International spillovers in global asset markets

The paper empirically estimates the financial transmission within and across bond and equity markets in the four largest global financial markets – the United States, the Euro area, Japan, and the United Kingdom. We argue that international bond and equity markets are highly interconnected both within and across asset classes in a globalized world, where the complex transmission process across various financial assets is not restricted to just the domestic market. This paper employs identification through generalized forecast error variance decompositions to estimate spillovers across four systemic markets in a Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework. We find that asset prices react most strongly to international shocks within the same asset class, but that there are also substantial international spillovers across asset classes. Rolling estimations analysis provides evidence that global asset markets have become more integrated and that the bilateral relationships change over time. Our results are robust to specifications that take into account the monetary policy stance and include foreign exchange markets.     

The stability of money demand in China: Evidence from the ARDL model

This study examines the demand for broad money (M2) in China using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration framework. The results based on the bounds testing procedure confirm that a stable, long-run relationship exists between M2 and its determinants: real income, inflation, foreign interest rates and stock prices. Importantly, our results reveal that stock prices have a significant wealth effect on long- and short-run broad money demand; its omission can lead to serious misspecifications in the money demand function (MDF). This finding is consistent with the notion that asset inflation (deflation) has systematic influence on the pattern of monetary aggregates.     

Asset market response to monetary policy news from SNB press releases

This paper analyses the effects of Swiss National Bank (SNB) communication on asset prices. It distinguishes between different monetary policy news contained in press releases following a monetary policy decision. Employing a latent variable approach and event-study methods, I find that medium- and long-term bond yields respond to changes in the communicated inflation and GDP forecasts as well as to the degree of pessimism expressed in press releases. Exchange rates mainly react to changes in the GDP forecast while stocks do not react to SNB communication on monetary policy announcement days. Additionally, short-term expectations about the future path of the policy rate are driven by the communicated inflation forecast. The results underline the role of qualitative news beyond quantitative forecasts in influencing market expectations and asset prices.     

Monetary policy and asset prices in an open economy

This paper examines whether central banks should respond to asset price fluctuations in a two-country sticky price model. We compare a monetary policy rule that targets both domestic asset prices and foreign asset prices with several alternative monetary policy rules. This paper shows that this policy rule can produce preferable outcomes because the domestic central bank incorporates important information that both domestic and foreign asset prices possess into its monetary policy. Our model suggests that central banks should consider both domestic and foreign asset prices in a two country framework with asset price fluctuations.     

Monetary policy on twitter and asset prices: Evidence from computational text analysis

In this paper, we dissect the Twitter debate about the future course of monetary policy and trace the effects of selected topics of this discourse on U.S. asset prices. We focus on the “taper tantrum” episode in 2013, a period with large revisions in expectations about future Fed policy. Based on a novel data set of 90,000 Twitter messages (“tweets”) covering the debate of Fed tapering on Twitter, we use Latent Dirichlet Allocation, a computational text analysis tool, to quantify the content of the discussion. Several estimated topic frequencies are then included in a VAR model to estimate the effects of topic shocks on asset prices. We find that the discussion about Fed policy on social media contains price-relevant information. Shocks to the discussion about the timing of the tapering, about the broader economic policy context and worrying investors are shown to lead to significant asset price changes. We also show that the effects are mostly due to changes in the term premium of yields consistent with the portfolio balance channel of unconventional monetary policy.     

Is deflation costly after all? The perils of erroneous historical classifications

I estimate average economic activity during periods of inflation and deflation while accounting for measurement errors in 19th century prices. These measurement errors lead to underestimation (overestimation) of economic activity during periods of inflation (deflation). By exploiting multiple deflation indicators, it is possible to recover the true relationship; the shortfall of US industrial production growth during periods of deflation ranges from −4.5 pp to −7.6 pp, instead of −2 pp. I also find a negative relationship between deflation and real activity in the UK. I then examine the cross-country variation in the estimates for eleven countries. The patterns are consistent with stronger biases for countries with more serious measurement errors in prices.     

The New Keynesian Phillips curve with myopic agents

Empirical estimations of the New Keynesian Phillips curve support hybrid versions with a positive weight on lagged inflation and a weight less than one on expected inflation. We argue that myopic price setting of some agents explains the low weight on expected inflation. The lagged term can be explained by trend extrapolation if information about the future is costly. In a laboratory experiment we implement the Calvo (1983) microfoundations of the Phillips curve. Our hypotheses are supported by the experimental data. About half of the subjects set optimal Calvo prices while about a third is myopic.     

