鄱阳湖流域内企业排污权的市场交易模式研究

排污权交易作为一种现代市场化治污防控重要手段,在污染物总量和种类得到控制的前提下,可以通过市场机制促进排污权交易双方效益最大化,实现社会环境资源的优化配置和经济增长方式的转变。以行政区域为界实施的排污权交易制度和污染物随自然区域扩散的特点对排污权交易的实施带来了一定困难,文章认为以流域管理为基础,按自然地理区域经济发展水平不同,讨论了不同地区同类污染物排放的成本差异,在考虑了排污权交易市场的公平与效率的基础上,分析了鄱阳湖流域内排污权交易市场的供求状况,建立了该流域排污权交易平台的交易模式和交易流程,并对合理完善排污权交易给出了如下政策建议:完善机构设置,发挥综合决策功能;完善排污权交易的分配制度;构建现代化排污权电子交易平台;完善企业排污主体的责任制度体系。     

创新之窗

地方传真湖北搭建排污权交易平台湖北省环保局近期公布了2008年环保执法新举措:启动排污权交易制度,执行环境有价政策。排污不达标企业将难以获得银行贷款;治污得力、保护环境的企业将可以在市场交易中获得回报。湖北省排污权交易平台也基本建成。今后,省内企业通过任何一台上网电脑,就可完成排污权买卖。从2008年开始,环保部门与金融单位联合建立信息通报渠     

创新之窗

沪杭交易机构联手推进环太湖流域排污平台建设近期上海环境能源交易所与杭州产权交易所签署合作协议,双方就共同推进环太湖流域排污权交易平台建设达成了一致,希望通过跨区域的合作,能够为未来全国排污权交易市场的广泛合作"探路",为环境保护市场化机制的深入开展提供新思路。此次合作是跨区域排污权交易的一次有力探索,双方力争通过两地排污权交易市场的充分交流与合作,     

排污权交易:地方实践风生水起

尽管"十一五"期间排污权交易在我国并未大范围展开,但全国过半省市试行了排污权交易,江苏、浙江、天津、湖北、湖南、山西、内蒙古、重庆等8省市区更是被环保部等部门批准为排污权交易试点省市,在探索和实践过程中初步建立起排污权交易法规体系,完成了多项排污权交易案例,这些成功经验对进一步推进全国排污权交易试点工作具有重要的意义.     

支持排污权交易的权证流通系统功能模型研究

排污权交易是通过市场机制来控制环境污染的重要手段,建立一套完整、精确的排污权证流通管理信息系统是排污权交易制度有效运行的保障.文章在分析权证流通系统特点、排污权证分配与交易流程以及权证流通系统功能需求的基础上,给出了一个支持排污权交易的权证流通系统功能结构模型,为系统开发打下了基础.     

深圳市主要污染物排污权交易政策制度评估

介绍了深圳市排污权交易进展情况,概括了深圳市排污权交易制度框架和制度体系,构建政策评估体系,从目的、政策框架、政策制度、综合效应对深圳市排污权交易制度进行评估分析。结果表明,深圳市制度设计较为完整,初始分配、政府储备、协议转让、总量监管等方面仍存在不足,行政强制手段过多,导致市场对资源配置效率降低,应进一步研究提高市场活跃度的因素,为正式实施排污权交易打下基础。     

关于国外排污权会计的最新发展进程述评与借鉴

排污权交易作为一项有效的环境经济政策,自设立以来在各国企业问迅速推广.随着交易规模的扩大和制度的健全,尤其是对企业财务影响的加剧,排污权交易的会计处理已成为近几年环境财务会计的热点与难点之一.本文系统研究了排污权交易会计研究的历史进程,介绍了欧盟、美国、日本等各国会计准则委员会及相关机构在排污权会计指南与实务上取得的最新研究进展,以期为我国排污权会计准则体系的构建提供借鉴.     

排污权拍卖理论研究综述

排污权交易政策是受到世界各国普遍关注的环境政策之一,排污权拍卖交易机制的设计是决定排污权交易市场效率的关键问题,为了使排污权交易市场能顺利健康的运行,本文就排污权拍卖的起因、拍卖方式的选择以及不同信息条件下的排污权拍卖等相关研究文献进行综述和评介,并提出了未来的研究展望.     

北部湾排污权拍卖交易建立的可行性分析

北部湾地区属于国家重点开发地区,近几年来开发的热潮始终不减,随之而来的生态环境破坏问题更是值得人们去关注,在我国虽然排污权拍卖的交易制度还尚处在萌芽阶段,但其重要性是不容忽视的,文章通过博弈模型,引进政府、排污企业、环境保护者三方,并结合北部湾地区自身特点,分析排污权拍卖交易实现的可行性及其条件,为解决北部湾在大开发过程出现的环境保护问题提供理论依据,使北部湾开发建设遵循可持续发展战略要求。     

污染物减排政策效果比较——基于经济学视角

我国政府已经把减少污染物排放作为约束性指标纳入到国家中长期发展战略之中,采取有效的污染物减排政策是中国缓解环境压力、实现经济社会可持续发展的重要手段.排污权交易制度是在总量管制的情况下,通过污染物排放权的分配,最终实现该区域总的排污量削减.本文从经济学的视角,研究了排污权交易的实施基础,并与行政强制性减排以及环境税减排进行了效率比较,结果表明排污权交易比单纯的行政强制性排污和环境税约束具有更高的市场效率以及灵活性,同时并不会降低整个社会的污染物排放效果.此外,从市场势力的影响、市场信息的影响、交易规则的影响等方面讨论了影响排污权交易市场效率的因素,对我国排污权交易市场的发展提出了相应的建议,为排污权交易市场的稳定运行提供了理论参考.     

