突破性创新、互补性资产与企业间合作的整合研究

主导企业在技术变革中经历了技术劣势后，这种劣势在何种程度上转化为商业劣势取决于突破性创新的破坏幅度。如果新技术只破坏了主导企业的技术能力而没有破坏互补性资产的价值．那么主导企业的绩效将会改进：如果新技术同时破坏了主导企业的技术能力和互补性资产的价值．那么主导企业的绩效将会下滑。正是由于大量突破性创新属于前者并且主导企业控制了大部分的互补性资产．开发了突破性创新的新进入企业只能与主导企业建立合作关系．共同分享创新利润。     

Stock of downstream complementary assets as a catalyst for product innovation during technological change in the U.S. machine tool industry

Research summary : We investigate the effect of incumbents' stock of downstream complementary assets on their product innovation during a disruptive technological change. We theorize that a firm's stock of downstream complementary assets, by providing critical information about shifting demand conditions, will play a catalytic role in firm adaptation during such a change. Using the advent of disruptive computer numerical control machine tools in the U.S. machine tool industry during the 1970s and 1980s as the context, we find that firms with greater stocks of downstream complementary assets are likely to be product innovation leaders during such a change. Managerial summary : Disruptive changes are challenging firms across industries. We concentrate on the U.S. machine tool industry during the 1970s and 1980s when Japanese manufacturers with disruptive computer numerical control systems challenged the U.S. manufacturers. We find that, under the threat of disruption, the greater the stock of downstream complementary assets a U.S. machine tool manufacturer has, the more likely it is to be the product innovation leader with the disruptive technology. Our findings provide novel insights for managers in companies that face disruptive changes and can help them avoid the consequences of such changes as predicted by prior research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

UNRAVELING THE PROCESS OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS AND INCUMBENT SURVIVAL IN THE TYPESETTER INDUSTRY

When radical technological change transforms an industry established firms sometimes fail drastically and are displaced by new entrants, yet other times survive and prosper. Drawing upon an unusually rich data set that covers the technological and competitive history of the typesetter industry from 1886 to 1990, this paper uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis to unravel this process of creative destruction. It argues that the ultimate commercial performance of incumbents vs. new entrants is driven by the balance and interaction of three factors: investment, technical capabilities, and appropriability through specialized complementary assets. In this industry, specialized complementary assets played a crucial role in buffering incumbents from the effects of competence destruction, and an analysis that examined investment or technical capabilities in isolation would have led to misleading results. This work thus highlights the importance of considering multiple perspectives when examining the competitive implications of technological change. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incumbents,technological change and institutions: How the value of complementary resources varies across markets

This article examines the influence of complementary resources on the performance of incumbents after a radical technological change. In investigating this relationship, we join the technological management literature and the institution‐based view of strategy and maintain that the value of complementary resources is contingent on the institutional environment in which the firm operates. In particular, we submit that formal institutions, both economic and political, moderate the relationship between the stock of complementary assets and firm performance. We test our hypotheses in the context of the world mobile telecommunications industry (39 countries and 134 mobile service providers). Our findings reveal how these resources are more valuable for incumbents in markets where market‐supporting institutions are weaker and political stability is higher. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry into Nascent Industries: Disentangling a Firm's Capability Portfolio at the Time of Investment Versus Market Entry

Research summary : This article examines the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. Because a firm's technological investments in nascent industries typically occur before market entry, this study makes a distinction between firm capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial investment. At the time of market entry, core technical capabilities and complementary assets influence the likelihood of entry. However, at the time of investment, a firm's integrative capabilities as well as the initial stocks of related technical capabilities and complementary assets become critical, as they enable endogenous development of core technical capabilities and complementary assets by the time of entry. The empirical sample consists of firms involved in field experiments in agricultural biotechnology during the period 1980–2010. Managerial summary : New product commercialization in a nascent industry typically requires access to not only core technologies of the focal industry, but also supporting commercialization assets. However, firms may not possess these critical capabilities when they first invest in the industry. Instead, empirical evidence from the context of agricultural biotechnology shows that at the time of first investment, a firm's integrative capabilities partly explain their likelihood of entry. Integrative capabilities encompass a set of practices that enable effective coordination and communication, and in turn put firms in an advantageous position to develop the needed capabilities by the time of entry. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complementary assets,start-ups and incentives to innovate

We examine to what extent market conditions facilitating start-up formation affect firms' R&D investment and profits. We consider a model in which R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate partly tacit technological know-how embodied in a key R&D employee, who might use it to form a start-up. The availability of complementary assets influences whether new firms are created and determine expected profits for start-up's founders. A large availability of complementary assets has the direct effect that the generation of start-ups is fostered. However, as a strategic effect, the incentives of incumbents to invest in R&D may be reduced because of the increased danger of knowledge loss occurring through start-up formation. We characterize the effects of an increase in the availability of complementary assets, showing that counter-intuitively there are cases in which it induces an increase in incumbents' R&D investment.     

