A Ricardian Model with Endogenous Comparative Advantage and Endogenous Trade Policy Regimes

This paper develops a Ricardian model with transaction costs and endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages. It shows that the level of division of labour and trade increases as transaction conditions improve. It identifies the conditions for trade negotiations that result in zero tariff rates and the conditions for the coexistence of unilateral tariff protection and unilateral laissez faire policies. The model may explain the policy transformation of some European governments from Mercantilism to laissez faire in the 18th and 19th century and policy changes in developing countries from protection tariff to trade liberalization and tariff negotiation.     

Tariff effects on MNC decisions to engage in intra-firm and arm's-length trade

Abstract .  Using confidential firm-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on activities of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) and their Canadian affiliates, we study the dramatic growth of intra-firm and arm's-length U.S.-Canada trade over the 198495 period. We find that decisions to engage in intra-firm and arm's-length trade are essentially unrelated to tariff and transport cost reductions over this sample period. Thus, we find that the increase in trade occurred almost entirely on the  intensive  rather than the  extensive  margin. This is consistent with case study evidence in Keane and Feinberg (2006), where MNC executives consistently indicate that the modest tariff reductions of the 198495 period were not sufficient to justify fixed costs of overhauling international supply chains. Our results have important implications for recent influential models of international trade that rely on sensitivity of intra-firm trade to tariffs at the  extensive  margin to explain how small tariff declines could have led to the explosion of intra-firm trade since the 1980s. We also find that initial conditions (i.e., 1983 tariffs) are uncorrelated with whether firms engaged in intra-firm or arm's-length trade activity at the start of the sample period. This result is surprising as it implies that firms/industries with a greater propensity to engage in trade were not, in general, successful at lobbying for more favourable tariff treatment.     

Inequality and Trade Policy: The Pro‐Poor Bias of Contemporary Trade Restrictions

This paper studies the pro‐poor bias of trade policy in India by estimating the household welfare effects of removing the current protection structure. The elimination of a pro‐poor trade policy is expected to have a negative differential welfare effect at the low end of the distribution. The paper first constructs trade restrictiveness indexes for household consumption items and industries using both tariffs and non‐tariff barriers. The results indicate that Indian trade policy is regressive through the expenditure channel as it disproportionately raises the cost of consumption for poorer households, while it is progressive through the earnings channel. Based on the net welfare effects, the elimination of the current trade protection structure is estimated to reduce inequality. These results indicate that a trade policy that is progressive through the earnings channel may induce a price effect that is regressive through the expenditure channel.     

Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating

Postwar “managed-trade” policies feature low baseline tariffs combined with selective nontariff protection. This paper interprets managed trade as a rational strategy to undermine trade-liberalization agreements in the absence of credible external enforcement. Analyzing the Kennedy GATT Round, I explore the calculus that led the United States to undermine across-the-board tariff reductions selectively by introducing nontariff barriers in industries with rapidly rising import demand. I show empirically that nontariff barrier dynamics across 216 industries support a rational-cheating interpretation of managed-trade policy.     

美国碳关税政策对中美贸易的影响

基于环境保护和贸易保护的目的,美国提出了征收碳关税诉求。这将对中国对美国的商品出口产生什么样的影响?本文根据我国各行业的碳排放强度和出口贸易细分数据,分析了美国征收碳关税可能会对我国各行业出口贸易的影响,并提出,中国应该在多边贸易组织的框架下对美国将实行的碳关税政策进行限制约束,及时调整国内产业结构。     

The Moral Hazard Play: A Review of The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF

We estimate the influence of trade preferences granted by Argentina on the origin of its imports. We try to identify if changes in Argentina's trade policy toward a set of countries had a differential effect, depending on whether goods were already traded, or on the contrary, if tariff changes affected mostly imports of new goods. We distinguish between the effects of changing tariffs and changing trade preferences. The econometric evidence shows that the effect of changes in tariff preferences on the probability of Argentina importing from other Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) members has been rather small, with most of the effect being explained by changes in tariff rates levied on imports from these countries. This result is stronger in the case of imports from Brazil.     

