The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.     

Informational externalities,strategic delay,and optimal investment subsidies

Abstract This paper examines optimal government policy when private investment generates information, but investors cannot internalize the informational value their actions have to others. Equilibrium exhibits inefficient delay, as investors adopt a wait‐and‐see approach. The government can alter incentives via an investment subsidy, but complications arise, since future subsidies may induce investors to disregard current policy initiatives. The paper shows that the government achieves its desired outcome only when the the investment subsidy is financed by a non‐distortionary, lump‐sum tax. When taxation is distortionary, the government faces a time inconsistency problem that may prevent effective policy.     

Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

International differences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be justified by different local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by different preferences for public spending. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon tax be added to these local taxes to correct the global warming externality? We address this question in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods have to be financed through distortionary taxation and the cost of public funds has to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show that when lump‐sum transfers between countries are allowed for, the second best tax on the polluting good may be decomposed into three parts: one, country‐specific, dealing with the local negative externality, a second one, country‐specific, dealing with the cost of levying public funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality and which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution is to show that the uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. Nevertheless, if lump‐sum transfers between governments are impossible to implement, international differentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take care of equity concerns.     

Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting

Taxation under oligopoly is analyzed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximize the utility of their shareholders. Assuming that preferences are either identical and homothetic or identical and quasi‐linear, then the oligopoly model is an aggregative game, which greatly simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of taxation. This novel analysis of taxation leads to a number of counterintuitive results that challenge conventional wisdom in microeconomics. A lump‐sum tax may increase the price of the oligopolistic good and decrease welfare whereas a profits tax may decrease the price of the oligopolistic good and increase welfare. A profits tax is shown to be superior to a lump‐sum tax. Furthermore, in line with conventional wisdom, total tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that leads to the same price for the oligopolistic good.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

Endogenous business cycles and systematic stabilization policy*

We study the effects of fiscal policy rules on the determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium in a perfectly competitive monetary model with constant returns. Government spending implies a distortion of the monetary steady state due to the implied taxation. We show that policy rules that let the GNP share of government spending depend sufficiently negatively on increases in GNP stabilize the economy with respect to endogenous fluctuations for arbitrarily little distortion of the steady state at which stabilization occurs. The rules do not involve lump‐sum taxation, negative income taxation, or exact knowledge of the economy's laissez‐faire steady state.     

Tax distortions in Sweden and the United States

We calculate the welfare costs of distortionary taxation (including inflation) in models calibrated for the United States and Sweden. The welfare costs are calculated using comparative steady state as well as dynamic analysis, where we take the costs of transition from the distorted to the optimal steady state into account. We also calculate the welfare costs of adding stochastic fluctuations. Our main finding is that the total welfare costs of the distortionary taxes including the distortionary effects of inflation are about five times higher in Sweden than in the United States. Meanwhile, stochastic fluctuations in policy turn out to have a relatively small impact on welfare.     

Fiscal policy and indeterminacy in models of endogenous growth

This paper investigates the dynamic behavior of two-sector models of endogenous growth with sector-specific external effects, and government expenditure financed by distortionary taxation. When this type of external effect is combined with a sufficient degree of capital taxation in a Lucas-Uzawa endogenous growth model, continua of equilibria will emerge in the region of the balanced growth paths. By contrast, indeterminacy is not possible when either sector-specific external effects or factor taxation are added to the model in isolation. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate that if labor supply is endogenous, indeterminacy can be consistent with much lower degrees of increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, certain types of fiscal policy will be associated with multiple balanced growth paths and the existence of a poverty trap. Finally, in the last part of the paper, we demonstrate that if physical capital is employed in both sectors of the economy, indeterminacy will emerge for varying combinations of factor taxation and external effects, even when returns to scale are constant at the social level.     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

Regulation and taxation: A complementarity

I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.     

