Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy

We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is stronger with compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for chief financial officers (CFOs) than for chief executive officers (CEOs), suggesting that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy. They also highlight firms within which the moral hazard concerns fueled by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance are most relevant.     

The Association between Board Composition and Corporate Pension Policies

This study examines the role of board composition in the determination of pension policies. The results suggest that the proportion of outside directors serving on the board is positively related with pension plan funding levels. In addition, the proportion of outside directors mitigates the relation between financial distress risk and plan underfunding. Last, as firms approach distress, boards with a greater proportion of outside directors tend to allocate a lower fraction of plan assets to riskier securities. Together, our findings suggest that outside directors are mindful of their obligations toward pension plan beneficiaries.     

External social networks and earnings management

Using a sample of U.S. listed firms for the 2000–2017 period, we examine how external social networks of top executives and directors affect earnings management in their firms. We find that well-connected firms are more aggressive in managing earnings through both accruals and real activities and that the results are robust after controlling for internal executive social ties. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that earnings management decreases after a socially connected executive or director dies. Additional analysis shows that connections forged by past professional working experiences have a greater impact on earnings management than connections forged by education and other social activities. Moreover, CFO social networks have a greater influence on earnings management than CEO social networks. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms, finding that 1) firms that are socially connected to each other show more similarities in their earnings management than firms that do not share a connection, and 2) more connected firms are less likely to incur accounting restatements. Collectively, our findings indicate that the external social networks of top executives and directors are important determinants of both their accrual- and real activity-based earnings management.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Pension Funding Regulations and Actuarial Gains and Losses

With pervasive pension funding deficits, Korean firms have been under pressure to improve their funding levels. We examine whether firms have incentives to set obligation‐decreasing pension assumptions when they have large pension deficits (pension obligations in excess of plan assets) and when they make insufficient contributions to external pension funds. We find that firms report larger actuarial gains (or smaller actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities when their pension funding ratio (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to defined benefit obligations) is lower and when contributions to plan assets relative to pension service costs are smaller. Next, upon the introduction of a minimum pension funding guideline, we find that the effect of the funding ratio and contributions to pension funds on actuarial gains and losses is more pronounced for firms whose funding ratios are slightly below the minimum funding ratio than it is for firms whose funding ratios exceed or fall short of the minimum by a large margin. Our results indicate that firms opportunistically exercise discretion regarding corporate pension accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards to comply with pension funding regulations, thereby reducing perceived pension deficits.     

Management friendship and insider opportunism

This study documents a significant increase in both trading activity and profitability of opportunistic top managers when a CEO develops a strong connection with subordinate executives through co-opting the executives who share social ties with him/her. This baseline evidence is robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative measures of management connection and insider opportunism, as well as controlling for other CEO and board attributes. Further analyses reveal that interpersonal connections between top managers are more likely to increase opportunistic insider trading in firms with lower-quality voluntary disclosures, more sociable executives, and relaxing legal barriers to insider trades. Increased insider opportunism in response to the CEO’s connection with other top executives engenders less informative stock prices and depresses stock market liquidity. Finally, insider trades in firms with stronger management connection are more predictive of future stock returns.     

CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy

To investigate CEOs' incentives to liquidate their firms, we examine the effects of insider ownership and compensation in stock options on 30 voluntary liquidation decisions by industrial firms in the period 1975–1986. We find that liquidation decisions are influenced by CEO incentive plans and increase shareholder value. Firms with more outside board members, smaller market-to-book ratios, and attempts by outsiders to gain control are more likely to be liquidated. Although few top executives of liquidating firms subsequently take comparable jobs, at least 41% of CEOs who downsize are made better off by liquidation.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?

We examine corporate financial and investment decisions made by female executives compared with male executives. Male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives. Further, acquisitions made by firms with male executives have announcement returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female executive firms, and debt issues also have lower announcement returns for firms with male executives. Female executives place wider bounds on earnings estimates and are more likely to exercise stock options early. This evidence suggests men exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared with women.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

Pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities: A contingent claims analysis using Parisian options

We analyze the market-consistent valuation of pension liabilities in a contingent claim framework whereby a knock-out barrier feature is applied to capture early regulatory closure of a pension plan. We investigate two cases which we call “immediate closure procedure” and “delayed closure procedure”. In an immediate closure procedure, when the assets value hits the regulatory boundary, the pension plan is terminated immediately. Whereas in a delayed closure procedure, a grace period is given to the pension fund for reorganization and recovery before premature closure is executed. The framework is then used to construct fair pension deals. Furthermore, we provide rules for deriving the optimal recovery period in pension regulation using utility analysis and interconnect the recovery period to the regulatory liquidation probability.     

Executive compensation and informed trading in acquiring firms around merger announcements

This paper analyzes informed trading in acquiring firms through (stock) merger announcements. We show that pre-announcement abnormal option volumes in acquiring firms strongly increase ahead of a stock merger (by approximately 300%). Furthermore, we show that the direction of option trades (puts or calls) prior to an announcement can predict post-announcement stock returns. Our results also indicate that higher wealth-to-performance sensitivities of top executives are related to higher abnormal put than call option trading before stock merger announcements. Overall, our results support the view that top executives have a hedging motive. They tend to purchase protection against, e.g., confounding (negative) information policies and/or empire-building mergers with negative NPVs, in order to avoid short-term salary losses (lower bonuses, lower stock options, etc.).     

Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?

This paper examines the impact of a defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze on the sponsoring firm's risk and risk-taking activities. Using a sample of firms declaring a hard freeze on their DB plans between 2002 and 2007, we observe an increase in total risk (proxied by the standard deviation of EBITDA and asset beta), equity risk (standard deviation of returns), and credit risk following a DB-plan freeze. The increase in credit risk is reflected in a decline in credit ratings and an increase in bond yields for freezing firms. When we examine investment strategies, we observe a shift in investment from capital expenditures before the freeze to more-risky R&D projects after the freeze, and an increase in leverage. These strategies (increased focus on R&D and higher leverage) increase the operating and financial risk the firm faces. Overall, we observe an increase in risk-taking following DB plan freezes, consistent with theories that DB plans act as “inside debt” that aligns managers’ interests with bondholders’.     

Pension return assumptions and shareholder-employee risk-shifting

Firm managers of defined-benefit (DB) pension plan sponsors reveal their primary motives — risk-shifting or risk-management — through their assumed expected rates of return (ERRs) on the plan assets. Managers with risk-shifting motives choose high ERRs to exploit flexible internal financing from employees via pension underfunding. Those with risk-management motives choose low ERRs to reduce future cash-flow uncertainty by improving the pension funding status. We examine if ERRs predict the firms’ future cash-flow allocation between pension funding and corporate investments, in a Japanese sample that mitigates the selection bias concern for US DB plan sponsors. Using dynamic panel regressions that control for lagged dependent variables, firms’ business prospects, and unobserved fixed effects, we show that higher ERRs precede higher capital investments, R&D expenses, and net pension obligations while revealing managerial aggression, especially among firms with high external financing costs. Higher ERRs predict higher market-to-book ratios for the firms with larger R&Ds and/or underfunding, suggesting that the risk-shifting channel of internal financing with high ERRs can help alleviate underinvestment problems.     

Top executives’ early-life experience and financial disclosure quality: impact from the Great Chinese Famine

This study investigates the impact of top executives’ Great Chinese Famine experience on firm financial disclosure quality. We find firms led by top executives who experienced the great famine in early life are less likely to conduct fraudulent financial reporting. The famine effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), smaller-cap, lower-profitability level firms and firms with weaker external monitoring. Further evidence suggests that top executives with great famine experience show greater tendency to implement secured debt structure, effective internal control and spend less on entertainment and travel costs, which in turn reduce the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting.     

Executive compensation, share repurchases and investment expenditures: econometric evidence from US firms

This paper modeled the dynamic inter-relationships between average salary, bonus, and stock options granted to top executives of 700 US firms using a merged ExecuComp and Compustat database. The effects of stock options granted and exercised on firms’ share repurchases and research and development and investment expenditures were investigated, taking into account simultaneity and distributional misspecification aspects. First, firms’ total assets, intangible assets, market-to-book value, and share repurchases were positively associated with the values of stock options granted. Second, stock options exercised in the previous year were significant predictors of share repurchases indicating that firms avoided dilution of earnings per share. Third, share repurchases and stock options granted were negatively associated with expenditures on research and development and long-term investments. Overall, the results suggest that high levels of stock options granted to executives and share repurchases are unlikely to have beneficial effects for raising future productivity.     

Executive option exercises and financial misreporting

Several recent papers document that the magnitude of potential gains from stock-based compensation is positively related to the likelihood of misreporting. In a sample of firms that announce restatements of their financial statements from 1997 to 2002, we examine whether managers realize these potential gains occurring from their accounting choices. After controlling for diversification needs and stock price impact, we find no significant evidence of higher option exercises by executives in the misreported years. However, for firms that are more likely to have made deliberate aggressive accounting choices, we find significant evidence of higher option exercises. For these firms, option exercises are higher by 20–60% in comparison to industry and size matched nonrestating firms. Options exercises by executives are also increasing in the magnitude of the restatement as captured by the effect of the restatement on net income. These higher option exercises tend to be more pervasive and are not just confined to the CEO and CFO of the firm.     

The Effects of Executive,Firm, and Board Characteristics on Executive Exit

We estimate a hazard model of the probability of top corporate executives exiting their firms over the period 1996–2010. Our main findings are that: (1) female executives have greater likelihoods of exit than males, (2) the likelihood of exit increases with the independence of the board and decreases with the fraction of the board that is female and the average age of board members, and (3) a higher percentage of independent directors on the board lowers the probability of exit more for females than for males. Further, controlling for exit risk reduces the well‐documented compensation differential between men and women.     

Cash-Balance Plan Conversions: Evidence on Excise Taxes and Implicit Contracts

Firms that wish to switch from a traditional defined‐benefit pension plan to a defined‐contribution‐type plan have a choice between converting to a cash‐balance plan or replacing the defined‐benefit plan with a full‐fledged defined‐contribution plan. According to Ippolito and Thompson's (1999; Industrial Relations, 39: 228‐245) excise tax avoidance hypothesis, a number of firms have switched to cash‐balance plans because conversion allows the firm to avoid excise taxes on its excess pension assets. In contrast to existing studies, our evidence supports the excise tax avoidance hypothesis. Cash‐balance plan conversions also have been criticized for imposing pension losses on older employees. The implicit contract theory of pensions predicts that poorly performing firms would be the ones that would impose losses on employees. However, our evidence indicates that firms converting to cash‐balance plans typically are not poor performers.