New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity

Despite the EU Stability & Growth Pact and existing constitutional limits on public deficit/debt at the (sub)national level in many EU member countries, in the wake of the 2010 Greek bailout, many politicians and policy advisors have proposed new constitutional “debt brakes” to prevent future fiscal crises and bailouts. This paper puts a question mark behind this popular policy recommendation. Public choice scholars and other critical observers have repeatedly emphasised that constitutional deficit/debt limits are not per se credible commitments to run a sound fiscal policy in the future. To demonstrate this, design defects of such fiscal constraints are usually pointed out (no politically independent control, no sanctions, etc.). Going beyond this standard approach of credibility assessment, this paper argues for taking the issue of institutional complementarity seriously. To assess its credibility, one has to not only examine the design of a deficit/debt limit but also the institutional environment (tax/expenditure policy, capital market, etc.) in which such a constitutional commitment is embedded.     

Fiscal strategies,foreign indebtedness,and overlapping generations

Conclusions This paper offers a unifying dynamic system approach to real government debt and real capital formation in a world economy. The sustainability of permanently maintained primary fiscal deficits is investigated in an open economy. In particular if national governments compete in the issuance of debt at an international capital market sustainable debt profiles appear only as a theoretical (i. e., not empirically valid) curiosity. Within the more realistic regime of an undercapitalized world economy a nation can only run a permanently maintained primary surplus. Starting from a PMP surplus the paper also demonstrates the viability of temporary deficits implying an increase in taxation later to stabilize the fiscal debt. By reversing the argument this shows, the right way to reduce government debt in a non-traumatic manner is to run a higher temporary surplus via higher taxation. Using this extrasurplus to buy back fiscal debt the economy may reduce taxation later while enjoying vigorous capital accumulation towards a higher capital-labour ratio. Furthermore, the paper shows that ceteris paribus a relatively high social security load and a relatively high size of a balanced budget causes external indebtedness via consumption oriented current account deficits. It is left for further research to see what happens if government borrows for public investment instead of public consumption.My research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. While preparing the paper 1 had access to unpublished work by M. Carlberg and T. Ihori. Discussions with M. Carlberg, H. Großmann, J. Michaelis, and H. Schmid are gratefully acknowledged. The diagrams were mastered by C. Schwarz.     

INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SOVEREIGN DEBT, AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT

We develop a political economy model of sovereign debt that shows that income inequality leads to popular pressures on the government to use foreign debt to finance a redistribution of income at the expense of productive public investment. Recognizing this fact, international lenders impose credit ceilings with the consequence that developing country borrowers invest less and grow slower.     

Broke,Ill, and Obese: Is There an Effect of Household Debt on Health?

We analyze the association between household indebtedness and different health outcomes using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel from 1999 to 2009. We control for unobserved heterogeneity by applying fixed‐effects methods and furthermore use a subsample of constantly employed individuals plus lagged debt variables to reduce problems of reverse causality. We apply different measures of household indebtedness, such as the percentage shares of household income spent on consumer credit and home loan repayments (which indicate the severity of household indebtedness) and a binary variable of relative overindebtedness (which indicates a precarious debt situation). We find all debt measures to be strongly correlated with health satisfaction, mental health, and obesity. This relationship vanishes for obesity after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity while it stays significant with respect to worse physical and mental health.     

How did household indebtedness hamper consumption during the recession? Evidence from micro data

The paper investigates the extent to which household indebtedness suppressed consumption during the economic downturn in 2008–2009. The paper uses a unique quarterly panel dataset containing financial information on over 100 000 individuals. The dataset covers the period 2005–2011, when there were large changes in credit volumes, income and consumption in Estonia, a new EU member country. The estimations show that indebtedness measured by the debt-to-income ratio and the debt service ratio hampers consumption over the whole business cycle. The negative impact of the debt service ratio is, however, substantially stronger during the recession than in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, while the negative effect of the debt-to-income ratio is relatively stable over the sample period. The findings suggest that household indebtedness is amplifying the recession and the debt repayment burden indicates the mechanism which is at work.     

