Interviews with Institutional Investors: The How and Why of Active Investing

We interview professional institutional investors to learn how they choose between active and passive management, select active equity managers and construct multi-manager portfolios. We find that many of the aspects emphasized in the fund management literature, such as returns generated by the average manager and emphasis on past performance, play a relatively minor role in decisions. In contrast, judgment is found to play a central role, particularly the evaluation of people when selecting managers, the role of confidence in retaining managers, and self-perceptions about capability to identify skilled managers. Past performance is not taken at face value, but analyzed to understand underlying sources of returns. Stated reasons for preferring active management relate to whether a handful of skilled active managers can be identified and combined to generate a better expected portfolio outcome; and are only vaguely associated with the performance of the average manager.     

Herding in delegated portfolio management: When is comparative performance information desirable?

We address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory, it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return. Instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset, because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract. On the other hand, herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically, resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that herding occurs, when the cost of information is high, information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse. Moreover, when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager's performance, they will not do so.     

Attribution of hedge fund returns using a Kalman filter

Hedge funds offer attractive investment possibilities because they engage in investment styles and opportunity sets which – because they are different from traditional asset class funds – generate different risk exposures. Conventional wisdom holds that hedge funds add value and provide unique investment opportunities because of their ability to invest in disparate risk exposures, and via the manager’s skill in selecting stocks and timing the market. In this article, a Kalman filter is used to decompose the time series of hedge fund returns into market timing and stock selection factors to establish whether fund managers really do generate statistically significant abnormal profits. Compelling evidence supports an alternative interpretation for the market timing return constituent. This work represents the first time the Kalman filter has been used to extract a time series of the capital asset pricing model’s dynamic variables for determining return component magnitudes.     

Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality

The author argues that increased foreign competition can affect technical choice and skill differentials even when actual imports do not rise significantly. A model is presented of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) in which a reduction in import barriers (whether technological or policy–imposed) encourages more strategic investment by incumbent firms. The predictions accord with many of the stylized facts: higher skill premia; higher ratios of skilled to unskilled workers employed in all sectors and throughout the economy; little change in import volumes or prices; and rapid technological progress with rather little change in total factor productivity.     

不同职业路径下基金经理变更对基金业绩的影响

本文对2003—2013年基金经理更换事件采用事件分析和面板数据回归进行研究。研究发现基金经理更换后基金业绩得到显著提升,此结论在牛市更显著。当基金历史业绩较好时更换基金经理对业绩没有影响;而当历史业绩较差时更换基金经理则会显著提升业绩。从职业发展路径来看,基金管理经验能有效提升基金经理的投资能力;之前具备资管经验的继任基金经理能够显著提高业绩;并且管理经验来自同一基金公司的继任基金经理更能改善业绩。     

Take a risk: Preferring prevention over control of biological invaders

Scientists have argued that invasive species can be managed most cost effectively with greater investments in prevention. Further, under ideas like the precautionary principle it is reasonable to expect that a cautious manager would use more prevention relative to control because it keeps more invaders out. Yet, this is not typically done. In many cases, private and public resources are invested primarily to control existing invaders rather than to prevent new invasions. Managers frequently wait until after invaders have arrived and then scramble to limit the damages. We believe these paradoxical decisions can be understood by recognizing the link between typical human preferences for risk bearing and the technology of risk reduction. We demonstrate quantitatively how managers perceived to be cautious or averse to risk tend to shy away from prevention relative to control. This counterintuitive result arises because control is a safer choice than prevention because its productivity is relatively less risky: it works to remove existing invaders from the system. In contrast, the productivity of prevention is more uncertain because prevention only reduces the chance of invasion, it does not eliminate it, and invasion may not occur even in the absence of prevention. Managers' averse to risk will inherently avoid as much uncertainty as possible, whether the source of uncertainty regards ecological outcomes or economic productivity. Implications for environmental decision making are clear. In invasive species management, if managers act as though they are risk averse, their caution can backfire when it leads to more control rather than prevention. The social consequences of this choice are a greater probability of future invasions and lower social welfare. Our results suggest that social welfare is highest when managers were willing to “take a risk” with prevention.     

An analysis of the demand for skill in a growing economy

We construct a trade theoretic model of skill formation with skill as a produced intermediate input. Capital is required for production as well as for education which transforms unskilled labor into skilled. We use this model to reflect analytically on India's rising requirement of skilled manpower. We show that even if growth of capital and supply of skilled manpower match, relative stagnation of unskilled manufacturing sector will magnify the gap between growth in demand and supply of skill. This may happen, for example, if there is a vast pool of workforce who may not have even the basic education to qualify as “unskilled” and excessive capital flows into the skilled sector. Thus a country with lack of education at a very basic level will be forced to import skilled manpower from the rest of the world.     

