Globalization of labor markets and macroeconomic equilibrium

It is shown that under all-round ‘atomistic’ behavior, international mobility of labor has a beneficial effect on national employment levels but an adverse effect on consumer-price-indices (CPIs) inflation rates. Accordingly, whether or not policymakers in individual countries will be prepared to welcome on macroeconomic grounds the increasing globalization of the labor markets will depend on how they evaluate lower unemployment relative to lower CPI inflation. On the other hand, mobility of labor has an overall positive effect on the wage-setters' position, implying that, contrary to the findings of much of the international-trade literature, an increasing globalization of labor markets would be welcome by unions. It is also shown that with globalization both of the labor markets and of the wage-setting processes, atomistic behavior by monetary policymakers may well lead to both high unemployment and high inflation. Indeed, we find that in such a situation, the best option for monetary policymakers is also to cooperate. Given the recent tendency for a greater globalization of the labor markets in the OECD both in terms of labor mobility and in the sphere of wage setting, this result provides support for more monetary co-operation among the industrialized countries. Finally, with international mobility of labor, inter-union co-operation coupled with inter-government co-operation may prove to be preferable even relative to all-round nonco-operative play.     

Admission standards,student effort,and the creation of skilled jobs

We consider the implications of expanding enrollment through lower standards in a model with human capital externalities and a market failure. Workers and firms make uncoordinated investment choices prior to random matching. Investment choices depend on the expected productivity of the counterpart in production. The setting generates a potential human capital externality as a more skilled labor force induces more skilled job openings. Exploiting the externality is complicated by a market failure which may cause some workers to earn a degree but not put forth the effort required to become highly skilled. We show that beyond a threshold, increased enrollment through low standards can be poor policy. Policies which increase returns to agents and firms in best matches can improve outcomes.     

Precautionary savings or working longer hours?

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic implications of the lack of insurance against idiosyncratic labor market risk. I show that in a model economy calibrated to observed individual level data, households make ample use of work effort as a consumption smoothing mechanism. As a consequence, aggregate consumption is 0.6% lower, work effort is 18% higher and labor productivity is 12% lower than they would be in a complete markets setting. Not surprisingly, the welfare benefits of moving towards complete markets are very large. Accounting for the whole transition to the new complete markets steady state I find the welfare costs of market incompleteness above 16% of individual lifetime consumption.     

Core Labor Standards and Competitiveness: Implications for Global Trade Policy

One of the principal arguments for inclusion of core labor standards in the WTO is that weak labor standards provide an illegitimate boost to competitiveness and may result in a "race to the bottom" in labor standards worldwide. This paper shows that, if the violation of labor standards results from discrimination against particular workers in export industries, employment, output, and competitiveness will be reduced since employment is determined by the short side of the market. If the problems arise from abuse of market power by employers, competitiveness will be similarly reduced. Only if freedom of association and collective bargaining were intended to allow workers in some sectors to restrict output and drive up wages would the absence of these standards raise competitiveness. However, if product markets are competitive, it is likely that association rights would increase output and competitiveness by raising productivity. The competitiveness argument seems either to reflect analytical confusion or to represent a cover for protectionist interests.     

就业再选择与劳动力市场效率

本文认为就业再选择是劳动力市场的基本特征。通过就业再选择使企业内部劳动力市场与外部劳动力市场连接在一起而成为一个整体。劳动者进行就业再选择的频度和难易程度,决定企业内外劳动力市场一体化的程度和劳动力市场的效率水平。因此,企业的人力资源管理,则必须摆脱“员工属于组织”的传统观念,以员工的就业再选择为出发点,并且,促进劳动者进行就业再选择才是建立健全劳动力市场机制的根本途径。     

The stationary wealth distribution under progressive taxation

This paper considers the long-run distribution of capital holdings in a model with complete asset markets and progressive taxation. Households are assumed to be heterogeneous in their labor market productivity. We show that this model is capable of producing a nondegenerate determinate wealth distribution. However, it also predicts that capital and labor income will be negatively correlated. These results are robust to the introduction of elastic labor supply and borrowing constraints.     

How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?

This paper explores how European Monetary Union will change the wage setting behavior of national labor unions. We derive the impact of national inflation aversion and labor militancy on the performance of national labor markets under different monetary arrangements. A common central bank raises inflation and unemployment if it acts as conservatively as national central banks. However, unemployment falls in countries that previously tied their monetary policy to the Bundesbank. We also examine the composition of EMU and the influence of national labor market legislation.
JEL Classification : E 24; F 02; F 33     

Do international labor standards contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem?

In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child-labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child-labor in developing countries and thereby improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child-labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child-labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child-labor.     

Mortality risks,education and child labor

In this paper, we investigate the role of young adult mortality on child labor and educational decisions. We argue that mortality risks are a major source of risks in returns to education in developing countries. We show that, in the absence of appropriate insurance mechanisms, the level of child labor is inefficient, but it can be too high or too low. It is too high when parents are not very altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children in the future. Uncertain returns to education, endogenous mortality or imperfect capital markets unambiguously increase child labor. When the level of child labor is inefficiently high, we also show that a cash transfer conditional on child's schooling can always restore efficiency regarding child labor.     

Capital specificity,imperfect labor mobility and growth in developing economies

Labor markets in developing economies may be afflicted by a multiplicity of interacting distortions. We consider a general equilibrium model of an economy distorted by both sector-specific sticky wages and imperfect mobility of labor. In this framework, we contrast the implications of capital accumulation in the short and long run. We show that, in contrast to both the case in the absence of a sector-specific sticky wage and the case in the absence of imperfect labor mobility, the short and long-run effects of growth on the economic system converge as the degree of labor mobility is limited.     