Alliance portfolio reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity

Research summary : We study how technological discontinuities generate first‐ and second‐order effects on alliance formation and termination, leading to reconfiguration of firms' alliance portfolios. Following technological shocks, we argue that firms often seek alliances that provide new resources while also having incentives to form alliances for reinforced and challenged resources that complement the new resources. In parallel, alliance terminations, even involving resources otherwise unaffected by the discontinuity, increase due to limits in firms' alliance carrying capacity. We study biopharmaceutical firms between 1990 and 2000, which faced a technological discontinuity in 1995 in the form of combinatorial chemistry and high‐throughput screening. We improve understanding of how technological discontinuities affect the value of resources and how firms reconfigure alliance portfolios in response. Managerial summary : When firms form alliances to gain new resources during technological discontinuities that disrupt their industry, they cannot consider only the focal new partnerships. Instead, new alliances create complementarity and substitution pressures that lead to broader reconfiguration of the firms' alliance portfolios: (1) complementarity creates incentives to also form alliances for resources that the technological discontinuity reinforces or challenges in order to improve the collective value of co‐specialized assets; (2) substitution creates incentives to terminate existing alliances, even if their value is otherwise unaffected by the discontinuity, in order to create carrying capacity for new alliances. Thus, one new alliance can generate a cascade of reconfiguration that challenges the balance between the benefits of stability and the need for change in an alliance portfolio. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bribery and investment: Firm‐level evidence from Africa and Latin America

Research summary : Using a unique database that measures firm‐level bribery in Africa and Latin America, we corroborate extant results in the literature that paying bribes deters firm investments in fixed assets. Our contribution is to explore four mechanisms. By adopting a reverse causality approach (Gelman and Imbens, 2013), we find evidence consistent with one of them: short‐term oriented firms prefer to bribe rather than invest in fixed assets, while the opposite is true for firms with a long‐term orientation. We rule out that bribe payments drain financial resources for investment, that firms that invest do not bribe because fixed assets make them less flexible and more vulnerable to future bribes, and that less efficient firms bribe rather than invest. Managerial summary : We ask whether, along with ethical issues, bribing affects the behavior and performance of firms in Africa and Latin America. Our statistical analysis shows that bribe payments do not reduce the short‐term performance of firms, but frustrate investments in fixed assets, which is the foundation of firms' long‐term growth. It is like seeking a job via nepotism or education. Nepotism makes it likely to find a job in the short term. However, the solid skills generated by education raise the odds of finding better jobs in the future. We rule out some common explanations for the trade‐off between bribing and investment (e.g., bribes drain resources to invest or that less efficient firms bribe and do not invest). Our analysis suggests that firms with short‐term orientations are more likely to bribe and firms with long‐term orientation are more likely to invest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Marketing Resources in Radical Innovation Activity: Antecedents and Payoffs

While radical product innovations represent significant engines of firm growth, questions remain over whether marketing helps or hurts (1) a firm's radical product innovation activity and (2) its rewards from radical product innovation activity. By attaching an attention‐based view of the firm to a market‐based assets view of marketing, this paper examines the role of three marketing resources—market knowledge, reputation, and relational resources—on radical innovation activity. Our conceptual framework posits differentiated effects among marketing resources as antecedents of radical innovation activity and as moderators of its impact on firms' financial performance. Using a survey of a broad set of high‐tech business‐to‐business (B2B) firms to test hypotheses, it is found that firms with strong relational resources enjoy a higher propensity for, and stronger financial rewards from, radical innovation activity. Reputational resources come with a trade‐off as they hurt the incidence of radical innovation but enhance its financial rewards. However, market knowledge resources appear to hurt both radical innovation activity and its financial rewards. Our results point to the multifaceted role of marketing in radical innovation activity, which is unlikely to come with a single benefit or liability as prior work often posits. Rather, our research heightens the alertness of managers to assess their firms' marketing strength as a bundle of stocks of several marketing resources. Managers must understand the distinct benefits and drawbacks of each resource in developing and launching radical innovations. Our research underscores the differentiated value of marketing in radical innovation activity in B2B high‐tech contrary to the entrenched idea of a limited or even stifling role of marketing in this context.     

