Measuring the gains from trade under monopolistic competition

Abstract .  Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups.     

Testing for the Fisher hypothesis under regime shifts: an application to Asian countries

This article aims to provide new insights into trade effects of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), using an imperfect competition framework. The model combines the new gravity model approach with supply-demand export equations in imperfect competition. In this regard, the role of scale economies, product varieties and expectations is explored. Facing the lack of international data on scale economies, we also develop a translog production system which makes it possible to obtain reliable estimates of this factor. For a more rigorous treatment of the endogeneity problem in the model, we make use of an instrumental GMM panel estimator. Results show limited effects of GAFTA on regional trade in imperfect competition, due to market segmentation and the predominance of inter-industry trade. In addition, the fitted intra-GAFTA trade values are far beyond the actual ones. This suggests that GAFTA countries could benefit from deeper regional trade integration. In this regard, the Arab Spring creates new opportunities to reinforce trade integration as a means of grasping additional trade gains in this area.     

Product differentiation and the gains from trade under Bertrand duopoly

Abstract.  In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important case seems to have been overlooked, and that is the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. Although many authors have analysed the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot duopoly and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade, there has been no thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly. In this article we present a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, and it is shown that there are always gains from trade. JEL Classification: F12     

Gains From Price Rigidity

This paper shows that there are substantial gains from price rigidity in an imperfectly competitive economy. Firms can increase their profits by agreeing some markets as markets of long-term contracts, of which prices are determined in advance to other spot market prices. Although they determine prices non-cooperatively in both markets, the mutual commitment making some markets' prices predetermined induces a price–price spiral between firms, which results in substantial gains for both firms. These gains outweigh the cost of inflexibility arising from price rigidity even though demand fluctuation is large and marginal cost is increasing.
JEL Classification Numbers: E30, E32.     

Structural Estimation of Variety Gains from Trade Integration in Asia

This article studies the variety gains of trade integration in Asia. Adopting a heterogeneous firm model of trade of monopolistic competition allowed us to estimate not only the welfare gains because of country specialisation, but also the variety gains arising from trade integration. The underlying structural parameters were estimated econometrically, based on a large panel of firm‐level data for the Asian economies (ORIANA). Our empirical findings suggest that, when relaxing the assumption of firm homogeneity and accounting for export market entry costs, the gains from trade integration are higher than in conventional models with representative firms.     

Trade and Gains from Trade Between Profit-maximizing and Labour-managed Countries with Imperfect Competition

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade.     

Existence of equilibrium in the Helpman–Krugman model of international trade with imperfect competition

Helpman and Krugman (Market structure and foreign trade. Increasing returns, imperfect competition, and the international economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1985) provide a synthesis of the traditional factor proportions theory of international trade and the theory of international trade due to the exploitation of scale economies in imperfectly competitive markets. They derive illuminating results about trade patterns and gains from trade, among other things, leaving unanswered the question of existence of equilibrium, however. The central significance of their characterization of properties of free trade equilibria with inter-industry and intra-industry trade calls for an analysis of existence of equilibrium. This is the object of the present paper. We prove the existence of equilibrium for the integrated multi-sector multi-factor Helpman–Krugman economy without national borders. Well-known conditions ensure that the world economy under free trade reproduces this equilibrium and thus establishes existence of a free trade equilibrium. Since an equilibrium of the integrated economy is not necessarily unique, the same holds true for a free trade equilibrium.     

Tacit Collusion and Non–uniform Prices

This article examines the possibility of building a tacit agreement between price–setters that yields non–uniform pricing. It is shown that firms with market power may restrict competition not only by alternating between periods of high prices and low prices (Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)), but also by always charging different prices and taking turns in being the monopolist. In contrast with the existing literature, price variability is not due to imperfect monitoring, stochastic demand or short–run pricing rigidity but it is a pure supply side effect. The author provides the necessary conditions to have collusion with non–uniform pricing, and shows that the latter dominates a fixed price solution. In terms of competition policy this result confirms that no price parallelism is not, per se , a signal of no collusion.     

Markups in the Euro area and the US over the period 1981–2004: a comparison of 50 sectors

This article provides estimates of price–marginal cost ratios or mark-ups for 50 sectors in eight Euro area countries and the US over the period 1981–2004. The estimates are obtained applying the methodology developed by Roger (J Polit Econ 103:316–330, 1995) on the EU KLEMS March 2007 database. Five stylized facts are derived. First, perfect competition can be rejected for almost all sectors in all countries; markup ratios are generally larger than 1. Second, average markups are heterogeneous across countries. Third, markups are heterogeneous across sectors, with services having higher markups on average than manufacturing. Fourth, services sectors generally have higher markups in the euro area than the US, whereas the pattern for manufacturing is the reverse. Fifth, there is no evidence that there is a broad range change in markups from the 1980s to the 1990s.     

Multi-Product Firms and Flexible Manufacturing in the Global Economy

We present a new model of multi-product firms (MPFs) and flexible manufacturing, and explore its implications in partial and general oligopolistic equilibrium. Globalization affects the scale and scope (or intensive margin and intra-firm extensive margin) of MPFs through a competition effect and a demand effect. The model highlights a new source of gains from trade: productivity increases as firms become "leaner and meaner", concentrating on their core competence; but also a new source of losses from trade: product variety may fall. Our results also hold under free entry, which allows in addition for adjustment along the traditional inter-firm extensive margin.     

The Voluntary (Private) Production of Public Goods,the Gains From Trade,and Comparative Advantage*

Any (finite) number of privately produced public goods are incorporated into a general trade-theory model of private goods and factors. Postulating Cournot-Nash behavior, a necessary condition for gainful trade is derived. Potential trade gains are related to the law of comparative advantage in private goods and the change in the underproduction of public goods. A sufficient condition is also proven. Trade gains/losses are compared for more or less populous economies. All the results have analogues in the literature on imperfect competition and/or increasing returns to scale.     

