Progress,Inconsistencies, and Neglect in the Social Control of Railway Freight Transport

We focus on the complementarity between original institutional economics, Mario Bunge’s framework of systemism, and the formal tools developed by complexity economists, especially in the context of agent-based modeling. We assert that original institutional economics might profit from exploiting this complementarity.     

Examining social processes with agent-based models

It is plain that the Austrian revival that began in the 1970s has yet to succeed in convincing the mainstream of the academy to jettison their physics-based mathematical models in favor of the sort of models and forms of argumentation that contemporary Austrians advocate. Agent-based computational modeling is still in its relative infancy but is beginning to gain recognition among economists disenchanted with the neoclassical paradigm. The purpose of this paper is to assuage concerns that readers might have regarding methodological consistency between agent-based modeling and Austrian economics and to advocate its adoption as a means to convey Austrian ideas to a wider audience. I examine models developed and published by other researchers and ultimately provide an outline of how one might develop a research agenda that leverages this technique. I argue that agent-based modeling can be used to enhance Austrian theorizing and offers a viable alternative to the neoclassical paradigm.     

发展经济学结构转型分析方法的演进与评价

结构主义发展经济学家在探讨发展中国家的结构转型问题时,所使用的结构分析方法,被认为是持这一思路的发展经济学家对发展经济学做出的最重要的贡献之一。在结构分析方法的演进过程中,传统的统计方法和投入—产出法,由于存在无法刻画产业间关联或因假设产业间关联呈刚性等缺陷,而逐渐被可计算一般均衡模型所取代。鉴于可计算一般均衡模型拥有更加适合于分析那些实行市场导向改革的发展中国家等优势,因而该模型具有更为广泛的应用前景。     

On positional consumption and technological innovation: an agent-based model

Positional behaviour is arguably a source of social externalities. Remedies for this market failure are defended by some authors and rejected by others. One of the issues discussed is the role that the competition for positional goods may have in generating technological innovation. This article aims to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of this process through the use of an agent-based model. Simulations show a plausible dynamics of the process of technological innovation as generated by consumption of positional nature. An interpretation of the results in the scope of the policy discussion in question is provided. The influence of key factors such as income inequality, the materialization of the Hirsch conjecture, and characteristics of the network of relative preferences, is analised. We also frame the potential interest of positional consumption and this model in particular in the context of the ongoing discussion among evolutionary economists on the behaviour of demand.     

Advancing economic analysis beyond the equilibrium framework

Twentieth century economics was dominated by the development and refinement of the concept of economic equilibrium. While it is worthwhile to understand the properties of economic equilibrium, equilibrium concepts have dominated economic thought to the point that they have obscured some of the more important issues economists have always strived to understand. At least since Adam Smith’s time, economists have tried to understand the causes of prosperity, and how economic welfare can be enhanced, but these issues are best understood outside the equilibrium framework. The foundations provided by the Austrian school point toward ways that economic analysis can expand beyond the equilibrium framework.

基于竞争约束的市场力量与福利损失测度理论述评

评估市场力量及其影响的核心在于模型化市场的竞争约束。勒那指数、推测变差模型、Chang—Tremblay模型、剩余需求函数法、托宾q等沿着不同的可观测变量假设与构造方式直接或间接地测度了市场力量,而Lavergne—Requillart．Simioni模型表明,希克斯剩余函数可以比马歇尔剩余函数更为逻辑内洽与精确地测度福利损失。古诺竞争模型、价格领导者模型、边际成本差模型等不同理论模型隐含着关于市场竞争状态的不同的认知与知识假定,由此会导致市场力量与福利损失测度的重大差异。合理刻画产业内的竞争状态是反垄断实践中实证地评估二者的关键。     

基于同质个体决策交易费用视角的制度变迁模型

主流的新制度经济学以交易费用为基础,逐渐发展了一个以交易费用、交易收益、交易利润或交易效率为核心变量,以制度变迁主体追求潜在利润最大化为动力,通过制度的均衡与非均衡过程的动态分析从而研究制度变迁的理论框架。当假设制度变迁主体都同质时,可以从这个制度变迁框架中抽象出主体理性、利益结构、资源约束、技术约束、制度约束等关于分析制度变迁的关键变量,以这些变量为基础可以构建一个以同质个体决策为基础的制度变迁模型。这个模型将为制度变迁的理性选择分析、演化变迁分析和博弈演化分析的统一提供一个全新的思路。     

