中国农贷市场的利率决定:一个经济解释

在中国农贷市场,供给方垄断和总供给不足的双重约束造成了市场分割,而分割的市场状态进一步导致了"多重均衡利率"的存在:关系借贷一如既往地维持着名义上的零利率,而正规金融机构和非正式金融市场中的利率也是分别决定的。由于正规金融和非正式金融之间的高利差状态普遍存在,不可避免地导致了以下两个结果:(1)高利率驱逐低利率导致"挤出效应";(2)寻租性的套利活动。解决上述问题的关键在于增加农村金融市场的信贷供给,从根本上缓解严重的供给不足问题。     

互联网使用能否提升农户信贷获得水平*——基于CFPS面板数据的经验研究

基于2014—2018年中国家庭追踪调查三期面板数据，运用联合估计的条件混合处理（CMP）模型和工具变量模型，本文分析了互联网使用对农户信贷获得水平的影响效应，并采用修正样本自选择偏差的双稳健IPWRA模型进行了稳健性检验。研究发现：互联网使用对农户信贷获得水平具有显著正向影响，既可以提升农户信贷的可得性，也可以提高农户的信贷规模。就不同贷款渠道而言，互联网使用同时显著提高了农户正规和非正规信贷获得水平。异质性分析表明，互联网使用对于处于中年、兼业程度大以及中西部地区的农户信贷获得水平促进作用更大；机制分析表明，互联网使用主要通过信息搜寻、社会互动以及收入增长三种效应来提升农户信贷获得水平。因此，贯彻落实“互联网+”政策，提升农村地区的互联网覆盖率，是缓解农户融资难和决胜脱贫攻坚战役的重要政策手段。     

Microfinance and households access to credit: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire

Evidence on microfinance services these days ironically shows a great preference for savings products rather than credit products by households. For some authors, this phenomenon is explained by the fact that microfinance products, and especially loans, from formal microfinance institutions do not fit the households demand. This paper first presents evidence on the observed phenomenon in the Ivorian microfinance sector. Second, it analyses the Ivorian credit market so as to understand the determinants of the choice for credits from formal sources versus informal sources. The results reveal the size of the loan, agricultural purpose, the geographical area where households live and ethnicity as factors influencing the choice for formal sources.     

农地确权、信贷配给释缓与农村金融的深度发展*

作为一项基础性、制度环境层面的变革，农地确权帮助更多农户进入金融市场、促进农村金融宽度意义上的“量”变作用已经初步显现。但是，它是否可以提高农户贷款数量，缓解信贷配给并促进农村金融深度意义上的“质”变？这是一个重要但鲜有研究的问题。本文从供给、需求、交易成本、价格、风险配给等角度，分析了农地确权缓解信贷配给、促进农村金融深度发展的理论机理，并通过有序多分类变量回归及倾向得分匹配方法进行实证分析。研究表明，农地确权对农户金融参与深度的影响主要表现为：因降低信息成本而缓解价格配给，因弱化农户的损失规避心理而缓解风险配给；同时，数量配给和交易成本配给的释缓作用尚未充分显示。     

信誉、财富与农村信贷配给——欠发达地区不同农村金融机构的供给行为研究

文章使用2006年云南、宁夏近800个农户家庭的调查数据,实证分析了欠发达地区不同农村金融机构的信贷供给行为.在区分农户的名义需求和有效需求的基础上,研究发现信用社和银行在发放贷款时偏向富有农户,民间借贷者没有这种偏向,因而其服务的覆盖面远远超过正式机构.两者都重视农户的信誉状况,但信用记录没有实现共享.这些行为的差异主要来源于各类金融机构之间信息成本和交易成本的差别.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Covariate and Idiosyncratic Shocks and Coping Strategies for Poor and Non-poor Rural Households in India

The objective of the paper is to track the association between different type of shocks experienced by rural households and corresponding coping strategies opted by them as they are, not only exposed to household-level and community level shocks, but also, lack effective risk management strategies which make them vulnerable to get into chronic poverty. A probit analysis has been used to articulate the comparative static distinction of risk management strategies between poor and non poor rural households using Additional Rural Incomes Survey/Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (ARIS/REDS) data surveyed by National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in rural India across 17 states to get a comparative static analysis. Households, generally, withdraw savings, seek remittances from migrant family members, take loan from formal and informal lenders and sell their existing assets and participate in Government sponsored welfare based programs to control after effect of shocks. Comparatively non-poor rural households could build up safety net (precautionary measure) to cope with price rise and other sudden shocks. But, extremely poor, generally, if don’t get help from relatives or can’t borrow from informal sources, ultimately starve at the time of sudden shocks. The welfare based government programs fail to arrest this extreme situation of grief during the idiosyncratic shocks.

     

信贷约束与农户非正规金融选择

本文考察来自正规金融机构的信贷约束对农户选择非正规金融的影响。基于农户调研,本文首先辨别农户受到的各种信贷约束,并将其与农户融资成本相结合,构建农户融资的理论模型。实证研究采用双变量Probit模型比较各种信贷约束对选择非正规金融的影响。研究发现：供给型和需求型信贷约束都显著地促进农户选择非正规金融。需求型信贷约束中,风险约束较大程度地促进农户通过非正规金融渠道融资。研究结论对制定农村金融政策将提供重要参考。     

我国农户金融参与意愿及其影响因素分析——基于河北省435名农户的调研数据

本文基于对河北省435户农户进行问卷调查所得的数据,运用二元Logit模型,对影响我国农户金融参与意愿的因素进行了分析。研究认为:农户户主的年龄、文化程度、信用社社员身份、农户家庭经营土地面积、农户家庭净资产水平以及农户对金融机构存贷款利率的认知对农户借贷意愿具有显著影响。最后,提出了促进我国农村金融发展的对策建议。     

正规金融与非正规金融合作会提高农户期望收益吗?——理论分析和实证检验

文章区分三种不同的市场结构从理论上分析了农户、正规金融机构和非正规金融机构三个主体的决策行为和期望收益,认为只有在正规金融部门与非正规金融部门共存且实现合作的市场中,农户的融资需求才能得到有效满足,农户的期望收益才能最大化。文章还利用遍布我国东、中、西部地区近10 000家农户的实地调研数据进行实证检验,为建立正规金融与非正规金融间的合作机制提供了经验证据。     

Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因

本文以改革进程中的非规范融资交易为研究对象 ,通过银行 -借款企业动态博弈和经验研究 ,归纳如下主要结论 :第一 ,在金融交易中 ,金融机构的腐败体现为利用资金配置权进行的两类寻租行为 ;第二 ,银行的寻租程度取决于改革进程中中央银行和财政对银行的转移支付和内控制度建设的相对力度比较 ,因而遏制融资腐败的方法是严格转移支付纪律 ,加强内控制度 ;第三 ,企业借款行为是在自筹资金和银行借款间进行的相对成本比较 ,企业被动选择行贿 (交租 ) ,因而其真实融资成本远远高于名义法定金融机构贷款利率 ;第四 ,由于存在转移支付机制 ,企业与银行的非规范金融交易的实质是对中央银行和财政转移支付的分割 ;第五 ,根据以上结论 ,民间借贷与正规金融价格实际是均衡的 ,不能简单定义民间借贷是高利贷 ,如果如此定义 ,则正规金融也同样具备高利贷特征。     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

Children's schooling in Nicaragua: What is the link between educational achievement,borrowing, and gender?

The impact of credit has been widely studied, and yet little is known about the effect of formal versus informal loans. In this paper, we contrast the two and their impact on children's schooling using longitudinal data from Nicaragua. To address endogeneity, we utilize both household fixed effects and locality–year fixed effects. Our results indicate that, on average, children from borrowing households fare worse than children from nonborrowing households, with male borrowers having a disproportionately negative effect on boys, and vice versa for girls and female borrowers. Informal credit is found to have a protective effect on school attendance, but the effects of formal and informal credit on cumulative schooling are found to be statistically equivalent. However, this appears to mask considerable heterogeneity within informal borrowing.     

Italian households’ debt: the participation to the debt market and the size of the loan

This paper analyses Italian households’ participation to the debt market, separating the probability of demanding a loan from the probability of being rationed by lenders; on the supply side of the market specific attention is paid to enforcement costs of the loan contract when customers default. A new result is that the age of the household head acts essentially as a demand factor, rather than a variable influencing the lender’s choice. Both current and future households’ income increase the demand for loans and reduce credit rationing. Self-employed workers are more rationed by lenders. Credit constraints are also linked to the area where the household lives, partly because of different enforcement costs. The final part of the paper analyses the equilibrium quantity of the loan, for households who have a loan and are not constrained. The loan size is positively linked to household net wealth and income profile. An important contribution of this paper is the finding that, not only the participation to the debt market, but also the loan size is negatively affected by enforcement costs.      

新型信贷模式下完善农村担保贷款机制的思考

农村经济发展的不平衡制约了现行传统农村信贷投放的规模和效益,而新的联保贷款和担保贷款模式既不需农户的实物抵押,也部分规避了信贷双方信息不对称的风险。要完善农村担保贷款制度,应采取措施积极扩大贷款担保主体;发挥政府对贷款的引导和保障功能;拓展涉农企业对农村信贷的担保职能;完善农村信贷激励机制;大力拓展对"三农"的金融保险业务;建立农村基层干部对农贷的奖励和责任机制。     

中国农村非正规金融:绩效、缺陷与治理

随着我国正规金融从农村纷纷撤走，非正规金融在农村地区迅速壮大，并为农村社会与经济发展提供了有力的金融支持。然而，由于非正规金融掌握信息的有限性和得不到法律认可与政府保护，从而它也存在许多缺陷，并对经济的平稳运行产生一些破坏作用。对待农村非正规金融，绝不能简单地否定或取缔它，而应持辩证的观点，扬长避短，因势利导，使其成为正规金融的有力补充。     

Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene?

Do banks deny credit to new start–ups? The presumption that they do has motivated government intervention in several forms, including publicly backed loan guarantee schemes in the UK and elsewhere. This paper presents an overview of the modern theory and evidence of credit rationing, and concludes that the case for credit rationing is weak. Ultimately, theoretical arguments for or against credit rationing are inconclusive, so evidence is needed to decide the issue. The evidence is not supportive of the view that credit rationing is an important or widespread phenomenon.     

获得贷款证缓解了农户信贷约束吗*——基于倾向得分匹配法的实证分析

本文利用中国农村金融调查数据,采取倾向得分匹配法,克服了农户获得贷款证的样本选择偏误和内生性问题,评估贷款证的获得与否对农户信贷约束的影响。研究结果表明：获得贷款证的农户信贷约束强度将显著降低438%,而拥有贷款证使农户在生产活动方面的信贷约束强度降低程度大于消费活动。在进一步评估获取贷款证对不同生产消费活动信贷约束的缓解效果时发现,获得贷款证对农户农业生产、做小生意、办企业、建房、上学方面的信贷约束强度有不同程度的降低作用,但对农户婚丧、看病的信贷约束并无影响。