性与现实性。