Oligopoly in international trade: Rise,fall and resurgence

Large firms played a central role in the “new trade” models that became a major focus of trade economists in the early 1980s. Subsequent literature for the most part kept imperfect competition but jettisoned oligopoly. Instead, as the heterogeneous firms literature burgeoned in the 2000s, monopolistic competition quickly became established as the workhorse model. The use of oligopoly in trade models has been criticized for reasons that we argue are unpersuasive. Renewed incorporation of oligopolistic firms in international trade is warranted. Quantitative investigations of welfare effects of trade policy should again address the impact of such policies on the allocation of profits across countries.     

A theory of cooperation in games with an application to market socialism

Abstract

Economic theory has focused almost exclusively on how humans compete with each other in their economic activity, culminating in general equilibrium (Walras–Arrow–Debreu) and game theory (Cournot–Nash). Cooperation in economic activity is, however, important, and is virtually ignored. Because our models influence our view of the world, this theoretical lacuna biases economists’ interpretation of economic behavior. Here, I propose models that provide micro-foundations for how cooperation is decentralized by economic agents. It is incorrect, in particular, to view competition as decentralized and cooperation as organized only by central diktat. My approach is not to alter preferences, which is the strategy behavioral economists have adopted to model cooperation, but rather to alter the way that agents optimize. Whereas Nash optimizers view other players in the game as part of the environment (parameters), Kantian optimizers view them as part of action. When formalized, this approach resolves the two major failures of Nash optimization from a welfare viewpoint – the Pareto inefficiency of equilibria in common-pool resource problems (the tragedy of the commons) and the inefficiency of equilibria in public-good games (the free rider problem). An application to market socialism shows that the problems of efficiency and distribution can be completely separated: the dead-weight loss of taxation disappears.     

The Incoherent Emperor: A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory

It is somewhat common for heterodox economists to come to the defense of neoclassical microeconomic theory. This is due to many reasons, but perhaps the commonest one is ignorance. It seems that most heterodox economists are not aware of the many critiques or that as a collective they completely undermine neoclassical theory. The objective of the article is to dispel ignorance by using the existing criticisms to delineate a systematic critique of the core components of neoclassical microeconomic theory: the supply and demand explanation of the price mechanism and its application to competitive markets. The critique starts by examining the choices, preferences, utility functions, and demand curves, followed by examining production, costs, factor input demand functions and partial equilibrium, and ending with perfect competition and the supply curve. In the conclusion, the implications of the results will be extended to the firm and imperfectly competitive markets, and then the question whether general equilibrium theory or game theory can save neoclassical microeconomic theory.     

Different compositions of aggregate sentiment and their impact on macroeconomic stability

In recent times a number of agent-based models have been put forward that specify an aggregate sentiment as the difference between optimists and pessimists and let the agents endogenously switch between the two attitudes. The present paper extends this stylized framework by adding a third category, which may be viewed as neutrality. On this basis it then formulates a dynamic three-dimensional Goodwinian model with a special focus on multiple long-run equilibrium positions, which may emerge from just one and very natural nonlinearity in the switching process. The equilibria exhibit the same difference between optimists and pessimists and thus give rise to the same aggregate rate of growth, so that they cannot be distinguished at the macroeconomic level. The feature in which they nevertheless differ is the share of neutral agents. Remarkably, this affects stability. In particular, the trajectories may converge to one of two locally stable equilibrium points, or alternatively to a uniquely determined limit cycle. Coexistence of these attractors is absent in a two-state sentiment dynamics. Generally, the results may also be of interest to empirical business cycle research.     

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.     

Evenly rotating economy: A new modeling technique for an old equilibrium construct

In the middle of the twentieth century, just five years before Arrow and Debreu proved the existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy in the Walrasian system, Ludwig von Mises introduced the English-speaking world to his alternative equilibrium construct: the evenly rotating economy. In contrast to Arrow and Debreu, which characterizes equilibrium as a unique vector of prices and quantities, Mises depicts equilibrium as a pattern of behavior. After reviewing the Misesian conception of equilibrium and its failure to take hold in the profession, I turn to the modern literature. I contend that the evenly rotating economy is a special case of the now-prevalent class of search-theoretic exchange models. As such, I argue that this class of models is particularly well suited for applications considered by economists working in the Austrian tradition.     

