The value of CEOs' supply chain experience: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Acquirer CEOs with experience in the target's industry supply chain (‘supply chain CEOs’) are associated with wealth effects of first-order importance: they earn 1.5% higher merger announcement returns. Conversely, their targets get a lower share of the merger gains. Acquisitions by supply chain CEOs also exhibit higher synergies, better post-deal accounting performance, and less goodwill written off. These findings withstand checks for endogeneity, anticipation bias, and numerous robustness tests. In takeovers by supply chain CEOs, superior acquirer performance stems from both value creation and rents negotiated away from target shareholders.     

Convergent synergies in the global market for corporate control

We investigate the informational role of the takeover premium as a forward looking price to expected synergies in the global market for corporate control. We find that premiums paid in the global market for corporate control are clustered in waves and driven to some extent by the US premium. International takeover premiums have become more responsive to US premiums as the globalization process evolved over time. Short-run divergent dynamics due to idiosyncratic or country-specific factors have become less severe, which suggests that expected synergies have become increasingly integrated in the global market for corporate control. Furthermore, we find that the region’s takeover premiums typically become more responsive to US takeover premiums when US economic conditions are relatively weak, when the US monetary policy is restrictive, when US credit risk is high, and when the region’s corporate governance (as measured by legal system quality and accounting quality) is high.     

CLUSTERED SYNERGIES IN THE TAKEOVER MARKET

In a competitive market for takeover bids, the takeover premium serves as an effective proxy for the expected synergy. We find that the expected synergy is primarily related to the premiums paid in other recent takeovers in the same industry. This relation is even stronger when considering previous takeovers (especially over the previous three‐month horizon) in the same industry that have the same payment method (cash versus stock) or form of takeover (tender offer versus merger). More of the variation in expected synergies among takeovers can be explained by the premiums derived from recent takeovers in the same industry than by all bidder‐ and target‐specific characteristics combined. We also find that the bidder valuation effects are inversely related to the premium paid for targets, implying that abnormally high premiums may reflect overpayment rather than abnormally high synergies.     

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.     

Risk aversion, intertemporal substitution, and the aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship

We analyze the role of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of investment and savings. Our main finding is that risk aversion cannot by itself explain a negative relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty, as the effect of increased uncertainty on investment also depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In particular, the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty is positive even if agents are very risk averse, as long as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low. A negative investment-uncertainty relationship requires that the relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are both relatively high or both relatively low. We also show that the implications of our model are consistent with the available empirical evidence.     

National culture and corporate debt maturity

We investigate the influence of national culture on corporate debt maturity choice. Based on the framework of Williamson, we argue that culture located in social embeddedness level can shape contracting environments by serving as an informal constraint that affects human actors’ incentives and choices in market exchange. We therefore expect national culture to be related to debt maturity structure after controlling for legal, political, financial, and economic institutions. Using Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, power distance, and masculinity) as proxies for culture, and using a sample of 114,723 firm-years from 40 countries over the 1991-2006 period, we find robust evidence that firms located in countries with high uncertainty avoidance, high collectivism, high power distance, and high masculinity tend to use more short-term debt. We interpret our results as consistent with the view that national culture helps explain cross-country variations in the maturity structure of corporate debt.     

Wealth and Executive Compensation

Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives. Since high wealth (excluding own‐firm holdings) implies low absolute risk aversion, this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation. To examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power, I use lagged wealth (typically measured before the CEO was hired), and the results remain for one of two incentive measures. Also, the wealth–incentive result is not stronger for CEOs likely to face limited owner oversight. Finally, wealth is unrelated to pay levels, and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill.     

Nonlinearly weighted convex risk measure and its application

We propose a new class of risk measures which satisfy convexity and monotonicity, two well-accepted axioms a reasonable and realistic risk measure should satisfy. Through a nonlinear weight function, the new measure can flexibly reflect the investor’s degree of risk aversion, and can control the fat-tail phenomenon of the loss distribution. A realistic portfolio selection model with typical market frictions taken into account is established based on the new measure. Real data from the Chinese stock markets and American stock markets are used for empirical comparison of the new risk measure with the expected shortfall risk measure. The in-sample and out-of-sample empirical results show that the new risk measure and the corresponding portfolio selection model can not only reflect the investor’s risk-averse attitude and the impact of different trading constraints, but can find robust optimal portfolios, which are superior to the corresponding optimal portfolios obtained under the expected shortfall risk measure.     

Explaining the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle using Stochastic Discount Factors

I use Stochastic Discount Factors to examine the sources of the idiosyncratic volatility premium. I find that non-zero risk aversion and firms’ non-systematic coskewness determine the premium on idiosyncratic volatility risk. The firm’s non-systematic coskewness measures the comovement of the asset’s volatility with the market return. When I control for the non-systematic coskewness factor, I find no significant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock expected returns. My results are robust across different sample periods and firm characteristics.     

