The influence of buy-side analysts on mutual fund trading

We present evidence on the trading and performance impact of buy-side analysts. Using data provided by a large global asset manager, we relate buy-side analysts’ recommendations to fund transactions on a daily basis. We show that buy-side analysts significantly influence trading decisions: Fund managers strongly follow recent recommendation revisions, even after controlling for other trading determinants. Positive abnormal returns to buy-side analysts’ revisions are also reflected in the performance of mutual fund trades: Trades triggered by buy-side recommendations have higher returns than other trades. Overall, the impact of buy-side analysts is more pronounced than that of sell-side analysts.     

INVESTORS ADJUST EXPECTATIONS AROUND SELL-SIDE ANALYST REVISIONS IN IPO RECOMMENDATIONS

In this article I compare investor response to sell-side analyst recommendation revisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms in the first three years after issue with that of a benchmark control sample of firms that have been public longer. I test whether investors in IPO firms adjust their initially optimistic expectations as information about new issues is released and uncertainty is resolved. In support of my hypothesis that investors adjust expectations downward, I find abnormally negative returns around analyst revisions of IPO firm recommendations. Additionally, I find the effect of analyst revisions on long-run performance of IPO firms is economically significant.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism

This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Our analysis of a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 through 2006 indicates that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. Controlling for a number of variables, including the ties between analysts and investment banks, we find that the greater the portfolio weight of a stock in the fund family, the more optimistic the stock ratings from affiliated analysts become. Since 2002, analysts’ optimism on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds has declined. However, an analyst's decision of upgrading a stock to a “strong buy” rating is still significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family.     

Research for sale: Determinants and consequences of paid-for analyst research

I examine the determinants and market impact of paid-for coverage using a hand-collected sample of paid-for reports over 1999–2006. More than five hundred publicly listed US companies paid for analyst coverage since 1999. Yet little is known about the informational consequences of this analyst research. Firms with greater uncertainty, weaker information environments, and low turnover are more likely to buy coverage as they have the most to gain from analyst coverage but are unlikely to attract sell-side analysts. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest, I find paid-for reports have information content for investors based on 2-day abnormal returns. After the initiation of coverage, companies experience an increase in institutional ownership, sell-side analyst following, and liquidity. In addition, the results are strongest for the fee-based research firm with ex ante policies that reduce potential conflicts of interest.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

Environmental performance and analyst information processing costs

This study tests whether the information processing costs of analysts vary positively with the environmental performance information available on the firms they follow. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that these costs increase when analysts process a wider array of environmental performance ratings. Specifically we find that as the number of environmental performance ratings increases, analysts cover fewer firms in their portfolio, provide fewer earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast revisions, and make less timely forecast revisions. Two additional tests confirm that our results relate to environmental performance information and not to confounding factors. First, the “shock” of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 implemented for California firms in 2012 increases analyst information processing costs incremental to the main effect of environmental performance ratings. Second, analyst information processing costs increase further in the year a firm covered by an analyst provides a CSR report for the first time. Our results have implications for firm managers considering voluntary environmental disclosure and investors deciding on what stocks to include in their socially responsible portfolios because when processing costs are high, analysts will provide less information or less timely information, resulting in more gradual price discovery in capital markets.     

Analyst talent,information, and insider trading

We examine 1984–2018 data and show that the talent or ability of sell-side financial analysts affects a covered firm's information environment—more so than the simple number of analysts covering a firm. We find that while analysts in general produce market and industry-level information, high-ability analysts contribute more firm-specific information. Firms covered by high-ability analysts experience significantly less insider trading prior to positive earnings news. Results only reside in opportunistic (not routine) trades. When an analyst initiates (terminates) coverage we find decreased (increased) subsequent insider trading. Both changes are primarily driven by analyst talent. Analyst ability also negatively relates to insider trading profitability.     

Analyst characteristics, timing of forecast revisions, and analyst forecasting ability

We first examine whether analysts with certain characteristics that prior research has identified are related to superior forecasting ability systematically time their forecast revisions later in the fiscal quarter. We then examine whether this superior ability persists after controlling for the timing advantage by using relative forecast error, a measure that largely eliminates the timing advantage of recent forecasts. Using a sample of quarterly earnings forecast revisions over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009, we find that analysts with more firm-specific and general experience and more accurate prior-period forecasts, analysts employed by larger brokerage firms, and analysts who follow fewer industries and companies tend to revise forecasts later in the quarter. We also find that analyst characteristics that are positively correlated with revision timing are negatively related to relative forecast errors. These results are consistent with analyst characteristics being useful proxies for analyst forecasting ability and analysts with greater ability revising forecasts later in the quarter.     

The Dynamics of Earnings Forecast Management

This paper examines whether firms manage analyst forecasts andthe associated value consequences. We find that earnings forecaststend to grow pessimistic over the forecast horizon and theseforecast changes and their timing are key determinants of whetherfirms generate positive earnings surprises: Late forecasts thatraise (lower) the consensus sharply reduce (raise) the probabilityof positive surprises. This findng is the opposite of that predictedif consensus revisions reflected new information arrival. Investorsseem to be "misled": downward consensus revisions lead to largeabnormal returns following the earnings announcement. Paradoxically,downward forecast management reduces post-announcement shareprice, as the impact of reduced forecasts dominates the gainfrom generating positive surprises.     

Complicated firms

We exploit a novel setting in which the same piece of information affects two sets of firms: one set of firms requires straightforward processing to update prices, while the other set requires more complicated analyses to incorporate the same piece of information into prices. We document substantial return predictability from the set of easy-to-analyze firms to their more complicated peers. Specifically, a simple portfolio strategy that takes advantage of this straightforward vs. complicated information processing classification yields returns of 118 basis points per month before transaction costs. Consistent with processing complexity driving the return relation, we further show that the more complicated the firm, the more pronounced the return predictability. In addition, we find that sell-side analysts are subject to these same information processing constraints, as their forecast revisions of easy-to-analyze firms predict their future revisions of more complicated firms.     

Do brokerage houses add value? The market impact of UK sell-side analyst recommendation changes

This paper reports on the first full study investigating the economic role of sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations in the UK market. We also explore whether UK analysts are, in practice, influenced by the same biases as that reported for their US counterparts.We find that share prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes, not only at the time of the recommendation change but also in subsequent months. The price reaction to new sell recommendations is greater than the price reaction to new buy recommendations and exhibits post-recommendation drift which is consistent with initial underreaction to bad news. Returns generated are influenced, cross-sectionally, by factors associated with a firm's information environment and analyst incentives such as size, same-sign earnings forecast revisions and recommendation changes that skip a rank.We find that UK analysts’ investment recommendations in practice appear less susceptible to potential conflicts of interest than their US counterparts. The ratio of new sell to buy recommendations is higher in the UK and a greater proportion of such recommendations are accompanied by same-sign earnings forecast revisions than their equivalents in the US. We find brokerage house investment banking relationships do not appear to impact (adversely) on abnormal returns.     

Analyst underreaction and the post-forecast revision drift

The post-forecast revision drift (PFRD), the phenomenon of delayed stock price reactions to analyst forecast revisions, is a well-documented market anomaly. Prior research attributes PFRD to underreaction by investors to analyst forecast revisions. This study investigates the role of the analyst forecast revision process itself in the PFRD anomaly. Using a large sample of US firms, we confirm prior findings of a positive serial correlation (momentum) in individual analysts’ revisions to their earnings forecasts and, based on both indirect and direct tests, document a positive association between this momentum and PFRD. Further analyses reveal that both the forecast revision momentum and PFRD vary in similar ways with respect to the nature of the news driving the revisions and the information environment. Collectively, our findings show that underreaction by individual analysts in the forecast revision process is an important contributor to the PFRD phenomenon.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Does information uncertainty affect investors’ responses to analysts’ forecast revisions? An investigation of accounting restatements

Prior studies provide only limited evidence on how and why investors rely on analyst forecasts. We investigate one aspect of this research paradigm by examining investor response to analyst forecast revisions using accounting restatements as a proxy for uncertainty. We find that investors tend to rely more on the information that analyst characteristics convey about forecast accuracy in restatement firms than in non-restatement firms. The evidence also suggests that the level of restatement intensity and the length of reaction window affect investors’ reliance on these characteristics. Further analysis demonstrates that the innovation in forecast revisions also affects the association between investor response and analyst characteristics. Our findings are consistent with increased information uncertainty stimulating investor demand for analyst research.     

The Persistence of Opportunistic Insider Trading

We study the drivers of persistent insider trading profitability by examining the trades of insiders whose past trades have been profitable. We find that the current transactions of these persistently profitable (PP) insiders better predict firm performance than those of other insiders. The relative abnormal performance is more pronounced for trades of insiders who are managers rather than large shareholders or unaffiliated insiders and for trades in firms with weaker governance and greater information asymmetry. The trades of PP insiders also better predict earnings surprises, major corporate news, and analyst revisions. Collectively, these results indicate that PP insider transactions provide valid signals regarding future firm performance and that persistence in profitability is driven by informational advantages.     

Mutual fund trades and the value of contradictory private information

We investigate the performance of mutual funds that trade using private information. These funds are uniquely identified from a set of 2730 funds with 44,315 fund-periods between 1994 and 2005. We compare the alignment of fund trades with brokers’ recommendations, which we regard as “public information” in the universe of informed and uninformed mutual funds. Funds that systematically trade counter to the public information form a homogenous subset of the privately informed funds. By using private information that contradicts the public information, these funds exhibit a superior average performance. After we control for serial correlation in fund returns, we assess this advantage as being an economically significant 1.7% per annum. We also show empirically that smaller funds are better able to capture the benefit of private information.     

Institutional investor information network,analyst forecasting and stock price crash risk

In this paper, we construct the information network of fund investors based on the theory of social relationship networks and examine its impact of fund information sharing with analysts on stock price crash risk. Our results show that private information sharing among institutional investors reduces crash risk. Further results show that fund information sharing can alleviate analyst optimism bias and improve analyst forecast accuracy, which further reduces stock price crash risk. Moreover, these identified effects are more pronounced in a bull market than a bear market. Our study contributes to the research on private information transmission in fund information networks, and provides a new perspective for recognizing the relationships among institutional investor behavior, analyst forecasting, and stock price crash risk.     

An examination of the effects of management earnings forecast form and explanations on financial analyst forecast revisions

Using a sample of 978 quarterly management earnings-per-share forecasts made during the period 1993 to 1999, we document that financial analyst revisions to management earnings forecasts are a function of management forecast form. More precise forecasts (measured three different ways) lead to greater revision of financial analyst consensus EPS forecasts for a given level of unexpected earnings as predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Bayesian adjustment models. Also, consistent with our arguments, maximum forecasts are interpreted as bad news by analysts. Our results, while consistent with theory, are inconsistent with recent experimental studies which do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of management earnings forecast form on the association between unexpected earnings and financial analyst forecast revisions. We also re-examine Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough's (2004) finding that attributions used to explain management forecasts affect the reaction to the forecast using analyst data. Consistent with their findings using stock prices, the attribution presence (especially external attributions) increases financial analyst revisions pursuant to management forecasts.