边际贡献分析法在亏损企业中的运用

<正>一、边际贡献的概念边际贡献也称变动成本加成定价法,就是销售收入减去变动成本后的差额。即仅计算变动成本,不计算固定成本,而以预期的边际贡献补偿固定成本,从而获得收益的定价方法。要计算边际贡献,必须确定变动成本。而变动成本的界定应该根据企业的特点灵活运用。首先我们来看下变动成本的概念,变动成本(Variable Costs)与固定成本相反,变动成本是指那些成本的总发生额在相关范围内随着业务量的变动而呈线性变动的     

网络接入定价与规制改革:以电信业为例

本文以电信业为例,通过双头垄断网络运营商之间接入价格决策的博弈模型分析,比较研究对等与非对等接入定价的效率及其规制改革问题,在讨论接入规制目标的基础上,提出可选接入规制方案.本文一个重要观点是,接入成本将影响零售服务价格;对于电信运营商,拥有多少用户固然重要,但更重要的是用户消费多少电话量.     

双寡头企业定价策略研究——基于边际成本控制能力视角

价格竞争是近年来在我国的市场竞争中经常出现的一个现象,如何在激烈的竞争中有效地确定自己的价格策略成为每个企业都要面临的重要问题。文章使用博弈论的方法来分析基于边际成本控制能力的双寡头企业的定价策略。在双寡头企业的边际成本控制能力相同时,联合定价的策略要优于各自定价所达到的均衡策略;在双寡头企业的边际成本控制能力不同时,边际成本控制能力较强的企业优势明显;当竞争对手隐藏其成本信息时,企业的定价策略与其所掌握的竞争对手的信息的精确度有关。     

下游市场存在竞争的企业集团转移定价研究

基于企业集团面临下游竞争，研究了企业集团的中间产品的转移定价问题。研究结果表明，集团的中间产品的转移价格大干中间产品的边际成本。与Hirshkifer提出的边际成本转移定价策略相比，本文提出的转移定价策略为优。     

轨道客车细分市场的定价策略研究

为了更好的实现战略发展目标,提升企业的实力,唐山轨道客车有限责任公司需要构建有效的分级策略体系,定价策略是其中重要的一环,本文从轨道客车细分市场的定价策略角度出发,阐述轨道交通装备行业的市场细分状况,研究细分市场上如何制定价格策略,提升企业多元化定价能力,加快实现企业的战略化目标。     

超市场细分理论在3G套餐设计上的应用

对于运营商而言,3G用户是极具价值的用户群体,为了抢夺到更多的此类用户,三大运营商纷纷推出各自的资费套餐,但3G用户对各类业务的需求程度是不同的,现有3G套餐组合并不能最大程度的满足所有个体消费者的需求。因此,笔者结合超市场细分理论,借鉴英国电信"搭积木"式的套餐策略,针对对国内运营商的3G套餐提出相应的改进措施,以满足不同用户需求并提高用户满意度。     

供热价格制订的理论探讨

本文概述了供热价格的三种定价方法,对比分析了平均成本定价法和边际成本定价法,介绍了供热成本的主要影响因素,最后用边际理论对两部制热价的合理性进行了论证。     

资费模式竞争均衡研究

引言 自从美国AT&T 1983年推出"超越美国"套餐,二部制资费模式在电信市场初步崭露头角.二部制属于一种市场细分策略,并且给予用户进行选择的权力,因而有助于刺激电话使用量的增长,为各国电信公司所仿效,带动了全球性的电信资费创新.     

关于移动通信资费套餐设计中的可研究性问题的探讨

一.问题的提出 随着中国电信市场的对外开放和对国内电信运营商的重组,电信运营企业正面临业务迅速增长、ARPU(每用户平均收入)值下降、竞争日益激烈的严峻挑战.资费策略作为营销策略的重要分支,越来越受到运营商的青睐.国家对资费价格管制政策的逐渐放宽,使得电信运营商在一定程度上获得了自主定价权,于是资费套餐应运而生,并得以在市场上大行其道,资费走低的趋势逐渐演化为轰轰烈烈的资费套餐大战.     