On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange

In this paper, we consider a strategic equilibrium concept which extends Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmark of strategic market games proposed by Sahi and Yao (1989), we define the notion of Stackelberg equilibrium. This concept captures strategic interactions in interrelated markets on which a finite number of leaders and followers compete on quantities. Within the framework of an example, convergence and welfare are studied. More specifically, we analyze convergence toward the competitive equilibrium and make welfare comparisons with other strategic equilibria.     

科技型小微企业创新生态系统网络治理研究

建立一个完整、高效的创新生态系统是破解科技型小微企业创新困境、提高创新效率，以及助力新旧动能转换的有效途径。基于生态系统理论和演化动力学模型，构建科技型小微企业创新生态系统网络框架和网络联结模式，利用竞争、互利共生和捕食关系演化模型，分析演化模型的均衡点及其稳定条件。结果发现，创新生态位重叠程度决定了竞争激烈程度，系统演化均衡条件是主体间分工程度高，且嵌入适度。最后，从价值主体和机构主体两个方面〖JP〗提出推进科技型小微企业创新生态系统不断进化的治理策略。     

A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information

This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of short-run players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of ‘short-run’ players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some ‘long-run’ players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and “teach” the short-run players to maximize their long-run payoffs. All players optimize noisily. The proposed model nests an agent-based quantal-response equilibrium (AQRE) and the standard equilibrium models as special cases. Using data from 28 experimental sessions of trust and entry repeated games, including 8 previously unpublished sessions, the model fits substantially better than chance and much better than standard equilibrium models. Estimates show that most of the long-run players are sophisticated, and short-run players become more sophisticated with experience.     

Shackle on Equilibrium: A Critique

This paper presents a critical evaluation of Shackle's views on economic method. Shackle's arguments against equilibrium analysis are shown to apply to orthodox theory, which has subjectivist foundations, but not to the objectivist classical approach associated with Sraffa. The long-period equilibrium method is indispensable to the analysis of how market societies function. Moreover, since the classical theory contains no trace of the factor substitution mechanisms that underpin neoclassical orthodoxy, its explanations of distribution, employment and outputs must take explicit account of institutions, power and ethical norms. Thus there is no conflict between social economics and the method of the classical economists and Sraffa. On the contrary, the classical approach provides a rigorous framework for the investigation of the very issues that are at the center of institutional and social economics.     

Identification of firms’ beliefs in structural models of market competition

Firms make decisions under uncertainty and differ in their ability to collect and process information. As a result, in changing environments, firms have heterogeneous beliefs on the behaviour of other firms. This heterogeneity in beliefs can have important implications on market outcomes, efficiency and welfare. This paper studies the identification of firms’ beliefs using their observed actions—a revealed preference and beliefs approach. I consider a general structural model of market competition where firms have incomplete information and their beliefs and profits are nonparametric functions of decisions and state variables. Beliefs may be out of equilibrium. The framework applies both to continuous and discrete choice games and includes as particular cases models of competition in prices or quantities, auction models, entry games and dynamic games of investment decisions. I focus on identification results that exploit an exclusion restriction that naturally appears in models of competition: an observable variable that affects a firm's cost (or revenue) but does not have a direct effect on other firms’ profits. I present identification results under three scenarios—common in empirical industrial organization—on the data available to the researcher.     

现代经济学的基本分析框架与研究方法

本文讨论了现代经济学研究人类经济行为和经济现象所采用的基本分析框架和研究方法。一个规范经济理论的分析框架有五个基本组成部分:( 1 )界定经济环境;( 2 )设定行为假设;( 3 )给出制度安排;( 4)选择均衡结果;( 5)进行评估比较。基本的研究方法包括提供研究平台、建立参照系、给出度量标尺,及提供分析工具。本文也讨论了区分充分条件与必要条件的重要性;正确理解经济理论的作用,一般性与相对性;数学在经济学中的作用等。