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition*

A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of government revenue. Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point‐for‐point increases in destination‐based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national welfare and total government revenue. This note explores the implications of imperfect competition for this strategy. Examples are easily found in which this strategy unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.     

Product differentiation, competition, and international trade

In this paper the two workhorse theories of international trade under imperfect competition – Krugman's taste for variety model and Brander's strategic intra-industry trade model – are integrated into a single analytical framework. A quadratic utility function allows for a nesting of these two theories by postulating a consumer taste for variety over differentiated products, where the extent of product differentiation is linked to the intensity of strategic interaction among firms. The model yields intuitive predictions on the effects of the degree of product differentiation on the volume of trade and on the composition of the gains from trade under imperfect competition. JEL classification: F12
Différenciation de produits, concurrence et commerce international. Ce mémoire intègre deux théories connues du commerce international en régime de concurrence imparfaite – le modèle du goût pour la variété de Krugman et celui du commerce intra-industrie de Brander – en un seul cadre analytique. Une fonction d'utilité quadratique permet d'encadrer ces deux théories en postulant que le consommateur a un goût pour la variété dans une gamme de produits différenciés où le degré de différenciation est reliéà l'intensité de l'interaction stratégique entre les entreprises. Le modèle engendre des prévisions quant aux effets du degré de différenciation des produits sur le volume de commerce international et la composition des gains résultant de ce commerce en régime de concurrence imparfaite.     

Commercial Policy Towards Multinational Corporations Under Imperfect Information*

This paper examines host country government (HCG) commercial policy towards imports resulting from intrafirm trade conducted by a multinational corporation (MNC). the effectiveness of the HCG's commercial policy is impaired by its limited information about the MNC's cost of production. the commercial policy consists of restrictions on intrafirm transactions. We construct and characterize the optimal commercial policy under imperfect information and find that under imperfect information the optimal policy entails a distorted transfer price and a lower level of intrafirm trade relative to the full information case. Welfare implications of commercial policy under imperfect information are also examined.     

Imperfect competition and indeterminacy of aggregate output

This paper shows imperfect competition can lead to indeterminacy in aggregate output in a standard DSGE model with imperfect competition. Indeterminacy arises in the model from the composition of aggregate output. In sharp contrast to the indeterminacy literature pioneered by Benhabib and Farmer [J. Benhabib, R. Farmer, Indeterminacy and increasing returns, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1) (1994) 19-41] and Gali [J. Gali, Monopolistic competition, business cycles, and the composition of aggregate demand, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1) (1994) 73-96], indeterminacy in our model is global; hence it is more robust to structural parameters. In addition, sunspots in our model can be autocorrelated. The paper provides a justification for exogenous variations in desired markups, which play an important role as a source of cost-push shocks in the monetary policy literature. Our model outperforms a standard RBC model driven by technology shocks in several dimensions, including the volatility of labor market and the hump-shaped output dynamics.     

异质性企业贸易理论的起源与发展

本文旨在系统性地探究异质性企业贸易理论的起源与发展过程。首先对促使该理论诞生的实证挑战从企业的选择性出口、市场进入成本、资源再分配三个方面进行了综述;然后指出该理论发展的两条脉络和各自的理论基础,并在此基础上从平均生产率和贸易利得两个角度阐述了异质性企业贸易理论和新贸易理论之间的紧密联系,二者最大的差别便在于对边际生产成本的处理上,前者以边际成本的异质性替代企业的异质性,后者则忽略了企业之间的异质性。同时,针对国内学者的一些认识,本文也提出了自己的看法。     

出口的资源配置效应——基于中国制造业的经验检验

Melitz(2003)通过引入企业的生产率异质性,发现出口可以迫使行业内低效率的企业退出市场,继而通过行业内资源的重新配置实现行业总体生产率水平的提升。文章选取1999-2007年间中国制造业行业层面数据为样本,在分别运用索洛余值法、随机边界分析法(SFA)和数据包络分析法(DEA)对行业生产率水平进行测算的基础上,对贸易自由度与行业总体生产效率之间的关系进行经验检验,结果发现中国的出口对于行业加总的生产率水平的促进作用并不显著,没有明显证据表明异质性企业贸易理论提出的这一新的获得贸易利益的途径在中国的存在。最后,文章建议应该进一步消除各种阻碍自由贸易的壁垒,努力盈造行业内公平、有序的竞争氛围,继而获得由出口引致的通过行业内资源重新配置带来的贸易利得。     

The “Dark Side” of Deregulation: How Competition Affects the Size of the Shadow Economy

This paper builds a theory that explains the dramatic expansion of the underground economy in the late 1990s by the sharp increase in market competition worldwide. I model an oligopoly game where firms first decide on entry and sector, and then compete in price. Operating in the underground sector reduces variable costs, but comes at the risk of being detected and fined. As competition intensifies (i.e., as consumers become more and more price‐sensitive), underground firms attract more demand, thus stealing business and profits from official firms. As a consequence, more firms enter the underground economy. A lenient policy toward the underground economy may increase welfare when markups are high, but will be welfare‐detrimental when markups are low.     

Market, Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium

This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model of an economy with an arbitrary number of industries under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. The market structure of the model economy is expressed by two basic sets of parameters: the degree of competition, and the markup ratio prevailing in each industry. The government is supposed to control the degree of competition through antitrust policy and the markup ratio through entry policy. Using this model, I re-examine the results of traditional competitive equilibrium analysis and explore the effects of competition policies on economic welfare and international trade.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D50, F11, F12, L13, L41.     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.