Stocks,bonds, money markets and exchange rates: measuring international financial transmission

Understanding the complexity of the financial transmission process across various assets—domestically as well as within and across asset classes—requires the simultaneous modeling of the various transmission channels in a single, comprehensive empirical framework. The paper estimates the financial transmission between money, bond and equity markets and exchange rates within and between the USA and the euro area. We find that asset prices react strongest to other domestic asset price shocks, but that there are also substantial international spillovers, both within and across asset classes. The results underline the dominance of US markets as the main driver of global financial markets: US financial markets explain, on average, around 30% of movements in euro area financial markets, whereas euro area markets account only for about 6% of US asset price changes. Moreover, the methodology allows us to identify indirect spillovers through other asset prices, which are found to increase substantially the international transmission of shocks within asset classes. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can central banks run out of ammunition? The role of the money‐equities‐interaction channel in monetary policy

Many authorities claim that central banks ‘have run out of ammunition’, either because the central bank rate has dropped close to the zero lower bound or because of Keynes's liquidity trap. I argue first, that indefinitely large increases in the quantity of money remain possible even with the central bank rate close to zero, and, second, that increases in the quantity of money raise all asset prices, including the prices of quoted equities, not just bond prices. Bonds are an unimportant asset class in modern capitalist economies, relative to corporate equity and real estate. Meanwhile increases in equity prices always boost aggregate demand and output.     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

论GDP、CPI与国民经济总价值TH及通货膨胀、紧缩率i

本文通过使用"全面价值论"的观点,找到了国民经济总价值、剩余价值的实时计算指标及度量方法,也就是具体找到了GDP的完善化指标。给出了全面价值的价值规律指导下的国民经济全面协调发展的指路明灯。此外,通过全面价值论观点,还找到了符合通货膨胀或通货紧缩定义的"全部商品"的通货膨胀率或通货紧缩率计算公式,通过全部商品的通货膨胀率或通货紧缩率的具体计算,可以还原纸币本身的时间价值,使纸币起到实物货币的功能,成为根本治理通货膨胀、通货紧缩及金融危机的基本实操。     

Spillover effects on government bond yields in euro zone. Does full financial integration exist in European government bond markets?

This paper examines the time varying nature of European government bond market integration by employing multivariate GARCH models. We state that unlike other bond markets, in euro markets the default(credit) risk factor and other macroeconomic and fiscal indicators are not able to explain the sovereign bond yields after the beginning of monetary union. This fact might be counted as a signal for perfect financial integration. However, we also find that the global shocks affect Germany and the rest of euro bond markets in various levels, creating particular discrepancies in asset prices even we take into account the market specific factors. Different level responses of each euro market to the global shocks reveal that euro bond markets are not fully integrated with each other unlike the recent literature claimed. Besides, we explore that the global factors are effective for the volatility of yield differentials among euro government bonds.     

MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: SURVEYING THE SURVEYABLE

Abstract.  This paper surveys recent advances in empirical studies of the monetary transmission mechanism, with special attention to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Our results indicate that the strength of the exchange rate pass-through substantially declined over time mainly due to a fall in inflation rates and to some extent due to the so-called composition effect. The asset price channel is weak and is likely to remain weak because of shallow stock and private bond markets and because of low stock and bond holdings of domestic households. House prices may become an exception with booming mortgage lending and with high owner occupancy ratios. While the credit channel could be a powerful channel of monetary transmission – as new funds raised on capital markets are close to zero in CEE – it is actually not, as both commercial banks and non-financial corporations can escape domestic monetary conditions by borrowing from their foreign mother companies. The moderately good news, however, is that those banks and firms are influenced by monetary policy in the euro area because their parent institutions are themselves subjected to the credit channel in the euro area.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global deflation – a genuine risk?

• The notable decline in inflation in the Eurozone, US and UK since mid-2013 has led to suggestions that a period of widespread price deflation across the major economies is a risk. Adding to these concerns has been the trajectory of producer prices – already declining in the Eurozone and China and showing very subdued growth elsewhere.
• Our global GDP forecasts do not, in isolation, point to a worldwide deflation risk. We expect growth at 2.8% this year and 3.2% next, little changed from last month.
• But the starting point for this growth matters, specifically the gap between actual and potential output last year. Even with reasonable growth, an initially large output gap would imply downward pressure on inflation over the next two years.
• Unfortunately, the size of the output gap is very uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates for the major economies, especially Japan. Part of the problem is that it is hard to know how much potential output was (or was not) permanently lost during the global financial crisis and recession.
• Assuming substantial permanent losses, output gaps might be relatively modest now, but a more optimistic view of the supply side of the economy would suggest output gaps could be quite large – and arguably this fits better with the recent evidence from inflation.
• Overall, while we see a genuine risk of deflation in the Eurozone (with around a 15% probability) we are more upbeat about the other major economies, where growth in the broad money supply and nominal GDP do not seem to be signaling deflation risks.
• But the difficulty of measuring ‘slack’ in the economy for us underlines the case for central banks to err on the side of caution when setting monetary policy, and either not tightening too soon or easing further. This month we have built in a further ECB rate cut to our Eurozone forecast. In Japan, we have revised down growth for 2014–15 with recent data strengthening the case for additional monetary easing this year.

     

Debt-deflation,financial market stress and regime change – Evidence from Europe using MRVAR

Since the economic meltdown of 2008–2009 many euro area countries have experienced disinflation, and even deflation, in a period with large debt overhang, creating the conditions for continuing financial market stress. As disinflation and deflation push up the real interest rate, while growth and income declines, the leveraging problem becomes more severe and the economy risks shifting into a regime with high insolvency risk, high financial stress, rising credit spreads, possibly accompanied by strong adverse macroeconomic feedback loops. Investigating the consequences of those magnifying feedback loops, given the debt-deflation, we demonstrate the possibility of unstable dynamics and downward spirals in the presence of regime-dependent macro feedback loops, using a theoretical model with decentralized matching mechanisms on both labor and financial markets. To explore the amplifying linkages between deflation, output, labor and financial markets, we employ a new solution procedure called Non-linear Model Predictive Control (NMPC) to solve our models variants for out-of-steady-state dynamics. We apply a four variable Multi-Regime VAR (MRVAR) model with regime dependent (generalized) impulse-response functions (GIRFs) to study deflationary and financial risk drivers empirically for Southern and Northern EU countries. New measures for financial risk drivers are employed and GIRFs for output, inflation rates, interest rates and financial stress are explored. The econometric results of the MRVAR are roughly in line with the theoretical regime change model.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Financial turmoil will not derail expansion

• ? The further run of broadly positive economic news has been overshadowed by the recent financial market turmoil. We do not expect the latter to be the catalyst for any notable economic slowdown and have left our world GDP growth forecast for 2018 unchanged at 3.2%, which would be the strongest result since 2011, up from an estimated 3.0% in 2017.
• ? January survey data continued to strike a positive tone. Indeed, the global composite PMI rose to its highest level during the current upswing and points to a further acceleration in global GDP growth. Meanwhile, less timely world trade data showed strong growth in November after a weaker performance in September and October.
• ? Of course, these developments predate recent financial market developments. The key issue is whether the equity market sell‐off triggers significant spillovers to the wider economy. If the market reversal is to have notable repercussions, it will need to morph from a tantrum into a full‐blown crisis. For now, we still expect interest rates generally to edge higher, with three rate hikes still seen in the US this year.
• ? Despite the recent fall, equity prices are still up sharply compared with a few months ago and earnings growth remains solid. Against this backdrop, further weakness would probably require an additional trigger, such as a sustained rise in bond yields in response to a reassessment of the inflation and monetary policy outlook. Although inflation concerns have risen recently, our view remains that price pressures will rise only gradually in the advanced economies and that the upside risks to both inflation and bond yields remain well contained.
• ? The upshot is that recent events have not prompted us to reassess the outlook for this year or beyond. We continue to expect world GDP growth to pick up to 3.2% this year, reflecting strong growth in both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. And our forecast for 2019 is also unchanged at 2.9%. In turn, world trade growth remains quite strong, helped by the weaker US$, but is seen slowing to 5% this year from just over 6% in 2017, with a further modest easing to 4.3% in 2019.

     

Hedging inflation with individual US stocks: A long-run portfolio analysis

This paper examines whether individual stocks can act as inflation hedgers. We focus on longer investment horizons and construct in- and out-of-sample portfolios based on the long-run relationship (cointegration) of stock prices with respect to consumer prices. Empirical evidence suggests that investors are better off by holding a portfolio of stocks with higher long-run betas as part of asset selection and allocation strategy. Stocks that outperform inflation tend to be drawn from the Energy and Industrial sectors. Finally, we observe that the companies average inflation hedging ability declined steadily over the past ten years, while the number of firms that hedge inflation has decreased considerably after the recent downturn of the US economy.     

New Methods for Forecasting Inflation,Applied to the US*

Models for the 12‐month‐ahead US rate of inflation, measured by the chain‐weighted consumer expenditure deflator, are estimated for 1974–98 and subsequent pseudo out‐of‐sample forecasting performance is examined. Alternative forecasting approaches for different information sets are compared with benchmark univariate autoregressive models, and substantial out‐performance is demonstrated including against Stock and Watson's unobserved components‐stochastic volatility model. Three key ingredients to the out‐performance are: including equilibrium correction component terms in relative prices; introducing nonlinearities to proxy state‐dependence in the inflation process and replacing the information criterion, commonly used in VARs to select lag length, with a ‘parsimonious longer lags’ parameterization. Forecast pooling or averaging also improves forecast performance.     

Is High Inflation Here to Stay in the UK?

The first decade of monetary policy independence saw a period of low and stable inflation, but over the past six years this has given way to higher, and more volatile, inflation. The increase in inflation rates has both external and domestic origins. Higher commodity prices, in particular food, and rising prices of manufactured goods imported from emerging markets have been important. In both cases the sharp depreciation of the pound in the aftermath of the financial crisis has compounded the impact on the UK. There has also been a marked step upwards in domestic inflationary pressures which has largely come from administered & regulated prices, such as domestic energy prices and university tuition fees. These categories account for just 10% of the inflation basket, but over the past six years they have contributed 0.9ppts to an average CPI inflation rate of 3.1%…