Trade and Industry Policy

This article consists of a review of changes in trade and industry policy, along with discussions of the determinants of change and the major problem areas. Policy between 1965 and 1985 is summarised, and the growth of unemployment in the 1970s is suggested as a key determinant of change. Higher protection in certain industries, and moves to more quantitative methods ot protection can be related to unemployment, in Australia as in other countries. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that protection is likely to prove ineffective in reducing unemployment. The reliance on protection in particular cases is ascribed to a wish by governments to preserve specific jobs, not to increase overall employment. Policy can have a role in facilitating or restricting structural change which can arise from several sources, such as changing trade patterns and preferences. The devices of policy are considered briefly to determine whether they are likely to facilitate change or not. It is concluded that they often provide incentives to avoid change. The scale problem is considered, and it is suggested that the cost of protection could be high in industries subject to significant scale economies. Scale and adjustments are considered in the light of two industries, motor vehicles and whitegoods, and the role of industry plans is examined. The actuality of trade and industry policy often differs from announced intentions, and this ambiguity can give rise to uncertainty which itself has a cost.     

Protection with many sellers: An Application to Legislatures with Malapportionment

What effect, if any, does legislative malapportionment have on international trade protection? This paper argues that in malapportioned legislatures, such as the U.S. Senate, industries become over‐represented in a legislature if they are disproportionately located in small constituencies. As a result, industries that are disproportionately located in smaller constituencies are likely to receive greater protection from international trade. To argue this point theoretically, this paper develops a new model, combining legislative bargaining and a model of lobbying to study trade protection while allowing for a legislature with multiple legislators and differently sized constituencies. We then test the predictions of this new model using tariff votes from the U.S. Senate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a panel of tariffs and non‐tariff barriers to trade in the U.S. in the 1990s. Considerable support is found for the model's predictions. Industries concentrated in states where the population is low receive greater protection from imports.     

反倾销被诉贸易效应的实证分析与比较——基于1998-2008年动态面板数据模型的SYS-GMM估计

在整理全球反倾销案件的基础上,通过收集相关贸易数据,利用1998-2008年被诉反倾销案件为样本建立动态面板数据模型,实证分析了12个主要国家和地区被诉反倾销的贸易破坏效应和贸易转移效应,通过SYS-GMM估计进行回归估计得到稳健性结果。实证结果表明,反倾销措施对贸易额和出口市场份额的影响远大于关税措施的影响,成为多数国家限制进口、保护本国国内产业的主要贸易政策。反倾销对中国、日本、中国台湾和俄罗斯的负面影响较大。最后考察反倾销对产业竞争力的影响发现,反倾销申诉和反倾销措施对申诉方的产业竞争力有显著的提升作用,并且反倾销措施的影响远大于反倾销申诉的影响。     

Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality: Evidence from India

We evaluate empirically the impact of the dramatic 1991 trade liberalization in India on the industry wage structure. The empirical strategy uses variation in industry wage premiums and trade policy across industries and over time. In contrast to most earlier studies on developing countries, we find a strong, negative, and robust relationship between changes in trade policy and changes in industry wage premiums over time. The results are consistent with liberalization‐induced productivity increases at the firm level, which get passed on to industry wages. We also find that trade liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India. This is consistent with the magnitude of tariff reductions being relatively larger in sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.     

Protection and Liberalisation in Australia and Abroad

This article reviews changes in Australian protection policy between 1967 and 1995, particularly the political economy aspects. The story is quite complex, and until 1974 was unusual by international standards, with a sophisticated Australian tariff debate and the remarkable transparency role of the Industry Assistance Commission (IAC), and its predecessor, the Tariff Board. The role of Alf Rattigan, Chairman of the Tariff Board and later the IAC, is stressed. Liberalisation since 1988 has been drastic, so that most tariffs will be brought down to 5 per cent by the year 2000. All quotas were ended by 1993. This can be contrasted with very high protection levels in 1967 and quite high levels even in 1987. Substantial unilateral trade liberalisation normally requires exchange rate depreciation, and the floating of the Australian dollar made the tariff reductions possible. The motives for Australian trade liberalisation in the 1980s are compared with those for similar liberalisations in many developing countries.     

