The behavior of consumer loan rates during the 1990 credit slowdown

This study re-examines the 1990 credit slowdown by investigating the loan pricing behavior of commercial banks. We find strong evidence that large, undercapitalized banks contributed to the credit slowdown by charging consumers a higher-than-average loan rate relative to better-capitalized institutions. This disparity in lending exists even after accounting for bank funding costs. Thus, we argue that there was a lending slowdown that occurred among large, undercapitalized banks. The reluctance to lend among undercapitalized banks is at least suggestive of behavior that is consistent with a credit crunch.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Contagion risk in the Australian banking and property sectors

The Australian banking system emerged from the global crisis virtually unhurt, with most banks still profitable, adequately capitalized, and with AA credit ratings. Are there any risks or vulnerabilities in this success story? This paper analyzes Australia’s systemic banking risk and attempts to determine if this risk increased with the recent global crisis and whether this risk is related to the downturn experienced in the real estate market. We use extreme value theory to measure banks’ and property firms’ univariate Value at Risk, as well as multivariate intra-sector and inter-sector contagion risks. Of the 13 sectors analyzed, we find that the property sector exhibits the highest level of extremal dependence with the banking sector. The credit crisis significantly increased the probability of a bank or property firm crashing. Moreover, contagion risks significantly increased not only within the banking and property sectors, but also between those sectors.     

Information Contagion and Bank Herding

We show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit-maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks. When bank loan returns have a common systematic factor, the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor. The increase in a bank's cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality (in addition to the systematic risk factor). Hence, banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. Competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives.     

Sovereign Credit Risk,Banks' Government Support,and Bank Stock Returns around the World

We explore the joint effect of expected government support to banks and changes in sovereign credit ratings on bank stock returns using data for banks in 37 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments. This result is stronger for banks in advanced economies where governments are better positioned to provide that support. Our results suggest that stock market investors perceive sovereigns and domestic banks as markedly interconnected, partly through government guarantees.     

Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.     

嵌入投资银行后的银行危机传导模型

基于Sujit模型,通过在支付清算系统内构建嵌入投资银行的危机传导模型,同时考虑中央银行的两种政策对防范少数银行危机蔓延至系统危机的作用,结果发现,少数银行引发系统危机的主要原因在于危机银行影响了与其有着支付清算关系的债权银行的收益和它们的预期信心,中央银行政策对控制危机传导是有效的.     

On the Contagion Effect in the US Banking Sector

By using the spatial econometrics methodology, this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the US banking sector during 2001 to 2012. In addition, the contagion signals up to the Subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks. Our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system. However, we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations.     

Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets

We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected.     

Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: Maximum entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns

Interbank markets allow banks to cope with specific liquidity shocks. At the same time, they may represent a channel for contagion as a bank default may spread to other banks through interbank linkages. This paper analyses how contagion propagates within the Italian interbank market using a unique data set including actual bilateral exposures. Based on the availability of information on actual bilateral exposures for all Italian banks, the results obtained by assuming the maximum entropy are compared with those reflecting the observed structure of interbank claims. The comparison indicates that, under certain circumstances, depending on the structure of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates of interbank exposures and banks’ capitalisation, the maximum entropy approach overrates the scope for contagion.     

The Evolution Of Bank Resolution Policies In Japan: Evidence From Market Equity Values

We examine the evidence in equity markets concerning bank regulatory policies in Japan from 1995 to 1999. Our results support the presence of information‐based contagion in Japanese equity markets. When the failure of a bank of certain regulatory status was announced, it adversely affected excess returns on banks with equal or lower levels of regulatory protection. Market participants therefore initially behaved as if only second regional and smaller banks would be allowed to fail. As the situation deteriorated, however, banks that traditionally enjoyed greater regulatory protection were also perceived to lose their too‐big‐to‐fail status.     

Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and the revised Basel Accord

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.     

Correlation expansions for CDO pricing

This paper develops numerical approximations for pricing collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other portfolio credit derivatives in the multifactor Normal Copula model. A key aspect of pricing portfolio credit derivatives is capturing dependence between the defaults of the elements of the portfolio. But, compared with an independent-obligor model, pricing in a model with correlated defaults is more challenging. Our approach strikes a balance by reducing the problem of pricing in a model with correlated defaults to calculations involving only independent defaults. We develop approximations based on power series expansions in a parameter that scales the underlying correlations. These expansions express a CDO tranche price in a multifactor model as a series of prices in independent-obligor models, which are easy to compute. The approach builds on a classical approximation for multivariate Gaussian probabilities; we introduce an alternative representation that greatly reduces the number of terms required to evaluate the coefficients in the expansion. We also apply this method to the underlying problem of computing joint probabilities of multivariate normal random variables for which the correlation matrix has a factor structure.     