Moving toward markets? Labor allocation in rural China

China's economic reforms have brought rapid growth in rural off-farm employment, raising questions about the assumption that rural China is labor surplus and has poorly functioning factor markets. We investigate this by testing for separability between household labor demand and supply using panel data. We find that separability is rejected overall, indicating that factor markets remain underdeveloped. Nonseparability, however, is associated with labor surplus in some areas and labor shortage in others. Moreover, separability holds where substantial employment opportunities exist in the wider township, suggesting that such employment promotes competitive allocation within villages as well as the inter-village movement of resources.     

The effects of tax reform on labor supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when analyzing how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue and the welfare cost of taxation. Our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of taxpayer response.     

Why should Southern economies stay in the Euro Zone? The role of labor markets

We assume a world of two countries in a fixed exchange rate system. These countries differ in the features of their labor markets. The home country is characterized by a dual labor market, with formal and informal sectors. In the foreign country, a nominal wage rigidity exists. In this context, the situation of the labor markets in each country is not optimal owing to a misallocation of workers between sectors in the domestic economy and unemployment in the foreign economy. We show that a devaluation of domestic currency implies a fall in production in each country and deterioration of labor markets in both countries.     

Taxation,insurance, and precautionary labor

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In a previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance. We show, however, that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets. Whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance, it also causes welfare-reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue. In addition, adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance. We illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market. Notably, we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives.     

The Male-Female Pay Gap Driven by Coupling between Labor Markets and Mating Markets

Synopsis Males often get paid more than females for the same work. This male-female pay gap has been observed throughout the world over many years. The most commonly cited explanations focus on gender oppression and workplace discrimination. We agree that discrimination contributes significantly to the pay gap; however, other factors may play important roles in how the sexes compete in the labor market. We use observations from psychology and concepts from biology to show how aspects of mate choice may influence labor markets. With a mathematical model, we analyze how mating preferences for partner wages affect the differences in wages between males and females, and in turn how wage differences affect mating preferences. If some extrinsic force, such as discrimination, creates an initial bias in wages, then coupled feedback between mating preferences and wages creates and maintains excess mating preference and wage biases. This model demonstrates how coupling between labor markets and mating markets can lead to outcomes that do not occur when analyzing either market in isolation from the other.     

Labor market integration policies and the convergence of regions: the role of skills and technology diffusion

We study the role of different labor market integration policies on economic performance and convergence of two distinct regions in an agent-based model. Production is characterized by a complementarity between the quality of the capital stock and the specific skills of workers using the capital stock. Hence, productivity changes in a region are influenced both by the investment of local firms in high quality capital goods and by the evolution of the specific skill distribution of workers employed in the region. We show that various labor market integration policies yield, via differing regional worker flows, to distinct regional distributions of specific skills. Through this mechanism, relative regional prices are affected, determining the shares that the regions can capture from overall consumption good demand. There occurs a trade-off between aggregate output and convergence of regions with closed labor markets resulting in relatively high convergence but low output, and more integrated labor markets yielding higher output but lower convergence. Furthermore, results differ substantially in several respects as distinct labor market opening policies are applied.     

Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes

Many countries use centralized exit exams as a governance devise of the school system. While abundant evidence suggests positive effects of central exams on achievement tests, previous research on university-bound students shows no effects on subsequent earnings. We suggest that labor-market effects may be more imminent for students leaving school directly for the labor market and, on rigid labor markets, for unemployment. Exploiting variation in exit-exam systems across German states, we find that central exams are indeed associated with higher earnings for students from the school type directly bound for the labor market, as well as with lower unemployment.     

Investment Crowding‐Out and Labor Market Effects of Financialization in the US

This paper studies the impact of financialization on unemployment in the United States. We estimate a dynamic multi‐equation macro labor model including labor demand, labor suppy, wage‐setting, and capital accumulation equations. Financialization appears as a key determinant of capital accumulation which, in turn, is the transmission channel toward its unemployment effects. We conduct a series of counterfactual simulations where we quantify the macroeconomic consequences of the recent swings experienced by the financialization process. We find that it has had relevant unemployment effects in all periods considered, even in those where financial payments were not the main driver of capital accumulation. We also identify a structural change in the financialization process in the early 1980s, and find that it has caused USA unemployment to systematically fluctuate around 2 percentage points above what it would otherwise have done. We call for a reappraisal of the way financial markets work, and stress the vital need of preventing financial devices that result in productive investment crowding‐out.     

Product Market Integration,Rents and Wage Inequality

Globalization in the form of product market integration affects labor markets and produces winners and losers. While there are aggregate gains, it is in general ambiguous how inequality is affected. We explore this issue in a Ricardian model and show that it depends on the balance between “protection” and “specialization” rents. In particular, wage inequality among similar workers (residual wage inequality) may be U ‐shaped, at first decreasing and then increasing in the process of product market integration. Consequently, there may be gains in both the efficiency and the equity dimension until integration reaches a certain level at which a trade‐off arises.     

THE PRICING OF JOB CHARACTERISTICS WHEN MARKETS DO NOT CLEAR: THEORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*

This article examines nonsequential search when jobs vary with respect to nonpecuniary characteristics. In the presence of frictions in the labor market, the equilibrium job distribution need not show evidence of compensating wage differentials. The model also generates several pervasive features of labor markets: unemployment and vacancies, apparent discrimination, and market segmentation. When workers are homogeneous, restrictions on the range of job offers decrease welfare and cannot reduce unemployment. However, when workers have heterogeneous preferences, such restrictions may lower unemployment, and can even lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare. We consider the impact of policies banning discrimination and regulating working conditions.