Household debt,macroprudential rules,and monetary policy

Today's Canadian economy features a historic high of household debt and persistently low growth rate. The average debt-to-GDP ratio has reached the level experienced in the U.S. just prior to the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we ask whether monetary policy should lean against the household indebtedness or macroprudential policies are better suited for the task. To provide a quantitative answer, we develop a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring a micro-founded banking sector. We estimate the model using Canadian data and conduct policy experiments. Our findings favor macroprudential approach to reining in indebtedness: using monetary policy that reacts to household debt increases inflation volatility and lowers borrowers' welfare, while using macroprudential policies such as lowering the loan-to-value ratio limit increases borrowers' welfare.     

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules within which political activity takes place. Rules that meet the criterion of agreement are desirable constitutional rules, and Buchanan recognized that not all government activity satisfies that criterion. Buchanan is the father of the subdiscipline of constitutional political economy, and his “politics as exchange” approach provides the foundation for much work in that area. Buchanan has created a foundation that is rich in ideas, but leaves behind a number of unanswered questions that point the way toward a further development of the research program in constitutional political economy.     

Currency devaluations,aggregate demand,and debt dynamics in economies with foreign currency liabilities

The article uses a post Kaleckian model to analyze how currency devaluations affect aggregate demand and capital accumulation in an economy with foreign currency liabilities in the short-run. In benchmark post Kaleckian open economy models, currency devaluations have two effects. First, they change international price competitiveness and thus affect net exports. Second, devaluations change income distribution and thereby affect consumption and investment demand. The overall effect on aggregate demand and investment is ambiguous and depends on parameter values. Existing models, however, disregard balance sheet effects that arise from foreign currency-denominated external debt. The article develops a novel post Kaleckian open economy model that introduces foreign currency-denominated external debt and balance sheet effects to examine the demand-effects of devaluations. Furthermore, the article models the dynamics of external and domestic corporate debt. It discusses how an economy may end up in a vicious cycle of foreign-currency indebtedness and derives the conditions under which indebtedness becomes stable or unstable. It shows that the existence of foreign currency-denominated debt means that contractionary devaluations are more likely, and that foreign interest rate hikes, and high illiquidity and risk premia compromise debt sustainability. Devaluations only stabilize debt ratios if they succeed in boosting domestic capital accumulation.     

Constitutional quandaries in Europe

Most of the constitutional political economy literature has followed Buchanan and Tullock by remaining inherently normative, but a small literature has appeared that examines the properties of constitutions by considering the motives of the people who actually write the constitution. This literature is in the positive public choice tradition, in that it assumes that the people who write a constitution are interested in advancing their interests and not those of someone else. This note discusses the need for and nature of a constitution that would advance the interests of all citizens, and then the procedures that would be necessary to create and adopt such a constitution.     

Budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline: Edmund Burke's insightful contribution

Recent developments in the political economy of public finance literature have focused on the features of budgetary institutions that facilitate budgetary discipline — a sub-discipline of constitutional economics. In this literature, there has been no attempt to trace the development of economic thought on the relationship between budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline. This may be because debt accumulation in peacetime is seen as a late twentieth-century phenomenon. As a result, Edmund Burke's contribution, in his speech ‘On Economical Reform’, seems to have been forgotten. This paper highlights Burke's contribution and identifies the extent to which it captures those features of budgetary institutions that are currently recognized as facilitating budgetary discipline.     

Constraining Leviathan

This article commemorates James M. Buchanan and his contributions to public choice and constitutional political economy. It focuses on what Buchanan had to say about constraining the State, or as he often referred to it, Leviathan. It concentrates on a handful of his major works that I think capture important elements of his thinking. It discusses Buchanan’s writings on public debt and government deficits; the size of the state; federalism; and taxation, among other things. It is argued that the main emphasis in Buchanan’s work as it pertained to constraining the State was to include provisions in the constitution that could achieve this end. These included a balanced budget amendment, rules governing the expansion of the money supply, constraints on the types of taxes that could be levied, linking expenditure proposals to the taxes that would finance them, earmarked taxes, and a generality principle, which would avoid a majority coalition’s exploitation of a minority. The article also includes a discussion of the current constitutional crisis in the United States.     

