Mutual Fund Performance: Measurement and Evidence1

The paper provides a critical review of empirical findings on the performance of mutual funds, mainly for the US and UK. Ex‐post, there are around 0‐5% of top performing UK and US equity mutual funds with truly positive‐alpha performance (after fees) and around 20% of funds that have truly poor alpha performance, with about 75% of active funds which are effectively zero‐alpha funds. Key drivers of relative performance are, load fees, expenses and turnover. There is little evidence of successful market timing. Evidence suggests past winner funds persist, when rebalancing is frequent (i.e., less than one year) and when using sophisticated sorting rules (e.g., Bayesian approaches) ‐ but transactions costs (load and advisory fees) imply that economic gains to investors from winner funds may be marginal. The US evidence clearly supports the view that past loser funds remain losers. Broadly speaking results for bond mutual funds are similar to those for equity funds. Sensible advice for most investors would be to hold low cost index funds and avoid holding past ‘active’ loser funds. Only sophisticated investors should pursue an active ex‐ante investment strategy of trying to pick winners ‐ and then with much caution.     

Equity risk versus retirement adequacy: asset allocation solutions for KiwiSaver

New Zealand's KiwiSaver superannuation system operates with a conservatively low asset allocation towards equity investments. Evidence suggests ‘conservative’ portfolios are riskier than portfolios holding more growth assets when considering shortfall risk. This study employs stochastic simulation to determine the optimal asset allocation to improve the balance of probabilities for retirement adequacy. The findings show that KiwiSaver default funds are excessively conservative, preventing investors from reaching their retirement goals. Increasing the asset allocation to equities across the range of available KiwiSaver funds is the only solution to significantly improve retirement adequacy in New Zealand given the low contribution rates observed.     

Inexperienced investors and bubbles

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers’ investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers’ actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.     

Asset allocation and age effects in retirement savings choices

We examine the asset allocation decisions of members of three large Australian retirement savings funds. Superannuation Guarantee legislation in 1992 made Australian employees compulsory investors by requiring employers to contribute a fixed proportion of earnings to a superannuation fund on behalf of employees. A majority of these employees can choose an investment strategy for these contributions. We examine how actual investment strategy and asset allocation choices of members change with age in view of the conventional wisdom that individuals allocate less to risky assets as they age and investments theory which provides conflicting advice on the issue.     

ETF Premiums and Liquidity Segmentation

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) provide a means for investors to access assets indirectly that may be accessible at a high cost otherwise. I show that liquidity segmentation can explain the tendency for ETFs to trade at a premium to net asset value (NAV) as well as the life‐cycle pattern in premiums. ETFs with larger NAV tracking error standard deviations (TESDs) tend to trade at higher premiums and the liquidity benefits offered by foreign ETFs and fixed income ETFs are revealed to be the most valuable to investors. Further tests validate that TESD has the desirable properties of a liquidity segmentation measure.     

The price of skill: Performance evaluation by households

Skilled investors make money off uninformed investors. By acting as intermediaries, they provide a hedge to the uninformed investors themselves. I present a model in which households have imperfect information about expected returns. Non-traded income shocks lead them to rebalance, sometimes at the wrong time. Active funds hedge this risk by trading on superior information. In equilibrium, they pay off when non-traded income disappoints, earning a premium that makes them appear to underperform index funds after fees. Empirical results using aggregate fund flows support the model. A corresponding asset pricing test can account for the apparent underperformance of active funds.     

Venture capital funds: Flow-performance relationship and performance persistence

This paper finds that venture capital funds that are expected to be backed by more skilled investors show no performance persistence but a significant flow-performance relationship. In contrast, funds that are expected to be backed by less skilled investors show performance predictability and have a non-significant flow-performance relationship. These results suggest that only skilled investors use all available information to adjust their capital allocation and, as a result, eliminate performance predictability as argued theoretically by Berk and Green (2004). Results also show that Kaplan and Schoar (2005) overstate the persistence in fund performance by not using an ex ante measure of the performance of earlier funds. Whether or not an ex ante measure is used, however, the persistence is largely due to unsophisticated investors. When investors are sophisticated, the performance of earlier funds, sequence and fund size do not help predict the performance of the focal fund.     

Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

Supply uncertainty of the bond investor base and the leverage of the firm

We examine the effect of the bond capital supply uncertainty of institutional investors (e.g., mutual bond funds and insurance companies) on the leverage of the firm using a novel data set. Our main finding is that the supply uncertainty of the firm's bond investor base — measured as (i) the average portfolio turnover, or (ii) the average flow volatility of investors holding the firm's bonds, or (iii) the prevalence of mutual funds among the firm's bondholders as opposed to insurance companies — has a negative and significant effect on the leverage of the firm. The supply uncertainty of the firm's bond investor base also has a negative and significant effect on the firm's probability of issuing bonds, and a positive and significant effect on the firm's probability of issuing equity and borrowing from banks. We take a multi-pronged approach to address potential endogeneity issues, including use of geography-based instruments and firm fixed effects, subsample analyses, and a placebo test. Our results highlight the fragility of access to the bond market for companies that depend on mutual funds with high turnover/ flow volatility as primary bond investors.     

How loss averse are investors in financial markets?

We investigate loss aversion in financial markets using a typical asset allocation problem. Our theoretical and empirical results show that investors in financial markets are more loss averse than assumed in the literature. Moreover, loss aversion changes depending on market conditions; investors become far more loss averse during bull markets than during bear markets, indicating their more profound disutility for losses when others enjoy gains. Contrary to most previous results, we find that investors are more sensitive to changes in losses than changes in gains.     

The unintended consequences of the zero lower bound policy

We study the impact of the zero lower bound interest rate policy on the industrial organization of the U.S. money fund industry. We find that in response to policies that maintain low interest rates, money funds: change their product offerings by investing in riskier asset classes; are more likely to exit the market; and reduce the fees they charge their investors. The consequence of fund closures resulting from interest rate policy is the relocation of resources in affected fund families and in the asset management industry in general, as well as decline in capital of issuers borrowing from money funds.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Utilitarianism and fairness in portfolio positioning

The paper introduces the theory of optimal positioning of financial products. It is illustrated in the context of long-term intertemporal portfolio allocation and can be applied for example to asset allocation funds. We embed this problem in location theory: the portfolio is optimized within the investors’risk aversion dimension. For the CRRA utility functions, we compute explicitly the distance functions. For the first (utilitarian criterion), the average utility of the investors is maximized. For the second one (fairness criterion), the choice of portfolio is optimized so that the average monetary loss due to the lack of customization is minimized. Given the distribution of investors’ risk aversion, we provide a solution method and an algorithm to optimally position standardized portfolio along one of these two criteria.     

Active fund management: Global asset allocation funds

We examine the value of active fund management of global asset allocation funds. We use unique daily data and a modified Sharpe's [Sharpe, W., 1992. Asset allocation: management style and performance measurement. Journal of Portfolio Management 18, 7–19] Return-Based Style Analysis method to create a three-index model. We introduce an alternative method derived from Sharpe to calculate attribution returns that measure active fund management performance. Our results suggest that a sample of global asset allocation funds add value for investors. To determine the estimation ability of our model and the implications for estimated asset allocation decisions, we report historical and cross-sectional root mean square errors, which give positive indications of reliability.     

Investor behaviour and reaching for yield: Evidence from the sterling corporate bond market

We provide evidence on how corporate bond investors react to a change in yields, and how this behaviour differs in times of market‐wide stress. We also investigate ‘reaching for yield’ across investor types, as well as providing insights into the structure of the corporate bond market. Using proprietary sterling corporate bond transaction data, we show that insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers are typically net buyers when corporate bond yields rise. Dealer banks clear the market by being net sellers. However, we find evidence for this behaviour reversing in times of stress for some investors. During the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, asset managers were net sellers of corporate bonds in response to a sharp rise in yields, potentially amplifying price changes. At the same time, dealer banks were net buyers. Finally, we provide evidence that insurers, hedge funds and asset managers tilt their portfolios towards higher risk bonds, consistent with ‘reaching for yield’ behaviour.     

Optimal allocation to hedge funds: an empirical analysis

What percentage of their portfolio should investors allocate to hedge funds? The only available answers to the above question are set in a static mean-variance framework, with no explicit accounting for uncertainty on the active manager's ability to generate abnormal return, and usually generate unreasonably high allocations to hedge funds. In this paper, we apply the model introduced in Cvitanic et al (2002b Working Paper USC) for optimal investment strategies in the presence of uncertain abnormal returns to a database of hedge funds. We find that the presence of the model risk significantly decreases an investor's optimal allocation to hedge funds. Another finding of this paper is that low beta hedge funds may serve as natural substitutes for a significant portion of investor risk-free asset holdings.     

Hedge Fund Indices: Reconciling Investability and Representativity

Following a growing concern among investors about the quality of hedge fund index return data, this paper addresses the question of whether designing hedge fund indices that fulfil the usual requirements (in particular representative and investable) is or not a feasible task, given a variety of features that are specific to that industry. To test whether or not investability should necessarily come at the cost of representativity, we use a well‐known methodology in the asset pricing literature based on the concept of factor replicating portfolios. Our results suggest that it is actually possible to construct representative indices based on a limited number of funds that are open to new investments, except perhaps in the case of equity market neutral strategies, provided that: i) these funds are suitably selected and ii) a portfolio is constructed with the objective of replicating the common trend in hedge fund returns for a given strategy. A range of robustness tests are performed that show that high correlation of the factor replicating portfolios with the common factor of returns for each strategy is remarkably stable with respect to modifying the number of funds in the replicating portfolio or changing the frequency of rebalancing.     

On the characteristics and performance of long-short, market-neutral and bear mutual funds

We evaluate the return performance of long-short, market-neutral and bear mutual funds using multi-factor models and a conditional CAPM that allows for time-varying risk. Differences in the bearish posture of these mutual funds result in different performance characteristics. Returns to long-short mutual funds vary with the market, returns to market-neutral mutual funds are uncorrelated with the market and returns to bear mutual funds are negatively correlated. Using the conditional CAPM we document significant changes in the market-risk exposure of the most bearish of these funds during different economic climates. We then assess the flow-performance relationship for up to 60 months following up and down markets and find that investors direct flows towards market-neutral and bearish funds for several months after down markets. Market-neutral funds provide a down market hedge, but bear funds do not generate the returns that investors hope for.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

The alpha and omega of fund of hedge fund added value

In spite of a somewhat disappointing performance throughout the crisis, investors are showing interest in hedge funds. Still, funds of hedge funds keep on experiencing outflows. Can this phenomenon be explained by the failure of fund of hedge fund managers to deliver on their promise to add value through active management, or is it symptomatic of a move toward greater disintermediation in the hedge fund industry? We introduce a return-based attribution model allowing for a full decomposition of fund of hedge fund performance. The results of our empirical study suggest that funds of hedge funds are funds of funds like others. Strategic allocation turns out to be a crucial step in the investment process, in that it not only adds value over the long-term, but most importantly, it brings resilience precisely when investors need it the most. Fund picking, on the other hand, turns out to be a double-edged sword.