论经济下行形势下银行信贷风险防范及应对

随着我国市场经济的不断发展,银行在经济发展中的重要作用也日益明显,其中银行信贷工作是银行工作中的重要组成部分,如何在经济下行形势下,加强银行信贷风险的防范已经是我们又一个值得探讨的课题。本文从经济下行形势下银行信贷面临的主要风险出发,分析了发生银行信贷风险的原因,并提出了几点防范的措施,目的在于降低银行信贷风险,促进银行长期可持续发展。     

当前经营环境对银行信贷客户影响研究

2008年以来,受金融危机影响,全球经济处于下行周期,受其拖累,我国经济增长放缓,企业经营普遍下滑。在此背景下,银行信贷业务潜在风险有所增加,威胁到银行信贷资产质量,使银行信贷经营面临严峻考验,并相应加大了银行信贷结构调整的难度。为此,本文综合分析当前宏观经济形势,在对A银行信贷客户点面结合进行快速抽样调查的基础上,透析市场环境变化对银行信贷客户的影响,并特别关注了制造行业、外贸类客户的整体运行状态及潜在风险,据此提出应对当前形势的信贷政策和具体措施建议,希望有助于银行防范信贷系统性风险。     

银行信贷项目全面风险管理工作研究

鉴于整个银行的管理过程是一项庞大的系统工程,银行信贷又是银行经营管理的支柱产业,受到多方因素的影响。对银行信贷项目的全面风险管理就变得尤为重要,也是银行经营管理的重要课题。通过多项实证研究,总结出影响银行信贷风险的三大主要因素即:银行内部因素、环境风险等级、贷款企业的状况。     

影子银行、信托资金行业投向与系统性风险北大核心

影子银行资金投向复杂,防范风险跨行业交叉传染成为当前规范影子银行发展的重点。本文以资金信托行业投向作为影子银行的代理变量,采用△Co Va R模型,利用来自19个行业的资金信托投向数据测算尾部风险指标,分析以信托业为代表的影子银行部门系统性风险的生成机理和风险传导路径。研究发现,由本文模型测算的以信托业为代表的影子银行部门系统性风险主要由行业间关联性驱动,时间维度上具有顺周期性;通过构建指标识别出系统重要性行业和系统脆弱性行业,对前者的溢出效应和后者的吸收效应采取必要的风险隔离措施。因此,在经济上行周期,应通过完善监测系统来捕捉影子银行可能出现的风险,对与影子银行相关的行业采取重点监管措施,防范在下行周期风险出现跨行业扩散,减轻实体经济受到的影响。     

新经济常态下加强银行信贷风险防控的探究

经济下行时期,银行的信贷风险防控比片面追求业务的快速发展更为重要,逐渐成为了是当前各国商业银行风险管理的核心。如何准确把握和有效防控银行信贷风险,确保银行信贷资金安全,是商业银行的一项长期任务和系统工程。文章分析了经济新常态环境下银行信贷风险存在的问题,并提出了加强银行信贷风险防范的对策。     

基于自由裁量贷款损失准备的经理自主权行为分析北大核心CSSCI

本文以中国16家上市商业银行为研究对象,以自由裁量贷款损失准备为经理自主权的代理变量,分析中国商业银行经理人员在计提贷款损失准备方面的自主权行为。实证结果表明存在使用自由裁量贷款损失准备调整资本充足率和盈余管理的行为,银行还使用其来缓解风险和融资压力;银行经理人员主观感知到的经济下行和监管压力对自由裁量贷款损失准备有显著影响,经理人员在感知到经济下行后会减少计提自由裁量贷款损失准备,这在一定程度上缓解了贷款损失准备计提的顺周期性。     

浅析经济下行期对公存款的营销

经济的发展受许多因素影响,经济的发展存在周期性的波动.当前我国经济受到国际经济大环境不景气的影响,出现了经济下行的势头.绩效考评是银行金融活动管理中一种常用的形式,是银行经营管理活动中一种具有导向作用的活动、是调节银行内部资源配置的有效手段.做好银行在经济下行期的对公存款营销是促进国民经济增长的重要途径.     

零售行业银行信贷风险分析与防范措施分析

鉴于零售行业是一个市场风险较高的行业,银行在对其进行信贷业务时,应加强风险分析,并及早采取一定防范措施.本文即在分析零售行业银行信贷存在的风险因素的基础上,对如何采取有效防范措施规避风险提出了相关对策.     

