外部审计对缓解控股股东代理冲突的价值分析

通过股权的集中,控股股东代理冲突日益严重。本文从外部审计的视角,基于2007-2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司财务资料,分析企业对外部审计的需求随控股权集中的变化过程,并分析外部审计在缓解控股股东代理冲突与保护中小股东利益方面所发挥的作用。     

外部审计对缓解控股股东代理冲突的价值分析

通过股权的集中,控股股东代理冲突日益严重。本文从外部审计的视角,基于2007-2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司财务资料,分析企业对外部审计的需求随控股权集中的变化过程,并分析外部审计在缓解控股股东代理冲突与保护中小股东利益方面所发挥的作用。     

经营者代理问题与控股股东代理问题的比较

股权分散下的经营者代理问题与基于股权集中的控股股东代理问题是两种不同的分析范式．两者之间存在较大的差异,国内研究代理问题往往是将两类代理问题混在一起,没有区分其差异。本文在已有的研究基础上,从不同的方面比较了两种代理问题产生的原因、表现形式,以及它们的解决方法。     

经营者代理问题与控股股东代理问题的比较

股权分散下的经营者代理问题与基于股权集中的控股股东代理问题是两种不同的分析范式,两者之间存在较大的差异,国内研究代理问题往往是将两类代理问题混在一起,没有区分其差异。本文在已有的研究基础上,从不同的方面比较了两种代理问题产生的原因、表现形式,以及它们的解决方法。     

我国上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为研究：一个委托代理模型

我国上市公司控股股东侵占上市公司以及中小股东利益的行为屡见不鲜。其主要途径包括：虚假招股说明书、关联交易、股利政策、定向增发以及利润操纵。上市公司中小股东与控股股东间存在着委托代理关系。控股股东的利益侵占行为不仅降低了上市公司的期望收益,还降低了控股股东自身的努力程度以及所享有的收益份额。通过推进上市公司股权分散化、完善上市公司信息披露制度、推进＂以股抵债＂等金融创新,可以纠正上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益行为。     

实际控制人监督、行业竞争与经理人激励——来自私人控股上市公司的经验证据

本文研究私人控股上市公司的实际控制人监督和行业竞争对经理人激励的影响。具体地,以实际控制人兼任薪酬委员会委员与否来衡量实际控制人监督的力度,基于我国私人控股上市公司的数据研究发现,与实际控制人不兼任薪酬委员会委员的公司相比较,实际控制人以董事身份兼任薪酬委员会委员的公司的经理人薪酬-业绩敏感度更高,且这一关联关系只出现在所处行业竞争程度相对较高的公司中。本文的发现意味着,对于私人控股上市公司来说,实际控制人通过直接参与薪酬委员会的运作来有效监督和改进经理人激励机制,完全独立的薪酬委员会未必最优。本文的发现也为我国私人控股上市公司实际控制人的正面治理作用提供了新的证据。     

会计师事务所审计行业专门化对公司代理成本的抑制分析

作为降低公司代理成本的一种制度安排——独立审计,其自身质量的高低会影响这种作用的发挥。公司代理成本可以大致分为公司股东与管理层之间的管理层代理成本、控股股东与中小股东之间的控股股东代理成本以及股东与债权人之间的债务代理成本。通过分析发现。会计师事务所审计行业专门化对这些都有较好的抑制作用。     

会计师事务所审计行业专门化对公司代理成本的抑制分析

作为降低公司代理成本的一种制度安排——独立审计,其自身质量的高低会影响这种作用的发挥。公司代理成本可以大致分为公司股东与管理层之间的管理层代理成本、控股股东与中小股东之间的控股股东代理成本以及股东与债权人之间的债务代理成本。通过分析发现,会计师事务所审计行业专门化对这些都有较好的抑制作用。     

股权分置改革、控股股东与现金股利——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以2003-2007五年间存在控股股东的分红上市公司为研究样本,采用多变量回归分析方法对股权分置前后上市公司现金股利政策进行了比较研究。实证研究结果表明,股权分置改革前,上市公司每股现金股利与控股股东持股比例正相关,支持现金股利的"侵占"假说;股权分置改革后,存在控股股东的上市公司现金股利支付水平下降,并且每股现金股利与控股股东持股比例的正相关系显著减弱,从而证实股权分置改革后现金股利的"隧道"效应减弱。     

我国农业上市公司终极控制人性质、两权分离度与公司运行特点

本文以2006—2009年我国农业上市公司为研究样本．考察了终极控制人性质与两权分离度与上市公司运行特点的关系。研究发现．国有控制上市公司相对于非国有控制上市公司,相对费用项目偏高,我国农业上市公司的日常运行行为习惯与其终极控制人性质有很大关系,但对两权分离度的敏感程度一般。其中具体的原因和影响,其“浪费”与“掏空”之间的关系值得我们继续深入探讨。     

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

Abstract:  Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders.     

Can differences in the background characteristics of the chairperson–CEO vertical dyad reduce management agency costs?—A perspective Based on the internal configuration of the top management team

We test whether differences in the background characteristics of firms’ chairperson and CEO can reduce management agency costs. We find that when the chairperson is older, has a higher level of education, and has more overseas experience than the CEO, the management agency costs will be lower. A series of robustness tests do not change our conclusions. In further analysis, we find that the negative relationship between the two is more significant for SOEs or firms experiencing fierce market competition. Finally, we also find that the chairman-CEO’s vertical dyad background characteristics differences can help to improve firm performance. Our study provides theoretical and practical implications for companies on how to best configure their top management team.     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.     

行业专长与审计质量——基于投资者和财务报告视角的经验研究

本文从投资者和财务报告视角实证检验了行业专长和审计质量之间的关系。我们利用我国2001～2006年约6000家上市公司样本数据,构造了盈余反应系数模型和操控性应计模型,主要采用多元回归方法进行了统计分析。结果显示:在控制了相关变量的影响后,行业专长事务所审计客户的财务报告质量高于非行业专长事务所审计客户的财务报告质量。这表明行业专长促进了审计质量的提高。     

An Agency Analysis of Firm Diversification: The Consequences of Discretionary Cash and Managerial Risk Considerations

Firm diversification is shown to be a function of excess discretionary cash flow and managerial risk considerations. We measure firm diversification using the concentric diversification index. The index is positively related to both the number of business units in the firm and the extent to which the business firm's segments differ. Consequently, the measure provides a proxy for how firm diversification decisions impact the risk of the firm, and the measure is found to be inversely related to both total risk and unsystematic risk. Consistent with the agency arguments of discretionary cash flow, we find the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm to be a significant positive determinant of the level of firm diversification. We also find support for both a wealth transfer hypothesis over low levels of managerial ownership, and a managerial risk aversion hypothesis over high levels of managerial ownership.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Trading-off Corporate Control and Personal Diversification through Capital Structure and Merger Activity

Abstract:  In this study we use direct estimates of the portfolio diversification of the largest shareholder in a firm to study the impact of shareholder diversification on the firm. For firms where the controlling shareholder is an individual, our tests indicate that the owner-managers use debt, dual class shares and corporate control transactions (merger activity) to strategically trade off corporate control and the drawback of poor portfolio diversification. However, for firms where the controlling shareholder is an institution, our results indicate that control but not diversification is important.