Does taxation have real effects on agricultural output? Theory and empirical evidence from China

China has a long history of taxing agriculture, with special levies on output. Whether farm households are taxed on a lump-sum basis or as a proportion of output is an important issue. This paper develops a theoretical model to understand better the effects of the lump-sum and proportional taxation on agricultural output. It then empirically investigates the predictions using tax and output data on Chinese agriculture. The theoretical model predicts that lump-sum taxation affects only consumption, while proportional taxation simultaneously affects consumption, capital inputs and final output. Although the main tax policy targeted output, our results suggest that taxation had only a modest impact on output since it was effectively applied as lump sum taxation brought about by localized levies and taxes.     

Monetary and fiscal policies in a heterogeneous‐agent economy

We study the effects of long‐run inflation and income taxation in an economy where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. We construct a tractable competitive‐search framework that generates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. We analytically characterize the stationary equilibrium and the policy effects on individual choices. Quantitative analysis finds that monetary and fiscal policies have distinct effects on macro aggregates, such as output, savings and wealth, income and consumption inequalities. There is a hump‐shaped relationship between welfare and the respective policies. Overall, welfare is maximized by a deviation from the Friedman rule, paired with distortionary income taxation.     

Foreign Aid,Government Spending,and the Environment

Using an endogenous growth model, this paper examines the growth and welfare effects of the allocation of foreign aid in the recipient economy. As public inputs are a productive factor, a rise in the allocation of aid to the public inputs increases growth and hence the welfare of the economy. However, raising the ratio of aid to pollution abatement may not help an economy, because it crowds out public inputs. Since public inputs are also partly financed by income taxation, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is larger than the growth‐maximizing rate, because a portion of the aid constitutes a lump‐sum transfer and can increase household consumption and hence welfare.     

Taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies

Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return.     

Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate

We survey the history of carbon taxation, the range of market-based instruments (MBIs) of environmental control, and the state of the double dividend debate, in order to suggest directions for future research into MBIs. Returning MBI revenues as lower distortionary taxes rather than as lump sums raises aggregate welfare, but we favour MBIs which raise little or no revenue, for reasons of political acceptability to interest groups. At the same time, the overall case for any environmental improvement is weaker because of general equilibrium interactions with prior distortionary taxes. Research seems most necessary on quantifying the efficiency benefits of market control of heterogeneous polluters, the benefits of environmental improvement, the tax interaction effect, and the various information costs of an MBI, all on a case-by-case basis for different pollutants and places.     

Income Taxation, Endogenous Factor Prices and Production Efficiency

In an analysis of a two‐type income tax model with endogenous wages, this paper shows that production efficiency is violated in the optimum with (i) non‐linear and (ii) linear income taxation if and only if a distortionary tax schedule is implemented. These findings complement earlier results of the literature. In passing, it is also shown that optima with non‐linear redistributive income taxation cannot be identified with the redistributive regime if the assumption of endogenous wages is taken seriously.     

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.     

Capital taxation in a dynamic general equilibrium setting

The familiar two-factor, two-commodity incidence model is extended to a dynamic setting in which the supply of capital is variable and the government can use money or bonds to balance its budget in addition to neutral lump sum taxation. The dynamic incidence effects of a sectoral tax on capital are qualitatively similar to the static incidence effects when the government balances its budget with neutral taxes, but are qualitatively different when the government uses money or bonds. In this case, while capital bears the burden of the tax in the short run, it is able to shift it in the long run.     

SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DEMAND SYSTEM* AND OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION

We have two major tasks in this paper. The first is to obtain a reasonable estimate of the Japanese demand system, which includes leisure, income and commodity choices. The second is to compute and evaluate the optimal tax equilibrium. The estimation result, based on the Almost Ideal Demand System, is found to be consistent with the microeconomic theory. We evaluate the optimal commodity tax structure by calculating the equilibria under lump‐sum, optimal commodity and uniform commodity taxation schemes. The deadweight losses under uniform taxation are very small, and the optimal commodity tax rates are strikingly close to uniform.