论排污权交易

排污权交易是一种采用经济手段进行环境保护的手段,越来越多地受到了国际及国内社会的重视。本文对排污权交易进行了系统地介绍,论述了排污权交易的含义、性质、目的、特征,并在此基础上论述了排污权交易法律关系的构成。最后,对我国的排污权交易制度建立的障碍进行了分析,提出了构建我国排污权交易制度的若干设想。     

论我国排污权交易制度的现状与发展

环境问题的日臻凸显,使得如何更好的处理环境问题成为了世界舞台上热议的话题,而排污权交易已经成为了各国公认的较为行之有效的解决方式。如何科学合理的划定我国排污权交易过程中存在的问题,建立一种准确的市场模式,并且在发展的过程中逐步完善,必将成为我国当前及今后很长一段时期内发展的主流问题。     

排污权交易模式的比较研究

文章将排污权交易模式分为无偿分配模式和有偿分配模式、短期交易模式和长期交易模式、存量分配模式和增量分配模式、现货交易模式和期货交易模式共四大类八种模式,并对这些模式进行比较,最后对交易模式选择给出相应建议.     

论生活排污权交易制

当前城市生活污染已呈超过工业污染之势,城市环境保护工作面临着加快环保基础设施建设的紧迫任务。而与此同时,一大批致力于生活污染源头控制的环保技术和设备却得不到转化和应用。针对这一目前城市环境管理工作中的新矛盾,本文在借鉴工业排污权交易制的基础上,首次提出了生活排污权交易制的设想,并就生活排污权交易制的理论基础、运作模式以及急待解决的一些问题等方面展开了论述。     

排污权交易的法经济学思考

排污权交易是近年来备受各国关注的一项环境经济政策。它的出现，改变了传统环境管理制度消极和滞后的一面，给环境保护事业带来了新的生机，笔者试图从法经济学的角度对排污权交易成本-效果分析，分析表明：较之行政管制，其费效比高，是值得推行的一项环保经济政策。     

鄱阳湖流域内企业排污权的市场交易模式研究

排污权交易作为一种现代市场化治污防控重要手段,在污染物总量和种类得到控制的前提下,可以通过市场机制促进排污权交易双方效益最大化,实现社会环境资源的优化配置和经济增长方式的转变。以行政区域为界实施的排污权交易制度和污染物随自然区域扩散的特点对排污权交易的实施带来了一定困难,文章认为以流域管理为基础,按自然地理区域经济发展水平不同,讨论了不同地区同类污染物排放的成本差异,在考虑了排污权交易市场的公平与效率的基础上,分析了鄱阳湖流域内排污权交易市场的供求状况,建立了该流域排污权交易平台的交易模式和交易流程,并对合理完善排污权交易给出了如下政策建议:完善机构设置,发挥综合决策功能;完善排污权交易的分配制度;构建现代化排污权电子交易平台;完善企业排污主体的责任制度体系。     

基于外部性理论视角下的排污权交易制度

环境保护中之所以会存在外部不经济性,是由于主体在经济活动中,只考虑其独立的经济利益,将环境污染的成本转嫁给全社会一同分担,由此造成了环境保护的外部性。而排污权交易作为一种新型的环境治理政策工具,其根本立足点是通过市场手段将外部的不经济性内部化,即让其进入市场使产权明晰化以达到治理污染、保护环境的目的。     

排污权交易机制研究进展

排污权交易谋求充分利用市场机制治理环境污染,通过总量管制与排放交易规制,达到环境容量优化配置,其实质是环境容量产权明晰化的制度变迁过程。排污权初始配置方式与价值评估、排污权定价机制、排污权交易制度下厂商行为、政府管制及交易制度的社会福利分析,构成了当前排污权交易机制研究的基本内容。现行的排污权交易制度刚刚处于起步阶段,亟需在排污总量控制的科学性、排污权定价的约束性、初始分配的公平性、市场交易的完备性、监督机构的权威性等方面积累探索经验。     