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.     

Pollution Permits: A Discussion of Fundamentals

The author provides an economic analysis of tradable pollution permits by clarifying the derivation of permit supply and demand relationships and connecting those concepts to permit trading for the case of two polluters. Using the standard comparison of costs and benefits, he makes the marginal cost of emission reduction of a typical polluter the basis of the derivation of its permit supply and demand schedules. Developing these relationships for both polluters allows the creation of market schedules for permit supply and demand. He demonstrates equilibrium in the market for permits and the corresponding trading of permits. He discusses the satisfaction of the equi-marginal principle, which ensures that pollution reduction is achieved efficiently. The author concludes by considering the consequences of the presence of a third polluter in the market for permits.     

Tradable Discharge Permit System for Water Pollution: Case of the Upper Nanpan River of China

A discharge permit system for water pollution of theupper Nanpan River has been tested since 1992. Thispaper proposed the shift of the current non-tradablepermits to tradable permits to attain the samepollution reduction targets at a lower cost. It wasfound that this river appeared good for trading. Apilot trading program for point sources was thenrecommended to a smaller trading zone. There would beten potential trades for chemical oxygen demanddischarge, gaining an annual cost-saving of ChineseYuan 2.4 million, or saving 18.4% of the total annualcost to attain the reduction target without trading.The marginal pollution reduction cost was estimated atChinese Yuan 959 for one kilogram chemical oxygendemand per day. Meanwhile, `without trading' and `withtrading' scenarios would bring about 900.9 kg/day and51.5 kg/day of redundant reduction respectively. Thenet annual benefit arising from trading, about ChineseYuan 1.6 million, would still be significant. At last,the study recommended that compliance monitoring andexecuting institution requirements be kept in mindwhile designing the program. An information systemneeds to be established to provide potentialparticipants relevant information. The method ofpermit allocation and lifespan of permits should alsobe addressed later.     

A Pollution Offset System for Trading Non-Point Source Water Pollution Permits

Water pollution from non-point sources is a global environmental concern. Economists propose tradable permit systems as a solution, but they are difficult to implement due to the nature of non-point sources. We present a pollution offset system for trading non-point source water pollution permits. Conventional pollution offset systems suffer from thin markets and transaction costs. In this paper, we show how to overcome these problems with a centrally managed common-pool market. We define permits as allowable nitrate loading to a groundwater aquifer. This trading system utilizes estimates of potential nitrate leaching from land uses, a set of transport coefficients generated from a simulation of nitrate transport in groundwater, an online trading system, and a linear program to clear the market. We illustrate the concept using a hypothetical case study.     

Cross-Industry Emission Permits Trading

The present paper examines the effectiveness of emission permits trading across industries. We find that, while permits trading in a competitive environment minimizes costs of compliance, it also enhances product market imperfections. We also find that a standard-setting regulation yields superior welfare results if policy makers have able information. Standard setting allows policy makers the flexibility of taking into account the existing imperfections in each industry. Although not surprising, this result has important policy implications in situations in which policy makers consider establishing permits trading between publicly owned dominant polluters and other industrial polluters. Since policy makers have able information on publicly-owned firms, it might be welfare improving to directly control emissions of the dominant publicly-owned polluters. Given that many of the major polluters in the real world are large firms in heavily concentrated industries many of which are also regulated, our result warrants policy makers' attention.     

Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy

Concentration permits are regarded as an interesting policy tool for regulating emissions where, besides absolute amounts, also local concentration is important. However, effects of governance structure, trading system and possible policy interventions in the permits' allocation are not yet well analysed and understood. This paper explores in how far tradable fertilisation standards can be seen as a concentration permit trading (CPT) system which can be fine-tuned for further policy intervention. Indeed fertilisation standards such as obliged by the EU Nitrate Directive can be regarded as local nitrate emissions limits, and thus concentration permits. A multi-agent spatial allocation model is used to simulate the impact of defining the manure problem in terms of concentration permits rather than conventional emission permits. Impacts are simulated in terms of environmental performance and increased reallocation costs. The model is applied on the Flemish manure problem.     

我国排污权初始分配的研究

排污权初始分配是排污权交易制度实施过程中各方争论的一个焦点，也是一个技术和政治上的难题。目前国内外排污权初始分配的模式主要包括免费分配、有偿分配及此二者组合三种。本文对这三种模式的不同实施方法和各自的优缺点进行了论述，并分析了我国目前排污权初始分配的现状，最后基于免费分配和有偿分配相组合的模式对我国排污权初始分配进行了新的设计。     

Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Eur Econ Rev 49(8): 2041–2055) to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-firm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using firms’ historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using firms’ historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism.