A continuum of commitment

We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player can choose the level of adjustment cost to be paid in the last period to modify the action she announced in the first period. In the resulting continuum of commitment options, convexifying the choice between first-mover and second-mover advantage in pure strategies, we characterize when an intermediate adjustment-cost level is chosen in equilibrium. We show that the wastefulness of the adjustment cost may be in the players’ best interest, improving both of their individual net payoffs over making any fraction of the adjustment cost a side-payment from the first to the second player.     

A quantitative theory of social security without commitment

This paper investigates the determination of social security within a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model where agents live for many periods, and replacement rates are determined through voting in each period by forward looking agents. The distinctive feature is the study of Markov equilibrium policy outcomes which do not rest on a commitment mechanism. Versions of the model are calibrated to the US economic, policy, and demographic conditions. Even in the absence of commitment, the policy preferences of tax-paying working-age voters sustain a positive level of retirement benefits. This follows because the current choices about social security will have, at the time when the current voters will retire, a positive impact on the political support for social security and on the returns to savings. On the other hand, the projected decline in the U.S. population growth rate causes the replacement rate and the tax rate to decline. This quantitative response without commitment differs from that in the case when policies are committed at time zero.     

构建绩效考核新机制建设和谐环保新潞安

本文从理论角度出发,阐述了效率与公平并重、环境代价内部成本化、以人为本等绩效考核环节在构建和谐潞安中的体现,并指出政府职能的进一步转变及建立新的考核手段将是潞安高层次和谐的主导因素。     

Investment without regulatory commitment: The case of elastic demand

This paper analyzes a regulation game with asymmetric information and lack of commitment. It expands Besanko and Spulber's (1989) framework to the case of elastic demands using a generalized Nash solution. It is found that the most important property of the equilibrium with inelastic demand is not carried over to the elastic demand case, i.e., incomplete information worsens underinvestment, contrasting to Besanko and Spulber's result.     

Catch‐up cycle: A general equilibrium framework

Successful latecomers have certain stylized facts: an inverse U‐shaped GDP and capital per capita growth rates, high growth rates during the catch‐up period, and rapid structural changes. This paper proposes a general equilibrium framework and documents a catch‐up cycle that successful latecomers are likely to experience. Technology adoption or imitation and the diminishing marginal return to capital are the two driving forces of the catch‐up cycle. Technical gap and speed/efficiency of technical catching‐up are two fundamental determinants for successful catching‐up. Market competition, a beneficial financial system for resource allocation and openness are essential factors associated with speed/efficiency of technical catching‐up and thus with successful catching‐up. This paper concludes by a case study of China and sheds light on the different policy choices in various stages of the catch‐up cycle.     

Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption–saving decisions

We provide a new model of consumption–saving decisions which explicitly allows for internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of ‘over-consuming,’ or alternative control processes which require internal commitment but are immune to such temptations. Standard models in behavioral economics ignore such internal commitment mechanisms. We justify our model by showing that much of its construction is consistent with dynamic choice and cognitive control as they are understood in cognitive neuroscience.The dynamic consumption–saving behavior of an agent in the model is characterized by a simple consumption–saving goal and a cut-off rule for invoking control processes to inhibit automatic processes and implement the goal. We discuss empirical tests of our model with available individual consumption data and we suggest critical tests with brain-imaging and experimental data.     

The cohort effect of political change on language speaking: Evidence from Hong Kong

It has been proven that language is a symbol of culture and politics. This study investigates the cohort effect of Hong Kong's handover on the language spoken in adulthood based on the 2006 and 2011 Hong Kong population censuses. We find that Mandarin is more likely to be used by Hong Kong natives who were exposed to the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 during their school-age years, especially the generation that were exposed during their primary-school years. This cohort insisted on speaking Mandarin, even when the political environment changed from 2006 to 2011. Our evidence reveals that the political change that occurs during one's school-age years has a long-term impact on an individual's behaviour in adulthood. Further discussion indicates that exposure to political change such as regime transfer during school-age years impacts an individual's national identity.     

