An empirical note on the impact of federal deposit insurance on bank failures in the U.S.

This study empirically examines the impact of federal deposit insurance coverage on the failure rate of commercial banks in the U.S. over the 1963–91 period. The analysis allows for the potential bank failure rate impact of the growth rate of real GDP, the real prime lending rate, the real cost of funds, and the commercial bank tangible capital-to-asset ratio, while measuring federal deposit insurance coverage as the percentage of deposits at federally insured banks that was covered by federal deposit insurance. The instrumental variables' estimates indicate that the greater the extent of federal deposit insurance coverage, the higher the bank failure rate.     

Anti-insurance: Analysing the Health Insurance System in Australia

This paper develops a model to analyse the Australian health insurance system when individuals differ in their health risk and this risk is private information. In Australia private insurance both duplicates and supplements public insurance. We show that, absent any other interventions, this results in implicit transfers of wealth from those most at risk of adverse health to those least at risk. At the social level, these transfers represent a mean preserving spread of income, creating social risk and lowering welfare – what we call anti-insurance. The recently introduced rebate on private health insurance can improve welfare by alleviating anti-insurance.     

HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES AMONG OLDER DISPLACED WORKERS

This article investigates the relationship between health insurance coverage and employment behavior among older workers with an involuntary job loss. It finds that various sources of health insurance are available to mitigate the circumstances where employer-sponsored health insurance is terminated when older workers lose jobs involuntarily. However, older displaced workers remain less likely to be insured than comparable nondisplaced workers by 7.6 percentage points one year after the job loss. The analysis also reveals that having secure health coverage before job displacement is associated with lower probabilities of reemployment and longer postdisplacement nonemployment spells. (JEL I12 , J32 , J63 , J14 )     

The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection

Kaplow (1992) shows in a complete-information environment that allowing income tax deductions for losses as partial insurance is undesirable in the presence of private insurance markets. This paper elaborates on Kaplow's finding by studying two extreme types of asymmetric information structures in private insurance markets: Either the insured or insurers possess superior information. It is shown that our derived result is consistent with Kaplow's if the insured have superior information; however, Kaplow's negative conclusion with respect to the income tax deduction will be overturned if insurers have superior information instead. A policy implication from our finding is that whether or not to allow an income tax deduction for losses needs to be more refined and, specifically, it should be tailored to the “adverse selection” information structures of private insurance.     

Analysis on demand‐ and supply‐side responses during the expansion of health insurance coverage in Vietnam: Challenges and policy implications toward universal health coverage

This study examines how the demand and supply of healthcare services have responded to the expansion of health insurance coverage in Vietnam by using biyearly provincial panel data from 2006 to 2014. The results of our analysis indicate significant progress towards universal health coverage (UHC) in Vietnam, with the expansion of health insurance coverage being accompanied by increases in admissions and inpatient days. However, some concerns remain. Our findings show a positive response of supply capacity only in terms of doctors and nurses at higher‐level hospitals (provincial hospitals), and none in other relevant aspects. Moreover, we find no positive response of the number of outpatient visits. Another concern is the issue of financial protection. The decline in out‐of‐pocket payments is not significant throughout our observation period, suggesting that lowering the cost of healthcare is not straightforward and that the expansion of health insurance coverage alone cannot achieve this. We believe that the Vietnamese experience has valuable implications for other emerging and developing countries, considering that the expansion of health insurance coverage is likely to increase utilization of healthcare services significantly and that the supply side needs to be prepared for the increase.     

Does health insurance reduce illness-related worker absenteeism?

The objective of this article is to examine whether having health insurance reduces illness-related absenteeism among older workers. A nationally representative sample of 1780 workers in the United States, aged 52–64, are drawn from the 2004–2006 Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Binary logistic regressions and censored Tobit models are estimated for workers’ likelihood of missing work days due to illness and the number of illness-related work days missed, respectively, while explicitly addressing the possibility of insurance-selection effects. The findings suggest that over a 12-month period, older workers without health insurance are as likely as insured workers to miss work days due to illness and there are no differences in the number of days missed between insured and uninsured workers. However, there is strong evidence that poor baseline health, onset of new diseases and longer hospitalization significantly increase an older worker's absenteeism at work. These results suggest that having health insurance does not affect illness-related absenteeism among older workers in the US. Future research examining other aspects of worker productivity, such as ‘presenteeism’, and the longer term effects of insurance on productivity can extend our understanding of the role of health insurance in the workplace.     

How well does the U.S. Government provide health insurance for infants?

