From command-and-control to market-based environmental policies: Optimal transition timing and China’s heterogeneous environmental effectiveness

Despite the rich literature on command-and-control and market-based environmental policies, the transition between them has received relatively less attention. This paper identifies that there exists an optimal transition timing from command-and-control policies to market-based policies by analyzing the trade-off between the abatement cost and innovation compensation effects of environmental regulations, and the optimal transition timing occurs when the marginal opportunity cost of pollution abatement equals the marginal output of capital input. Using province-level data of 30 regions in China from 2007 to 2015, we measure environmental efficiency by the slack-based model with desirable and undesirable output, and adopt the spatially adaptive semi-parametric model to carry out our empirical research, which shows that command-and-control policies, rather than market-based policies, promote China’s environmental efficiency. Enhancing investment in technological innovation contributes to improving environmental efficiency for both types of policies. Finally, the effect of such policies on environmental efficiency remains heterogeneous across regions.     

IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ARE MARKETS THE SOLUTION?

While market approaches are clearly valuable for improving U.S. environmental policy, they cannot solve all of the problems, and not necessarily the most difficult ones. They can ensure that a given total abatement is achieved at minimum cost. But, if pollution damages depend on how abatement effort is allocated among polluters, this is not necessarily the most desirable outcome. One also needs to be sure that the potential gains from trade implicit in market solutions will actually be realized within some given time; the empirical evidence here is not necessarily promising. Rather than how aggregate abatement should be distributed among polluters, the chief difficulty often lies in determining how much overall abatement is required. A key factor that economists tend to overlook is the difficulty of ascertaining just how benefits vary with abatement effort. Uncertainty and risk aversion in connection with the marginal benefit curve may explain regulatory actions that are otherwise hard to justify.     

Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications

The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.      

CONCEPTUAL AMD STATISTICAL ISSUES IN DEVELOPING ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES-RECENT U.S. EXPERIENCE

The purpose of this paper is to describe the conceptual and statistical basis of the estimates of United States public and private spending for pollution abatement and control (PAC) prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. The concepts and definitions were designed to ensure comparability with the national economic accounts since much of the analysis of the effects of environmental programs on the economy is conducted with the aid of the accounts. The work to date has been limited to pollution associated with harmful "foreign" substances and forms of energy discharged in the course of production, distribution and consumption. The conceptual base includes evaluation of benefits, but estimates completed thus far are limited to the cost of pollution abatement and control.
Definitions are given for pollution, pollution abatement, direct pollution abatement cost, indirect pollution abatement cost and indirect benefits. A framework for the estimation and presentation of PAC expenditures is developed and the estimate of U.S. PAC expenditures for 1972 and 1973 is presented. A brief chronological summary of the BEA project is also provided.     

Environmental Degradation,Longevity, and the Dynamics of Economic Development

I construct a two-period overlapping generations model in which longevity is positively affected by public spending on health services and negatively affected by pollution. It is shown that the parameters which determine the extent of environmental degradation (i.e., emission rate and pollution abatement) may also represent additional factors affecting the dynamics of the economy, the likelihood of multiple (non-trivial) steady-state equilibria and the emergence of poverty traps. The distribution of public spending between public health care and pollution abatement that maximizes equilibrium income is also derived. This distribution of spending minimizes the threshold which the economy needs to surpass in order to avoid a poverty trap while, under certain circumstances, it can maximize equilibrium welfare as well.     

The relationship between pollution abatement costs and environmental regulation: Evidence from the Chinese industrial sector

Since the 2000s, China has been trying to strengthen emission controls in response to increasing pollution problems. However, strict implementation of emission controls generates pollution abatement costs. Using regional data for 29 provinces in the Chinese industrial sector from 1995 to 2010, this study estimated the pollution abatement costs for each province through the measurement of environmental efficiency, by applying a directional distance function approach. Moreover, using panel data analysis, this study clarified whether there is a nonlinear relationship between pollution abatement costs and environmental regulations. The empirical results are as follows. The study confirmed that the burden of abatement costs tended not only to occur in the central and western regions but also to increase in the eastern region. Moreover, the nonlinear relationship is inverted U‐shaped; thus, pollution abatement costs increase, as a negative effect of environmental regulations, until a certain inflection point, after which they decrease.     

Rethinking the optimal level of environmental quality: justifications for strict environmental policy

Traditional environmental theory suggests that the optimal level of a pollution emission occurs when the marginal damage created by the emissions is equal to the marginal cost of reducing the emissions. We argue that the benefits from reducing pollution should be much more broadly defined to include at least three other sources of benefits. First, we develop a game-theoretic model in which firms may under-invest in cost-saving ‘green technologies’. Second, we demonstrate that consideration of future damages and abatement costs leads to a lower current optimal pollution level than that obtained in traditional models. Finally, we show that ecological complexity creates indirect pathways by which greater pollution increases the likelihood of generating irreversible environmental damage. This broader definition of the benefits of pollution abatement yields an optimal level of pollution that may actually be less than the level at which conventionally-measured marginal damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. Thus, environmental policy should be stricter.     