Contingent valuation: A new perspective

After several decades of academic research on the contingent valuation (CV) method a consistent behavioral explanation of ‘hypothetical bias’ is still lacking. Based on evidence from economics, economic psychology and the political sciences, I propose an explanation that is based on two simple working hypotheses about respondent behavior in contingent valuation surveys. The first hypothesis is that survey respondents are unable to form consistent preferences about unfamiliar goods unless the choice context offers reliable, informative cues which can be rationally exploited in simplified heuristics. The second hypothesis is that the probability and impact of strategic responses in dichotomous-choice questions about public goods depends on the extent to which the presented hypothetical costs differ from the actual costs. The literature on hypothetical bias is revisited in the light of these behavioral hypotheses. I find that the hypotheses are generally supported by the empirical data. Moreover, the hypotheses are able to explain several important empirical phenomena that previous research has not been able to explain. In particular, they solve the puzzle that pre-election polls, but not CV surveys, are able to predict actual referendum outcomes, and they explain why income effects on willingness to pay are lower in CV responses than in actual votes. If confirmed by further studies, the hypotheses will have important implications for future research and practice. First, the hypothetical costs presented in the dichotomous-choice question should to be close enough to the actual costs to be credible to all respondents. This can be achieved by specifying the costs as a percentage (rather than absolute) change in taxes. Second, the respondents should be given the option to answer based on information about the positions of large parties and interest groups with known political orientation rather than based on the raw policy information. Theory and evidence suggest that this new survey paradigm largely eliminates the fundamental problems of the conventional stated preference methods.     

The importance of government commitment in attracting firms: A dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy

Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.     

Strategic commitment with R&D: The case of Bertrand competition

When there is multiplicatively separable demand and firms compete in the price dimension, there is no room for strategic use of R&D by firms. Under a different demand situation, strategic use of R&D by firms competing in the price dimension reduces R&D spending, reduces output, increases price, and increases profits of each firm.     

Gains from commitment in monetary policy: Implications of the cost channel

Many empirical studies find robust evidence that marginal cost of production directly depends on the nominal rate of interest. This relationship induces a cost channel for monetary policy transmission. Although the empirical literature provides ample evidence for a cost channel, studies that evaluate the welfare gains from monetary policy commitment have so far entirely ignored its presence. This study shows that, overlooking the cost channel, one significantly underestimates the welfare gains from monetary policy commitment. I find that there is a robust positive relationship between the size of the cost channel and welfare gains from monetary policy commitment. Using a version of the new Keynesian model calibrated to the US economy, I find that failure to take into account the presence of a cost channel leads to an understatement of the gains from monetary policy commitment by an amount equivalent to a 0.48 percentage points permanent cut in quarterly inflation.     

盘活闲置资产培育新经济增长点

由于历史原因,清流县形成了由原军工企业的厂房、设备为主的闲置资产,总价值达1亿多元.如何变现盘活这批闲置资产,使之成为我县新的经济增长点,是一个必须认真探讨和尽快解决的问题.     

Inventing together: exploring the nature of international knowledge spillovers in Latin America

This paper studies the nature, sources and determinants of international patenting activity in Latin American countries (LACs) and examines the extent to which LACs benefit from R&D that is performed in the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). By using patents and patent citations from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, we trace sectoral knowledge flows from G-5 countries to LACs. We study the impact of three channels of knowledge flows: foreign R&D, patent citation-related spillovers, and face-to-face contact spillovers. Our results, based on data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, suggest that international knowledge spillovers from the G-5 countries were a significant determinant of inventive activity during the period 1988–2003. We find that the stock of ideas produced in the USA has a strong impact on the international patenting activity of these countries. Moreover, controlling for US-driven R&D effects, bilateral patent citations and face-to-face relationships between inventors are both important additional mechanisms of knowledge transmission. Some of our results suggest that the latter mechanism is more important than the former.     

Sentimental fools: a critique of Amartya Sen’s notion of commitment

Commitment is problematic because one sometimes pursues it against one’s interest. To solve it, the paper proposes a distinction between ‘non-binding’ and ‘binding’ commitments. Non-binding commitment is about ambition, such as becoming a great chef, which bolsters welfare in the pecuniary sense as well as self-respect. In contrast, ‘binding commitment’ is about honesty. While it diminishes welfare, it augments self-integrity. The neoclassical view reduces both commitments to interest, while the multiple-self approach separates both commitments from interest. The separation permits the confusion of sentimental fools, who enter commitments without regard to interest, with rational sentimentalists, who take interest into consideration.     

Incorporating contemporaneous residual relationships: A new approach

A direct (and easy to use) measure for capturing any information contained in the contemporaneous relationships among the residuals of different equations is derived herein from the moment generating function of the joint probability density function of the residuals.