考虑基准资产的动态投资组合选取

职业基金经理的目标经常是希望自己的投资组合以稳定的表现能够超越所某一基准资产或组合。因此本文给出一个考虑基准资产的动态均值——方差投资组合选取模型。假设状态之间的转移遵循马氏过程,给定状态转移矩阵,可以得到对风险资产最优投入的解析表达式。此表达式表明对风险资产的投入由三项构成,前两项是不考虑基准资产时对风险资产的投入,最后一项与基准资产有关;在基准资产上的权重由基准资产收益的大小来决定,与积极投资组合管理者的风险厌恶程度无关;随着风险厌恶程度的增加,管理者会减少在风险资产上的投入。数值分析显示考虑基准资产的投资组合是一个积极的投资组合。     

The effects of imperfect auditing on managerial compensation

We study the optimal shareholder–manager contract having the property to induce the manager to exert high effort and truthfully reveal firm performance. This contract design problem is solved under the assumption of imperfect auditing, either because of mistakes or because of collusion between managers and auditors. The imperfection of the audit technology is costless up to a threshold, beyond which it causes a distortion in the incentive compatible contract or even prevents its existence. This result may help explain the observed decline in the use of stock options, tracing it back to an unfocused activity or poor performance of auditors.     

Luck versus skill over time: time-varying performance in the cross-section of mutual fund returns

ABSTRACT

Using returns histories spanning January 1984 to October 2014 of 5785 actively managed US closed-end equity mutual funds, we address the ‘thorny problems’ highlighted by Fama and French (The Journal of Finance, 2010, vol. 65, p. 1925) that arise due to their resampling procedure. This prevents them from capturing time variation in the parameters of equilibrium asset pricing models. These problems are addressed by combining innovative procedures which allow for testing of multiple break dates on fund-specific parameters along with cross-section bootstraps that remain valid in the presence of time-varying parameters. We find that substantial proportion – 8% – of the estimated versions of the asset pricing model have significant changes in their parameters. The effects of this time variation on the cross-section distribution of the risk-adjusted performance measure are significant and substantially increase centiles of the right tail of this distribution when compared to those produced without time-varying parameters. Our evidence regarding the lack of actively managed US equity mutual funds that generate excess returns is significantly weaker than those of Fama and French but our results do not overturn their pessimistic conclusion regarding the lack of skilled managers. We do find, unlike Fama and French, that managers generating negative returns are just unlucky but have no skill.     

业绩排名、市场状态与基金经理的风险调整行为:“争名”还是“逐利”?

业绩锦标机制下,不同的市场状态会影响基金经理的风险调整行为。薪酬激励与职业忧虑会使得基金经理在风险调整时做出不同的选择。本文以2006年至2010年间的开放式基金作为研究样本,利用基金中报与年报所公布的投资组合明细,分析基金业绩排名对于基金经理风险选择行为的影响,研究发现:牛市状态下薪酬激励占据了主导地位,促使基金经理在上半年业绩排名较低的情况下在下半年增加投资组合的风险以谋取最大化薪酬;职业忧虑则会使业绩排名产生的影响在熊市下正好相反。此外,研究还发现,市场年中收益越高即市场的表现"越牛",排名较低的基金经理相对于排名较高基金经理提升其投资组合风险的表现也越明显。     

PERFORMANCE‐BASED FEE CONTRACT AND RISK‐TAKING STRATEGY IN ASSET MANAGEMENT TOURNAMENT

This paper investigates how performance‐based fee (PBF) contracts affect strategic risk‐taking behaviours of fund managers in an asset management tournament. In the perfect equilibrium, managers with better mid‐year performance will hold the risky asset with a higher probability in the remaining of the year, compared to managers with poorer mid‐year performance. If the volume of the cash flow into the winner fund is contingent on its level of success, the winning fund will take a more aggressive approach. When the PBF contract pays more heed to relative performance against the benchmark, managers are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies.     

