Why are interest spreads so high in Uganda?

Using international comparisons and a unique bank-level dataset on the Ugandan banking system over the period 1999 to 2005, we explore the factors behind consistently high interest rate spreads and margins. International comparisons show that the small size of Ugandan banks, persistently high T-Bill rates and institutional deficiencies explain large proportions of the high Ugandan interest rate margins. The Ugandan bank panel confirms the importance of macroeconomic factors, such as high inflation, high T-Bill rates and exchange rate appreciation. There is also evidence for the small market place and high costs of doing business explaining persistently high spreads and margins; smaller banks and banks targeting the low end of the market incur higher costs and therefore higher margins. Spreads and margins also vary significantly with the sectoral loan portfolio composition of banks, while there is little evidence for foreign bank entry, privatization or changes in market structure explaining variation in spreads or margins over time.     

Bank efficiency in South‐Eastern Europe

This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six transition countries of South‐Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using a stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost efficiency of South‐Eastern European banks is 68.59 percent, and the average profit efficiency is 53.87 percent. Regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency show that foreign banks are characterized by higher profit efficiency but lower cost efficiency, and government‐owned banks are associated with lower profit efficiency than domestic private banks. However, the efficiency gap between foreign‐, domestic private‐ and government‐owned banks narrows over time. We also find that the market power of a bank has a positive association with both cost and profit efficiency. Institutional development, proxied by progress in banking regulatory reforms, privatization and enterprise corporate governance restructuring, also has a positive impact on bank efficiency.     

Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market

In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.     

HOW DID STATE‐OWNED BANKS RESPOND TO PRIVATIZATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN EXPERIMENT

ABSTRACT ** : The paper examines the response of banks to privatization. Using data on all state‐owned banks for the period 1990–2006, the findings indicate that fully state‐owned banks are significantly less profitable than partially privatized ones. The improvements in performance by partially privatized banks are, in fact, sustained after privatization. In addition, the analysis indicates that privatization improves profitability, efficiency and improves bank soundness, while lowering bank risk. While the improvement in bank risk is typically spread out over a much longer period, the progress in terms of profitability and economic efficiency typically occurs in the post‐privatization period.     

TO LIST OR TO MERGE? ENDOGENOUS CHOICE OF PRIVATIZATION METHODS IN A MIXED MARKET

When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare‐enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private‐firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the government's choices concerning privatization.     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.
     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

The determinants of privatization prices: evidence from Turkey

This paper analyses the determinants of privatization prices in a multi-industry study using a sample of 68 recently privatized firms from Turkey. Results show that revenue and market characteristics are significant determinants of privatization prices while current cost and profit indicators are not. It is argued that potential buyers regard these state firms as inefficient, therefore do not take into consideration their current costs and profits in determining their value. When the dependent variable is altered by dividing the firm's privatization price by the firm's sales (revenues), it is found that sales-adjusted privatization prices are responsive to firms profit margins. However, this result does not hold when the sample is restricted to a single industry. Profit margins along with other profitability and firm efficiency measures are no longer significant determinants of sales-adjusted privatization prices in the cement industry analysis. Unexploited production opportunities measured by capacity utilization ratios, and complete private ownership resume a more important role.     

The competitive nature of the nursing home industry: price mark ups and demand elasticities

Nursing home markets are likely to deviate from a competitive structure because of limitations on entry imposed by Certificate of Need (CON) regulations and the potential for product differentiation along such attributes as location, religious affiliation and quality. This paper investigates the structure of nursing home markets in New York State by calculating price mark ups and residual private pay demand elasticities. It shows that the residual demand elasticity is bound by estimates based on price mark ups above marginal costs and above Medicaid rates. This approach allows estimation of demand elasticities in all markets, whether or not CON regulations constrain bed supply. Mean price elasticities (in absolute value) calculated for nursing homes in New York State in 1991 ranged from 3.46 to 3.85.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

COMPETITION,REGULATION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

In this paper we consider a simple model of an industry with network externalities, where a benefit to each consumer from network services depends on the size of the network. We first consider a single network and cover the cases with and without fixed cost of entry. We then turn to the two‐network industry, where the incumbent network and a new entrant network compete for the market and may differ both in their marginal costs and demand structures. In addition, we identify several situations where public policy may play a crucial role in sustaining socially advantageous network service provision.     