Can ambiguity aversion solve the equity premium puzzle? Survey evidence from international data

Ambiguity aversion has been suggested as a potential explanation for the equity premium puzzle in recent theoretical models. To test this hypothesis, we measure the amount of ambiguity aversion in a large-scale international survey. A comparison to the average equity premia in these countries demonstrates that ambiguity aversion does, indeed, have a significant influence on the amount of equity risk premium, even when controlling for macroeconomic parameters. Finally, we connect differences in ambiguity aversion to differences in uncertainty avoidance, one of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.     

Takeover premiums and the perception of auditor independence and reputation

This study investigates if there is a positive association between takeover premiums and the bidder’s perception of target firm auditor reputation and independence. Using auditor size as a proxy for auditor reputation, the results indicate that in hostile takeovers target shareholders receive a higher takeover premium when a Big 4 auditor audits the target firm prior to the takeover. This result is only significant, however, in the period prior to the highly publicised audit failures. The impact of perceived auditor independence on takeover premiums is studied using the levels and size of non-audit service (NAS) fees provided by the target firm auditor. Using three proxies for auditor independence, the results show no association between perceived auditor independence and takeover premiums. This finding is robust to partitioning the sample by auditor size, takeover hostility and splitting the sample into takeovers pre- and post- the corporate scandals that occurred in 2002.     

Do More Risk-Averse Investors Have Lower Net Worth and Income?

This study examines the relationship between attitude toward risk and both net worth and income. The data are obtained from a financial diary kept by a national, scientifically selected sample of more than 3000 households. Results show that both net worth and income are negatively related to risk aversion.     

Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay

We calibrate the standard principal–agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U.S. CEOs. We show that this model predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies; many would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies. These contracts would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility to CEOs. We conclude that the standard principal–agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts.     

CEO cultural background and corporate cash holdings

This paper examines whether the cultural background of chief executive officers (CEOs) affects corporate cash holdings. Using UK data from 2000 to 2018, we find that CEOs with a cultural background that emphasises power distance and uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with corporate cash holdings, while CEOs with a cultural background that emphasises masculinity are negatively associated with corporate cash holdings. Our results are robust to various robustness tests. Further analyses show that the impact is more pronounced when power is concentrated among top executives, when the CEOs have a degree of discretion in pursuing their own goals, and when information asymmetry is high.     

Uncertainty avoidance,loss aversion and stock market participation

Stock market participation differs a lot across countries. Cultural dimensions could be a potential factor for that. We show that indeed uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is linked to rates of stock market participation across countries. We can show even more that uncertainty avoidance has an indirect effect through loss aversion on stock market participation. The country level effects are confirmed on the individual level using data from a recent large-scale international survey, but on individual level there is also a strong effect of UAI on stock market participation after controlling for loss aversion. These results are robust after controlling for ambiguity aversion, and economic and demographic variables. Finally, we find that UAI is related to negative attitudes about stock markets in general.     

Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk

We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.     

The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale

This paper analyzes the timing of mergers motivated by economies of scale. We show that firms have an incentive to merge in periods of economic expansion. Relaxing the assumption that firms are price takers, we find that market power strengthens the firms’ incentive to merge and speeds up merger activity. Finally, comparing mergers with hostile takeovers we show that the way merger synergies are divided not only influences the acquirer's and the acquiree's returns from merging, but also the timing of the restructuring.     

CEOs’ experience of the Great Chinese Famine and accounting conservatism

This study investigates how a CEO's early-life experience of the Great Chinese Famine affects corporate accounting conservatism. We find that companies whose CEOs had experienced famines in early life adopted more conservative accounting policies. This famine experience effect is more pronounced in high uncertainty environments proxied by non-SOEs, politician turnovers and the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Additional tests indicate that CEOs with famine experience tend to support conservative accounting practices for contingencies and accelerate the recognition of asset impairments in negative events. Overall, consistent with imprinting theory, our results highlight the role of early-life traumatic experiences in shaping CEOs’ risk preferences and financial reporting policies.     

Gravity and culture in foreign portfolio investment

Using panel regression estimates from the IMF’s CPIS survey of foreign debt and equity portfolios across 174 originating and 50 destination countries from 2001 to 2007, we clarify the role of culture and extend the set of cultural variables that have been investigated in gravity models of foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Incorporating Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of individualism, masculinity, power distance and uncertainty avoidance, we show how cultural traits in both originating and destination countries, as well as the cultural distances that separate them, interact with geographic distance and other gravity variables to determine global FPI patterns. We find hitherto unreported effects and show that while gravity always deters FPI, aspects of culture and cultural distance can offset this by supporting FPI.     

Derivative Pricing with Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market

We derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity risk, derivatives, and short‐selling due to hedging of nontraded risk. We show that illiquid assets can have lower expected returns if the short‐sellers have more wealth, lower risk aversion, or shorter horizon. The pricing of liquidity risk is different for derivatives than for positive‐net‐supply assets, and depends on investors' net nontraded risk exposure. We estimate this model for the credit default swap market. We find strong evidence for an expected liquidity premium earned by the credit protection seller. The effect of liquidity risk is significant but economically small.