电信产品的营销模式创新

随着国内电信产品营销运营业的竞争加剧,一些电信运营商驾御市场的能力缺陷随之凸显。未来很长的一段时期,运营商要想获得市场竞争的胜利,必须从根本上对营销模式进行创新。一、掌握需求细分市场在电信营销模式创新中,对用户需求的了解和     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Franchise bidding,regulation and investment costs

This paper analyzes the design of an optimal monopoly franchise policy when firms incur investment costs. We show how this policy depends on the timing of entry. When the investment cost is a fixed cost or a sunk cost paid after knowing the marginal cost parameter, the optimal policy consists of a Baron-Myerson type pricing rule and a lowest cost awarding rule. When the investment cost is a sunk cost paid before knowing the marginal cost parameter, auctioning the right to serve the market eliminates the need for an incentive regulation: the price is given by the complete information Ramsey formula and the subsidy is a Loeb-Magat type subsidy, while an entry fee yields first best entry.     

The effectiveness of regulation in the electrical energy industry

There is a gap between what federal and state regulatory commissions are authorized to do and what they are doing to regulate the electrical energy industry. It has been argued that a pricing scheme in the industry has evolved akin to the pricing scheme a discriminating monopolist might employ for different classes of consumers that are spatially diffuse. The attention of the paper is focused on the effectiveness of regulation in the industry, given the characteristics of it. The method of analysis chosen is to construct two models which are polar opposites and compare the results with what was actually the situation in 1973. The conclusion indicates that it is justifiable to argue that the electrical energy industry on the whole is not allowed to behave as a spatial monopolist. It is not correct to conclude that monopolistic tendencies are absent. Specifically, the pricing structure does depart from the competitive criterion which requires price to equal marginal cost for each consumer sector and all regions. Further, little electrical energy is transmitted interregionally.     

Price Dispersion and Consumer Reservation Prices

We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of firms: the highest price is the monopoly price, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many firms. The equilibrium pricing pattern is the same when prices are chosen sequentially.     

Monopoly Pricing as a Consumer Exaction in the Public Utility Sector

A bstract . The many studies on the measurement of deadweight welfare loss due to monopoly pricing have largely ignored the public utility sector of the economy. For the residential customer class in the municipally-owned water industry , the useable formula for the welfare loss triangle depends on the divergence between price and long run marginal cos and the price elasticity of demand Only price is directly observable. Statistical methodology developed here and elsewhere provides unique estimates of marginal cost and elasticity for each utility. The welfare loss, as a percentage of the residential customer class's annual water bill, is 9 to 10 per cent for locally regulated water utilities and 5 to 6 per cent for state regulated utilities–a level above those reported in most of the studies on manufacturing industries. Regulation , however, can make a difference.     

A MODEL OF SEARCH AND SHOPPING BY HOMOGENEOUS CUSTOMERS WITHOUT PRICE PRECOMMITMENT BY FIRMS

Price setting by firms and search by customers is analyzed, relaxing two basic attributes of most search models: price precommitment and agent heterogeneity. Customers are characterized by individual demand functions for a homogeneous good and can choose to employ a threat to search. Firms noncooperatively make pricing decisions by using the individual demand curves under conditions of constant marginal cost. Firms adopt pricing rules that optimally respond to customer search histories. Bargaining power is endogenously assigned. Firms know their common marginal cost; customers, the cost distribution. The unique separating equilibrium is characterized by a lumpy distribution of prices and by heterogeneous shopping behavior by customers giving rise to "shoppers" and "nonshoppers"     

Multi‐unit pricing

A price takes the form of a cost for either one unit (single‐unit pricing) or multiple units (multi‐unit pricing). I consider a monopolist selling units of a good to a population of homogeneous consumers to explain why one is preferred to the other. A mental cost arises if the division problem a multi‐unit price causes is done. If marginal utility remains high multiple units are desired. Multi‐unit pricing is preferred since it creates a cost if fewer units are purchased. If utility exhibits strong diminishing returns single‐unit pricing is used to avoid the calculation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal road capacity in the presence of unpriced congestion

This paper studies how the optimal capacity of a road is affected by a pricing constraint which keeps the toll fixed below its optimal value. The answer is found to depend on the value of the price elasticity of travel demand at the second-best optimum. The pricing constraint lowers the optimal capacity, if the price elasticity is sufficiently high. But under reasonable assumptions, the pricing constraint raises the optimal capacity, if the price elasticity is less than the ratio of the consumer price of travel to the private congestion cost at the second-best optimum. This ratio cannot be less than one.