The Strategic Choice Of Managers And Managerial Discretion

Managerial discretion is likely to be beneficial to shareholders because of strategic cross-effects in an oligopoly. In certain circumstances, shareholders deliberately retain managerial discretion in equilibrium even when the reduction of managerial discretion is cost free. It is found that the positive effect of managerial discretion on profits can only be created by power-building (shirking) managers if quantity (price) competition prevails in the market. Consequently, the dominant strategy for the owners of a quantity- (price-) competing company is to employ a power-building (shirking) manager. The strategic effect of such a match between the type of manager and the form of competition exists for all managerial decisions as far as firms interact with each other.     

Implications of manager replacement: evidence from the Spanish mutual fund industry

We analyse the financial consequences of manager replacement in a sample that includes all domestic and European equity funds in Spain. Specifically, we examine a total of 104 funds of the sample that experience manager turnover over the period 1999–2009. We find that underperforming funds in the pre-replacement period experience a significant improvement in the excess returns and performance after the manager change, an improvement that lasts over time for domestic equity funds. The analysis of the risk profile indicates that funds experiencing a manager change do not show significantly different levels of risk before the replacement dates although they tend to show an increase in the level of total risk after the change. Finally, the pool-regression analysis of the investment flows confirms that manager changes tend to impact negatively on subsequent flows of those funds with manager turnover.     

EVA:国有资产保值增值的新概念

在我国国有资产监督管理体系的构建中，确立科学的国有资产保值增值指标和有效的国有资产经营者激动机制是两项基础性工作。本文引入EVA（经济增加值）概念，认为基于EVA建立国有资产保值增值指标，更能真实地反映国有资产的经营业绩；根据EVA思想设计经营者激励机制，对解决国有资产委托——代理问题更有实质性意义。     

Informed trade,uninformed trade and stock price delay

The probability of informed trading (PIN), a measure of information-based trading risk, has been broadly applied to empirical studies on asset pricing. However, it is still controversial whether PIN measures exclusively the risk of firm-specific private information or it also captures the private interpretation of market wide public information. This article examines the relevance of PIN to the delayed response of stock prices to market-wide information. We find that PIN significantly explains individual stock price delay even controlling for size, liquidity and risk, and low-PIN stock prices adjust to market information more rapidly not only because of a notably high level of informed trading but also an even much higher level of uninformed trading. Our findings support the notion that PIN also captures the private skilled interpretation of public common factor information by sophisticated investors, and provide new empirical evidence on how information-based trading affects the speed at which stock prices adjust to information.     

Relative Demand for Skills in Swedish Manufacturing: Technology or Trade?

The rate of change in the share of skilled labor has increased steadily over the past 35 years in Swedish manufacturing. A closer inspection of the period after 1970 indicates that, while relative supply changes of skilled labor seem to have been the main driving force behind the growing skill shares in manufacturing industries over the period 1970–85, an acceleration in the relative demand for skills appears to have propelled higher skill shares during the late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. Consistent with such a development is the finding of an increasing degree of complementarity between knowledge capital and skilled labor, and that Swedish manufacturing firms, in recent years, have invested heavily in R&D. There is also some support for the belief that intensified competition from the South has increased the relative demand for skilled labor. However, the impact appears to be small and essentially driven by the textile industry.     

Labor matching behavior and trade adjustment

This paper develops a model of costly trade and team production to examine the matching behavior of skilled workers in an open economy. Trade liberalization changes the supply of skilled production teams available for hire, even when firm production techniques remain fixed. As trade barriers fall, some workers choose to quit small firms in order to accept less skill intensive jobs at large firms that participate in foreign markets. Changes in worker matching behavior can explain several stylized features of firm-level adjustments to trade, with effects that are not limited to firms on the margin of exit or exporting. Trade is shown to rationalize the matching behavior of workers, leading to aggregate gains in productivity and lower prices. Openness benefits workers employed at exporting firms, however the likelihood of gaining from trade is not necessarily increasing in skill. Wages in the open economy are tied to both worker skill and job type.     

The impact of management incentives in intergroup contests

In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment. The results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only. However, group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures.     

管理者政治关联、制度环境与企业绩效间关系的实证研究

以2008—2013年中国沪深两市的上市公司为研究样本,采用最小二乘法实证检验了管理者政治关联对企业绩效的影响,探讨了不同层面的政治关联对企业绩效影响的差异,揭示了管理者的政治关联在制度环境不完善时的替代效应。研究结果表明:管理者有政治关联会显著提高企业绩效;中央级政治关联对企业绩效的推动作用显著大于省市县级政治关联;管理者政治关联是一个有效的制度外替代机制,制度环境不完善地区的企业管理者拥有政治关联可有效提高企业绩效。