Evolutionary diffusion: internal and external methods used to acquire encompassing,complementary, and incremental technological changes in the lithotripsy industry

This study links theories concerning methods that firms use to acquire technology with theories concerning types of technological change. We place particular emphasis on interorganizational relationships. We predict that firms will often acquire know-how needed for encompassing technological change through equity-based arrangements with other organizations, complementary technological changes through nonequity interorganizational arrangements, and incremental changes through internal R&D. Our theory draws on perspectives that emphasize the need to develop new competencies within a business organization and to protect the value of existing competencies. Our empirical analysis examines methods of technology acquisition that firms have used in the commercialization of medical lithotripters, which are devices that fragment stones in the kidney and gall bladder. The analysis contributes to a better understanding of how technology acquisition methods vary with the manner in which technological change relates to a firm's existing capabilities. The study also helps develop our understanding of the evolutionary processes by which capabilities diffuse through an industry. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pawn to Save a Chariot,or Drawbridge Into the Fort? Firms' Disclosure During Standard Setting and Complementary Technologies Within Ecosystems

Research summary: W ithin an ecosystem, standard setting coordinates development of complementary technologies across firms. But each firm can itself own multiple of these complementary technologies. We study how a firm's own complementary technologies influence its disclosure inclination during standard setting. We identify a tradeoff: disclosure increases value‐creation of the firm's non‐disclosed complementary technologies, but also heightens expropriation risk. Using data on the U.S. communications equipment industry 1991–2008, we show that the firm's complementary technologies increase its disclosure inclination when its technological areas are less crowded, but decrease such inclination when there are SSO members with strong expropriation abilities. Findings stress that disclosure involves but a piece of the firm's portfolio; a systemic perspective of the entire portfolio provides a more comprehensive picture of value‐creation during standard setting . Managerial summary: W hy should a firm disclose its key technology to participate in standard setting within an ecosystem? We urge managers to think beyond “disclosing to ensure compatibility with other firms' complementary technologies within the ecosystem” as a motivation, to also consider how disclosure affects the firm's own complementary technologies within its portfolio. Disclosure in one technological area makes the firm's nondisclosed complementary technologies in other areas more valuable to itself, especially with fewer rivals competing in these other areas. But disclosure also renders the firm susceptible to losing these complementary technologies to rivals, especially when rivals have strong expropriation abilities. Analyzing disclosure decisions by communication equipment firms, we show that this tradeoff is indeed a relevant consideration in managers' strategic calculations when participating in standard setting . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D and technology purchase through licence agreements: complementary strategies and complementary assets

This paper reports on a major UK-wide investigation into the role of inward technology licensing and in-house R&D as alternative and complementary strategies in new product and process development.The role of licensing in the technology strategy of the firm can be viewed as the 'buy' in the context of 'make or buy' technology decisions. Such technology purchases may be made for a number of reasons including insufficient in-house resources or gaps in R&D provision stemming from small scale, risk, low investment in research or diversification away from existing research competencies. However, technology markets might have substantial information imperfections and transaction costs. The tasks of finding a technology provider, transferring the technology inwards and absorbing it into commercially successful new products and processes, can inhibit the use of licensing agreements for technology acquisition.
This research, using a sample of 128 manufacturing companies (including both licensees and non-licensees), examines some key propositions around the use of technology licensing. Data was collected on technology strategies, complementary assets, internal organisation and market structure. Analysis of the data suggests that strategies of 'buy and make' are complements rather than alternatives, and that extensive use of licensing requires substantial complementary assets to be in place. The nature of product-market positioning was found to be a significant driver of technology strategy, with firms that pursue product differentiation being the most likely to license. Whilst a priori it might be expected that internal organisation would influence technology strategy, this study was only able to provide weak support for this.     

Virtuous or vicious cycles? The role of divestitures as a complementary Penrose effect within resource‐based theory

Research summary: Studies of how divestitures affect firm performance offer mixed results. This paper unpacks relationships between divestitures and subsequent performance, focusing first on the moderating role of prior performance and then on mechanisms through which divestitures by higher‐ and lower‐performing firms affect performance. The study suggests that divestitures can exacerbate weakness and reinforce strength: divestitures by lower performers improve profits but inhibit sales growth and tend to speed the firms’ exits as independent actors; by contrast, higher‐performing divesters invest in support of existing assets and gain new growth, while avoiding becoming acquisition targets. Most generally, divestitures help reduce constraints to changing a firm's resource base, which we refer to as a complementary Penrose effect. Managerial summary: Divestitures help both struggling firms and high performers free financial and managerial resources that they can reinvest in more productive uses. In doing so, divestitures reinforce the strength of high performers but may exacerbate weaknesses of struggling firms. Divestitures by lower performers improve their profits but inhibit their sales growth and increase the chances that the firms will be acquired. By contrast, higher‐performing divesters gain new growth by investing in support of existing and recently acquired assets and, by doing so, are less likely to become targets of acquirers who seek their productive assets. Thus, divestiture is part of a downward cycle for struggling firms but supports a virtuous cycle for superior firms.     