The formation of financial networks

Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite various benefits, linkages between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this article, I investigate whether banks can commit ex ante to mutually insure each other, when there is contagion risk in the financial system. I model banks' decisions to share this risk through bilateral agreements. A financial network that allows losses to be shared among various counterparties arises endogenously. I characterize the probability of systemic risk, defined as the event that contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing, in equilibrium interbank networks. I show that there exist equilibria in which contagion does not occur.     

Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation

Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms and very little during recessions. We propose a simple explanation for this phenomenon. We show that instead of dampening productivity shocks, the banking sector tends to exacerbate them, leading to excessive fluctuations of bank credit, output, and asset prices. Our explanation relies on three ingredients that are characteristic of modern banks’ activities: moral hazard, high exposure to aggregate shocks, and the ease with which capital can be reallocated to its most productive use. At the competitive equilibrium, banks offer privately optimal contracts to their investors, but these contracts are not socially optimal: banks reallocate capital excessively upon aggregate shocks. This is because banks do not internalize the impact of their decisions on asset prices. We examine the efficacy of possible policy responses to these properties of credit markets, and derive a rationale for macroprudential regulation in the spirit of a Net Stable Funding Ratio.     

Credit derivatives and bank credit supply

Credit derivatives are the latest in a series of innovations that have had a significant impact on credit markets. Using a micro data set of individual corporate loans, this paper explores whether use of credit derivatives is associated with an increase in bank credit supply. We find only limited evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit. The strongest effect is for large term loans—newly negotiated loan extensions to large corporate borrowers, with a largely negative impact on (previously negotiated) commitment lending. Even for large term borrowers, increases in the volume of credit are offset by higher spreads. These findings suggest that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow, accruing mainly to large firms that are likely to be “named credits” in these transactions. Finally, use of credit derivatives appears to be complementary to other forms of hedging by banks, though the banks most active in hedging appear to charge more for additional amounts of credit.     

银行信贷资产证券化信用风险度量及传染研究——基于修正KMV模型和MST算法的实证

精准科学地度量和描述信用风险及传染机制有利于银行信贷资产证券化的高效健康发展和货币市场系统性风险的防范.运用修正KMV模型测度银行信贷资产证券化产品在不同时期的信用风险,并采用最小生成树(MST)算法考察银行间信用风险的传染机制.结果显示:政策性银行和大型商业银行发行的产品在各个时期信用风险均处于较低水平;股份制银行、城商行和农商行发行的产品违约率前期略高于前两类银行,但后期明显下降;后三类银行位于银行股票收益率网络的中心位置,具有传递信息和维系网络稳定的重要作用.     

Incentives to innovate and financial crises

In this paper I develop a model of a competitive financial system with unrestricted but costly entry and an endogenously determined number of competing financial institutions (“banks” for short). Banks can make standard loans on which plentiful historical data are available and unanimous agreement exists on default probabilities. Or banks can innovate and make new loans on which limited historical data are available, leading to possible disagreement over default probabilities. In equilibrium, banks make zero profits on standard loans and positive profits on innovative loans, which engenders innovation incentives for banks. But innovation brings with it the risk that investors could disagree with the bank that the loan is worthy of continued funding and hence could withdraw funding at an interim stage, precipitating a financial crisis. The degree of innovation in the financial system is determined by this trade-off. Welfare implications of financial innovation and mechanisms to reduce the probability of crises are discussed.     

信用违约风险传染建模

在信用组合中,企业的违约是相互随机依赖的。除了来自宏观经济因素的影响,即因果传染;还有一种影响来自于企业间的直接相互关系,我们称其为信用违约传染。在目前,席卷全球的次贷风暴,就是一个信用风险传染的实例。到目前为止,人们尝试了从不同角度为违约传染建模,特别是从简约模型角度出发。本文从结构模型角度出发,为信用违约传染建模。并在此模型基础上,分析其对信用衍生品定价的影响。     

信用衍生品在我国商业银行信用风险管理中的应用

我国商业银行针对其面临最重要的风险之一的信用风险采取的信用风险管理方式长期以传统模式为主,这种方式较为被动,缺少积极性及动态有效性。该种方式的缺陷在经济全球化的形势下显得更为严峻,而信用衍生品作为能够有效转移信用风险的创新产品,很有须要将其引进到信用风险管理中。在学习与借鉴前人关于信用衍生品在银行信用风险管理应用的经验上,运用了实证分析方法,对银行信用资产质量与信用衍生品交易量的关系作出了研究,得出了信用衍生品在一定程度上对于降低或转移商业银行信用风险产生了作用,进而保证了信用资产质量的结论,结合了信用衍生品在我国实际的发展现状与条件,提出了该产品在我国商业银行信用风险管理中运用的建议。