论排污权交易中政府的职能定位

排污权交易是基于市场的环境经济政策,需要政府的宏观调控来保证其有序运行。本文根据排污权交易的理论和实践,分析了政府在整个排污权交易过程中的职能,政府的职能定位是初始分配、行政指导、监督管理和基础服务。     

市场化是解决水污染蔓延的根本途径

在治理我国水污染蔓延的过程中,传统的治理方法表现出很大的局限性。在市场经济条件下,运用制度经济学的原理,采用市场化的治理方案,即排污总量一定的条件下,实行排污权交易的方法,才是根本上解决水污染问题的途径。     

Pollution Permits: A Discussion of Fundamentals

The author provides an economic analysis of tradable pollution permits by clarifying the derivation of permit supply and demand relationships and connecting those concepts to permit trading for the case of two polluters. Using the standard comparison of costs and benefits, he makes the marginal cost of emission reduction of a typical polluter the basis of the derivation of its permit supply and demand schedules. Developing these relationships for both polluters allows the creation of market schedules for permit supply and demand. He demonstrates equilibrium in the market for permits and the corresponding trading of permits. He discusses the satisfaction of the equi-marginal principle, which ensures that pollution reduction is achieved efficiently. The author concludes by considering the consequences of the presence of a third polluter in the market for permits.     

中国汇率市场化的产权经济学分析

我国自1994年外汇体制改革以来，在推进汇率市场化进程中出现了一些问题，针对这些问题，我们试图运用产权经济学的有关理论，通过提出汇率市场化在产权方面的要求来分析产生这些问题的深层次原因，并从产权角度提出了改革建议。     

基于Internet的排污权交易平台分析与设计

利用现代信息技术进行排污权交易平台的开发是河南省排污权交易体系的一个重要组成部分,也是排污权交易发展的必然趋势。排污权交易平台的开发以排污权交易为核心,基于B/S三层体系架构,实现排污权总量控制、申购、交易、跟踪预警、信息管理、平台维护和信息发布等为一体的系统功能,为更好地实现排污权交易提供了系统性的支持平台和有力的实施保障。     

Airing Your Dirty Laundry: A Quick Marketable Pollution Permits Game for the Classroom

In this article, the authors describe a simple classroom game that demonstrates the advantage of tradable emissions permits in regulating environmental pollution. Students take on the role of polluters who must consider the costs of complying with a uniform reduction and a tradable permits program. The class is divided into high-cost polluters and low-cost polluters so students can observe the gains from trade as high-cost students purchase pollution rights from the low-cost students in the tradable permits scenario. A major advantage of the game is that it can be conducted within as little as 20 minutes and does not require that students have prior knowledge of economics or regulatory policies. This makes the game appropriate for economics and noneconomics courses alike.     

不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择

要实施排污权交易制度，在理论和实践中首先要解决的一个关键问题是初始排污权的分配问题。因为在实践中以初始排污权的免费分配方式更具有操作性，所以亟待解决的是初始排污权免费分配方案的选择与制定。本文研究的是在不同的市场条件下分析、建立并选择适合的初始排污权免费分配的分配模型。     

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.      

Allocating Tradable Permits on the Basis of Market Price to Achieve Cost Effectiveness

It is a well known result that distributional constraints can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market where the emission target is no longer met at least cost. In this paper, we suggest an allocation rule for tradable permits which can handle this problem. If the permit allocation is dependent on the market price for permits, this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents.     

On the Use of Exchange Rates as Trading Rules in a Bilateral System of Transferable Discharge Permits

The use of a system of transferable discharge permitsto control the harmful effects of non-uniformly mixedpollutants requires the application of trading rulesin order to prevent permit trading among sources fromviolating environmental standards. The elements andproperties of bilateral trading rules can be analyzedmore easily once formulated as exchange rates, whichwould convert, in a cost-effective way, the emissionright potentially given up by the seller into an offsetting emission right acquired by the buyer. Inthis article, a new expression for such exchange ratesis proposed and then analyzed to infer someunexplored properties of the system.     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.