Market orientation,marketing capabilities,and firm performance

Drawing on traditional resource‐based theory and its recent dynamic capabilities theory extensions, we examine both the possession of a market orientation and the marketing capabilities through which resources are deployed into the marketplace as drivers of firm performance in a cross‐industry sample. Our findings indicate that market orientation and marketing capabilities are complementary assets that contribute to superior firm performance. We also find that market orientation has a direct effect on firms' return on assets (ROA), and that marketing capabilities directly impact both ROA and perceived firm performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge,firm boundaries,and innovation: Mitigating the incumbent's curse during radical technological change

We explore the relationship between a firm's organization and its ability to face a radical technological change. We suggest that, during such a change, the presence of both in‐house upstream knowledge and downstream market linkages, within a firm's boundary, has its advantages. We test our predictions in the context of the robotics industry where manufacturers of mechanically controlled “brawny” robots, which were valued mainly for their payload capacity, faced the advent of electrically controlled “brainy” robots that emphasized accuracy and repeatability. We find that “preadapted” firms—the ones with prior relevant technological knowledge and with access to internal users of “brainy” robots—were the innovation leaders in the emerging new technology but were laggards in the old technology. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Relationships between Resource Configurations and Launch Strategies in Taiwan's IC Design Industry: An Exploratory Study

Within the last decade, the link between launch strategies and new product performance has been widely investigated. However, the relationship between resource configurations and launch strategies has received little attention. This study endeavors to fill that void by examining the relationships between resource configurations and launch strategy selections. In addition, this study investigates the moderating effects of market growth and competitiveness on the relationship between resources and launch strategies. Drawing on contingency theory and strategic studies, this study proposes that resource contingencies affect changes in launch strategies. This study also suggests that market characteristics play a contingent role in the relationships between the configurations of resources and launch strategy choices. Based on extensive studies reporting on market characteristics and their links to strategies, this study proposes that two market characteristics—market growth and competitiveness—are relevant for launch strategy decision making. Taiwan's integrated circuit (IC) design industry has been used as the analytical sample, as it has been identified as a promising sector for new product development. Based on the result of investigating 90 firms, four resource configurations are identified: (1) strategic and organizational abilities; (2) technological capabilities; (3) societal assets and goodwill; and (4) physical assets. Furthermore, two different launch strategies—innovative and product advantage and cost oriented—also are discovered. The results from a seemingly unrelated regression model reveal that technological capabilities and societal assets and goodwill contribute to the variation in the firms' choices of launch strategies. This study further conducted the simple slope analysis to observe the effect of the technological capabilities on the innovative and product advantage strategy under different levels of the market growth rate. The results interestingly showed that firms with technological capabilities demonstrated different degree of tendencies in employing this strategy in alignment with various market growth rates. The finding sheds some lights on the moderating role market characteristics play on the relationships between resource configurations and launch strategy selections. Academic implications and suggestions for practitioners also are provided.     

CUSTOMER POWER,STRATEGIC INVESTMENT,AND THE FAILURE OF LEADING FIRMS

Why might firms be regarded as astutely managed at one point, yet subsequently lose their positions of industry leadership when faced with technological change? We present a model, grounded in a study of the world disk drive industry, that charts the process through which the demands of a firm's customers shape the allocation of resources in technological innovation—a model that links theories of resource dependence and resource allocation. We show that established firms led the industry in developing technologies of every sort—even radical ones—whenever the technologies addressed existing customers' needs. The same firms failed to develop simpler technologies that initially were only useful in emerging markets, because impetus coalesces behind, and resources are allocated to, programs targeting powerful customers. Projects targeted at technologies for which no customers yet exist languish for lack of impetus and resources. Because the rate of technical progress can exceed the performance demanded in a market, technologies which initially can only be used in emerging markets later can invade mainstream ones, carrying entrant firms to victory over established companies.     

Technology and Corporate Scope: Firm and Rival Innovation as Antecedents of Corporate Transactions

This paper studies the role of technological innovation as an antecedent of changes in corporate scope. It argues that technological innovations prompt the firm to reconfigure its corporate portfolio—to redeploy resources to areas of new opportunity while it divests out of marginal businesses. Results from a cross‐industry sample of U.S. manufacturing firms show successful innovation by a firm is followed by both expansion into new areas through complementary resource seeking acquisitions and divestment out of existing noncore businesses. This relationship is found to be moderated by the level of investible resources available to the firm, and supports the notion of scarce resources as a constraint on firm scope. In addition, firms are found to change their corporate scope in response to rival innovation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Know-how and asset complementarity and dynamic capability accumulation: the case of r&d

Dynamic capabilities enable firms to create new products and processes and respond to changing market conditions. This empirical investigation of dynamic R&D capabilities deals with the role of complementary know-how and other assets in the context of changing conditions in the U.S. petroleum industry during the 1970s and early 1980s. The analysis suggests that, in response to rising oil prices, firms with larger amounts of complementary technological knowledge and physical assets also undertook larger amounts of R&D on coal conversion (a synthetic fuels process). © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.