Environmental performance and returns to pollution abatement in China

Because of China's extremely rapid economic growth, the scale and seriousness of environmental problems is no longer in doubt. Whether pollution abatement technologies are utilized more efficiently is crucial in the analysis of environmental management in China. This study analyzes how the performance of environmental management has changed over time using province level data for 1992-2003. Mixed results for environmental performance are shown using nonparametric estimation technique. We find that environmental performance index, abatement effort, and increasing returns to pollution abatement play important roles in determining the pollution level over the period of the study.     

Managing the quality of a resource with stock and flow controls

We consider a class of problems, which we call “SFQ” problems, in which both stocks and flows can be controlled to promote the quality of a valued resource, such as environmental quality or public infrastructure. Under the optimal policy, periodic restoration of the stock of quality complements positive but variable abatement of the flow of damages. When deterioration is more rapid or highly variable, or when abatement is more expensive relative to restoration, the optimal policy relies relatively more on restoration.When deterioration is due to private firms or individuals, a flow tax equal to the present value of marginal damages provides efficient incentives for abatement. This tax rises at first as quality worsens, but eventually falls as restoration nears. The revenues raised by such a tax approximates the cost of restoration, with the two quantities converging as the variance of flows goes to zero.We discuss the implications of the SFQ model for a range of real-world problems in the environmental arena, and for the management of public infrastructure. But the lessons are general, and we briefly discuss how they apply to private stocks of physical and human capital.     

On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.     

Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance

In this paper, we analyze whether it is socially desirable that fines for exceeding pollution standards depend not only on the degree of non-compliance but also on technology investment efforts by the polluting firms. For that purpose, we consider a partial equilibrium framework where a representative firm chooses the investment effort and the pollution level in response to an environmental policy composed of a pollution standard, an inspection probability and a fine for non-compliance. We find that the fine should strictly decrease with the investment effort when (i) there are administrative costs of sanctioning; (ii) the optimal policy induces non-compliance; and (iii) either the fine is sufficiently convex in the degree of non-compliance or the investment effort decreases marginal abatement costs significantly.     

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.      

Is the value of environmental goods sensitive to the public funding scheme? Evidence from a marine restoration programme in the Black Sea

In this paper, we conduct choice experiments in Turkey and Ukraine on the valuation of a marine restoration programme in the Black Sea, to examine whether the value of environmental goods is sensitive to the source of public financing. We contribute to the debate on the optimal composition of public expenditure, an issue that can be controversial in times of financial crises. We discriminate between two funding regimes through the reallocation of public spending. The first proposes financing the marine restoration programme by reducing public expenditure for investments in renewable energy, and the second by reducing public expenditure for civil servants’ training. The results reveal that the marginal value of public money depends on the funding source. Furthermore, attribute values are sensitive to the trade-off implied by the funding scheme. The magnitude of the results differs in the two countries considered, because of their heterogeneity in political and cultural dimensions.     

Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

Government Expenditure Financing in a Two‐Sector Cash‐In‐Advance Model of Endogenous Growth

We show that an expansion in the government size could be desirable from the viewpoint of the economy's long‐run growth, wherein factor intensity between the sectors, the mode of public spending financing, and the form of the cash‐in‐advance (CIA) constraint are crucial. We also show that when real balances are required only for consumption purchases, money financing is equivalent to consumption tax financing, but is not equivalent to income tax financing. If both consumption and gross investment are liquidity‐constrained, then the three financing methods are mutually not equivalent. The optimal financing scheme has the following features: (1) when the CIA constraint applies only to consumption purchases, any combination of the money growth rate and the consumption tax rate that satisfies the government budget constraint constitutes an optimal financing mix; (2) when the CIA constraint applies to both consumption and investment purchases, consumption tax financing only is optimal.     

A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill

In this paper we adopt the green goodwill argument as to why firms voluntarily invest in abatement capital. We investigate the effects on the abatement investment decision of changes in uncertainty about future green goodwill, competitor abatement investments, regulations, etc., using a real options framework. Our results indicate that increased uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for green products in the future discourage voluntary abatement investments. The model also suggests that voluntary abatement investments are promoted by an increased threat of regulation and competitor abatement investments. Furthermore, the benefit-cost ratio of the abatement investment project, at the point where it is optimal to invest, is independent of what regulatory regime (stringent or lenient) the firm operates in. We also conclude that despite the fact that voluntary abatement investment exists, there may still be room for environmental policy.     

Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant

We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and environmental damage depends on pollution stock. An increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. An increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage. Taxes dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses.     

Environmental participation in the U.S. sulfur allowance auctions

The 1990 Clean Air Act established a sulfur emissions-trading program among utilities. This was the first large scale adoption of this type of emissions-trading program and the program’s success has attracted international attention. An interesting aspect of this program is that in addition to trades among the polluting firms and brokers or investors, individuals and groups have been participants, buying allowances to retire them and reduce sulfur emissions. This provides a relatively unique way to examine the “willingness to pay” for further reductions of sulfur emissions. I examine environmental participation in the sulfur allowances market, focusing on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allowance auctions which have been conducted annually since 1993. The existence of groups purchasing these allowances in order to retire them suggests that the overall cap on sulfur emissions may be higher than the optimal emissions level. The marginal benefits from the first ton of emissions reduction appear to be significantly larger than marginal abatement costs. Total spending to retire sulfur emissions allowances, while small in relation to the total market, is sizeable in terms of the alternate purchases these groups and individuals could have made.      

Intertemporal Emission Permits Trading Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility

This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital.