Policy risk,strategic decisions and contagion effects: Firm‐specific considerations

Research summary : In this article, we investigate the firm‐specific environment and its impact on firm strategy focusing on adverse changes in the policy environment and their effect on divestitures. We argue that experiencing a negative change in the firm‐specific policy environment causes firms to reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, making them more likely to divest. Operationalizing negative shifts in the firm‐specific policy environment through formal policy disputes between firms and governments, we find that following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest both in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific, applying only to firms directly involved in a dispute . Managerial summary : What is the impact of change in the firm‐specific environment on firm strategy? We argue that when firms directly experience a negative change in their policy environment that is specific to them, they negatively reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, which makes them more likely to undertake a divestiture. We analyze formal disputes between firms and governments that arise from adverse changes in policy and find that, following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific as it applies only to firms directly involved in a dispute . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm performance,rent appropriation,and the strategic resource divestment capability

Dynamic capabilities manifest the organizational capacity to purposefully create or modify the firm's resource base. In this paper, we consider resource divestment an important firm‐level resource management capability that manifests a two‐step organizational change routine. Firms must first be motivated to engage in resource divestment, and then decide which resources should be ‘sold off.’ In exploring this firm‐level capability, we employ factor market theory to consider the ‘seller side’ of the market, and provide a useful framework for conceptualizing how firms generate competitive advantage through resource divestment. We test our model of the resource divestment capability with a dataset of professional baseball franchises during the period 1969–83. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asset divestment as a response to media attacks in stigmatized industries

In stigmatized industries characterized by social contestation, hostile audiences, and distancing between industry insiders and outsiders, firms facing media attacks follow different strategies from firms in uncontested industries. Because firms avoid publicizing their tainted‐sector membership, when threatened, they can respond by divesting assets from that industry. Our analyses of the arms industry demonstrate that media attacks on the focal firm and its peers both increase the likelihood of divestment for the focal firm. Specifically, attacks on the focal firm are the most consequential, followed by attacks on peers in the same industry subcategory, and by attacks on peers in different subcategories. These findings shed new light on divestment as a response to media attacks in stigmatized industries and lead us to rethink impression management theory. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.     

The Impact of Divestment on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of UK Companies

It has widely been suggested that during the 1980s many diversified firms narrowed the scope of their activities by refocusing on core businesses, primarily through divestment activity. This study examines the impact of divestment on firm performance, using an unbalanced panel of 132 UK quoted companies over the period 1985 to 1993. The results suggest that divestment has a positive, significant and substantial effect in raising the profitability of the vendor company. We find limited support for the view that the benefit from divestment is greater for larger and/or more diversified firms and firms operating with weak governance arrangements.     

A path to value creation for foreign entrepreneurs

Research summary : Firms founded by foreign entrepreneurs constitute an influential and growing part of the world economy. Yet, the existing research has given little consideration to the strategies of foreign entrepreneurs beyond their decisions to start a firm. In this article, we address this gap by examining how foreign entrepreneurs may bring value to their firms as firm managers. We argue that foreign owner‐managers may benefit their firms by having access to home‐country resources. We demonstrate that, compared to hired local managers, foreign owner‐managers reduce firms' operating costs by disproportionately hiring home‐country labor when this labor is more cost‐efficient. This effect is larger for labor‐intensive industries and for entrepreneurs from less wealthy countries. Managerial summary : Foreign entrepreneurs represent an important part of the world economy. Yet, we know little of how foreign entrepreneurs manage their firms. In this article, we examine whether foreign entrepreneurs and domestic managers hire different employees. We find that when foreign entrepreneurs manage their firms personally, they hire a larger number of foreign workers, and such workers are cheaper and more productive than the local labor. Conversely, domestic managers tend to hire local employees, despite their higher relative wages. Foreign owner‐managers are particularly valuable in labor‐intensive industries and when their home‐country labor is inexpensive. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political hazards and entry modes of Chinese investments in Africa

Africa has achieved the fastest growth rate of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) recently. Yet heightened political hazards present substantial challenges to foreign firms in Africa. This study examines the entry strategies that firms may take to mitigate such hazards by exploring the relationship between political hazards and entry mode choices in Africa. We further consider how an investing firm’s host country experience and foreign aid provided by its home country government to host countries in Africa can influence this relationship. In a sample of listed Chinese firms’ investments in Africa from 2000 to 2014, we find that Chinese firms tend to use the joint venture mode when political hazards are high in an African country. This relationship is weakened when they accumulate host country experience and when the Chinese government’s foreign aid to an African country increases. Our findings point to firm-level strategies to mitigate political hazards as well as instruments available to home country governments to help their multinational firms operating in host countries characterized by unstable political environments.     

Real options in divestment alternatives

This paper examines the implications of real options theory for both the decision to divest a business unit and the mode of divestment. It is shown that the decision to divest a business unit and the decision to engage in staged modes of divestment are both sensitive to uncertainty, consistent with a real options logic. However, in the face of uncertainty, the results suggest that staged forms of governance create real options that are of lesser value as compared to simply not divesting a business unit and also as compared to completely divesting a business unit. Thus, this study shows that firms have real options of varied value to choose from in the context of divestments. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

De‐commitment to losing strategic action: evidence from the divestiture of poorly performing acquisitions

We use a mental accounting framework to study the conditions in which CEOs de‐commit to poorly performing acquisitions and so become more likely to divest them. We test this framework by contrasting the experiences of 68 firms that divested acquisitions with a control sample of 68 firms that did not divest their acquisitions. Consistent with the theory that we use to explain and predict de‐commitment, our results suggest that poorly performing acquired units tend to be divested when executives can place them within ‘attributional accounts’ (i.e., accounts for the cause of the performance that do not incriminate them) and ‘comprehensive accounts’ (i.e., within the context of overall firm performance). Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technology and Corporate Scope: Firm and Rival Innovation as Antecedents of Corporate Transactions

This paper studies the role of technological innovation as an antecedent of changes in corporate scope. It argues that technological innovations prompt the firm to reconfigure its corporate portfolio—to redeploy resources to areas of new opportunity while it divests out of marginal businesses. Results from a cross‐industry sample of U.S. manufacturing firms show successful innovation by a firm is followed by both expansion into new areas through complementary resource seeking acquisitions and divestment out of existing noncore businesses. This relationship is found to be moderated by the level of investible resources available to the firm, and supports the notion of scarce resources as a constraint on firm scope. In addition, firms are found to change their corporate scope in response to rival innovation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Status in a strange land? Context‐dependent value of status in cross‐border venture capital

Research Summary: While recent literature has depicted status as an intangible asset that is firm‐specific and mobile, we have a limited understanding of whether status confers advantage in a way similar to other intangible assets. This study examines the macro‐structural contingencies that influence the marginal value of firm status as firms expand to new markets. Building on the literatures on status and social approval assets, as well as globalization and international management, we hypothesize that two conditions influence how valuable home‐country status will be in a given host country: the interconnectedness of the home and host countries, and their relative position in the global network. We test our hypotheses in a study of 187 venture capital (VC)‐backed biotechnology ventures in 19 countries between 1990 and 2006. Managerial Summary: Startups typically prefer high‐status VC investors for endorsements, network connections, and resources. One might expect the benefits of high‐status VCs to be even higher when they invest across borders. Yet, we show that status is ingrained in context, and that the performance advantage of partnering with high‐status cross‐border VC firms depends on the relationship between the country of the VC firm and that of the startup. We find that, when the VC industries in the two countries are more connected, the positive effect of cross‐border VC firm status on successful exit is amplified. However, when the VC firm comes from a more central country than the startup, the benefits of VC firm status are less pronounced and vice versa.     

Cross‐border acquisitions by state‐owned firms: How do legitimacy concerns affect the completion and duration of their acquisitions?

Research summary: Cross‐border acquisitions may raise legitimacy concerns by host‐country stakeholders, affecting the acquisition outcomes of foreign firms. We propose that theorization by local regulatory agencies is a key mechanism that links legitimacy concerns with acquisition outcomes. Given that theorization is time consuming and its outcome is uncertain, we argue that state‐owned foreign firms experience a lower likelihood of acquisition completion and a longer duration for completing a deal than other foreign firms. Moreover, we introduce a set of firm characteristics (target public status, target R&D alliances, and acquirer acquisition and alliance experiences) that may affect the threshold level of legitimacy, thereby altering the proposed relationships. Our framework and findings provide useful implications for institutional theory on its core concept of legitimacy. Managerial summary: Cross‐border acquisitions by state‐owned foreign firms may lead to national security concerns and thus debates and discussions among local regulatory agencies. We argue that such institutional processes may reduce the likelihood of acquisition completion and prolong the duration of acquisition completion. Using cross‐border acquisitions in the United States, we find that acquisitions by state‐owned foreign firms are not less likely to be completed than acquisitions by other foreign firms, but they take more time to be completed. Moreover, state‐owned foreign firms are less likely to complete an acquisition when the target firm has more R&D alliances. However, their acquisition experience and alliance experience in the host country increase the likelihood of acquisition completion, whereas their alliance experience alone shortens the acquisition duration. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The determinants of corporate divestment in the UK

It has been widely suggested that since the early 1980s many diversified firms narrowed the scope of their activities by refocusing on their core businesses, primarily through divestment activity. This study examines the extent and determinants of divestment across a large sample of UK firms over the period 1985–1989. Divestment is analysed using both a proportions and count data (Poisson and negative binomial regressions) approach. The results confirm that corporate divestment is not merely a reflection of managerial idiosyncrasies or mean reversion behaviour in the activities undertaken, but is a purposeful response to exogenous change in a manner broadly consistent with both the agency theoretic and strategic views of the firm.     

Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports?