The debate over universal health insurance (HI) in the U.S., as well as the proper role of the government in the HI market, has been quite heated. Fueling this debate is the uncertainty pertaining to the benefits of HI in general, and the relative benefits of private versus public HI in particular. This uncertainty stems from non-random selection into different types of HI (private, public, or none) in combination with the absence of experimental data. Moreover, the lack of typical exclusion restrictions complicates identification of the causal effects of different HI types. Here, the aim is to assess the causal impact of public HI, relative to private HI, on the insured infant’s health. To that end, this study employs the methodology proposed in Altonji et al. (J Polit Econ 113:151–184, 2005) which trades off what can be learned in exchange for not requiring an exclusion restriction. Nonetheless, the method remains quite informative in the present context. Specifically, using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey, Birth Cohort, along with several measures of infant health, the results suggest that while public HI is associated with worse infant health, this association disappears once selection on observables and unobservables is considered. In fact, the estimated effects of public HI are predominantly positive once both types of selection are admitted. Further analysis reveals that the likely beneficial effects of public HI are due to greater coverage for infants at a much lower cost.     

Supplementary private health insurance and health care utilization of people aged 50+

Does supplementary private health insurance (PHI) coverage influence health care utilization in countries where the coverage ratio with public health insurance is high? I estimate this effect using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Handling the potential endogeneity of supplementary insurance coverage and the large fraction of zero observations in the utilization models influences the empirical results. I show that the effect of PHI coverage on inpatient and outpatient care utilization is not trivial even in countries with generous public health funding. The main finding is that supplementary PHI coverage increases dental care utilization, but decreases the visits to general practitioners. Private insurance is estimated to have little and insignificant influence on the utilization of inpatient care and outpatient specialist care. The magnitude of the effect of supplementary PHI on health care utilization varies with the characteristics of the health care systems.     

Broker monitoring of premium adequacy: the role of contingent commissions

Contingent commissions, which are payments made by an insurer to brokers based on the volume and profitability of insurance placed with the insurer, have been criticized as damaging to the relationship between the insured and its broker. The argument is made that contingent commission payments encourage brokers to select insurers for their clients based on the potential to earn contingent commissions, rather than on the needs of the insured. We argue that contingent commission payments, which while directly paid by the insurer are ultimately paid by the insured through higher premiums, are beneficial to insureds because they provide an incentive for the broker to place their coverage with an insurer that is charging an adequate premium. We contend that although inadequate premiums are perhaps good for the insured in the short term, in the longer term, inadequate premiums will result in price hikes or coverage restrictions that are harmful to the insureds. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that insurers who pay contingent commissions experience less price fluctuation over the underwriting cycle than insurers who do not pay contingent commissions in the US property and casualty insurance industry.     

Do Consumers Purchase Too Much Health Insurance? The Role of Market Power in Health‐Care Markets

Several authors have suggested that consumers purchase too much health insurance in private markets. We readdress this issue within a model that combines excess health‐care demand due to health insurance with market power due to monopolistic production of health‐care services. We evaluate the market equilibrium in terms of consumer welfare and social welfare. The consumer welfare criterion suggests that in the market equilibrium consumers in fact purchase too much health insurance coverage. The social welfare criterion, in contrast, suggests that because profits of the health‐care industry are properly accounted for, consumers should purchase more insurance coverage than they choose to do in the market equilibrium.     

Galtonian Regression, Company Age and Job Generation 1986–95

We study the growth of employment at the company level using a very large database of company accounts. More than 31 000 independent companies were studied over 1986–95, though we concentrate on the 8 103 companies which survived throughout the period. We find that smaller companies grew relatively to larger ones in each of the cyclical phases studied, 1986–89, 1989–92 and 1993–95. But their advantage diminished steadily. Despite the negative effect of size on employment growth, and downsizing amongst the largest companies, over half the net new jobs created in survivors were in companies with more than 500 employees.     