Preferential Liberalization,Antidumping, and Safeguards: Stumbling Block Evidence from MERCOSUR

There is not yet consensus in the trade agreements literature as to whether preferential liberalization leads to more or less multilateral liberalization. However, research thus far has focused mostly on tariff measures of import protection. We develop more comprehensive measures of trade policy that include the temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies of antidumping and safeguards; studies in other contexts have also shown how these policies can erode some of the trade liberalization gains that arise when examining tariffs alone. We examine the experiences of Argentina and Brazil during the formation of the MERCOSUR over 1990–2001, and we find that an exclusive focus on applied tariffs may lead to a mischaracterization of the relationship between preferential liberalization and liberalization toward non‐member countries. First, any “building block” evidence that arises by focusing on tariffs during the period in which MERCOSUR was only a free trade area can disappear once we also include changes in import protection that arise through TTBs. Furthermore, there is also evidence of a “stumbling block” effect of preferential tariff liberalization for the period in which MERCOSUR became a customs union, and this result tends to strengthen upon inclusion of TTBs. Finally, we also provide a first empirical examination of whether market power motives can help explain the patterns of changes to import protection that are observed in these settings.     

The magnification effect in global value chains

We examine the “magnification effect,” which demonstrates that as the number of separable production stages increases, trade increases dramatically as trade costs decline. We empirically investigate the existence of this magnification effect by estimating gravity-type equations for worldwide trade to obtain the tariff elasticity of trade per industry. We find that tariff elasticity is higher in industries with a greater degree of global value chain participation. These results are observed for both gross and value-added trade. Furthermore, we find that tariff elasticity is higher in intra-Asian trade, especially in machinery industries.     

The effect of the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian multilateral trade liberalization

In this paper show that the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) tariff preferences have triggered a decline in Canadian external tariffs, explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998. Next, we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the US firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in Canada; this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the US and Canada. Finally, we estimate the effect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in Canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity.     

Is Trade Liberalisation Pro-Poor in Pakistan? Evidence from Large-Scale Manufacturing

This article aims to analyse the impact of industry-level trade liberalisation (measured through industry-specific tariff rates) on poverty in Pakistan. Combining data for tariff rates with the Labour Force Survey of Pakistan, we use quantile regression analysis to estimate the impact of changes in tariff rates on workers’ wages (associated with the manufacturing sector of Pakistan) that are at different points of the income distribution. Our findings meaningfully signal that trade liberalisation helps to reduce poverty in the economy. Based on these results, this study provides policy recommendations to reap maximum benefits from trade liberalisation.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries

This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the "concertina rule" for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs but not moves towards uniformity and particularly not increases in low tariffs. I show that the basic principles of tariff reform are the same in unilateral, multilateral and customs union contexts. Finally, I suggest that the theory of strategic trade policy does not justify subsidies to high-technology industries.     

Protection and commercial policy: Experiments with a general equilibrium econometric model

This paper analyzes the incidence of commercial policy by simulating the effects of an import tariff in the context of a general equilibrium econometric model of the U.S. It is found that in the long run the tariff protection given to importables is mainly at the expense of exportables, rather than the nontraded goods sector. The simulations also provide the general equilibrium responses of a number of other variables to changes in commercial policy, which may be of interest from a policy perspective.     

International Duopoly, Tariff Policy and the Superiority of Free Trade

This paper addresses the effectiveness of tariff policy in the long-run production framework in which decisions must be made about plant size and the level of output to be produced by foreign duopolists competing with each other in the importing country's market. We consider two types of tariff regime, discriminatory and uniform, and show that the importing country's welfare is unambiguously higher in the uniform tariff case. We consider free trade in the same production framework and show that, as the long-run capacity decision becomes increasingly relevant relative to the short-run quantity decision, free trade dominates tariffs in welfare rankings.
JEL Classification Number: F1.