独立董事的政治关联与公司绩效

以2006年～2007年间我国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了我国上市公司中独立董事的政治关联是否具有业绩后果。研究发现,独立董事政治关联程度与企业以托宾Q值度量的业绩存在显著的正相关关系,该正相关关系在第一大股东为国有股的上市公司中表现尤为明显。该结果表明,我国上市公司独立董事的政治关联是一种有利于增加企业价值和提升企业业绩的至关重要的政治资源,对于第一大股东为国有股的上市公司,该政治资源的业绩后果更明显。     

独立董事的效用障碍问题研究

独立董事是指兼职董事，其具体职能是参加董事会议，为公司决策、业务控制提供建议和咨询及监督执行董事和管理层。独立董事制度起源于20世纪70年代的英美等国，现已被实践证明是改善公司治理结构行之有效的制度，世界上许多国家建立了比较完善的独立董事制度。设立独立董事制度的目的是为了解     

突围叠床架屋的困境 审计委员会能否替代监事会？

<正>独立董事与监事、监事会制度的最大区别,可能在于独立董事更具“外部属性”,其权力来源包括但不限于公司内部权力架构安排,而监事、监事会制度依然是公司财产权的派生物。凡出现内部监督乱象的公司里,大多都存在对独立董事、监事角色认识不足的问题     

设立独立董事的效果分析--来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查

针对我国设立独立董事制度的种种疑难，基于国内外理论和实证研究设立独立董事效果面临的各种问题．相关文献资料得到不同的甚至是相互矛盾冲突的结论，本文通过问卷调查从另一角度来审视这些问题。通过对独立董事设立的效果、独立董事最担心的风险、独立董事发挥作用的有效条件、独立董事的薪酬待遇、影响独立董事发挥作用和导致独立董事辞职等重要因素的问卷调查和分析，有助于从内生和外生因素的角度来理解报酬、独立性、成本、风险、激励机制和外部环境因素对独立董事作用与效果的影响。     

公司监督机制冲突与立法模式选择

一、独立董事制度在国外的实践董事分内部董事与外部董事，独立董事是独立的外部董事，也就是从公司外部选任的与公司成员或公司业务不发生能影响独立判断的关系的外部董事。 独立董事制度起源于美国，从概念的提出到制度的成熟已经经历了近半个世纪的时间，该制度是股东大会中心主义向董事会中心主义转变过程中的产物。由于美国公司股权的高度分散，加上信息的不对称性，使大量的中小投资者对公司的决策缺乏影响力，对公司也缺乏有效的监督，股东大会的权力日渐式微。此时公司高层管理人员和内部董事对董事会提名产生影响，     

非执行董事当更有作为

正非执董无论是股东内部的兼职董事、专职董事或股东外部聘请的独立董事,对公司及其业务的认识可能会比执董少,但这绝非不利因素,非执董拥有的相关经验及其相同或近似行业的经验将可与执行董事形成互补非执行董事是不在公司管理层担任职务的董事,也称为非常务董事,作为董事会成员之一,非执董对执行董事起着监督、检查和平衡的作用。非执董一般包括在股东职能部门任职的兼职董事、股东委派的不在公司担任除董事以外其他     

董事文摘

所有董事会都应当努力加强其独立性。董事会的主体应由独立董事构成，他们与公司不存在任何有可能阻碍他们调查和质询管理层的商业或个人关系。这些独立董事应当在委员会工作中扮演主要角色。至少应当任命一名资深（或权威）的非执行董事。一种更为极端的解决办法是任命一位非执行董事长，这种做法在美国以外的地区颇受欢迎。     

慌不择路还是风险规避：康美事件冲击下的独立董事辞职信号研究

本文以2021年11月12日康美药业证券虚假陈述责任纠纷一审案为切入点，考察了康美事件冲击下独立董事辞职行为的信号传递。研究发现：康美诉讼判决结果所引发的A股独立董事“辞职潮”主要表现为一种“慌不择路”的行为，而非基于“风险规避”动机做出的决策；市场则是按照独立董事辞职所折射的负面信号而非针对公司实际运营情况做出的负面反应，这也导致部分公司不得不重新聘请独立性更高或声誉更高的独立董事来“自证清白”；只有当企业存在内部董事主动辞职时，独立董事的辞职才更可能是公司经营危机前置的信号。进一步检验发现，独立董事的选择性辞职行为更多是基于与公司的利益绑定深度，而非公司实际风险大小。异质性分析表明，当辞职公告进行捆绑信息披露或披露的辞职原因为工作原因时，能缓解负面的市场反应；而声誉越高、越具有行业专长的独立董事辞职则会造成越负面的市场反应。本文提供了一个在中国特色监管背景下独立董事辞职前因后果的理论分析框架，并为如何进一步完善独立董事的权责界定提供了一定的经验证据。     

为什么要当独立董事

大约十几年前，我读到了西洋学者的一篇研究论文，他用“超额收益法”来估算和讨论独立董事辞职是否对公司和市场形成影响，有所触动。于是，我就写了个研究框架，让一位研究生就中国的情况进行尝试性的类似研究。几个月过去了，得出的研究结论在统计意义上相当不明显。在中国，独立董事辞职，股民在市场上根本不以为意，股票价格没有任何在统计上的显著性反应。     

第四届(2007)中国上市公司董事会“金圆桌奖”

评价指标1.董事会结构指标,反映董事会规模,机构设置和独立董事比重等情况。2.董事会行为指标,反映董事会活动、独立董事勤勉尽职、信息披露情况     

独立董事能否防范上市公司合谋：一项基于上市公司的经验证据

独立董事能否防范上市公司合谋,一直是一个有争议的话题。文章通过对我国78家受证监会公开处罚的制造业上市公司的实证分析,发现：独立董事获得报酬不能够抑制上市公司的合谋行为;独立董事人数与上市公司合谋行为之间没有明显的差异;独立董事的学历与上市公司合谋行为之间存在着正相关关系。为了抑制上市公司的合谋行为,保持其独立性,建议：禁止独立董事从上市公司那里获得报酬;在聘请专业人才作为独立董事方面,应该聘请一些既有专业技能又有时间保证的专业人才,并不是学历越高越好。     

Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy?

This paper examines whether adopting OECD-prescribed corporate governance principles can solve the major corporate governance problem in an emerging economy—controlling-shareholder expropriation. We argue that “good governance practices” in OECD countries (e.g., an active board of directors, separation of chairperson and the CEO, significant presence of outside directors, and a two-tier board) cannot mitigate the negative effect of controlling-shareholder expropriation on corporate performance for two main reasons. First, most good governance practices are mainly designed to resolve conflicts between shareholders and the management but not conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Second, board directors are typically not independent to controlling shareholders, and supervisory directors often have low status and weak power in a firm. Using a panel of over 1,100 Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2003, we find supportive evidence for our arguments. We discuss the implication of our study for public policy and strategies of investors.     

Under the microscope: An experimental look at board transparency and director monitoring behavior

Research Summary: It is well known in corporate governance scholarship that independent directors differ in the vigilance with which they monitor corporate insiders. This difference depends largely on whether independent directors are concerned more with their public reputation or with their prospects in the director labor market. The explanation for this difference depends on an assumption of information asymmetry, however. In the present study, we relax the assumption of information asymmetry to examine how boardroom transparency affects directors’ monitoring behavior. Using a randomized experimental study of actual independent directors, we find that boardroom transparency amplifies the effect of directors’ inclinations toward either active or passive monitoring, with directors inclined toward vigilant monitoring becoming even more vigilant, and directors inclined toward passive monitoring becoming even more passive. Managerial Summary: In most advanced economies, the board's internal decision processes are either undisclosed or disclosed only to a very limited extent. It remains unknown, then, whether directors would behave differently if their behaviors were made public. We find that when their actions are disclosed to the public, directors concerned with their public reputations become more vigilant, whereas those concerned with their prospects for additional board seats become more passive in monitoring corporate insiders. Whereas regulatory bodies and corporate governance watchdogs have recently advocated for greater disclosure of the boardroom decision‐making process, our study suggests that such mandatory disclosure requirements can exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the problem of passive director monitoring.     