REFORM OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM: AN APPRAISAL OF THE FHLBB AND FDIC STUDIES

This paper presents an appraisal of the studies of the deposit insurance system submitted to Congress by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in compliance with the Garn-St. German legislation of 1982. The purpose of these studies was to assess the current structure of the deposit insurance system in light of the changes in the regulation of depository institutions mandated in recent legislation
Many observers of the financial system believe that, as a result of recent regulatory changes, the deposit insurance agencies do not have sufficient power to control risk-taking of insured institutions. These two reports present an assessment of mechanism which could be used to limit the risk of the deposit insurance agencies
The emphasis in both reports is on ways in which the amount of market discipline applied to insured institutions could be increased. Both reports identify essentially three ways in which this might be accomplished. First, risk-adjusted deposit insurance prices might be employed. Second, the volume of uninsured creditors might be increased, either through changes in limits of insurance coverage or through imposition of requirements for use of subordinated debt. Third, the current public deposit insurance system might be partially supplanted by one that is private. This paper evaluates the merits of each of these proposals and compares the positions taken by the FHLBB and the FDIC on the issues     

THE EFFECT OF PARENTAL MEDICAID EXPANSIONS ON CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE

Research on public health insurance expansions has typically focused on those targeted by the expansions; we estimate the spillover effects of parental Medicaid expansions on the insurance coverage of their children. Expanding parental Medicaid eligibility may increase participation by already‐eligible, uninsured children by increasing the value of Medicaid enrollment for the entire family. However, parental expansions may also generate crowd out from private coverage. Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation during a period of major parental Medicaid expansions, we find substantial effects of the expansions on the Medicaid participation of children, with evidence of crowd out among some subsamples. (JEL H51, I13, I38)     

The effect of non-employment-based health insurance program on firm's offering of health insurance: Evidence from the social health insurance system in China

To achieve universal health insurance coverage, many developing countries have established a segmented health insurance system, which contains separate programs for workers with formal employment and residents without formal employment. A potential concern with such a segmented system is that the establishment of a non-employment-based insurance program may generate a disincentive for firms to provide health insurance benefits to workers. In this study, we empirically examine this crowd-out effect of a non-employment-based insurance program, the Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI), in China. Exploiting city-by-year variations in the roll-out process of the program and utilizing a unique administrative dataset on Chinese firms, we find that the enactment of URBMI reduced a firm's offering of an employment-based health insurance program by a statistically significant 0.94-1.29 percentage point. This crowd-out effect was stronger among domestic private firms, new firms, and firms that are individual-owned.     

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re‐examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity.     

The Employment Effects of Gender Discrimination in Australia 1994–95

Interpreting the unexplained component of the gender wage gap as indicative of discrimination, the empirical literature to date has tended to ignore the potential impact wage discrimination may have on employment. Clearly, employment effects will arise if discrimination lowers the female offered wage and the labour supply curve is upward sloping. The empirical analysis employs the ABS Income Distribution Survey 1994–95 and finds evidence of both wage and associated employment effects. The analysis is replicated for the earlier period 1989–90. A comparison across time is of interest given the substantial deregulation of the Australian labour market over the period.     

Determinants of private health insurance coverage among Mexican American men 2010–2013

Abstract

Background: Private health insurance (PHI) represents the largest source of insurance for Americans. Hispanic Americans have one of the lowest rates of PHI coverage. The largest group in the US Hispanic population are Mexican Americans; they account for about two in every three Hispanics. One in every three Mexican Americans aged 64 years and under did not have health insurance coverage. Mexican Americans have the most unfavorable health insurance coverage of any population group in the nation.

Objectives: The objective is to determine the factors associated with the gap in PHI coverage between Mexican American and non-Hispanic American men.

Methods: This study used the National Health Interview Surveys (2010–2013) as the sample. A non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition was run, estimating the explained and unexplained gap in PHI coverage between the groups. Several robustness tests of the model were also included.

Results: This study estimates that 44.4% of employed Mexican American men are covered by PHI compared to 79.5% of non-Hispanic American men. Nearly 60% of employed Mexican American men were found to be foreign born, 35% have an educational attainment less than a high school degree, and 40% are likely to have language barriers. Decomposition results show that income, low educational attainment, being foreign-born, and language barriers diminished the probability of private health insurance coverage for Mexican Americans, and that 10% of the gap is unexplained.

Conclusions: Most of the difference in the PHI rate between Mexican American men and non-Hispanic men is explained by observable differences in group characteristics: education, language, and immigration status. About 10% of the difference can be attributed to discrimination under the traditional interpretation of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The PHI rate gap is large and persistent for Mexican American men.     

Public provision of health insurance and aggregate saving in an overlapping generations model with endogenous health risk: The South Korean case

This paper examines the effect of expanding public health insurance in South Korea on medical expenditures and aggregate saving using an overlapping generations model with endogenous health risk. South Korea had a substantial underinsured population, which is aging rapidly. Higher public health insurance benefits reduce individual medical expenditure and health risks but lead to a modest decline in individual and aggregate saving. Even after the expansion, the medical care coverage remains incomplete, and the elderly face a substantial risk of out-of-pocket medical expenditures.