企业融资结构化运作的风险管理思考

2010年以来受银行信贷收紧影响,企业融资来源普遍收窄,由此造成民间借贷的融资活动异常活跃。目前已出现借款人在取得银行贷款资金后再以高利率转借至民间借贷市场,从而赚取高额利差的融资结构化运作现象。此类行为蕴藏着较大的系统性风险,受经济下行影响,已出现风险传递和扩散至银行的潜在苗头,对银行融资安全构成严重威胁。本文对此类行为的模式和风险状况进行分析研究,进一步提出风险管理的建议。     

资本缓冲、货币政策与信贷行为

本文基于2002-2013年我国上市银行的面板模型,构建我国上市商业银行的资本缓冲调整模型和信贷行为影响模型,探讨我国商业银行资本缓冲的周期性及其对信贷的影响。实证结果表明:我国上市商业银行的资本缓冲具有显著的逆周期性特征;资本缓冲调整对银行信贷扩张具有显著的负向作用,并且在一定程度上强化了货币政策对银行信贷的影响程度。根据这一研究结果,为了应对我国商业银行信贷投放的顺周期性,应进一步完善银行体系的逆周期资本缓冲机制,充分发挥资本缓冲机制对商业银行信贷行为的调节作用。     

Bank loan-loss provisions and the income-smoothing hypothesis: An empirical analysis, 1976–1984

This article tests an income-smoothing hypothesis for a sample of 106 large bank holding companies for the period 1976 to 1984. Our focus is on the behavior of the provision for loan losses as a function of bank income and alternative measures of business conditions likely to affect loan portfolio risk-taking or quality. Using an econometric model with pooled time-series, cross-sectional data, we find evidence of income-smoothing behavior over our test period. Our dummy-variable models indicate that regional banking companies tend to engage in income smoothing more than money-center banks. Alternative motivations for income-smoothing behavior, which include bank regulatory policy, risk management, agency theory, and compensation policy, are explored and their policy implications considered.     

The role of bank monitoring in corporate governance: Evidence from borrowers’ earnings management behavior

In this paper, we examine the corporate governance role of banks by investigating the effect of bank monitoring on the borrowers’ earnings management behavior. Our analyses suggest that a borrowing firm’s earnings management behavior generally decreases as the strength of bank monitoring increases. The strength of bank monitoring is measured as (1) the magnitude of a bank loan, (2) the reputation (rank) of a lead bank, (3) the length of a bank loan, and (4) the number of lenders. These results imply that bank monitoring plays an important role in the corporate governance of bank-dependent firms. We further examine other bank loan characteristics (collateral, refinancing, loan types, and loan purposes) and their effects on borrowers’ earnings management behavior. Our analyses show that collateral and loan types are significantly associated with borrowers’ earnings management behavior while refinancing and loan purposes have no association.     

房价波动中商业银行住房抵押贷款风险控制研究

随着我国房地产市场环境的变化,银行房地产贷款的风险也在不断变化。本文具体分析了房地产的特性及其价格影响因素、现阶段我国房地产业的困境、房价调整与银行贷款风险关系的特点,并对银行的风险管理提出相应建议。     

The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments

In this article we examine the impact of bank loan characteristics on firm leverage adjustments, with a special focus on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. The results show that, on average, more bank loans slow down leverage adjustments. The subsample analysis reveals that bank loans slow down leverage adjustments in underlevered firms but speed up adjustments in overlevered firms. This finding suggests that bank lenders are able to limit their risk exposure in borrowers and protect their own rights. Further evidence indicates that the effect of bank loans is more notable during the global financial crisis and when a firm is financially constrained. Bank loan concentration and maturity have a significant impact on leverage adjustments as well.     

Earnings management and auditor specialization in the post-sox era: An examination of the banking industry

This study examines the impact of auditor specialization on bank loan loss provisions for a large cross-section of US banks for the period 2002-2006. We find a positive relationship between earning (before provision) and loan loss provision, suggesting that bank managers use LLP to smooth earnings in the post-SOX period. However, this relationship is significantly moderated by audit industry expertise, providing strong evidence that industry specialization constrains income smoothing. In further analysis, we find some evidence that auditor specialization is more effective in reducing potentially incoming-increasing earnings management. Our results hold after controlling for self-selection bias and are robust to alternative measures of industry specialization. Overall, our findings support the conclusion that audit industry expertise plays an effective monitoring role in constraining management’s discretionary accounting choices.     

Modeling Foreign Bank Performance and Lending Behavior

This paper examines the profitability and commercial loan growth of foreign banks using a simultaneous‐equation framework. Maximizing behavior provides a two‐equation system in which bank profitability depends on variables related to expected returns, costs, and risks and in which loan growth is determined by risk and return variables. The model is tested to evaluate the determinants of foreign bank performace and lending behavior in the United States between 1987 and 1991. Overall the results indicate that factors such as capital strength, commercial and industrial loan growth, and assets composition were important in determining foreign banks' return‐on‐assets in the period under study. The role of capital appears to be particularly important in explaining foreign bank performance. The single significant determinant of loan growth was found to be previous period's loan growth.     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Product Market Imperfections and Loan Commitments

I show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower's industry. A bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. While it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment, all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments.     

Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent bank failures

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.     

Credit allocation when borrowers are economically linked: An empirical analysis of bank loans to corporate customers

Using detailed loan level data, we examine bank lending to corporate customers relying on principal suppliers. Customers experience larger loan spreads, higher intensity of covenants and greater likelihood of requiring collateral when they depend more on the principal supplier for inputs. The positive association between the customer’s loan spread and its dependence on the principal supplier is less pronounced when the bank has a prior loan outstanding with the principal supplier, and when the bank has higher market share in the industry. Longer relationships between the customer and its principal supplier, and between the bank and the principal supplier, mitigate lending constraints. The evidence is consistent with corporate suppliers serving as an informational bridge between the lender and the customer.