中国最后贷款人制度：演进及其在银行强制性退出中的角色

最后贷款人制度与银行类金融机构的强制性市场退出之间存在着密切的互动关系,前者往往是隶属于中央银行的职能;后者是往往是监管部门的职能.在这种分权安全下,两者的有效协调对于银行类金融机构的有序退出起着十分重要的作用.本文在对中国最后贷款人制度的演进与特点分析总结的基础上,就中国最后贷款人在银行类金融机构强制性市场退出中所扮演的角色进行了探讨,并就该制度的完善以及拟议中的存款保险制度的建立提出了相应的政策建议.     

问题银行救助的最后贷款人政策

最后贷款人是中央银行化解个别问题银行流动性困难的一个重要措施，也是各国银行完全网的主要组成部分。国际惯例中最后贷款人的前提条件、原则、实施策略，以及如何提高公共资金使用效率、降低道德风险、维护监管当局声誉等问题，对中国人民银行先例最后贷款人的实践是至关重要的亟待解决的关键环节。     

跨国银行国际监管中的最后贷款人制度分析

当今世界的金融市场越来越成为一个密不可分的整体,银行的危机,特别是跨国银行的危机极易引起系统性的金融风险,国际监管日益重要。但同时,作为防范危机有利武器的最后贷款人制度却在对跨国银行的国际监管中处于含混不清的状况,未能发挥应有的作用。本文从跨国银行国际监管问题入手,分析最后贷款人制度在跨国银行国际监管中难以实施的原因,并尝试提出解决途径。     

最后贷款人操作中的透明度与模糊性

最后贷款人政策是一国银行危机管理的重要手段,也是金融安全网的主要组成部分。中央银行在实施最后贷款人职能时,面临来自银行的道德风险。作为降低道德风险的一种制度安排,要求中央银行在进行最后贷款人操作时,同时保持政策的透明度争模糊性,寻求两者之间的平衡。     

银行安全网效率探析

银行安全网是指政府为保护银行体系的安全和健康,防止银行业因不利冲击所导致的传染性挤兑破坏的一组政策机制设计,包括或隐或明的存款保险、最后贷款人政策、无法支付银行的处置方式及审慎的监管要求等.安全网的存在降低了银行危机导致的成本,更重要的是,它的存在减少了因存款人挤兑所引致的银行危机发生的可能性.通过限制不必要的风险或者帮助困难银行,安全网政策总能有社会效益.但是,安全网是有成本的,存款保险的成本和银行救助的成本有时甚至会超过所有失败银行的总损失.在亚洲金融危机中,泰国、印度尼西亚、韩国和日本的银行救助成本约占GDP的20%-50%.一个有效率的安全网应是全面考虑安全网可能成本和收益的福利最大化的政府政策.     

市场退出制度与中小商业银行发展问题研究

一、商业银行市场退出与最后贷款人制度 中央银行制度创立的初衷就是为了稳定金融和防范银行危机,作为最后贷款人(Lender of Last Resort,简称LOLR),中央银行向可能或已经发乍信用危机的银行提供流动性支持成为世界各国的普遍做法.     

浅议我国建立存款保险制度应具备的基本条件

存款保险制度是指一个国家为了保护存款人的利益和维护金融秩序的稳定，通过法律形式确立的一种在银行因发生意外事故破产时进行债务清偿的制度。目前世界上许多国家建立了金融安全网，主要由存款保险制度、最后贷款人制度和审慎监管三大部分组成。目前我国最后贷款人制度和审慎监管已经基本建立和形成，由中国人民银行和中国银行业监督管理委员会负责。     

基于委托代理视角的央行最后贷款人问题

本文从委托代理理论的角度,分析四种不同情况下中央银行扮演最后贷款人角色可能存在的激励目标冲突导致的政策失灵问题。首先,当中央银行集货币政策与银行监管职能为一身时,代理问题可能导致“内部角色冲突”;其次,监管职能分离后,“内部角色冲突”出现了“外部化”;第三,如果在央行独立性和监管独立性不强的情况下,会导致最后贷款人问题的实际决策权向政府的集中;第四,在预算软约束情况下,最后贷款人政策为整个金融体系提供了显性或隐性的担保,这种担保的存在又反过来加重了预算的软化,如果不加以限制,最后贷款人政策极易成为一种低效率的政策。     

银行业安全网的设计

银行安全网是政府为防止银行业受不利冲击而导致传染性挤兑破坏所设计的一组政策机制。它包括存款保险、审慎管制政策、最后贷款人政策以及资不抵债银行机构的处置政策等。我们可以把银行业安全网视为一系列断路器,用以防止个体银行的问题在整个银行体系的传染。五个断路器在不     

"大而不倒"救助政策的理论和实证研究

由于大银行倒闭的巨大破坏性,最后贷款人在救助中通常奉行"大而不倒"政策。考虑到救助成本是银行资产规模的增函数,如果救助银行是最优的,那么救助任何一个更大的银行将也是最优的,这也意味着"大而不倒"救助政策在理论上的成立。在"大而不倒"政策下,规模和风险之间存在相互影响的关系。"大而不倒"救助政策影响银行的规模选择和资产风险的组合选择,导致银行追求变得更大且更具风险。     

Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.     

Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative

This paper offers a historical perspective on the evolution of central banks as lenders of last resort (LOLR). Countries differ in the statutory powers of the LOLR, which is the outcome of a political bargain. Collateralized LOLR lending as envisioned by Bagehot (1873) requires five key legal and institutional preconditions, all of which required political agreement. LOLR mechanisms evolved to include more than collateralized lending. LOLRs established prior to World War II, with few exceptions, followed policies that can be broadly characterized as implementing “Bagehot's Principles”: seeking to preserve systemic financial stability rather than preventing the failure of particular banks, and limiting the amount of risk absorbed by the LOLR as much as possible when providing financial assistance. After World War II, and especially after the 1970s, generous deposit insurance and ad hoc bank bailouts became the norm. The focus of bank safety net policy changed from targeting systemic stability to preventing depositor loss and the failure of banks. Statutory powers of central banks do not change much over time, or correlate with country characteristics, instead reflecting idiosyncratic political histories.     

Do Lender of Last Resort Policies Matter? The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Banks During the Great Depression

The paper uses a unique set of Depression-era bank financial data in a two-step system of equations with instrumental variables to estimate the effectiveness of lender of last resort (LOLR) strategies in a survival model with self-selection bias. Decreasing RFC loan collateral requirements over 1932–1933 facilitate the analysis of a relationship between LOLR collateral and survival. The results suggest that the RFC's practice of subordinating depositors' and investors' interests through senior claims on banks' best assets may have caused banks to fail. Although recapitalization after March 1933 helped banks survive the Great Depression, recapitalization is not a typical LOLR strategy.     

The lender of last resort

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort (LOLR) from a Central Bank (CB) viewpoint. The model in a static setting suggests that the CB would only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, consistent with the insight of “too big to fail”. In a dynamic setting, CB’s optimal policy in liquidity support depends on the trade off between contagion and moral hazard effects. Our results show that contagion is the key factor affecting CB’s incentives in providing LOLR and they also provide a rationalization for “constructive ambiguity”.     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities—the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)—that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008–2009. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and, in the case of the TSLF, at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.     

Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?

The maintenance of financial stability is facilitated by well-designed safety-net arrangements aimed at limiting the risk of disruption in the financial system (crisis prevention) and the consequences of disruption if it arises (crisis management). An important element of crisis management is the lender of last resort (LOLR) function. This article reviews the main ideas on LOLR reflected in the academic literature, going back to Henry Thornton almost 200 years ago.     

Funding money-creating banks: Cash funding,balance sheet funding and the moral hazard of currency elasticity

Once banks are viewed as money creators rather than financial intermediaries, a distinction between their cash funding and balance sheet funding can be made. This distinction opens up various insights. It allows for a fuller explanation of the cash needs of banks with reference to the pattern of their cash gains and losses. It facilitates an understanding of the central bank as not only a cash lender of last resort (LOLR) for some banks some of the time, but also as a cash lender of continual and only resort (LOCOR) for all banks all of the time. It leads to novel insights into the sources of banks' balance sheet funding. The paper investigates the various implications of the central bank's elastic currency policy in its role as LOCOR, particularly how it thereby incites considerably more moral hazard than conventionally acknowledged. This realisation opens up a better understanding of the banking sector's proneness to excess and the economy's susceptibility to financial cycles. The paper concludes by weighing the merits of the only two policy strategies by which banking excess can be checked.     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

中国商业银行收入结构多元化对银行风险的影响

不同于以往文献专注于收入结构与银行绩效关系的研究,本文基于资产组合理论关于多元化组合可以分散风险的观点,对我国商业银行收入结构多元化与银行风险变化之间的关系进行研究。首先利用14家商业银行12年的数据建立面板数据模型,分析非利息收入占比提高对银行风险的影响。在此基础上,再根据资产组合理论对银行风险进行进一步的分解,试图更深一步探讨收入结构多元化与银行风险变化之间的关系。结果表明,中国商业银行收入结构多元化与银行风险间的关系并不显著,银行风险的降低主要归因于利息收入波动风险减小,而随着非利息收入占比的提高,非利息收入波动风险反而增加,对总风险的贡献值增加。基于本文的实证结果,在银行风险控制方面对中国商业银行收入结构转型提出了有益的建议。