Foreign bank entry,bank efficiency and market power in Central and Eastern European Countries1

This article analyses the implications of the recently observed sharp expansion of foreign banks in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as measured by equity ownership. We show that the mode of foreign entry has a pivotal impact on the post‐entry performance of banks in CEECs. Foreign greenfield banks are characterized by superior cost efficiency, compared with domestic and foreign‐acquired banks. The efficiency of foreign‐acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, but improves thereafter. Banks acquired by foreigners have less market power relative to domestic and foreign greenfield banks. Overall, the CEEC banking sectors have benefited from the increased foreign bank participation, both in terms of higher efficiency and more competition.     

Privatization,foreign bank entry and bank efficiency in Croatia: a Fourier-flexible function stochastic cost frontier analysis

Using bank balance sheet data for Croatia for 1994 to 2000, this study estimates a Fourier-flexible frontier cost function. Specification tests indicate that the stochastic frontier model with a Fourier-flexible form with a truncated normal distribution of the inefficiency term allowing for time varying cost efficiency is preferred. The results show that new private and privatized banks, contrary to some expectations, are not the most efficient banks through most of the period. Privatization also does not seem to have an immediate effect on improved efficiency. However, better cost efficiency is associated with a lower likelihood of failure, suggesting that better risk management and better cost management are signs of better management in general. Finally, foreign banks have substantially better efficiency scores than all categories of domestic banks.     

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).     

Opening up for foreign banks: How Central and Eastern Europe can benefit1

This paper analyses the role of foreign banks in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. With respect to their planned EU membership, these countries have to consider the full implementation of free trade in financial services. Generally, liberalizing the market access of foreign banks allows the production of financial services according to comparative advantage, it fosters competition, it promotes bank privatization, and it facilitates a transfer of know-how into the emerging financial systems. The most important sequencing issue that arises is that the incumbent banks should have been recapitalized for their truly inherited bad loans before markets are opened up. In view of the reform progress that has already been made in the countries under review, abolishing remaining entry barriers is unlikely to put the stability of banking systems at risk while allowing the benefits of open markets to be exploited.     

Product mix,transactions and cost behaviour: a study of South African bank branches

This paper utilizes microeconomic theory and a panel data set to assess the impact of product mix and transactions on cost behaviour of bank branches in South Africa over the short and long‐term. Estimates of properties of concavity and monotonocity indicate that the cost functions of typical bank branches in South Africa are neither consistent with short‐term nor long‐term cost‐minimizing behaviour. This corroborates earlier findings which indicate that South African banks have low production efficiency and high market power. In addition the cost functions and two production‐output type indices indicate that overall, the intermediation‐output type mix (foreign exchange and custodial services) has a more significant effect on cost behaviour than the production‐output type mix (cheque and deposit accounts). The variety of production‐output type services provided by a branch appears to have limited effect on costs. However the financial value of production‐output type transactions has an impact on costs while the financial value of intermediation type products does not. Branches that provide intermediation‐output type products tend to have higher variable costs – the key determinant of costs is the number of transactions.     

Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on lending rates: Theory and evidence

Policy makers who decide to liberalize foreign bank entry frequently put limitations on the mode of entry. We study how different entry modes affect the lending rates of foreign and domestic banks. In our model, the mode of entry determines whether a foreign bank inherits a customer base. This, in turn, affects how information is distributed between foreign and domestic banks. We show that this distribution of information about incumbent customers leads to stronger competition if foreign entry occurs through a greenfield investment. As a result, domestic bank lending rates are lower after greenfield entry. We find empirical support for this prediction for a sample of banks from 10 Eastern European countries for the period 1995–2003.     

Service Deregulation,Competition, and the Performance of French and Italian Firms

This article reports estimates of the impact of service regulation reform on the productivity of French and Italian firms in retail, transports and professional services over the period 1998–2007. We implement a two‐stage least squares estimation: the first‐stage instruments mark‐ups, a financial measure of rents, with barriers to entry and the second stage estimates the impact of instrumented mark‐ups on total factor productivity (TFP), a real measure of firm efficiency. We find that entry barriers lower firm productivity by raising mark‐ups and rents. These estimates imply that, if French and Italian regulators had adopted the OECD best practices in terms of entry barriers, firms in these sectors would have increased their TFP level by five percentage points. We do not find any robust evidence of a non‐linear relation between mark‐up and productivity.     

Are private banks more efficient than public banks?

We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and, surprisingly, that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank's environment, management's risk preferences, the bank's activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.