Public Debt,Economic Growth and the Real Interest Rate: A Panel VAR Approach to EU and OECD Countries

ABSTRACT

We investigate the causal relationship between public debt ratios and economic growth rates for 31 EU and OECD countries. We estimate a panel VAR model that incorporates the long-term real interest rate on government bonds as a vehicle to transmit shocks in both the public debt to GDP ratio and the economic growth rate. We find no causal link from public debt to growth, irrespective of the levels of the public debt ratio. Rather, we find a causal relationship from growth to public debt. In high-debt countries, the direct negative impact of growth on public debt is enhanced by an increase in the long-term real interest rate, which in its turn decreases interest-sensitive demand and leads to a further increase in the public debt ratio.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

Sustainable fiscal strategies under changing demographics

This paper develops an overlapping generations model to evaluate, first, the steady state growth-maximizing level of public debt around which an economy needs to stabilise; second, how the optimal level of public debt varies as a function of key population parameters; third, how fiscal rules designed to stabilise the economy around that debt level need to vary with the population parameters; and, fourth, how well the model performs as a reasonable and plausible representation of the advanced economies that face fiscal strain and deteriorating demographics. The main conclusion is: despite diminished fiscal space and flexibility due to deteriorating population parameters, a relatively benign steady state is feasible and available under mild fiscal restraints. The bigger problem will be how to get there without financial or fiscal breakdowns along the way. We offer some political economy perspectives on how best to manage that risk.     

High debt companies' leverage determinants in Spain: A quantile regression approach

With a severe debt overhang problem in Spain, either public or private, the analysis of the factors that influence companies' leverage in this country reveals essential, in particular for the high-indebted firms. This study benefits from the quantile regression approach advantages over the OLS method to analyze the leverage determinants for a large sample of companies for the 2001–2011 period depending on their level of indebtedness. This method reveals that for the highly-leveraged companies many factors are no longer significant and that cash flow variable is crucial if the companies would like to decrease their debt levels.     

Intergenerational conflict and public sector size and structure: A rationale for debt limits?

How do budget rules influence the size and structure of the public sector? This question is considered in an overlapping generations political economy model. The different horizons of agents influence their voting behaviour and lead to excessive deficit financing and debt accumulation, reducing welfare of all subsequent generations. Along an equilibrium trajectory with increasing debt, the tax burden increases and public sector activities are crowded out due to the increasing costs of debt servicing. A debt ceiling may halt this process leading to less debt, more public consumption and higher welfare.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.     

Political instablility and seigniorage: An inseparable couple — or a threesome with debt?

In the literature, political instability is shown to raise seigniorage and/or debt, but there is no debt‐seigniorage trade‐off. However, what happens when the IMF gets involved? Based on a political economy model of intertemporal public finance this paper presents qualitatively new and robust results. First, political instability causes myopic government behaviour and produces more debt, not more seigniorage. Second, IMF policies requiring debtor countries to achieve both monetary and fiscal stability at the same time are ineffective. Third and surprisingly at first sight, debt conditionality aiming at monetary stability is particularly effective in heterogeneous societies with unstable governments.     

Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of ‘Normative Power’

‘Normative power’ is an increasingly popularised concept in the study of EU external relations in fields including military policy, human rights, and international trade. Defined by Manners, it acknowledges the normative foundations of the European project, examines how Europe acts to (re)shape internationally accepted norms, and makes the claim that Europe ought to influence external partners' conception of ‘normal’ behaviour in pursuit of a just global order. This article, however, argues that a moral economy perspective is central to a critical reorientation of the concept of normative power towards appraisal of discrepancies between nominal EU norms and material EU policy outcomes. Examining Europe's ‘normative power’ in its relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, it demonstrates how a moral economy of ACP–EU ties has been instituted in negotiation with European ethical norms as to solidarity with ‘the poor’. Nevertheless, the moral economy of ACP–EU ties is seen not to be ‘moral’ in terms of outcomes for vulnerable citizens in ACP countries. Rather the embedding of moral norms concerning pro-poor ‘development’ has rationalised asymmetric economic ties. ‘Normative power’ is understood as the EU's utilisation of moral norms in the public legitimisation and self-rationalisation of geopolitical interest and commercial gain in its relations with external ‘partners’.