Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients

This article studies transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients in Spain. We analyse the duration of unemployment, distinguishing between spells that end in recall (workers returning to the previous employer) and spells that end in exit to a new job. This distinction allows us to find that the recall hazard rate increases around the time of exhaustion of benefits. However, this happens only for workers receiving Unemployment Insurance (UI). Because we are unable to replicate this result for workers receiving Unemployment Assistance (UA), we believe the finding lends support to the hypothesis that in Spain firms and workers make a strategic use of UI.     

“I’ll be Back” – Austrian Recalls

Using administrative data I estimate the chances of leaving unemployment for unemployed Austrians, distinguishing between finding a job with a new employer, returning to the previous employer, or leaving the labour market. There is evidence of substantial recall amongst unemployed Austrians, about a third of unemployed men are recalled. Competing risks analysis shows that the shapes of the hazards are different for the three risks. Workers who are recalled are a highly homogeneous group in comparison to the other unemployed.Thanks to Alison Booth, Simon Burgess, Stephen Jenkins, Karl Pichelmann, Mark Taylor, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and an anonymous referee. I also thank the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna for the kind provision of the data. Special thanks to Franz Brandel for his help with data extraction and management.     

Recurrent unemployment,welfare benefits and heterogeneity

The objective of this paper is to investigate the causes of the recurrences of individuals in unemployment during benefit periods. So as to attain this objective, we use administrative data from the Spanish Employment Agency to estimate a duration model with multiple spells that allows for unemployment state dependence through lagged unemployment duration in order to distinguish the heterogeneity and scarring effects. We find that an increase in the duration of previous unemployment benefit periods lengthens the expected duration of future unemployment benefit periods. True state dependence and heterogeneity, intensity of job search and local labour market conditions are among the elements that explain this unemployment state dependence.     

Labour market transitions and unemployment duration: Evidence from Bulgarian and Polish micro-data1

The segmentation of the labour market is one of the most striking characteristics of the transition process in Central and Eastern European countries. Not only do the young, unskilled workers and women face a high risk of unemployment, but joblessness also varies significantly geographically. This paper sheds some light on labour market segmentation in transition countries by analysing individual records of individuals registered at the labour offices of two Polish regions (Warsaw and Ciechanov and two Bulgarian regions (Sofia and Botevgrad) over the initial three to four years of the transition to a market economy. The empirical results confirm the existence of highly selective firing and hiring processes in the Polish and Bulgarian labour markets. Overall, unskilled or poorly educated workers have the highest probability of becoming unemployed and remaining without a job for a long period of time. We also analysed the determinants of unemployment duration across regions and over time using a piece-wise constant hazard model with multiple destinations, i.e. employment and exit from the labour force. The results suggest that the unemployed with a high education and previous experience in the private sector have a higher probability of getting a new job, especially in the more dynamic labour markets, while those without previous work experience tend to stay unemployed for a longer period of time and often leave the labour market. The econometric results also suggest that the reforms of the unemployment benefit systems have produced important effects on unemployment flows.     

Willingness to pay and the demand for lotto

The way that unemployment duration affects employment prospects, is investigated using Norwegian micro transition data encompassing detailed accounts of 14 807 unemployed adults. A generalized non-proportional Weibull model is estimated, with two possible exits from the unemployment pool: a job or a labour force exit. On average the probability of obtaining a job is fairly constant at the individual level, while the probability of exiting the labour force increases significantly as unemployment duration is prolonged. For some particular groups of unemployed, there is also a marked negative duration dependence in the probability of obtaining a job.     

Job search and unemployment insurance: New evidence from time use data

This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the U.S., modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities. The major findings are: 1) the average U.S. unemployed worker devotes about 41 min to job search on weekdays, which is substantially more than their European counterparts; 2) workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less than the average unemployed worker; 3) across the 50 states and D.C., job search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits, with an elasticity between ?1.6 and ?2.2; 4) job search intensity for those eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI) increases prior to benefit exhaustion; and 5) time devoted to job search is fairly constant regardless of unemployment duration for those who are ineligible for UI.     

Censored quantile regressions and the length of unemployment periods in West Germany

In this paper, we estimate the effect of different macro and micro variables on the distribution of unemployment duration in West Germany using censored quantile regressions. We analyze unemployment periods of more than 91,000 observations from the years 1981 to 1997 drawn from the IAB employment subsample. The latter is an administrative data set that is representative with respect to the socially insured workforce. Surprisingly, we find that the educational degree and variables indicating the macroeconomic environment such as the unemployment rate have a weak effect only. On the other hand, variables reflecting the (un-)employment history of an individual such as the length of tenure, recall to the same employer in the past, recent unemployment, and the position in the population income distribution before unemployment have the strongest effects on unemployment duration. We conclude that work history variables are the ones most suitable in characterizing the unemployment duration of an individual. From a methodological point of view, it is interesting that some regression coefficients have a different sign depending on the quantiles of the unemployment duration distribution. This clearly is a violation of the classical proportional hazard assumption which is very common in unemployment duration analysis.     

Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

Unemployment durations of job losers in a labour market in transition

Slovakia is one of the Central European countries in transformation from a centralized command system to a decentralized market economy. This paper studies the labour market position of Slovak job losers. Using data from labour force surveys we analyse exit rates out of unemployment. We find that male, young, higher educated job losers in districts with low unemployment rates have substantially shorter unemployment durations than their counterparts. There is evidence that for some job losers it is very hard to find a new job.     

Estimating the relationship between labour market tightness,unemployment insurance benefits and union election activity

Using detailed data from the US National Labor Relations Board, we find labour market tightness, defined as the ratio of job vacancies to the number of unemployed, has a positive relationship with the likelihood of voting in favour of union representation. Specifically, a 1 SD increase in labour market tightness increases Vote Share in favour and the likelihood of union certification by roughly 1.5% and 3%, respectively. We also find that length of unemployment insurance benefits has a positive relationship with Vote Share in favour. Taken together, these results suggest that workers are more comfortable engaging in pro-union election behaviours when exogenous conditions, like labour market tightness and unemployment insurance benefit duration, shift in a way that more favourably insulates them from unemployment and income risk.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

Job Security,Financial Security and Worker Well‐being: New Evidence on the Effects of Flexible Employment

This paper uses panel data drawn from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to provide new evidence of the links between unemployment, wages, job security, financial security and workers' well‐being for workers in flexible employment. Our findings indicate that workers in flexible employment encounter more unemployment and experience increased job insecurity; unemployment is associated with wage penalties. Lower wages, job insecurity and financial insecurity affect well‐being. However, these negative outcomes are mitigated by longer job tenure. Our results have implications for moves towards a flexicurity model of employment     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

The Beveridge curve in Europe: new evidence using national and regional data

The Beveridge curve depicts the empirical negative relationship between job vacancy rate and unemployment rate, and reflects the efficiency of the job matching process. Movements along a fixed downward sloping Beveridge curve are associated with cyclical shocks, while shifts of the curve arise from structural factors that alter the matching efficiency between job vacancies and unemployed workers. National and regional data on job vacancies and unemployment are combined to estimate the Beveridge curves of five European countries and their regions, focusing on the period 1975 to 2004. I also analyse whether shifts in European Beveridge curves are due to changes in the composition of the unemployed pool, labour market rigidities or cyclical and structural shocks. The empirical evidence suggests that changes in labour market rigidities, long term unemployment, as well as cyclical shocks are responsible for outward shifts in European Beveridge curves. I also find evidence of nonlinearities in the relation between unemployment and labour market institutions.     

Job exit of men: new job destination versus unemployment destination

Job exit of men over the age of forty is described and analysed using monthly observations derived from the 1988-89 UK Retirement Survey. A competing risks model is described and estimated. The results show that tenure and age determine transitions from a job to a new one, whereas those transitions from a job to unemployment are also determined by business cycle variables.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Does accessibility to local public employment agencies matter? Answers from a French quasi-experiment

We question whether accessibility to local public employment agencies impacts exits from unemployment. We deal with the potential endogeneity of the residential location of jobseekers by using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment. We use exhaustive and geo-located individual data on jobseekers and local public employment agencies. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data, we find no evidence that jobseekers with improved accessibility to the local public employment services experience an improvement of their probability of exiting unemployment. We however find evidence of transitory organizational effects. These findings strongly question the costly strategy of a fine distribution of local public employment agencies across the territory while suggesting that institutional issues are key.     

河南省就业状况评价

对就业状况的评价应有一个指标体系，包括就业、失业、劳动者素质和收入。2001年统计数据显示；虽然河南省的城镇登记失业率低于全国平均水平，但从业人数下降；创造就业岗位能力差；女性失业人员比例较高；下岗职工减少缓慢；职工平均工资水平落后；城镇贫困人口增加较快。整体就业状况不如全国。     

Sensitivity of Job Destruction to Vintage and Tenure Effects

Matching models with endogenous job destruction typically deliver excessively volatile job destruction and moderate volatility of vacancies. In our model, vintage and tenure effects promote the creation of new matches that are temporarily more productive, while reducing the survival of temporarily less productive matches. This cleansing effect produces a counter‐cyclical inflow into unemployment, removes the strong response of job destruction to productivity shocks, and generates a downward‐sloping Beveridge curve, as in the data. The model also generates more volatility in vacancies, the job‐finding rate, and labor‐market tightness.