This study examines the impact of bribery within the home country on firm exports by developing two contrasting hypotheses. On the one hand, preferential treatment resulting from government officials in exchange for bribes may promote exports by enhancing efficiency and enabling bribing firms to better compete in foreign markets. On the other hand, preferential treatment resulting from bribes may decrease exports by providing firms with more established positions within the domestic market diminishing the incentive to explore foreign markets. Adopting the three‐stage least squares method, we test these competing arguments using a sample of firms operating within transition economies. We find that bribery within the home country decreases rather than increases firm exports. The implications of our findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political capabilities,policy risk,and international investment strategy: evidence from the global electric power generation industry

Whereas conventional wisdom holds that multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest less in host countries that pose greater policy risk—the risk that a government will opportunistically alter policies to expropriate an investing firm's profits or assets—we argue that MNEs vary in their response to host‐country policy risk as a result of differences in organizational capabilities for assessing such risk and managing the policy‐making process. We hypothesize that firms from home countries characterized by weaker institutional constraints on policy makers or greater redistributive pressures associated with political rent seeking will be less sensitive to host‐country policy risk in their international expansion strategies. Moreover, firms from home countries characterized by sufficiently weak institutional constraints or sufficiently strong redistributive pressures will seek out riskier host countries for their international investments to leverage their political capabilities, which permit them to attain and defend attractive positions or industry structures. We find support for our hypotheses in a statistical analysis of the foreign direct investment location choices of MNEs in the electric power generation industry during the period 1990–1999, the industry's first decade of internationalization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Once bitten twice shy? Experience managing violent conflict risk and MNC subsidiary‐level investment and expansion

Research summary : Researchers have increasingly emphasized the need to better understand how context affects the value of experiential learning. We address this gap by investigating when corporate‐level experience can be leveraged across borders and when experience needs to be country‐specific to be valuable. We test our hypotheses using a unique multi‐source panel dataset of 379 large MNCs from 29 home countries and their subsidiaries in 117 host countries over a 10‐year period, 1999–2008. In contrast to prior research, we find that the ability of a firm to leverage its experience with political risk across borders is limited by the type of risk involved. Experience with nonstate violent conflicts may be transferrable, but only country‐specific experience appears to yield measureable benefits for conflicts involving the host country government . Managerial summary : Violent conflicts not only increase social unrest but also impose added costs of doing business. For managers who find themselves in the midst of violent conflicts or who wish to survive and potentially gain a competitive advantage in operating in such challenging environments, is it possible to learn to manage such a seemingly “unmanageable” problem? In contrast to studies that have examined other types of political risk, we find that the ability of a firm to leverage its experience with violent conflict risk across borders is limited. Specifically, only country‐specific experiential knowledge about how the host government prepares and manages such conflict risks yields measureable economic benefits for MNCs and their subsidiaries operating in countries during conflict . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies

In deregulated industries former monopolies often adopt asymmetric behaviors: these firms impede the entry of foreign competitors in their home market, especially using defensive political strategies, and, at the same time, aggressively develop international strategies in foreign markets. To account for this behavior, I develop a game theoretic model involving three players: the former monopoly, its home government, and the host government of the country into which the firm wants to enter. I show first that there are in fact different asymmetric strategies that former monopolies can use in such a setting, and that a global strategy cannot always be implemented by those firms because of cooperation issues between the two governments. I also study the conditions under which these issues can be solved and show that this can happen only when the firm develops a political strategy that integrates both defensive and offensive activities. Overall, this paper therefore argues that asymmetric strategies are not always adopted to maintain monopoly rents but are also dictated by the nature of the international relationships between the governments involved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Losers Picked? An Empirical Analysis of Capacity Divestment and Production Reallocation in the Japanese Cement Industry

As demand in an industry shrinks, pressure for the reduction of capacity arises. A key issue is whether plants which, from an efficiency perspective, should reduce output in fact do so. Focusing on the Japanese cement industry, we examine whether less efficient plants reduce capacity. We find that less efficient firms are not more likely to reduce capacity than more efficient firms; however, less efficient plants within a multi‐plant firm are more likely to reduce capacity than more efficient plants. In addition, we find that this divestment pattern has led to a substantial drop in industry‐wide allocative efficiency.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MNEs and corruption: the impact of national institutions and subsidiary strategy

We argue that the pressure MNE subsidiaries face to engage in corrupt practices in their host country varies positively with the institutionalization of corrupt practices in both host and home country environments. We further argue that the relationship between an MNE's home country environment and the pressure it faces in the host country is moderated by its localization strategy. Results suggest a positive relationship between the host country corruption environment and the pressure subsidiaries face to engage in bribery locally. Mixed results emerged concerning MNEs from home countries participating in the OECD Convention for Combating Bribery. Results concerning the impact of the home country corruption environment are best viewed in light of significant moderating effects. When MNEs did not have local partners, firms from less corrupt home countries reported less pressure to engage in corrupt practices locally; however, the presence of local partners eliminated this relationship. Results will help managers understand the pressures their firm is likely to face when operating in corrupt host country environments, and also offer guidance concerning how the firm might reduce its exposure to those local institutional pressures. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.