分类表决让独立董事真正维护中小股东的利益

我国独立董事制度存在的主要问题是独立董事受大股东的控制,没有主动监督大股东及其代理人的动力。解决这一问题的关键是落实中小股东的监督权。实行股权分类表决制度,取消大股东对独立董事有关事项的表决权,将该表决权完全交给中小股东,可以保证独立董事脱离大股东的控制,回归到中小股东的利益立场。文章最后还构建了一个完善独立董事制度后的新公司治理结构。     

董事会结构与公司绩效关系的实证研究——以纺织服装业上市公司为例

从董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事长与CEO两职合一等董事会结构特征入手,选取2009-2011年我国纺织服装业上市公司统计年报数据为样本,结合上市公司财务评价指标体系和证监会对业绩评价的规定,采用spss19.0统计学软件,建立回归模型,对董事会的结构特征与公司绩效关系进行回归分析,以期在实证结果基础上,对我国上市公司董事会结构等方面提出合理化建议,不断优化企业经营业绩。     

Managing foreign R&D laboratories in China

This paper focuses on the management of R&D units established by foreign companies in China, investigating R&D missions, site build-up, integration with the parent organization, and overall performance measurement. The research is based on 37 qualitative expert interviews with local R&D directors and managers conducted between 2001 and 2004, using a semi-structured research questionnaire, and semi-quantitative research done on 199 foreign R&D labs in China. Cultural influences on R&D management, location advantages, expatriate involvement, and organizational evolution of local laboratories are discussed. We find that foreign R&D laboratories in China are not only important vehicles for local market development but also increasingly important sources of locally developed technology.     

Independent directors' dissent on boards: Evidence from listed companies in China

Research summary: Although opinion conformity is believed to be commonly used by corporate elites to invoke reciprocity, it is hard to study in the context of corporate boards since boards are typically “black boxes.” Focusing on publicly traded companies in China, where disclosure of dissent is mandated, we show that dissent is associated with a breakdown of the social exchange relationship within boards. Specifically, dissent is more likely to occur when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board, or when the board “game” is reaching its last round, defined as a 60‐day window before departure of the board chair or the director herself. Our findings lend considerable support to conceptualization of boards as a social exchange device. Managerial summary: With a novel dataset from China we ask the question of whether the social norm of reciprocity compromises independent directors' decisions. Our results lend considerable support to the hypothesis that independent directors would generally defer to top management as they feel indebted for being offered a director position and in exchange independent directors provide support. We identified two instances in which independent directors are more likely to dissent due to a breakdown of social exchange relationships: (1) when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board, and (2) when the board “game” was reaching its last round, that is, either the board chair or the director herself is leaving the board. © 2015 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

独立董事能够勤勉和诚信地进行监督吗——独立董事行为决策模型的构建

本文关注的问题是独立董事在监督过程中,其勤勉性和公正性受到哪些因素的影响。通过建立个体行为决策模型,我们得出了以下结论:四项因素会对独立董事监督的效果产生影响。其中,来自独立董事个人方面的因素有两项:独立董事与控股股东之间的私人关系,会对监督的诚信度与勤勉度都产生负向影响;独立董事付出努力的机会成本,会对监督的勤勉度产生负向影响。来自外部环境的因素有两项:外部的监管力度能够同时促进独立董事监督的诚信度和勤勉度;控股股东对董事会的信息隐瞒会降低独立董事的勤勉度。基于以上结论,我们对独立董事制度的进一步完善与改进提出了相应的建议。     

CEO narcissism and myopic management

The current research, leveraging the upper echelons' theory, examines the association between CEO narcissism and firms' myopic management. The study further examines the underlying mediating effect of market orientation in this linkage. Finally, the study examines the moderating effect of the output-oriented board of directors on the indirect effect of CEO narcissism on myopic management, i.e., a moderated-mediation analysis. Data on a sample of 210 Indian firms from 2009 to 2016 suggest that CEO narcissism positively influences the firm's myopic management. Furthermore, market orientation partially mediates the influence of CEO narcissism on myopic management, such that CEO narcissism lowers market orientation. The lesser the market orientation more is myopic management. However, as the output orientation of the board of directors increases, the indirect positive effect of narcissism on myopic management is decreased. Our study shines a light on the antecedents of myopic management and its role as a mediator under the contingency effect of demographics of the board of directors, i.e., the marketing board of directors.